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‘If you know your history 
Then you would know where you coming from 
Then you wouldn't have to ask me 
Who the heck do I think I am 
… 
I'm just a Buffalo Soldier 
In the heart of America’ 









‘Land is power, so gimme forty acres 
Let's see how far I can take ya’ 







1. Introduction  




In her 1938 memoirs, Mrs. R. H. Coombs recalled her father saying that “the worst of the war 
was afterwards.”1 This succinctly captures the popular perception of the period, which held 
sway over the American imagination for nearly a century. This narrative reflected the 
Southern whites’ experience of the era, a point of view which they had actively promoted 
both during and after Reconstruction. In July of 1877, for instance, a Mr. Voligny, who had 
fought for the Confederacy, but fled to Paris befor the war’s end, wrote his former army-
buddy John C. Moncure, a prominent Shreveport lawyer and politician, of his hope that  
the time has come for bringing before the world this long array of political crimes 
against which unfortunately no redress is to be had. Could not some of the disgraceful 
facts, of which there are too many, be collected into a book duly certified to by 
unimpeachable men and published without any remark upon them – a list of horrors 
and of the villainies of the late administration – a charge to a universal jury, composed 
of men with upright consciences. I believe such a publication, translated into all 
languages, would carry weight with it, and I do notknow of any one better qualified 
to undertake this task with reference to the state of [Louisiana] than yourself. It were 
only just that Grant and his army of carpet-baggers should be exposed before the 
world.2  
 Although historians have since discredited the idea that Reconstruction subjected 
Southern whites to ‘horrors and ‘villainies,’ the fact remains that in the former Confederacy 
the end of the Civil War by no means meant an end to violence and disorder. Instead, it meant 
Reconstruction. For over a decade following the close of the Civil War, the national 
government committed itself, at least in theory, to providing greater political and civil 
equality for the recently emancipated black population of the South. The vast majority of 
Southern whites fiercely resisted this attempt to curtail the political, economic, and racial 
dominance they took for granted, presenting the fedral government with challenges similar to 
those faced by a foreign army of occupation.  
 Conservative whites, particularly in black-majority states such a Louisiana, regularly 
resorted to political terrorism in their struggle to reclaim political, economic, and racial 
                                                 
1 ‘Mrs. R. H. Coombs Memoirs, 1860 – 1870, [p. 6],’ Archives and Special Collections, Noel Memorial Library, 
Louisiana State University at Shreveport.  
2 ‘July 2, 1877, Paris, Voligny to Moncure,’ J. Fair Hardin Collection, Mss.1014, LLMVC [Hereinafter: Hardin 
Collection], folder 9:45. 
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control over their communities under the banner of white supremacy. In the end, such 
violence thwarted attempts to substantially reform the racial hierarchy in the South. It did so 
in two related, but distinct ways. On the one hand, it undermined, and eventually destroyed, 
the organizational capacity of the local and state Republican Party, as its leadership either fled 
to safer areas, gave up on enforcing racial equality, or else suffered the often lethal 
consequences of standing firm. On the other hand, political violence served to increase the 
material, political, and ideological costs to the federal government involved in enforcing civil 
and political equality for the freedpeople. Soon these costs rose beyond the point that 
Northern politicians - and the electorate they depended on - were willing to sustain. 
 Historians have only recently begun to systematically study the strategies and 
mechanisms that structured Southern whites’ violent opposition to Reconstruction and 
contributed to their ultimate success in reclaiming control of the South.3 Taking the Red River 
Valley in northwestern Louisiana as a case study, this research expands on these efforts.4 I  
seeks to elucidate and analyze the patterns of interaction between, on the one hand, 
conservative whites’ political terrorism, and, on the other hand, the local Republican 
leadership of both races, the freedpeople on whose v tes they depended, and the agents of the 
federal government. Understanding these mechanisms can help us answer the crucial question 
of not only why, but also how Reconstruction failed in the kind of rural environment that 
characterized most of the South. It particularly clarifies the role that political violence played 
in undermining Reconstruction’s viability, as well as the closely intertwined question of why 
local, state, and federal authorities, failed to come up with an adequate response to this 
terrorist challenge, thus creating an atmosphere of impunity that allowed such violence to 
further flourish. Why, particularly, did the federal government, which, after all, had just 
emerged victorious from the far greater military challenge of the Civil War, fail to find an 
                                                 
3 Michael Perman first drew the outlines of these mechanisms as early as 1991, but only in recent studies of New 
Orleans and North and South Carolina have historians begun the work of fleshing them out: Michael Perman, 
“Counter Reconstruction : The Role of Violence in Southern Redemption,” in The Facts of Reconstruction : 
Essays in Honor of John Hope Franklin, ed. Eric Anderson and Alfred A. Moss Jr. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1991), 121–40; James K. Hogue, Uncivil War : Five New Orleans Street Battles And the 
Rise And Fall of Radical Reconstruction (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006); Mark L 
Bradley, Bluecoats and Tar Heels: Soldiers and Civilians in Reconstruction North Carolina (Lexington: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 2009); Richard Zuczek, State of Rebellion : Reconstruction in South Carolina 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2009); Carole Emberton, Beyond Redemption: Race, Violence, 
and the American South after the Civil War (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2013). 
4 The geographic scope of this research extends to the pre-Civil War parishes bordering on the Red River as well 
as those created during Reconstruction: Bienville, Bossier, Caddo, DeSoto, Grant, Natchitoches, Rapides, R d 
River, and Winn. 
1. Introduction  
 17  
 
adequate response when white Southerners challenged its attempt to impose greater racial 
equality upon the defeated South?  
The answer to these questions, moreover, suggests that Reconstruction’s failure was 
not the more-or-less inevitable consequence of the essentially conservative nature of the 
national Reconstruction project, as many nationally oriented historians since at least the 1970s 
have implied.5 This study, by contrast, argues that even the limited program enacted by 
lawmakers might have achieved far more, had the fedral government enforced its provisions 
vigorously when faced with extra-legal, often violent resistance by Southern whites. 
Reconstruction represented not so much a ‘Compromise of Principle,’ as an all-out 
capitulation in the face of terrorism.  
The federal government possessed the requisite power t  guarantee civil and political 
equality for the freedpeople, although doing so would have required the long-term garrisoning 
of the South. Such a permanent military presence could have provided the necessary security 
and stability for the nascent Republican Party to establish its viability and for the freedpeople 
to acquire the educational and economic resources necessary to effectively claim the rights of 
citizenship that the national government had granted th m on paper. However, over the course 
of Reconstruction Southern whites’ resistance becam increasingly effective in thwarting such 
a policy. Instead of widespread violence and night-riding, a strategy that quickly provoked 
Northern outrage and a subsequent federal response, white militants increasingly used 
targeted violence and intimidation to erode the organizational viability and perceived 
legitimacy of the Republican Party. Southern Republicans’ dependence on the federal 
government, meanwhile, further undermined their legitimacy, not just in the eyes of 
conservative Southern whites, but also increasingly in the eyes of the northern public and the 
politicians they elected. Federal institutions, meanwhile, whether the army, the Freedmen’s 
Bureau, or the Department of Justice, consistently lacked both the resources and the mandate 
to deter the terrorist challenge to their authority. 
 The contingent nature of Reconstruction’s failure is further highlighted by the 
potential for alternative outcomes. Besides exploring the ultimately successful strategy of 
Southern whites, this study also asks how, and to what extent, local Republicans and federal 
                                                 
5 This argument was initially developed by (among others) Michael Les Benedict, A Compromise of Principle : 
Congressional Republicans and Reconstruction, 1863-1869 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1974); and 
William Gillette, Retreat from Reconstruction, 1869-1879 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1979). A similar argument has most recently been put forward by Mark Wahlgren Summers, The Ordeal of the 
Reunion: A New History of Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014). 
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officials achieved intermittent – and short-lived – successes in implementing civil and 
political equality for the freedpeople, even in one of the most violent regions of the South. 
Much of this success came during a few brief years in the early 1870s, after the Ku-Klux Klan 
and the Knights of the White Camellia had collapsed, but before the White League made its 
appearance. In this period, political violence against blacks and white Republicans briefly 
abated and Republicans held reasonably firm control over much of the local government 
along the Red River. Republicans overwhelmingly won the local elections in 1870, as blacks 
voted relatively unmolested.  
 Local military commanders also achieved some success, as we will see, when they 
used their discretion to forcefully prosecute the most militant and violent elements among the 
white population. Such local commanders, even with small numbers of troops, succeeded in 
securing a measure of peace and good order in the vicinity where they were stationed. In the 
long run, however, these proactive military officers received neither the manpower nor the 
mandate they required to consistently pursue such a forceful policy, eventually leaving those 
most sincerely committed to the ideals of Reconstruction frustrated, disillusioned, and bitter. 
Nevertheless, such local achievements, however limited, provide a crucial counterpoint to the 
narrative of violent resistance, and remind us thatReconstruction’s failure was not a historic 
inevitability, but the result of the federal government’s refusal to commit the resources 
necessary to resist the well-orchestrated campaign of political violence.  
 
Which Reconstruction’s Failure? 
Following the Civil War, disagreement abounded, both in the North and in the South, as to the 
contours of the new political, economic, and social order of the nation, and particularly the 
position of the freedpeople within that order. What, is short, was Reconstruction to entail? 
The vast majority of white Southerners, as well as a ignificant number of Northerners, 
desired a speedy restoration of the Union and reconciliation of the sections to ensure political 
stability and economic prosperity. This ‘conservatie program of Reconstruction’ presumed a 
rapid restoration civil government in the Southern states, granting those states their traditional 
political autonomy, and restoring the white population to their full political rights. Those who 
preferred a ‘radical program of Reconstruction,’ advocated sweeping reforms of the South’s 
political, economic, and social institutions in the interest of greater racial equality.6 They 
                                                 
6 These ‘programs’ are analytical concepts distinct from the historic policies and events of either Presid ntial or 
Congressional Reconstruction. Throughout the text, the terms ‘radical Reconstruction’ and ‘Reconstruction’ 
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advocated enfranchisement of the former slaves, equal educational opportunities, and even 
land-redistribution. Since such policies would inevitably be resisted by the white population 
of the Southern states, such a program implied a long-term commitment to federal supervision 
of, and intervention in these states, going well beyond the traditionally established role of the 
national government. 
 This fundamental disagreement as to the ultimate purpose of Reconstruction 
contributed to the contentious nature of politics in Louisiana, and throughout the South, 
between 1865 and 1877. The vast majority of Southern whites never accepted the inclusion of 
blacks in the body politic, and persistently contested the legitimacy of Southern Republican 
regimes that depended on the votes of recently freed slaves. As a result, electoral politics 
became little more than a tactical tool in a wider contest over the very constitutional 
boundaries within which such partisan competition was to take place. When the democratic 
process threatened to yield undesirable results, Southern whites proved more than willing to 
pursue their goals by extra-legal, often violent, means.7  
  As we shall see, white terrorism in the South, was in part an effort to undermine the 
Northern commitment to a radical program of Reconstruction. Where local Republican 
leaders and federal officials offered a robust respon e, white militancy quickly subsided and 
blacks could participate in the political process. However, any possibility of success, even in 
areas with an African-American majority, would have required a long term commitment by 
the federal government to guarantee the rule of law and the political rights of the freedpeople 
in the face of white opposition. This was a reality which many Republicans, even professed 
Radicals, refused to acknowledge. In response, Southern whites developed a strategy of 
escalating violence and terror to which local government was ultimately unable and the 
federal government unwilling to resist.  As a result, from 1872 onwards Northern 
politicians and public opinion became increasingly disillusioned with the radical program of 
Reconstruction, and instead chose to pursue a policy f onciliation aimed at reincorporating 
the Southern states in the national union. By 1877 federal troops had returned to their barracks, 
and the South was well on the road to restoring white supremacy, although it would be 
                                                                                                                                              
 
refer to policies and political programs aimed at implementing racial equality in the South. When capitalized, 
‘Radical’ refers to politicians generally understood to belong to the Radical wing of the national Republican 
party. I reserve the term Congressional Reconstruction for the brief period between March 1867 and July 1868 
when Louisiana fell under direct military supervision as part of the Fifth Military District. The conservative 
program, first implemented under Johnson in the immediate postwar years is referred to as restoration. 
7 Hogue, Uncivil War, 7. 
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decades before Southern whites fully and legally abrogated the reforms of Reconstruction, 
ushering in the era of Jim Crow.8 Various factors contributed to Northern disillusionment with 
pursuing a more radical course of Reconstruction in the face of Southern intransigence. These 
included fundamental constitutional and legal objections to an enlarged national government, 
Northern racial prejudices and discomfort with black enfranchisement, and practical 
objections to the economic costs of a continued federal presence - especially after the 
financial panic of 1873.9  
 Beyond such ideological and economical motives, Northerners came to see a more 
conciliatory and conservative approach to Reconstruction as the only course by which to 
preserve the Union. As Gregory P. Downs persuasively argues, it was not as obvious to 
contemporaries as it has since appeared to historians that “the end of the Civil War meant the 
end of all civil wars in the United States.” The contested elections of 1876 in particular, which 
effectively resulted in the permanent abandonment of the radical program of Reconstruction, 
“raised the prospect that regional fragility would spread to the center, creating a two 
government problem in Washington D.C.”10 Although the radical program of Reconstruction 
was abandoned, Reconstruction did not fail per se from contemporaries’ point of view. As 
Mark Wahlgren Summers has argued, we ought not to assume  
that most Americans saw the main purpose of Reconstruction as a second American 
revolution at all. In that sense, it would indeed prove a failure [..] But in another quite 
conservative sense [..] Reconstruction had not failed at all. Its goal was to assure that 
the main purpose of the war would be fulfilled - of a Union held intact forever: of a 
North and South able to work together, a Union free of slavery, where sectional 
rivalries would not burst out in internecine war or in vaunting appeals to state 
sovereignty, backed by armed force.11  
                                                 
8 J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics : Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-
Party South, 1880-1910 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of 
Jim Crow (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974). 
9 On Northern complicity in the failure of radical Reconstruction and its causes see among others: C. Vann 
Woodward, “The Political Legacy of Reconstruction,” The Journal of Negro Education 26, no. 3 (1957): 231–40; 
Michael Les Benedict, The Fruits of Victory : Alternatives in Restoring the Union: 1865 - 1877 (Lanham: 
University Press of America, 1986); William Gillett, Retreat from Reconstruction, 1869-1879 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1979), chap. 15; Eric Foner, Reconstruction : America’s Unfinished Revolution, 
1863-1877 (New York: Perennial Classics, 2002), chap. 11. 
10 Gregory P. Downs, “The Mexicanization of American Politics: The United States’ Transnational Path from 
Civil War to Stabilization,” The American Historical Review 117, no. 2 (April 1, 2012): 388, 390, 396. 
11 Mark Wahlgren Summers, A Dangerous Stir : Fear, Paranoia, and the Making of Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 270. C. Vann Woodward has put forward a more Marxian version of 
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This, however, was the result of a political choice, not an inevitability. In the face of 
persistent Southern violence, the federal government and the Republican Party sacrificed 
racial equality in the South, in return for political reunion, stability, and, finally, presidential 
victory in 1876. 
 
From Morality Play to Moral Ambiguity: The Historiography of Reconstruction 
Only in recent years, have historians of Reconstruction begun to unravel the complex 
dynamics which drove political, economic, and social developments in this turbulent period of 
American history. Such an approach, which would hardly merit comment in many other areas 
of history, has not always prevailed in Reconstruction scholarship. For most of the twentieth 
century, in fact, both conservative and Revisionist h orians rehashed the partisan struggles 
of the era, rather than dispassionately analyze them. Both presented the era as a morality play, 
although the roles of heroes and villains radically shifted as a result of changing political and 
racial values. While much research from this period emains invaluable, much work remains 
to be done before we can fully understand the era as it appeared to contemporaries.  
 In the half-century or more following the end of Reconstruction, Southern whites’ 
conservative point of view dominated the widely accepted narrative of Reconstruction. By the 
early decades of the twentieth century, this narrative gained academic sanction through the 
works of Walter Lynwood Fleming, William Archibald Dunning, and the latter’s many 
students. James Ford Rhodes and Claude Bowers’s widely read works, meanwhile, further 
cemented this perception of Reconstruction as the ‘tragic era’ of American history in the 
popular imagination.12 This Dunning school, as it came to be known, consistently downplayed 
and excused the use of violence by Southern whites in overthrowing the Republican regimes 
in the South, arguing that political violence remained ,limited to isolated incidents, or 
otherwise that it was a necessary evil, justified by extreme circumstances of the time. Fleming, 
for instance, characterized the Ku Klux Klan as “a white terror to counteract the black one,” 
                                                                                                                                              
 
this analysis, in which further reform in the South was sacrificed to benefit the interests of a narrow economic 
elite: C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1971), 23–24. 
12 William Archibald Dunning, Reconstruction, Political and Economic, 1865-1877 (New York; London: Harper 
& Bros., 1907); Walter Lynwood Fleming, The Sequel of Appomattox : A Chronicle of the Reunion of the States 
(Princeton: Yale University Press, 1920); James Ford Rhodes, History of the United States from the Compromise 
of 1850 to the Final Restoration of Home Rule at the South in 1877 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1904), vol. 
6 and 7; Claude Gernade Bowers, The Tragic Era : The Revolution after Lincoln (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 1929). 
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which had the beneficial result of “[keeping] the ngroes quiet and [freeing] them to some 
extent from the influence of evil leaders.” Writing at the nadir of American race relations, 
moreover, these authors shares in the racial prejudic s of their time. They blithely describe the 
recently freed and enfranchised black population of the South as lazy, ignorant, and corrupt. 13 
 They reserved their worst venom, however, for the white Republicans, who were 
invariably termed ‘Carpetbaggers’ - for those coming down from the North - and ‘Scalawags’ 
- for those from below the Mason-Dixie line.14  In the Dunningite literature, these 
Carpetbaggers and Scalawags, aided by black veterans of the Union army and the Freedmen’s 
Bureau, misled the gullible blacks of the South into voting them into power over the unfairly 
disenfranchised whites and subsequently taxed the Southern population into poverty in order 
to enrich themselves and their corrupt cronies. The Republican Party, these authors insisted, 
was not a legitimate political institution, but rather a conspiratorial organization aimed at 
misleading the blacks in order to subjugate and exploit the white population under color of the 
law.15 
 John Rose Ficklen and Ella Lonn most prominently represent the Dunning school 
among scholars of Reconstruction in Louisiana. Ficklen studied the period through 1868, 
when conservatives attempted to restore much of the prewar racial order, while Lonn wrote 
about radical Reconstruction and ‘Redemption’ in the years that followed.16 Both authors 
struggled to reconcile the details of white violenc they discovered in the sources with the 
ideological schema imposed by the Dunningite narrative. Ficklen, after conscientiously 
relating the murders of dozens, and possibly hundreds, of blacks in the violence leading up to 
the 1868 presidential elections, nevertheless insists that the blame lay primarily with the black 
population “aroused by their radical white leaders to assert their legal rights against the whites 
and even to commit acts of aggression.” This naturally evoked deep-seated fears of “servile 
insurrection,” and Southern whites were more than justified in defending themselves in the 
ensuing “race war.” Lonn similarly excuses the whites who massacred dozens of blacks at 
Colfax. They, after all, “knew only too well how brutal infuriated negroes become, and so 
were easily alarmed.” While she admits that “about 37, who were captured, were shot down in 
                                                 
13 Fleming, Sequel of Appomattox, 253, 258. 
14 This work avoids the use of the pejoratively laden t rms Scalawag and Carpetbagger, except in quotations. It 
instead uses the more cumbersome, but more accurate te ms ‘Southern/Northern born white Republican.’ 
15 Dunning provides a clear example of this conspiratori l view of the Republican party in Reconstruction, 
Political and Economic, 115–117. 
16  John Rose Ficklen, History of Reconstruction in Louisiana (through 1868) (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University, 1910); Ella Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana after 1868 (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1918). 
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cold blood” she does not consider these murders sufficient justification for the “wildest stories 
of outrageous cruelties and barbarities by the white men.”17 
 In the early decades of the twentieth century, a sm ll number of black intellectuals 
authors, most prominently W. E. B. DuBois and John R. Lynch, dissented from the 
Dunningite narrative. From his 1910 essay in the American Historical Review through his 
1935 magnum opus, DuBois emphasized the historical experience of the former slaves and 
thus reintroduced the idea of the ‘Benefits of Reconstruction.’ Lynch, born a slave in 
Louisiana in 1847, had experienced political turmoil of Reconstruction up close, representing 
Mississippi in the federal House of Representatives n the 1870s and 1880s. Years later, in 
1913, he published a memoir of the period, hoping to “bring to public notice those things that 
were commendable and meritorious, to prevent the publication of which seems to have been 
the primary purpose of nearly all who have thus far written upon that important subject.”18  
 In 1939 Francis Simkins laid the foundations for revisionism, as the postwar response 
to the Dunningites came to be called. His passionate critique of the Dunningite view of 
Reconstruction in the Journal of Southern History disparaged their “extremely partisan 
judgment of still timely historical events,” which placed a “civic duty” on scholars of the 
period to “foster more moderate, saner, perhaps newer views of his period,” and “adopt a 
more critical, creative, and tolerant attitude toward so important a period.” A year later, 
Howard K. Beale, while praising Dunning and his followers for the quality of their historical 
research, advocated that a younger generation of historians “cease lauding those who ‘restored 
white supremacy’ and instead to begin analyzing the restorationists’ interests to see just what 
they stood for in opposing the Radicals.” Such research would, he expected, rehabilitate some 
of the Republican policies and politicians of the Rconstruction era and avoid the Dunningites 
mistake of “[accepting] certain contemporary biases along with the suggestive names” such as 
Carpetbagger and Scalawag.19 
                                                 
17 Ficklen, Reconstruction in Louisiana through 1868, 225–231; Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana after 1868, 
240, 242. 
18 W. E. B. Du Bois, “Reconstruction and Its Benefits,” The American Historical Review 15, no. 4 (1909): 781–
99; W. E. B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America : An Essay toward a History of the Part Which Black 
Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860-1880 (New York: Free Press, 1999); 
John Roy Lynch, The Facts of Reconstruction (New York: Neal Publishing, 1915), 11; Justin Behrend, “Facts 
and Memories : John R. Lynch and the Revising of Reconstruction History in the Era of Jim Crow,” The Journal 
of African American History 97, no. 4 (2012): 427–48. 
19 Francis B. Simkins, “New Viewpoints of Southern Reconstruction,” The Journal of Southern History 5, no. 1 
(1939): 49–61; Howard K. Beale, “On Rewriting Reconstruction History,” The American Historical Review 45, 
no. 4 (1940): 807–27. 
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 Over the following decades, historians increasingly heeded Simkins’s and Beale’s 
pleas, refuting much of the Dunningite narrative and rehabilitating the policies both of 
Radical Republicans in Washington D.C. and of the Republican regimes in various Southern 
states. The civil rights movement, which C. van Woodward called the ‘Second 
Reconstruction,’ significantly influenced these authors, who often framed the Republican 
policies as precursors to the racial struggles of their own time.20 They emphasized the 
attempts by Radical Republicans to provide the freedp ople with civil and political rights and 
with education and they rehabilitated the Southern Republican politicians, both Northern and 
Southern, so despised by an earlier generation of historians.21 While not entirely ignoring the 
“blunders of the era,” Stampp, for example, insists that “it was worth a few years of radical 
reconstruction to give the American Negro the ultimate promise of equal civil and political 
rights.”22  
 While their intentions were laudable, the revisionist authors essentially inverted the 
Dunningite narrative, casting the Radical Republicans s idealistic heroes and the Southern 
whites as racist villains, intent on preserving their own privileges at any cost. By the 1970s, a 
more nuanced approach to the period - sometimes termed post-revisionist, although it was 
partly developed in parallel with revisionist scholarship – slowly began to emerge. These 
scholars emphasized the relative conservatism of Radical policies and attempted to understand 
the politics and strategies of Southern whites, rather han simply berate them for their racist 
worldview.23 Working out from this more “jaundiced view of American institutions,” the 
                                                 
20 Woodward, Strange Career, 8–10. Richard M. Valelly’s recent study does an excellent job of showing just 
how different these “two Reconstructions” were: The Two Reconstructions: The Struggle for Black 
Enfranchisement (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2004). 
21 An overview of early revisionist works can be found in Bernard A. Weisberger, “The Dark and Bloody 
Ground of Reconstruction Historiography,” The Journal of Southern History 25, no. 4 (1959): 427–47. Key 
works in this vein include: LaWanda Cox and John H. Cox, Politics, Principle, and Prejudice, 1865-1866 : 
Dilemma of Reconstruction America (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963); Kenneth M. Stampp, The Era of 
Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (New York: Random House, 1965); Harold Melvin Hyman, ed., The Radical 
Republicans and Reconstruction, 1861-1870 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967); William S. McFeely, Yankee 
Stepfather: General O. O. Howard and the Freedmen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). For a 
revisionist interpretation of Reconstruction in Louisiana see: Roger Adrian Fischer, The Segregation Struggle in 
Louisiana, 1862-77 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974). Meanwhile, studies that reflected the older, 
Dunningite point of view continued to be published as late as 1865: Theodore B. Wilson, Black Codes of the 
South (Montgomery: University of Alabama Press, 1965). 
22 Stampp, Era of Reconstruction, 215.  
23  On the conservative basis of Reconstruction see th work of Michael Les Benedict: “Preserving the 
Constitution: The Conservative Basis of Radical Reconstruction,” The Journal of American History 61, no. 1 
(1974): 65–90; A Compromise of Principle : Congressional Republicans and Reconstruction, 1863-1869 (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1974). On Southern whites see: Michael Perman, Reunion Without Compromise : 
The South and Reconstruction: 1865-1868 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Michael Perman, 
The Road to Redemption : Southern Politics, 1869-1880 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984); 
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most recent scholarship has, as Justin A. Nystrom puts it, stepped “out of the shadow of 
certitude and inevitability” that characterized both the Dunningites and the revisionists, “by 
embracing the murkiness and moral ambiguity” that characterized the postbellum South24 In 
doing so, these historians moved beyond the traditional focus on national and state politics, to 
paint a richer, more textured picture of the Reconstruction’s struggles, incorporating rural, 
female and black perspectives.25 
 This study builds upon and expands these trends in three distinct ways.26 First, it 
explores the dynamics and experience of incessant violence and terror that characterized 
Reconstruction politics in a rural setting typical of the cotton South. Secondly, this study 
emphasizes the fundamentally contested and anarchic nature of Reconstruction politics, in 
which day-to-day control over the levers of power was often more important than the formal 
outcome of the political process. At the same time, th se localized struggles over political, 
economic, and racial control both reflected and influenced the developments of 
                                                                                                                                              
 
James L. Roark, Masters Without Slaves : Southern Planters in the Civil War and Reconstruction (New York: 
Norton & Co., 1977); Dan T. Carter, When the War Was Over : The Failure of Self-Reconstruction in the South, 
1865-1867 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985). This early post-revisionist interpretation of 
Reconstruction is synthesized in Erik Foner’s seminal Reconstruction. The most prominent post-revisionist 
works on Louisiana are: Joe Gray Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 1863-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1974); Peyton McCrary, Abraham Lincoln and Reconstruction : The Louisiana Experiment 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Joseph G. Dawson, Army Generals and Reconstruction : 
Louisiana, 1862-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982); Ted Tunnell, Crucible of 
Reconstruction : War, Radicalism and Race in Louisiana, 1862-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1992). 
24 Michael W. Fitzgerald, “Reconstruction Politics and the Politics of Reconstruction,” in Reconstructions : A 
New Perspective on the Postbellum United States, ed. Thomas J. Brown (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006), 93; Justin A. Nystrom, New Orleans after the Civil War (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
2010), 2. 
25 An excellent overview of these recent trends can be found in Thomas J. Brown, ed., Reconstructions : New 
Perspectives on the Postbellum United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). Studies on national 
and state Reconstruction that embody these new tendencies include: Steven Hahn, A Nation Under Our Feet : 
Black Political Struggles in the Rural South from Slavery to the Great Migration (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2003); Nicholas Lemann, Redemption : The Last Battle of the Civil War (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2006); Michael W. Fitzgerald, Splendid Failure : Postwar Reconstruction in the American 
South (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2007); Zuczek, State of Rebellion; Summers, Dangerous Stir; Bradley, Bluecoats 
and Tar Heels; Paul A. Cimbala and Randall M. Miller, eds., The Great Task Remaining Before Us : 
Reconstruction as America’s Continuing Civil War (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010); Emberton, 
Beyond Redemption. The best such contemporary scholarship on Reconstruction in Louisiana includes Hogue, 
Uncivil War; John C. Rodrigue, Reconstruction in the Cane Fields: From Slavery to Free Labor in Louisiana’s 
Sugar Parishes, 1862-1880 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001); Nystrom, New Orleans after 
the Civil War. Although Ted Tunnell’s Edge of the Sword: The Ordeal of Carpetbagger Marshll H. Twitchell 
in the Civil War and Reconstruction (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004) is modern in that he 
focusses on events in a rural setting, his narrative framework is strongly influence by the revisionist model. 
26 These trends bear a close relationship to what Yael A. Sternhell has identified as the ‘new revisionist’ 
approach to Civil War Scholarship, including an emphasis on “how rather then why” and a “redefinition of […] 
heroism and villainy.” Yael A. Sternhell, “Revisionism Reinvented?: The Antiwar Turn in Civil War 
Scholarship,” The Journal of the Civil War Era 3, no. 2 (2013): 239–56. 
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Reconstruction on a national scale. Finally this study deconstructs the highly moralized 
narratives imposed on Reconstruction by oth Dunningite and Revisionist historians. 
Southern whites were hardly the innocent and set-upon victims of a few conniving whites 
supported by a horde of ignorant Negroes; but neither were the white and black Republican 
leaders universally high-minded and idealistic prophets of the twentieth century civil rights 
movement. The story of Reconstruction, in fact, boasts few heroes and offers little comfort to 
those who conceive of American history as a uniform march towards progress. 
 
Why the Red River Valley 
A regional study, it would seem at first glance, can tell us little about the reasons for the 
failure of Reconstruction. Reconstruction, after all, was a national project, legislated in 
Washington and primarily enforced by the federal army. Only a relatively small faction of one 
party, the Radical Republicans, ever supported it wholeheartedly and only President Andrew 
Johnson’s intransigence created a political window of opportunity that allowed them to carry 
out their political priorities. Once the memories of the Civil War began to fade and other 
issues came to dominate the public debate, Radicalism as a political persuasion faded, as did 
and public support for Reconstruction in the North. T e financial and economic crisis that 
began 1873 and the Democratic congressional victory a year later accelerated these processes. 
When the presidential election of 1876 hinged on cotested votes in Louisiana, Florida, and 
South Carolina (as well as Oregon), Republicans acquiesced in home rule for the South in 
return for four more years in the White House. 
 Reconstruction, from such a perspective, stood or fell by the grace of federal policy, as 
dictated from the nation’s capital. Southerners - both black and white, Conservative and 
Radical, Republican and Democrat, and particularly in remote rural areas - had little say in the 
matter. There is certainly truth in such a perspectiv . Reconstruction could hardly have 
succeeded in a piecemeal or patchwork fashion. It is difficult to imagine the black population 
voting, owning property, and otherwise fully participating in public life in some parts of the 
South and not in others over any extended period of time. The failure of Reconstruction in the 
Red River Valley therefore was part and parcel of the failure of Reconstruction nationwide 
and the reasons for that failure can only be understood within such a national context. 
 That, however, is only half the story. While the failure of Reconstruction at the local 
level can only be understood in the context of its failure nationwide, the reason for this 
broader failure are intimately intertwined with the failed implantation of the national policy in 
the South itself. The legislation passed in the lat1860s and early 1870s, after all, had made 
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political and civil equality for blacks the law of the land. The relatively weak federal state, 
however, lacked the institutional tradition, the administrative capacity, and the political will to 
implement and enforce these laws. Republican state regimes, meanwhile, inherited a tradition 
of highly decentralized government that depended heavily on the involvement of local 
communities, rather than a centralized bureaucracy, for the day to day enforcement of law and 
order. Once local elites withdrew their support, the state had few institutional resources to 
project its power beyond the state capital. This failure to successfully implement 
Reconstruction at the local level played a crucial role in gradually - and understandably - 
undermining support for the entire project among the Northern electorate and Republican 
politicians 
 Even between 1867 and 1872, at the height of radical Reconstruction and Republican 
power, both nationwide and in Louisiana, the implementation of the reforms envisioned in 
Washington proved fraught with difficulties in the r alities of the rural South. From the very 
outset, white Southerners used and array of legal and extralegal strategies to resist and 
undermine any meaningful challenge to their own economic, political, and racial dominance. 
Only very rarely did this resistance directly target federal officials - soldiers, marshals, and 
agents of the Freedmen’s Bureau. Federal enforcement, however, proved haphazard and 
reactive, effective only at suppressing the most viible and extreme outbursts of violence after 
the fact. Whites, in response, targeted local officials and white and black Republican leaders, 
gradually undermining the legitimacy of both the state and federal authorities who proved 
increasingly unable to provide even the most elementary of state services to their citizens: 
physical security and law and order. 
 In this context, events in Louisiana served as a testing ground and bellwether for 
Reconstruction policies from before the end of the Civil War.27 The Republican Party in 
Louisiana, composed of the vast majority of blacks and a few Southern and Northern whites, 
faced significant challenges. The white population controlled the preponderance of the 
economic resources of the region – most importantly land and stock - as well as many other 
tangible and intangible assets, such as education, military training, and armaments. This 
allowed them to develop an effective strategy of opposition to the Republican authorities, 
even when they lacked access to the formal levers of tate power. Their strategies of 
resistance, both legal and extra-legal, have been wll documented both in Louisiana and 
                                                 
27  George Rable, “Republican Albatross: The Louisiana Question, National Politics, and the Failure of 
Reconstruction,” Louisiana History 23, no. 2 (1982): 109–30. 
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elsewhere.28 We know far less, however, of how both local government as well as federal 
authorities in the South responded – or failed to respond, at least adequately - to the 
challenges posed by a recalcitrant white population, particularly in rural areas.  
 In fact, studies of Reconstruction, until very recently, largely ignored the experience of 
rural areas, a rather stunning oversight considering that the vast majority of Southerners lived 
in sparsely populated rural counties. The focus, by both Dunningites and revisionists, on 
struggles over political power and racial ideology meant that research on Reconstruction dealt 
primarily on events and debates in Washington D.C. and the various state capitals.29 Taylor’s 
Reconstruction in Louisiana, for example, might more aptly have been titled ‘Reconstruction 
in New Orleans.’ Developments in rural areas, however, were crucial to the course of 
Reconstruction. Politics and government in nineteenth century America were very much local 
affairs, and regaining local autonomy, not just at he state but also at the county and ward 
level, was a crucial aim of the Southern whites who opposed Reconstruction. This was well 
understood by contemporaries such as Voligny, who “considered a free local and municipal 
government as the keystone and criterion of liberty.”30  
 For the reforms envisioned by Radical Republicans to ucceed, authorities not only 
had to declare the freedpeople citizens on paper, but also provide the black population 
throughout the South with the opportunity to vote, stand for office, litigate, and sit in the 
witness and jury boxes, as well as to acquire the economic and educational resources 
necessary to effectively and independently participate in the public sphere. As a precondition 
for such participation, moreover, they had to afford the protection of the law and physical 
                                                 
28 Allen William Trelease, White Terror : The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972); Frank J. Wetta, “‘Bulldozing the Scalawags’: Some Examples 
of the Persecution of Southern White Republicans in Louisiana during Reconstruction,” Louisiana History 21, 
no. 1 (1980): 43–58; George C. Rable, But There Was No Peace : The Role of Violence in the Politics of 
Reconstruction (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1984); James M. McPherson, “Review: Redemption or 
Counterrevolution? The South in the 1870s,” Reviews in American History 13, no. 4 (1985): 545–50; Perman, 
“Counter Reconstruction”; James G. Dauphine, “The Knights of the White Camelia and the Election of 1868: 
Louisiana’s White Terrorists; a Benighting Legacy,” Louisiana History 30, no. 2 (1989): 173–90; Gilles Vandal, 
Rethinking Southern Violence : Homicides in Post-Civil War Louisiana, 1866-1884 (Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 2000); Hogue, Uncivil War; Charles Lane, The Day Freedom Died : The Colfax Massacre, the 
Supreme Court, and the Betrayal of Reconstruction (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2008); Zuczek, State of 
Rebellion; Emberton, Beyond Redemption. 
29 Economic historians, of whom Roger L. Ransom and Richard Sutch are the most important, are the exception. 
They tend to focus on general trends, however, rathe  than on the specific dynamics of Reconstruction p litics in 
a rural setting: One Kind of Freedom: The Economic Consequences of Emancipation (Cambridge University 
Press, 2001). The earliest work to study Reconstruction politics in a rural setting, focusing on black organization 
in rural (and urban) Alabama and Mississippi is Michael W. Fitzgerald, Union League Movement in the Deep 
South: Politics and Agricultural Change During Reconstruction (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1989). 
30 ‘March 14, 1867, Paris, Voligny to Moncure,’ Hardin Collection, folder 9:45. 
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security to both the black population, as well as to the limited number of white Republicans 
scattered throughout the South. These struggles over ci il and political participation mostly 
took place at the local level. Despite a brief surge of centralization during and immediately 
following the Civil War, the vast majority of Americans in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, regardless of their partisan affiliation, remained ideologically committed to a highly 
decentralized administration.31 While national and state politicians debated the legal status of 
the freedpeople in the postwar society, Southern whites waged a fierce and often bloody 
struggle throughout the towns, villages, and scattered hamlets of the South to reclaim and 
enforce political, economic, and racial control over the recently freed black population.  
 Nowhere was this struggle fiercer or bloodier than in Louisiana’s Red River Valley.32 
The level of violence in the region was exceptionally high, in part because the political stakes 
were so great. The majority-black region was crucial to a Republican electoral majority in 
Louisiana, but the black majority was not so great, as it was along the Mississippi in the 
northeast of the state, as to preclude the possibility of whites overwhelming it. Just as 
Louisiana served as a testing ground and bellwether for national policies of Reconstruction, 
much of the violence that plagued the state either originated or reached its climax on its 
northwestern frontier. As we will see, the political terror that erupted across the state during 
the presidential election campaign of 1868, had been percolating - albeit on a smaller scale - 
in many of the northwestern parishes during the earlier elections in September 1867 and April 
1868. Later, the murder of dozens of blacks in Colfax and of six white Republican officials in 
Coushatta - and the failure of state and federal authorities to convict the perpetrators in both 
cases - laid the basis for the subsequent widespread ‘bulldozing’ of local Republican officials 
throughout the state. The significance of the region and the high level of violence it 
experienced, make the Red River Valley an ideal case to study the implementation of the 
racial equality envisioned by Radical Republicans in the context of ongoing and often violent 
resistance of entrenched local white elites in the rural South. 
 
                                                 
31 Morton Keller, Affairs of State : Public Life in Late Nineteenth Century America (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 
1977); Richard Franklin Bensel, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authori y in America, 1859-
1877 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Lawrence Powell, “Centralization and Its Discontents i 
Reconstruction Louisiana,” Studies in American Political Development 20, no. 2 (2006): 105–31; Heather Cox 
Richardson, West from Appomattox: The Reconstruction of America after the Civil War (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2007). 
32 According to statistics compiled by Gilles Vandal, the Red River Valley during Reconstruction boasted a 
murder rate quadruple that of the second most violent region in Louisiana: Rethinking Southern Violence, 46–50, 
72–73. 
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Some Theoretical Considerations: Political Violence and Southern Legal Culture 
While this study does not set out to either prove or disprove any particular theoretical 
framework for understanding political violence, it is influenced by certain conceptual 
frameworks, while implicitly rejecting others. The following offers a brief justification of 
these choices.33 Allen W. Trelease’s 1971 study of the Ku Klux Klan, offers an incredibly 
detailed overview and often subtle analysis of the violence and terror that swept the South in 
the early years of Reconstruction. However, he fails to place the Klan’s violence in the 
context of an ongoing struggle by Southern whites against Reconstruction that lasted well 
beyond the demise of the Ku Klux organization. Louisiana, in particular, receives relatively 
little attention, as the state saw relatively little Klan organization, despite having a longer and 
more violent Reconstruction experiences than any other state. Gilles Vandal’s recent work 
provides an important inspiration for this study, b identifying the Red River Region as by far 
the most violent in Louisiana and possibly in the entir  South. His emphasis on statistical 
analysis, however, often fails to adequately elucidate the mechanisms of the violence he 
catalogues, as well as its political significance for those involved as either perpetrators, 
victims, authorities, and bystanders.34 
 The only monographic study to systematically address the issue of violence during all 
of Reconstruction, George Rable’s But There Was No Peace, relies heavily on Ted Robert 
Gurr’s theory of Relative Deprivation and the underlying Frustration-Aggression hypothesis 
to explain Southern whites’ violent response to Reconstruction. In effect, Rable argues, white 
Southerners responded violently to discontent resulting from their decreased political, 
economic, and social position. While intuitively appealing – and in Rable’s hands seemingly 
applicable to the period – such psychological explanations suffer from fundamental flaws. In 
particular, they do not explain why some discontented groups rebel, while others do not. In 
fact, as Rod Aya notes, such theories amount to little more than the rather trivial truism that 
political violence only occurs under conditions of social discontent – in other words, that 
satisfied people do not rebel.35 
                                                 
33 A thorough overview of historical and contemporary theories of political violence, including critical nalysis, 
can be found in James B. Rule, Theories of Civil Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). 
34 Trelease, White Terror; Vandal, Rethinking Southern Violence. 
35 Rable, But There Was No Peace, 4, 61–62, 194:fn12–13, 212:fn10; Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Ted Robert Gurr, “The Revolution - Social-Change Nexus: Some 
Old Theories and New Hypotheses,” Comparative Politics 5, no. 3 (April 1973): 359–92; Rod Aya, Rethinking 
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 What we need, instead, is what Rule and Aya characterize as a ‘political’ theory of 
violence. As Aya puts it, somewhat abstractly, thisis an explanation that involves “(1) noting 
the actors’ intentions, which mostly include both getting a prize and getting away with it; (2) 
exploring […] their capabilities […] till you find an option whose outcome’s payoff will 
satisfy both sets of goal criteria; and (3) ‘vicariously’ taking that course of action,” that is 
placing yourself in their position and determining what choice would be the most logical from 
their standpoint. Such theories involve a model which is predicated on explaining political 
violence on a case to case basis, while assuming actors to be purposeful and rational in 
pursuing political goals.36 
 To understand the role of political terrorism during Reconstruction, this study draws, 
in particular, on one such model: that of contentious politics, developed by Charles Tilly, 
Doug McAdam, and Sidney Tarrow over the last two deca s. Rather than search for a 
singular cause, such as relative deprivation in the case of Gurr, this model views political 
violence as the outcome of complex interactions betwe n political actors as they strive to alter 
the balance of threats and opportunities, while pressing for recognition of their claims. 
Significantly, such a model does not consider violence to be categorically distinct from the 
normal political process, but as more or less continuous with other forms of contestation.37 
Such an approach is particularly relevant to this study, which places political violence in the 
context of an ongoing struggle for political, economic, and racial control of the Red River 
Valley by conservative whites. 
 By adopting a political approach this study rejects explanations based a persistent 
Southern culture of violence, rooted in either its ideal of honor or its frontier history.38 
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Explanations rooted in such relatively immutable cultural traditions fail to account for the 
extraordinarily high rates of violence that characterized Reconstruction compared to the years 
immediately following it.39 Moreover, a culture of honor, Southern or otherwise, poses 
additional theoretical problems as an explanation fr political violence. As in other honor 
systems, the South had numerous culturally accepted m chanisms to avoid a violent 
confrontation without losing face, so only if both parties involved in a conflict refused to yield 
did a dispute of honor in fact lead to violence. The reasons for such intransigence lay outside 
of the discourse of honor, which functioned as a justification and a cultural framework for 
violence, but was not its underlying cause. An honor c de, as Randal Collins has shown, 
merely represents  
an ideology of stratification that emerges in particular kinds of social structures; it is a 
justification, a moralistic cover that operates to give a veneer of legitimacy to 
stratification, just like any other stratification system. In this case, it is the blatant 
stratification of the violent over the unviolent, of groups who make toughness an 
organizing principle over those who are not so taught.40 
 Dismissing honor, or a more general Southern culture of violence, as an explanation 
for the widespread terrorism of the Reconstruction era, does not imply that this violence was 
in no way related to long-term features of Southern society and political culture. The South’s 
legal culture, in particular, played a crucial role in shaping the context of such violence and 
providing it with legitimacy in the eyes of many Southern whites. Christopher Waldrep has 
shown how within this legal culture “every white southerner understood what keeping African 
Americans ‘down’ meant and what it did not mean. It did not mean going to law; it did not 
mean relying on a police state. It meant vigilante violence and lynching.” This tradition 
involved an ongoing tension between the rule of lawand vigilante justice. Racism allowed 
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whites to see themselves as a tight knit community, “threatened by blacks’ crime. That sense 
of solidarity freed whites from the limits law and constitutionalism impose on punishing 
crime.”41 
 During Reconstruction, whites’ sense of community was reinforced by the external 
threat of federal intervention, as the “threat of a breakdown of cohesion can drive traditional 
communities into a tighter cohesion, making lynching more likely.” This resulted in the 
emergence of white paramilitary organizations that channeled these community sentiments, 
while shielding individuals from possible persecution. As Manfred Berg notes, “the Ku Klux 
Klan liked to portray itself as a traditional vigilante group meting out communal justice for 
odious crimes.” Many whites, in fact, sincerely believed that they or their neighbors acted 
lawfully and in self-defense when murdering blacks.42  
 The centralizing tendencies brought about by the Civil War and the early days of 
Congressional Reconstruction, exemplified by the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments, initially 
threatened the core values of this localized legal culture. By the end of the 1870s, however, 
violent resistance in the South, as well as the ideological traditions and economic interests of 
a large section of the North, overwhelmed these tendencies and ensured a return to localism 
and laissez fair governance.43 Reconstruction’s legacy of terrorism deeply influenc d the 
racial violence that would characterize the South for many decades. Although neither the 
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terminology nor the sexualized justification of late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
lynching were prominent during Reconstruction, provided a model for the impunity with 
which whites terrorized blacks, much as they had for centuries of slavery. As Michael Ayers 
Torri argues, “the lack of prosecution was a vital p rt of how lynching - and murders - could 
terrorize African-Americans, because it took the measure of white complacence toward 
killing blacks.” Moreover, he speculates, “the young men of the violent 1890s […] were born 
between the late 1850s and the early 1870s, growing up in Reconstruction’s chaos, when one 
of the chief lessons for Southern whites – taught to them by their fathers – was that violence is 
effective.”44 
 
With these considerations in mind, this study will examine the role that political terrorism 
played in an evolving combination of legal and extralegal strategies employed by 
conservative whites, aimed at reestablishing political, economic, and social control over the 
region and particularly over the recently emancipated black population. White conservatives 
desired to reestablish what John Hope Franklin has termed their sense of personal sovereignty. 
“Ruler of his own destiny, defender of his own person and honor, keeper and breaker of the 
peace, [white Southerners] approached a personal imper ousness that few modern men have 
achieved.” Placing the struggle for control at the center of the story of Reconstruction allows 
us to see continuity in the actions of conservative Southern whites over the course of 
Reconstruction. Regardless of their antebellum and wartime loyalties, few whites welcomed 
federal interference in local affairs, and even fewer felt comfortable with the racial revolution 
embodied in Reconstruction. Despite class and partisan divisions, the vast majority of whites 
thus shared a single purpose: to be free of ‘negro and carpetbag rule’ and to reestablish their 
own supremacy over their own affairs in the shortest possible time. This overriding purpose 
created a political context in which those willing to resort to violence and terrorism could do 
so with relative impunity, despite the unease that m ny moderates felt at such means and the 
potential for anarchy they implied.45 
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2. Shaping the Peace  
Conservatives, Unionists, and the Military, 1865-1867 
 
On Christmas Eve 1865, Elizabeth Ann Scofield, of Catalpa Grove plantation in Rapides 
Parish, wrote to her father in New York that the fredpeople in the South did not just “want 
freedom, but they wanted something more, lands, houses, homes, horses, mules, farming 
implements, at least a year’s supply provisions, in short a little capital to set up on [...] They 
say they were promised land with their freedom, and l  they expected to get, land they were 
waiting for.”1 The final weeks of 1865 found the rural South in turmoil. The reality of defeat 
and emancipation had begun to sink in, but no one knew with any certainty what status the 
freedpeople were to have in postwar Southern society. In August, the recently established 
Freedmen’s Bureau had briefly pursued a policy aimed at large scale redistribution of 
abandoned and confiscated lands among the freedpeople, but Andrew Johnson had quickly 
put a stop to the endeavor. Blacks nevertheless continued to hope that the Christmas holiday 
would see the fulfillment of the government’s promise to provide them with land. In response, 
rumors ran rampant among the South’s white population that blacks would “stage a 
coordinated ‘rising,’ slaughtering the whites and seizing their lands and properties.”2  
 Colonel F. M. Crandal, in charge of military forces in northwestern Louisiana, assured 
his superiors in New Orleans that this so called Christmas Day Insurrection Scare had no 
foundation. He expressed “no doubt that any petition indicating trouble from the freeing of the 
negroes would be signed very generally by the citizens here. There is very little real loyal 
feeling that I have discovered and much exceedingly bitter feeling against the Govt. and the 
Yankees.” The Bureau’s Inspector General for the state, reporting on the region shortly after 
the scare had passed, concluded that whites had not only exaggerated the dangers, but in fact 
fabricated them “as a justification for the perpetration of the most flagrant outrages by the 
disloyal planter upon the unfortunate negro!”3 
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 Officers who investigated similar rumors elsewhere, some of which had led to the 
disarming of blacks by local white militias, all reported that the blacks had no intention of 
taking up arms against the white population. However, as Captain Thomas Kennedy reminded 
his superiors, whites’ fears of a black insurrection were quite real, even if the danger of such 
an uprising was not. General Absalom Baird, in charge of both the state’s military forces and 
the Freedmen’s Bureau at the time, responded to these reports by assuaging such fears and 
promising planters assistance in disciplining the newly emancipated black labor force. 4 
 Despite personally giving little credence to the treats reported, Kennedy ordered his 
officers in the field to take precautionary measure against any armed insurrection by the 
freedpeople. He forwarded a letter from Bureau Commissioner Oliver Otis Howard to all 
Bureau agents emphasizing the need to counter false impr ssions among freedmen regarding 
land redistribution at Christmas. He made no mention of countering similarly incorrect 
impressions among the whites regarding a black uprising. In an accompanying statement to 
the freedpeople, Baird reiterated that they were “fr e as white people are free,” but went on to 
urge them to seek employment from white landowners, who “as soon as the little prejudices 
of the present are past […] will become your best friends, for it will be their interest to foster 
and protect you.”5  
 The fear of an armed black uprising and a subsequent race war was, in Dan Carter’s 
words, merely “a drama of the imagination,” existing only in the minds of the white 
population. Nevertheless, the freedpeople’s aspirations to economic independence, as well as 
their newfound assertiveness following emancipation, most certainly served to fuel the always 
simmering white fears of a black uprising.6 Following the euphoria of emancipation, the black 
population of the South used the initial months after the surrender to test the practical limits of 
their freedom, moving away from their old plantation to spend time in the towns and army 
camps, reuniting with their families, and establishing the foundations of their own 
communities.7 Economic independence, based on small-scale landownership, appeared the 
logical next step, but by October of 1865 the federal government made it clear that it would 
not redistribute land on any significant scale. Once the Christmas season had passed, the 
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possibility appeared definitely foreclosed and the freedpeople generally resigned themselves 
to a foreseeable future as landless laborers.8 
 The Christmas Day Insurrection Scare marked a crucial turning point in the 
conservative resurgence, in the wake of the Confederates’ defeat the previous spring. 
Buttressed by Johnson’s lenient policies and, at lest initially, by conservative Governor 
James Madison Wells’s support, conservative whites s t out to reestablish their political, 
economic, and racial control of the region. By Christmas, these conservatives, many of them 
unrepentant Confederate soldiers and officials, hadtaken control of the state and local 
government and enacted a series of laws, the so called Black Codes, which reduced the 
freedpeople to a legal status not far removed from slavery. Throughout the state, meanwhile, 
Confederate veterans formed militia companies, which served primarily to enforce white 
supremacy. The federal authorities’ muted response to the Insurrection Scare signaled to 
conservative whites that they could persecute blacks nd white Unionists with near impunity. 
It would, in fact, be more than a year before the federal government, through the Military 
Reconstruction Act of March 1867, made a significant ttempt to guarantee security and the 
civil and political rights of the freedpeople and white Unionists and Republicans. By then, 
however, Republicans faced the entrenched power of conservative white elites, which they 
had established in the first postwar years.  
 
Defeated, Yet Defiant 
After his tour of the South in May and June of 1865, Whitelaw Reid concluded that “the 
National Government could at that time have prescribed no condition for the return of the 
Rebel States which they would not have promptly accepted.” Following a similar inspection 
in the summer and early fall of 1865, prominent Republican Carl Schurz similarly found that 
the Southern “mind was so despondent that if readmission at some future time under whatever 
conditions had been promised, it would have been looked upon as a favor.” Some historians, 
including Eric Foner, have echoed these conclusions, arguing that the despondency and 
disorientation among Southern whites provided a window for the North to impose effective 
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reforms on the South and that it was only Johnson’s lenient policy that sparked the 
recalcitrance and resistance that subsequently undermin d such efforts. 9 
 Other scholars, however, including James Roark and particularly Michael Perman, 
have argued that, while accepting defeat and emancip tion as faits accomplis, Southern whites 
presented a defiant stand on all other matters from the outset. Those whites along the Red 
River who recorded their thoughts in the final weeks of the war and the months that followed, 
tend to confirm this latter interpretation. Many refused to admit defeat until the very end and 
continued to “indulge in the swagger which was so customary before and during the war.” 
Even those who accepted the inevitability of defeat and emancipation often shared, with what 
Schurz claimed was a small minority of ‘incorrigibles,’ a “hope for a time when the southern 
confederacy will achieve its independence.”10 
 Following the evacuation of Richmond on April 2, 1865 and Robert E. Lee’s defeat at 
Appomattox a week later, Shreveport briefly served as the formal capital of the disintegrating 
Confederacy, until General Edmund Kirby Smith surrendered to General Edward R. S. Canby 
on May 26. While Southern Louisiana had one of the longest experiences with wartime 
Reconstruction, the Red River Valley was among the last regions in the South to come under 
Union control. The war, particularly its final year, brought many hardships on the region, 
including a near famine in the final months of the war.11 Nevertheless, the final defeat of the 
Confederacy came as a shock to many whites along the Red River, whose only immediate 
experience of the war had been General Nathaniel P. Banks’s Red River Campaign in 1864. 
Although the Union army that marched into northwestern Louisiana inflicted heavy damages 
along the Red River, the confrontation had ended in resounding Confederate victory at 
Mansfield and Pleasant Hill.12 As late as May 12, Mary Rives, who managed her own 
plantation near Mansfield, defiantly rejected the possibility of defeat: “What, surrender our 
rights, our homes, our country, and liberty? No never! Struggle on, fight the hireling horde as 
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long as they have a foot on our soil, and our cause is with God.” Not only civilians believed in 
keeping up the fight until the bitter end. On May 8, James C. Wise, a Confederate Colonel 
from Rapides Parish, wrote to former Confederate Governor Thomas Overton Moore that 
“victory and independence are within our grasp if we ill only strike.”13 
 Others along the Red River demonstrated a more realistic appraisal of the situation 
during the final weeks of the conflict. William F. Murray of Shreveport, on hearing of Lee’s 
surrender, wrote a letter expressing “the blackness of our despair [...] as the full effects of that 
terrible disaster manifest themselves.” With the defeat at Appomattox, “at one fell blow falls 
head, heart, and soul of the Confederacy, and the bravest army the world ever saw, men 
unconquered in a hundred battles, with our most effici nt generals are powerless to succor our 
bleeding and falling country.” Mary Cornelia Wright similarly concluded that “the 
Confederacy, for which so much precious blood has been shed, will have to be given up.” 
David Pierson, one of four brothers from the Bienville and Winn area to serve in the 
Confederate army, wrote his father from Shreveport, where he was stationed, that “my last 
hope died within me when Genl. Lee surrendered.” He believed the Trans-Mississippi 
Department might hold out as long as a year, were it not for the soldiers being “destitute, 
disgusted, and determined not [to] sacrifice their lives to gratify anybody’s ambition.”14 
 James R. Andrews, a prominent conservative and soon-to-be-sheriff of Rapides parish, 
offered the most comprehensive and subtle analysis of the condition and mindset of the white 
population at the end of the war. He wrote Colonel Wise, advising him against prosecuting 
the war to the bitter end. Although he admitted that Wise, as a military officer, had better 
sources of information to judge the situation by, Andrews nevertheless could not believe “that 
we have the ghost of a chance of success left us.” He assured Wise that “the idea of reunion 
cannot be more repugnant to any man than it is to me, yet when I see that there is no other 
alternative, I may as well look the event fair in the face and reconcile myself to my fate, all of 
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its horrors vividly settled upon my retina, our humiliated condition properly appreciated.” If 
the population and soldiers “would resolve that every man should die rather than submit,” 
Andrews would happily fight to the bitter end, but in reality, neither soldiers nor civilians had 
the inclination to sacrifice themselves for a hopeless cause and “with women and children to 
be brought into the account [...] why destroy them without a prospect of equivalent result.”15  
 Notably, even those who accepted the inevitability of defeat, tinged their resignation 
with defiance. Mary Wright was “willing to wait years,” but would “never say die to the 
Confederacy.” Andrews buttressed his argument in favor of surrender by reminding Wise that 
“it will be an easy matter for us to make such laws as will enable us to manage [?] slave 
population quite as advantageously as their condition as slaves did in the event of the states 
getting back [?] their sovereignty, which I think will be the case.”16 In the first months 
following the surrender, conservative whites continued to show a similar mix of superficial 
resignation, with a powerful undercurrent of barely suppressed hostility towards the federal 
government, the freedpeople, and Southern white unionists. J. W. Shaffer, who served as the 
Union army’s chief quartermaster in New Orleans during the war, testified before the 
congressional committee on Reconstruction that “the great mass [of Southerners] are intensely 
disloyal.” Despite having lost the war, “these peopl  are determined to accomplish, if possible, 
an entire separation of the two sections. They cannot divide the territory; they have failed in 
that, but they are determined to divide the people, socially, politically, commercially, and, if 
they had any standings in morals on earth, morally also.”17 
 Union officers stationed in northwestern Louisiana after the surrender shared such an 
assessment. J. P. Hawkins, a brevet major general in command of western Louisiana, 
encountered “a desire to submit quietly to the government of the United States, not through 
any love for it, but because they have had enough of trouble and they wish prosperity to 
return.” A month later, Carl Schurz received two reports indicating just how superficial 
Southern submission was. General Canby noted that “t e feeling and temper of that part of the 
population of Louisiana which was actively engaged in or sympathized with the rebellion 
have not materially changed” since the surrender. A. Tullas, a former professor at the state 
seminary in Rapides, “found the influential men of [that] parish as hot rebels as they ever 
were during the rebellion. They may, by mouth, profess Union sentiments, but their hearts are 
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filled with hatred; they are only waiting for a favorable moment to turn the wheel back to its 
position as it was before the war.”18 
 Roark argues that many planters were more interested in economic survival than in 
politics following the war.19 In the mind of white conservatives, however, their economic 
interests remained inseparably intertwined with white supremacy and the political system that 
sustained it. They themselves made little distinction between the struggle for renewed 
prosperity, the fight for political control of the South, and the maintenance of a rigid racial 
hierarchy. Indeed, Andrews’s statement to Wise, cited above, illustrates that to many 
conservative whites, economic prosperity remained coterminous with white ‘management’ of 
the freedpeople, and hence depended on their political independence. Henry M. Hyams, a 
conservative lawyer, explicitly stated that continued racial superiority mattered more than 
mere economic survival. He wrote to Moore, under whom he had served as lieutenant 
governor during most of the war, that “to the loss f our property we submit as well as may, 
as it is the result of the war and fiat of fate, but to the degradation of being sunk even below 
the negro we cannot even contemplate without a feeling of horror that we cannot suppress.”20 
 Mary Rives, the spinster planter who wished to prosecute the war to the bitter end, left 
her plantation within half a year of the surrender to go live in Shreveport, as there remained 
“neither profit nor pleasure living with [the freedpeople] now.” In the intervening months she 
regularly complained in her diary of the blacks’ refusal to work as hard and as obediently as 
they had done as slaves. This undoubtedly harmed her financial prospects, but the loss of 
mastery inherent in the new circumstances upset her as much or more than the financial 
hardships she faced. She repeatedly expressed annoyance at the “unsettled” and “idle” work-
habits of her former chattel, with whom she had ‘contracted’ in exchange for being “fed, 
clothed, and doctored, as I have always done.” The idea of offering payment to secure their 
labor, whether in cash or in kind, apparently never entered her mind. Ultimately, she “left 
home with few regrets, many true friends are left but I could not stay with the negroes.”21 
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 Moore himself expressed little confidence in “freedman planting,” fearing that “the 
fruits of demoralization and idleness have not even ripened, much less been reaped.”22 The 
freedpeople’s supposed laziness and idleness was perhaps the most common racist trope 
regularly perpetuated by Southern whites, not only in their private diaries and correspondence, 
but also in their numerous local newspapers. In April 1868, the Bossier Banner eproduced an 
article from the Louisville Journal that blamed the poor agricultural productivity of the 
postwar years exclusively on the freedpeople’s unwilli gness to work, ignoring not only the 
wartime destruction of stock and capital investments, but also the severe floods and cotton 
worm infestations that destroyed much of the crops throughout the region in both 1866 and 
1867.23 General Phillip H. Sheridan, who commanded the Military District of the Gulf, 
comprising Texas and Louisiana, explained to a congressional committee just how 
disingenuous whites’ claims of black laziness were. The freedpeople, he admitted, “work only 
because necessity compels them. In this,” he dryly noted, “they are like all other persons. I 
have never known a white or a black man who was performing manual labor for the love of 
it.” 24 
 Whites continuously complained not only of blacks’ laziness, but also their purported 
immorality. As Louisiana Democrat editor Eugene R. Biossat graphically detailed, in his 46 
years living in Alexandria he had never seen  
such debauchery such complaints of petty thieving, and such disgraceful and 
disgusting scenes in the broad glare of day. And all seems to pass by unheeded, 
unrebuked, unpunished! The place is overrun, overcrowded with freedmen of all 
classes, from decriped [sic] old age down to the juv niles, all roaming, loafing, idling, 
spreeing, gambling and dancing around with perfect impunity, caring for no one, 
respecting no one, not even the common dictates of ordinary decency; not a night 
passing but what they attend in crowds Balls, ‘kissing parties’ and what they, in 
desecration, call preaching. And at these assemblies the morals of barbarians would be 
shocked to have to endure! They have their gambling halls on every square, and they 
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can even be seem gambling in the public streets! When t ese evils will be checked, 
whose business it is to abate them, we know not.25 
The freedpeople’s immorality, according to some conservatives, threatened their very survival. 
Released from the “restraining influence of whites,” the Banner concluded, “promiscuous 
intercourse, freedom of will and want of interest in their proginy [sic], has checked their 
increase by natural means.”26  For the first year following emancipation, conservati e 
newspaper editors regularly predicted that the black population, “free - so called - free from 
the protection and support of his former master, his only friend - free to become a wandering 
vagabond to perish on the high-way, [...] like the unfortunate Red man, must recede before the 
advancing tide of civilization, and vanish from the face of the earth, as ‘the last wave settles 
over him, forever.’”27 
 A final central element in whites racist portrayal of the freed black population was the 
latter’s inclination to criminality, a result of their supposed inability to work productively 
unless coerced. According to the Banner, “negroes in the South monopolize the criminal 
calendar,” and every Southern paper published “two paragraphs daily recounting thefts by 
negroes, and many additional attempts at robbery and even higher crimes.”28 
Despite the enormous changes in our understanding of Reconstruction since the 
Dunning era, much modern scholarship on Reconstruction, both in Louisiana and elsewhere, 
has continued to reflect the assumption that blacks did in fact widely engage in petty theft, 
condoned by their own community as a more or less ju tifiable response to their dire 
economic straits. Even Vandal, who explicitly debunks the “impressionistic and often 
distorted image” of rampant black violence, asserts that “being a thief was not […] an abstract 
phenomenon for freedmen, but an alternative mode of industry to satisfy their hunger, even if 
it meant living outside the abstract rules of law.”29  
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 Evidence from the DeSoto Parish district court reco ds, however, suggests that such 
assumptions need to be reevaluated. These records show that while individual blacks faced 
charges of petty theft, larceny, and horse theft, the black community as a whole did not 
condone such acts as a reasonable response to their social and economic position.30 Even in 
conservative publications, specific references to blacks committing crimes are far rarer than 
general statements about black criminality, while ev n such specific cases often lacked the 
evidence to back up the charge. Delos W. White, a Freedmen’s Bureau agent in Winn parish, 
noted in December 1867 that in every case of hog stealing reported, “there is always some 
white man at the bottom of the affair.” In one case, a white man named Warmock hired a 
freedman to kill some hogs, which turned out to include animals belonging to Henry Teagles. 
Without the Bureau agent to investigate such case, whites quickly blamed the freedpeople 
“for being a lawless and worthless people when it is the white man that is to blame and not 
the freedman.”31 Even the conservative Natchitoches Times placed the brunt of the blame for 
corn and cotton theft at the doorstep of crooked white merchants and not the freedmen. The 
editor advised planters “in no instance [to] disturb the freedmen while in the act of stealing, 
but follow them, and find out the merchant buying this stolen property, and prosecute him to 
the full extent of the law.”32 
 Southern whites’ deeply rooted racist mindset had t e paradoxical effect of somewhat 
leavening their contempt for the freedpeople with a measure of pity. Being naturally unsuited 
to freedom, whites blamed blacks’ laziness, immorality, and criminality on the “radical 
emissaries,” who taught them to “believe that laziness would make their fortunes and 
establish their supremacy, and that they would be li rally supplied from the North with 
whatever they wanted and couldn’t steal.”33 No such extenuating circumstances existed in the 
Southern mind to temper their hatred of and contemp for Northerners and Southern white 
Unionists. Elizabeth Scofield noted in December 1865 that “the older children have all 
imbibed a feeling of prejudice, dislike, disgust, if not almost hatred for everything, and almost 
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anybody, northern.” Mary Wright, wistfully contemplated “how happy we should all be” if 
the South “never again should see or hear of a Yankee.”34 
 Even as ardent a Unionist as Governor Wells shared in the prejudices so common to 
white planters from rural Louisiana. Wells’s contempt of Northerners served as a prime 
motivator for his conciliatory policy, which handed control of the state and local government 
to unrepentant former rebels. Wells also shared white Louisianians’ racial attitudes. He 
complained of “the lawless conduct of the negroes. Most of them have fire arms, which they 
use in shooting down stock; theft and burglary are of veryday occurrence and murders have 
been committed on defenseless women and children” In thus writing to President Johnson, 
Wells appealed to the latter as a fellow Southerner. “Your knowledge of the race, Mr. 
President, must convince you that if left to themselves, they will not work. I tremble for the 
consequences if they are allowed to congregate in large bodies in a state of idleness, which 
they will surely do if they have the liberty.” The governor’s disgust also extended to large 
numbers of colored troops stationed throughout the s ate. He warned the president that “their 
very presence demoralizes the negroes for all purposes f useful industry.”35 
 The mindset that pervaded Southern white society - from planters, politicians, and 
newspaper editors along the Red River up to the govern r in New Orleans - played an 
important role in their subsequent violent response to the national government’s attempts to 
provide the freed slaves with the privileges of citizenship. Even the majority resigned to 
defeat and emancipation, remained defiant and unrepe tant, resenting any intrusion in their 
affairs that threatened their political, economic, and racial dominance. Furthermore, their 
deep-rooted racism made it almost impossible for Southern whites to conceive of blacks as 
citizens who might actively, independently, and intelligently participate in the political and 
legal process. At most, they were willing to accord them a second-class citizenship, with 
which they would enjoy the limited protection of a political and judicial system controlled 
entirely by whites. Finally, their wartime experienc  left former Confederates, both soldiers 
and civilians, with a bitter hatred of Northerners and Southern white Unionists. They barely 
tolerated those, such as Wells, whom they considered politically useful. Most others faced the 
threat of violent retaliation by their neighbors, unless protected by federal troops. 
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Conservative whites later transferred this hatred to those whites, Northern or Southern, who 
defected from the ideology of white supremacy to join the Republican Party, the 
‘Carpetbaggers’ and ‘Scalawags’ of Reconstruction legend. 
 
Status Quo Ante 
Large parts of Louisiana experienced extensive wartime Reconstruction and, as a 
consequence, Unionists had a well-organized Free State Party in New Orleans, which might 
have served as the nucleus for a Republican controlled state government.36 This party, 
however, was an uneasy alliance comprising conservative Unionist planters, moderate and 
radical politicians, and the free blacks of New Orleans, the so called gens de couleur. While 
the more radical Unionists urged immediate emancipation and even partial enfranchisement 
for the free black population, more conservative Unionists opposed all political and civil 
rights for the black population. With the support of the military commander, Nathaniel P. 
Banks, moderate Unionist Michael Hahn was elected governor in February 1864 over the 
more Radical Thomas J. Durant. More importantly, at le st in retrospect, the conservative 
Unionist and wealthy Rapides Parish planter Wells was elected lieutenant governor on the 
same ticket.37 As a result, when the legislature elected Hahn to the US Senate, Wells acceded 
to the governorship on March 4, 1865. A conservative planter, who had no affinity with either 
the black population or Radical Northern politicians, controlled the state government of 
Louisiana as the Civil War drew to a close and the qu stion of Southern blacks political status 
took on increasing political importance. 
 Although Wells had bucked the mainstream of opinion among his social peers by 
opposing secession and actively supporting the Union effort during the war, as soon as he 
became governor, in March of 1865, he turned to the traditional planter elite of which he was 
a part as his natural base of support. When Johnson acceded to the presidency following 
Lincoln’s assassination, Wells supported the new president’s lenient policy towards Southern 
whites and continued to use his vast patronage power to return conservative whites to 
positions of statewide and local power in Louisiana. I  a June 10, 1865, address to the ‘people 
of parishes recently returned to the Union,’ Wells asked the citizens of each parish to make 
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recommendations for officers to fill the positions of sheriff, recorder, clerk of court, and 
police juror provisionally until elections could be h ld. Within a month these positions had 
been filled in Rapides, Caddo, and, presumably, most other parishes along the Red River. The 
conservative Louisiana Democrat heartily endorsed the appointments, which included a 
number of prominent conservatives who would later play a leading role struggle against 
Congressional Reconstruction over the next decade, such as Albert H. Leonard, James J. 
Weems, and Michael Ryan.38 
 Initially, Wells demanded that those he appointed b  able to take the oath prescribed 
by Johnson in his amnesty proclamation, but by early July he had relaxed even that 
precondition. Wells assured the president that former rebels “manifest the greatest readiness 
to comply with the requirements of your amnesty proclamation and submit themselves to the 
laws, and I do not know, nor have I heard of in anyquarter, any threat or even empty bravado 
suggesting vindictive or resentful feelings.” Wells had such confidence in the sincerity of 
returned Confederate soldiers that in making appointme ts to the “parochial machinery for 
administration and judicial purposes I have been less exacting in regards to the antecedents of 
said candidates.” This laxity extend in particular to “remote sections,” such as the Red River 
Valley, “where trouble was feared from disbanded soldiers, run away negroes, and other 
outlaws who might seek to disturb society, I appointed some fine men of resolution and 
Intelligence, who had some military service in the rebel ranks.”39 
 Wells’s conservative inclinations initially gained him the support of the vast majority 
of white conservatives, some of whom considered him“as their savior.” Others were less 
enthusiastic about the former Unionist, but nevertheless supported him on strategic grounds. 
Henry Hyams wrote to ex-Governor Moore, to assure him that, despite their wartime 
positions, Wells and Johnson would prove to be friends of the Southern whites. “Their 
instincts, if not of the states’ rights school, areyet for justice to the South and they are and 
will show themselves true to their instincts.” Under the circumstances, he argued, Wells was 
by far the best choice to ensure “a Reconstruction of the Union on the basis of the perfect 
equality of the States.” 40 Canby, the military commander in Louisiana, believed Wells to be 
sincere in his attempt to establish a loyal governme t, although he privately expressed doubts 
as to “the loyalty and the honesty (political) of some of his advisers, and I look with 
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apprehension upon many of the appointments made undr these influences during the past 
two months.” Officially, however, he followed Johnso ’s orders to recognize the Wells 
government, instructing his officers that officials ppointed by the governor “will be respected 
and supported by the military authorities.”41 
 Conservatives further’ cemented their power in Louisiana at the statewide elections 
held in November 1865. Wells easily won election as the candidate for both the Democrats 
and the moderate Republicans, while the more radical Republicans boycotted the elections. 
Wells thus stood unopposed, except for former Confederate governor Henry Watkins Allen, 
nominated by a small number of last-ditchers, such as Democrat editor Biossat, who refused 
to accept even Johnson’s moderate Reconstruction program and claimed the 1852 constitution 
to be in force.42 More significant than Wells’s victory, was the election of dozens of 
conservative state legislators. These legislators aggressively pursued policies that soon 
aroused slumbering divisions between the moderate Wells and the hard-line conservatives 
whites he had helped into power. Their legislation, particularly the infamous Black Codes, 
also angered politicians and public opinion in the North, disrupting the amicable restoration of 
civil rule that Wells and Johnson had hoped for.43 
 Following the elections, Wells immediately called a special session of the new 
legislature, and in the final weeks of 1865 it went to work to enact the conservative legislation 
favored by its white constituents. Many conservatives along the Red River felt that the main 
business of the special session should be the calling of a convention to replace the 1864 
constitution, in the framing of which the region had not taken any part. Initially it appeared 
that the legislature might do so, but by early January 1866 it became clear that they would 
take no action on the matter, to the chagrin of the conservative press, which accused them of 
representing “the views of the Radical party [...] rather than those of their constituents.”44 J. R. 
Head, the conservative representative from Bienville, became the target of the Bienville 
Messenger’s hostility when he introduced a resolution that accepted the 1864 constitution as 
the de facto basic law of the state. He argued that by accepting the constitution mandated by 
the federal government, the legislature could in tur force the federal government to recognize 
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its legitimacy. Since the constitution enshrined white-only suffrage it could be tolerated until 
a more propitious time for calling a convention.45 
 In numerous other matters, however, the legislature proved true to its conservative 
credentials. Lawmakers appointed a disabled Confederate veteran as doorkeeper, and allowed 
him to serve in his military uniform.46  Other measures went beyond symbolism. The 
legislature passed a bill that suspended the collection of taxes owed for the years 1861-1864 
in areas then under Confederate control. Wells promtly vetoed the bill, one of the first major 
disputes to arise between the governor and the legislature. The governor argued in his veto 
message that the proposed measure would not only “sanctify rebellion to the government, and 
treason to the nation,” but also unduly affect the loyal men of Southern Louisiana who during 
those years “alone have had the entire burden thrown upon them of sustaining the State and 
local administration.” Such arguments, however, held little appeal to the whites of 
northwestern Louisiana, who had already paid heavy t xes to “support their own de facto 
government.” Wells, according to the Messenger, showed “his cloven-foot in vetoing the bill.” 
The editor left it to what Wells had called the “bad men who took up arms” to decide for 
themselves the merits of the veto.47  In February, the governor did sign a subsequent 
compromise bill, which suspended the collection of wartime taxes throughout the entire state, 
but the damage to Wells’s relationship with conservatives throughout the state was not so 
easily repaired.48 
 While the tax law - as well as some other less important measures - created a rift 
between the legislature and the governor, other acts passed by the legislature served to 
inflame northern public opinion. The so called Black Codes were a series of laws passed in 
late December, in part as a response to the Christmas Insurrection Scare, which severely 
curtailed the freedom of black agricultural laborers. Unlike the earlier Black Codes of 
Mississippi and South Carolina, the Louisiana laws did not explicitly make any racial 
distinctions, in an attempt to placate Northern public opinion. However, they allowed local 
magistrates great leeway in interpretation, and with blacks precluded from voting and office-
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holding, the legislature expected conservative white officials to apply the laws in a 
discriminatory fashion.49  
 At the center of the Black Codes stood the labor and vagrancy statutes. The first, 
officially entitled the Act to provide for and regulate labor contracts foragricultural pursuits, 
obligated agricultural laborers to sign yearlong contracts by January 10 of each year. Once 
they signed, laborers remained bound to their employer for the entire year and would receive 
payment only at year’s end from the proceeds of the crop. Employers could deduct wages for 
sickness, damages done to animals and tools. They also h d the authority to fine freedmen one 
dollar for various acts of ‘disobedience,’ including, among other things, “leaving home 
without permission” and “impudence, swearing or indecent language.”50 
 The new vagrancy statute authorized any citizen to make a complaint to a local 
magistrate to have someone arrested for vagrancy. If convicted, either by confession or 
competent testimony, such vagrants were to post a bond for their future good behavior. If no 
bond could be posted, the vagrant would either be hir d out to a planter or put to work 
repairing roads and levees. The planters employing them would pay their salary into the 
parish treasury, with the laborer receiving only “such clothing, food and medical attention as 
[the planters] furnish their other laborers.”51 Other laws forbade the carrying of firearms on 
plantations without the owner’s consent; set harsh penalties for entering a plantation without 
the owner’s permission; forbade the “tampering with, persuading or enticing away, harboring, 
feeding or secreting” of laborers employed on a plantation; and provided for the apprenticing 
of orphans and indenturing of the destitute. Wells signed every one of these laws, although he 
did successfully veto an act that would have made any freedperson unable to provide himself 
or herself with shelter and employment subject to arrest and the sale of their labor.52 
 The Black Codes created a system of regulations that severely curtailed both the 
physical and the economic mobility of landless laborers. In the racially discriminatory 
application envisioned by the legislature the laws placed the freedpeople under the strict 
control of either his or her employer or, if unemployed, of the local white community as a 
whole. In Bienville Parish, for example, militia commander, W. D. Candler instructed his 
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subordinate officer, Captain Moss, to arrest “all persons without visible means of support, 
without regard to color,” singling out for particular attention “all Freedmen without homes 
and employment.” Although Canby found the new laws distasteful, he insisted that the army 
had no right to interfere with the constituted civil authorities.53 
 Not surprisingly, the conservative press approved of what they euphemistically called 
‘labor regulations.’ The Democrat claimed that the legislation was to the benefit of the 
freedpeople, curtailing “all opportunities for extorti n, oppression, cruelty, and unfair dealing.” 
The Messenger concurred, claiming that the legislature had “enacted more favorably for the 
freedmen than the magnanimous Bureau, with its swarms of superfluous agents.” At the same 
time, Conservatives assured themselves, the laws would guarantee that the freedpeople would 
not give in to their supposed natural laziness, forbidding them, “at their own cost, to pass their 
time in idleness.” The Bureau, according to conservative whites, did nothing but issue orders 
“for no other purpose than to annoy the people of the South and to put it out of their power to 
do anything for the unfortunate race who are unable to do anything for themselves.” 54  
 The legislature convened for its first regular session on January 22, 1866, a month 
after the close of the extra session in which it had p ssed the Black Codes. Lawmakers 
quickly ordered parochial and municipal elections, hoping to oust Wells’s political allies 
throughout the state, most prominently New Orleans mayor Hugh Kennedy who lost to 
former Confederate Mayor John T. Monroe in March. Wells managed to delay parochial 
elections until May, but by then the governor had lost all support among the conservative 
press in northwestern Louisiana. The D mocrat warned voter that it would be “their own fault 
if the imbecility which now characterizes the office holders throughout the state, shall 
continue for any length of time.”55  
 The press gave little attention to the elections, beyond publishing the names of the 
candidates and the outcome. With blacks precluded from voting, as General Sheridan 
correctly predicted, “glorification of the Rebellion means that those who participated are more 
likely to be elected.”56 Nearly all candidates reflected the conservative views of the white 
majority. After James R. Andrews won the Rapides sheriffalty by seven votes over the 
incumbent deputy C. V. Ledoux, Democrat editor Biossat merely expressed disappointment 
that “both gentlemen could not have been elected.” The outcome f the election, which 
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replaced all of the incumbent Wells appointees, generally pleased the Democrat’s editor, 
notwithstanding that he had greeted those same appointees with enthusiasm just a year 
earlier.57  
 The rising political fortunes of the conservative whites resulted not only in the passage 
of the repressive Black Codes and control of local offices, but also in the establishment of a 
militia force in many parishes, the primary purpose f which was to enforce white control 
over the freedpeople. In November of 1865, the Messenger approved Bienville militia captain 
J. Lang Lewis’s policy of recruiting on a volunteer basis, as under existing laws a draft would 
apply equally to both races indiscriminately and the editors did “not wish to compromise the 
dignity of the Freedman by compelling him to serve in the ranks with us poor white trash.”58 
Around the same time whites also organized militias in DeSoto, Caddo, Rapides, and, 
presumably, most other parishes. In Caddo, the local army commander warned that “no worse 
choice could have been made” in the selection of commanders.59 In Rapides, on the contrary, 
Colonel Scofield not only authorized the establishment of ‘vigilance committees,’ but even 
ordered his troops to provide them with all lawful aid in “arresting and bringing to 
punishment before the proper authorities all offenders against law and good order.” This 
earned him the gratitude of the conservative Democrat, which praised his efforts to “make the 
people feel that the troops are here for their protection and not their oppression.60  
 The stated purpose of these militia companies was to “protect[...] their families and 
property from the violence and lawless depredation of [...] bands of thieves.” However, 
wartime Unionist Dennis E. Haynes, who had suffered physical violence at the hands of 
conservative whites both during and after the war, complained to General Canby in November 
that the commanders appointed with Scofield’s approval included the “notorious murderers 
Bill Smart and Bob Martin,” who during the war had “with bloodhounds hunted down Union 
men.” A few months earlier, Haynes had made similar complaints to Wells in an anonymous 
letter published in the New Orleans Times. He could not abide that Smart, Martin, and “a host 
of other man-destroying villains, are at their respective abodes, enjoying in peace the fruits of 
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their bloody deeds,” while Haynes and his fellow Unionists suffered persecution and 
ostracism.61 
 Scofield justified his decision by insisting that the men appointed came highly 
recommended by the district judge, the parish sheriff, and the sheriff’s principal deputy. All 
three of these officials, however, were conservatives appointed by Wells, who shared in the 
racial prejudices of their class. Although the district judge, Michael Ryan, had opposed 
secession, he would run for Congress as a conservative Democrat in the extremely violent 
1868 elections and later led a walkout of all whites from the district court to protest the 
participation of blacks as grand jurors. Sheriff John Roach Williams had owned nearly over 
two hundred slave before the war and served in the Confederate cavalry. Williams’s deputy, 
Ledoux, had been a small slaveholder and a member of the Know Nothing Party before the 
war and a Wells appointee to the conservative postwar police jury. Although a wartime 
Unionist, who could swear the required test-oath to become sheriff in 1868, Ledoux did not 
join the Republican Party until 1872, when he promptly received its nomination for parish 
judge. Such men, we may assume, had no qualms aboutppointing unrepentant Confederates 
to lead the local militia, nor did they object to the militia’s employment as a tool of racial 
control.62 
 Although there is no record of the Rapides militia persecuting either the black 
population or white Unionists and Republicans, evidnce from other places along the Red 
River and throughout the state illustrate that the militia forces established in the fall of 1865 
regularly did so. The army records include numerous reports of militia companies disarming 
the black population, among others in DeSoto, where such action resulted, “as it has done 
elsewhere in this state, in the commission of several robberies and other outrages, and one 
murder.”63 In a report on the condition of the entire Red River region from the period, the 
Acting Assistant Inspector General J. Schuyler Crosby accused the militias in the region of 
cruelly and brutally punishing any negroes found outside of their former plantations.” This 
prevented the freedpeople from traveling to other plantation to seek employment elsewhere. 
These militias, he concluded, represented “nothing more nor less than the rebel army 
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reorganized, who seem to defy the authority of the United States and who are outspoken in 
their sentiments of disloyalty.”64  
 The Black Codes and the formation of militias embodied the legislative and executive 
culmination of conservative white political restoration in the months following the surrender. 
By early 1866, conservatives controlled nearly every important state and local office; had 
passed laws that transferred the individual control of the master over his slaves to a collective 
control over the black population by the white community; and had organized militias, 
reminiscent of the antebellum slave patrols, to enforce political, economic, and racial control 
over the freedpeople. With political power in the hands of the traditional elites, those who 
opposed them politically soon found themselves at the mercy of the very men whom they had 
believed defeated just six months earlier. 
 
Persecuting the Victors 
The rapid return to power by conservative whites spelled disaster for those who opposed their 
political interests. Freedpeople, Republicans, wartime Unionists, Northern immigrants, 
federal officials, and even US soldiers, suffered in ignities and persecution at the hands of 
conservative white militants, who met little opposition in settling scores, both personal and 
political, against their enemies. The army had neither he resources nor the mandate to curtail 
such violence, contributing to a general atmosphere of lawlessness and impunity that fostered 
widespread, often politically-motivated, violence against freedpeople and white Republicans. 
 It is not always straightforward to distinguish politically motivated violence from the 
more mundane crime engendered by the anarchic conditions that followed the Civil War. 
Conservatives, moreover, consciously confused the issue by repeatedly denying that violence 
against Unionists served a political purpose. They conveniently blamed violence on the so-
called Jayhawkers, bands of outlaws, mostly Confederate deserters and former Unionist 
scouts, who committed depredations simply from pecuniary motivations. Such gangs most 
certainly existed, especially in northwestern Louisiana, where outlaws could easily escape 
across state lines into Arkansas and Texas. A self-proclaimed ‘loyal citizen’ from Mansfield 
wrote General Sheridan to inform him that “companies of Jayhawkers have been organized 
between Mansfield and Shreveport and are committing […] all sorts of outrages: murdering, 
robbing, and burning down houses. The country is terror stricken and expects prompt action 
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on your part to put an end to the depredations of these outlaws.”65 In fact, thefts committed by 
these outlaw bands may well have accounted for a portion of the widespread property crime 
that whites conveniently blamed on the freedpeople. The lines, however, between common 
criminality and political violence, as well as that between respectable citizens and outlaws, 
often proved blurrier than the public statements by conservative whites suggested. 
 A case in point is the burning of a cotton gin owned by Luca Radisach, a relatively 
wealthy, 64 year old planter from Winn parish, who had moved to Louisiana from his native 
Italy more than 30 years before the Civil War. On May 27, 1865, the day after Kirby Smith’s 
surrender, a gang of outlaws robbed a neighbor of Radisach’s and rumors circulated that the 
Italian was to be their next victim. When the gang came to his property two nights later, he 
was prepared to meet them with guns and pistols loaded. Assisted by his “little son and a 
negro boy [...], gun in hand,” he made the unwelcome visitors wait outside his gate and sent 
his daughter out to negotiate. The gang members claimed to be paroled soldiers from Mobile, 
looking for something to eat. Radisach asked his daughter to examine their paroles and to 
promise them food in the morning it they camped outside the gate to his plantation. Refusing 
to show her their papers, they departed, but as they withdrew, they “struck a fire and set light 
to the gin house, containing 80 bales of cotton, his crop for the previous 3 years, and 100 
bushels each of wheat and rye and all his farming utensils.” 
 The next day, Radisach and his neighbors followed th  trail left by the desperadoes 
and came upon a “coat, belonging to John Mooney covered in a peculiar mud from 
Radisach’s plantation.” They arrested Mooney, who pr mptly confessed and gave up his 
accomplices, claiming that William Thornton was their l ader and Thomas Crawford his 
lieutenant. The outlaws had heard that Radisach had a lot of money in the house and went to 
rob him, but, finding him too well prepared, had fired the gin to lure him out. The posse 
reluctantly arrested Thornton, a well-respected local resident, but released him upon his denial 
of involvement. When the rest of the gang confirmed his participation, however, they 
rearrested Thornton, and, after deliberating whether to lynch them, handed the outlaws over to 
the recently arrived military force at Natchitoches. A military tribunal held a brief trial, 
releasing the suspects after hearing only two unimportant witnesses. By the time Brevet 
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Brigadier General Napoleon B. McLaughlin reopened the investigation in the summer of 1867 
all the suspects had moved to Texas.66  
There is no immediate evidence that the attack on Radisach had political motives. His 
foreign birth and opposition to secession may have marked him as an outsider an thus a 
relatively easy target to avoid community outrage. On the other hand, Winn parish had 
harbored more Unionist sentiment than most parishes along the Red River and after secession 
Radisach had supported the war effort and his son, Anthony, had served in the Confederate 
army. It was the army’s negligence, moreover, rather t an community’s disinterest that 
prevented conviction of the perpetrators. Two years l ter, however, when McLaughlin 
reopened the investigation, local resident immediatly politicized the case by incorrectly 
claiming that the perpetrators had been Union men. By then, opposition to the Military Bill 
and to increased federal interference had trumped whatever Unionist sentiment existed.67 
 The persecution suffered by Dennis Haynes, the wartime Unionist who complained to 
Canby about Scofield’s militia appointments, was more vertly political. Haynes, a native of 
Rapides parish, had moved to Texas shortly before the war, but returned to Louisiana in 1863. 
He assisted the Union war-effort, until captured by Confederate forces in 1863. He escaped 
and began to make his way home to Rapides, but was shot by guerrillas along the way and 
subsequently, from August 1864 until July 1865, served as acting military sheriff in Madison 
parish, in northeastern Louisiana.68 After the war, he returned to Rapides, where he found his 
home burnt and the vast majority of his white neighbors extremely hostile. Both Haynes 
himself, as well as friends who tried to assist him, regularly received threats of violence. 
When he tried to initiate legal proceedings against the guerrillas who shot him and against 
others who had beaten him during the war, not a single lawyer would take the case, including 
a Unionist acquaintance who feared “he would lose caste in that community by allowing 
himself to be employed by a Union man.”69 
 On September 4, these simmering tensions boiled ovr, when Joseph Texada severely 
beat Haynes in the streets of Alexandria, badly injur g the shoulder in which he had been 
shot. Texada and his relatives were notoriously violent men. Freedmen’s Bureau agents in 
Alexandria regularly received complaints of maltreament from the black employees of 
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Joseph and other Texada family members, including the deadly shooting of a 13 year old 
black boy named William Polydore by Joseph Texada in April of 1868.70 As their violent 
habits remained restricted to assaults on blacks and white Unionists - as well as an incident in 
which one brother shot and nearly killed another - the Texadas remained in good standing 
with the white community and the conservative civil authorities. Following the murder of 
Polydore, Bureau agent George Buttrick complained to his superiors that Joseph was a 
“notorious brawler, who has frequently committed assaults upon the negroes, but has always 
escaped punishment at the hands of the civil authorities.” Conservative whites, in fact, 
rewarded the Texadas for their violent resistance to Reconstruction. They elected Joseph to 
the conservative legislature in November 1865 and his older brother Lewis went on to hold 
positions of leadership in the parish Democratic Party. Joseph later served as a captain to one 
of the companies involved in the Colfax massacre of 1873.71 
 Haynes had no more success than the Bureau agents in bringing Texada to justice. The 
district court convened about a month after the beating, with Michael Ryan presiding. Haynes 
presented himself to the grand jury to make his complaint against Texada, but “was cursed 
and grossly insulted by one of the members of that body. I verily believed I would be 
assassinated had I remained.” He provided the clerkof the court with a legal brief containing 
his complaints against Texada and the men who had sot and beaten him during the war and 
quickly left Alexandria for the relative safety of Pineville, across the river, where federal 
troops were stationed. The grand jury ignored his complaint, instead issuing indictments 
against Haynes for larceny and fencing, based on actions he committed on a wartime foraging 
mission under military orders. Not much later he fled northwest Louisiana. He first went to 
New Orleans, where he wrote General Canby an account of his experiences, warning him to 
“anticipate another ‘bloody picture in the book of time’ being enacted by the assassination of 
the Union men and the discharged colored soldiers” in the rural areas of the state. In 
December he traveled on to Washington, where he testified before the Congressional Joint 
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Committee on Reconstruction about his own experience and the prosecution of Unionists and 
freedpeople generally.72 
 After Congress passed the Civil Rights Act in April 1866, Haynes again sought 
redress against Texada - as well as against Archie Smith, the man who had beaten him in 
1863 - through the federal judiciary. He lodged a complaint with United States Commissioner 
Shannon, who had Texada and Smith arrested in Alexandria and brought to New Orleans for 
examination. The defense counsel for Smith and Texada argued that, as this was a criminal 
case, only the state of Louisiana and the defendants had standing as litigants under the 
provisions of the recently enacted Civil Rights Bill. Haynes, as a victim, was not a party to the 
case and therefore his complaint was invalid. Moreover, the defendants “had not denied 
redress to Haynes” – the courts had done that - and therefore they had “in no manner or form 
violated the Civil Rights Bill.” The commissioner could, at most, prosecute “the justice who 
had refused to receive the complaint, the grand jury who had turned him away, the district 
attorney who would not file an information, or the Judge who declined to enforce the law.” 
Finally, the defense also pleaded that all facts in the case preceded the enactment of the Civil 
Rights Bill, making the case an unconstitutional ex post facto prosecution.73 
 The legal arguments employed in Texada’s defense refl cted accepted antebellum 
legal thinking and precedent. Criminal prosecution had traditionally rested almost entirely 
with the individual states, and victims had no standing to appeal to the federal judiciary, as 
they were not a party to the case between the stateand the defendant. Shannon declined to 
rule on the intricate legal points, releasing the defendants on bail to appear before the federal 
district court in November. Less than two weeks after their arrest, Texada and Smith returned 
home. For unknown reasons the case never came to trial in New Orleans, and the extent of 
federal jurisdiction in civil rights cases remained unresolved until Supreme Court Justice 
Noah H. Swayne ruled in a Kentucky case involving similar issues a year later. His opinion 
rejected the conservative arguments for a narrow ruling and opened the way for victims of 
racially motivated crimes to appeal to the federal judiciary.74 
 Around the time Texada and Smith returned from their aring in New Orleans, 
another conflict erupted in Rapides between conservative whites and a local Unionist, Henry 
N. Frisbee, a wartime colonel of a regiment of colored troops. This case, which revolved 
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around an alleged infraction of the new Black Codes, initiated a back and forth between local 
and federal courts similar to the Texada case. Following the war, Frisbee settled on a 
plantation in Rapides, not far from the home of the governor’s brother and Confederate war 
hero Montfort Wells. He brought with him a large sum of capital and nearly 400 black 
veterans from his regiment, whom he employed to work his plantation.75 According to 
Lieutenant Colonel Orin McFadden, in charge of the troops stationed near Alexandria, Frisbee 
“treats his laborers decently and accords to them the common rights of humanity.” This 
infuriated his neighbors, who claimed his conduct “is demoralizing the labor on other 
plantations. Yet the labor on Col. Frisbee’s plantation is not demoralized, but on the contrary 
is the most effective in the parish.”76  
 In April 1866, relations between Frisbee and his neighbors remained amicable. 
Following some trouble between Wells and his employees, Frisbee informed Captain T. G. 
Calvit, a manager or overseer on Wellswood plantation, that he refused to employ one of the 
freedmen discharged by Wells for misconduct. Over th  subsequent months, Wells repeatedly 
complained to the Bureau agent about the difficulties hey had disciplining their labor force, 
although none of these complaints mentions Colonel Frisbee.77 Then, on July 11, Wells and 
Calvit had Frisbee arrested and taken before Alexandri  justice of the peace R. M. Kilpatrick 
on charges of “enticing away negroes from their employers before the term for which they 
had contracted had expired,” an offense made punishable by the recently enacted Black Codes. 
Justice Kilpatrick placed Frisbee under bond to appe r at the next session of the district court 
for no less than $2000, twice as much as the bond placed on Texada by Commissioner 
Shannon in New Orleans.78 
 Frisbee responded by filing a complaint with US Commissioner Hiestand in New 
Orleans against Wells, Calvit, and Kilpatrick, as well as the sheriff and the prosecuting 
attorney, William A. Seay, for “collusion to prosecute him maliciously.” The commissioner 
dismissed the charges against Seay and the sheriff, but had the other three defendants brought 
to the state capital under guard of a deputy US marshal.79 No more mention is made of the 
case against Wells, Calvit and Kilpatrick, but the conservative Democrat made a point of 
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emphasizing that the jury at the district court ultimately acquitted Frisbee of the charges of 
enticement. The newspaper even published a letter signed by Frisbee to his lawyers Ryan and 
White, thanking them for their service and expressing his unexpected relief that he received 
“the same consideration and protection as any citizen,” from a jury that included “original 
secessionists, who would be supposed to have the strongest prejudices.”80 
 Other evidence, however, casts severe doubts over the sincerity of this letter. When 
Frisbee’s case came to trial, the Republican judge William H. Cooley, of the 7th district by 
chance replaced the far more conservative William B. Lewis who normally served Rapides. 
Cooley later testified before a congressional committee that the jury acquitted Frisbee - 
against whom “there was no more evidence of his guilt than there was of mine” - only 
because “they knew I would set aside their verdict as soon as they brought it in.” Judges had 
no such power to set aside an acquittal, and Cooley entertained no doubts that in Alexandria 
no jury would convict a white man suspected of crimes against freedpeople, Bureau agents, or 
white Unionists.81  In this case, conservative whites, realizing they could not obtain a 
conviction under Cooley, decided to make the best of the situation and use the jury’s acquittal 
and the letter from Frisbee as a propaganda tool to refute accusations of lawlessness and 
political persecution in the parish. In all likelihood Frisbee wrote the letter under duress, or 
the Democrat’s editor simply fabricated it, as two months later h fled the parish as a result of 
continual threats against his life and property.82 
 Even the hero’s status accorded to Confederate veterans offered little protection from 
persecution to those who subsequently cooperated with the federal forces. T. J. Mackey 
served as a captain of engineers in the Southern army during the Civil War, rising to chief 
engineer for the trans-Mississippi department by the war’s end. Following the surrender he 
volunteered to assist the Union forces in restoring order in northwestern Louisiana and 
northeastern Texas. He first served seven weeks as special provost marshal for Lamar county, 
Texas and adjoining counties and then worked three months as a volunteer collecting “many 
thousands stands of arms, several hundred wagons, an many hundred mules, &c., the property 
of the late Confederate States,” reporting first to he commanding officer at Shreveport and 
later to General A. J. Smith, commander of the Western District of Louisiana at Alexandria.83 
                                                 
80 LD, 66-10-24. 
81 CSS, 39-2, HOR. Rep. 16, 424-427. 
82 LD, 66-10-31, 67-04-24; CSS, 39-2, HOR. Rep. 16, 412- 13. 
83 JCOR 150-151. 
2. Shaping the Peace  
 61  
 
  Mackey soon found the mass of people in the region “bitterly antagonistic to all who 
declared themselves as willing to act in good faith towards the government. Good faith to the 
government, in the judgment of the people at large in Texas, meant bad faith to the 
community.”84  As special provost marshal, he attempted to prosecute those who had 
murdered civilians suspected of Unionist sympathies during the war, but lacking a 
constabulary force to support him he had but little success in the face of community 
opposition. In August 1865 some men ransacked his office while he was away. With the 
assistance of a detachment of troops he succeeded in arresting at least one of the men 
responsible, but while he was examining the suspect in his office, the man’s father assaulted 
him, the suspect grabbed his gun and a firefight ensu d in which Mackey was shot five times, 
before he could fend off his attackers, two of whom did not survive the encounter. Civil 
authorities in Texas immediately initiated legal proceedings against Mackey, who had fled to 
Shreveport. Colonel Crandal, commanding at Shreveport, sent an armed guard to transport the 
property collected by Mackey and escort his family to join him in Louisiana. Even federal 
troops were not safe in Texas, however, and “two of the company were murdered in cold 
blood, and in open day, under circumstances that marked the deed as one of extraordinary 
atrocity.”85 
 The widespread persecution of white Unionists had implications beyond the security 
and wellbeing of the immediate victims. Men such as Haynes, Frisbee, and Mackey might 
have provided the nascent Republican Party with competent local leadership as well as 
substantial economic resources. By the time, however, that Congress had passed the 
Reconstruction Acts and the Republican Party began seriously organizing in northwestern 
Louisiana, they all had fled the region.86 The violence also served as an unmistakable warning 
to any white man who might contemplate defying public opinion by supporting substantial 
rights for the freedpeople. They were certain to face social ostracism and economic isolation 
at best, and, at worst, their very life might be endangered. As a result, the Republican Party in 
the rural northwest of Louisiana consisted for the most part of the great mass of freedpeople, a 
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small number of white Northerners and only a very fw Southern whites brave enough to fly 
in the face of community opinion. 
 
Buffalo Soldiers in Dixie 
With conservatives in firm control of state and local government, the freedpeople and white 
Unionists could turn only to the federal government for protection from persecution. The 
army, however, lacked both the resources and the mandate to effectively police the vast and 
sparsely populated areas of the rural South, including the Red River Valley. On May 1, 1864, 
a few weeks before General Nathaniel P. Banks embarked on his unsuccessful campaign up 
the Red River, the Union army had over 60,000 active troops stationed in the Department of 
the Gulf, about ten percent of the total number avail ble for active duty. By March of 1865, as 
the war drew to a close, the number was reduced to jus  over 35,000, less than six percent of 
the total. Less than six months later, on August 3, 1865, General Sheridan, in charge of the 
newly created Division of the Gulf received orders to discharge “all white troops, infantry, 
cavalry, and artillery,” stationed in Louisiana, “which, in your judgment, could be dispensed 
with.”87  
 As a result of these orders, less than 8000 active duty forces remained stationed in 
Louisiana by the close of 1865. General Canby, commanding the Department of Louisiana, 
wrote to Division command that the rapid demobilization threatened to “reduce the troops so 
far as to seriously embarrass the service.” A month earlier, Colonel Crandal had warned his 
superiors in New Orleans that northwestern Louisiana d eastern Texas was “a dangerous 
place for a Northern man to live in. Robbery and murder are common, Northern men and US 
Officers are insulted on boats and in the country, where there is no danger of arrest from the 
military authorities.” A further withdrawal of troops, he warned, would result in “an exodus of 
all Northern men.”88 Despite these warnings, Canby received orders in early January to 
“muster out of the white volunteer troops all but about five hundred (500) and of the colored 
troops all but about five thousand (5000) of the force present within your department.” To 
accommodate these further reductions, Canby recommended concentrating all remaining 
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forces along the Red River in Alexandria, leaving oly a small garrison at Shreveport to guard 
the public property there.89 
 The rapid and massive demobilization of the army following the Confederate 
surrender had an indelible and long-lasting impact on the course of Reconstruction. As a 
result, the army lacked the resources to adequately police the South and enforce the political 
and civil rights of the freedpeople, even if the political will to do so had existed. In the short 
term, moreover, the army inevitably expended a great d l of available energy and manpower 
on the enormous logistical and administrative operation involved in demobilization, leaving 
little available for the administration of civil aff irs. The discharge of large numbers of 
soldiers also affected the Freedmen’s Bureau, which was mostly staffed by detached troops. 
As these troops received their muster out, the Bureau lost experienced personnel, as 
replacements, if these arrived at all, often lacked the knowledge of local affairs essential in 
dealing with racial, political, and economic tensions.90  
 The demobilization also affected the quality and racial balance of the regular troops in 
Louisiana. As early as August 17, 1865, Hawkins, the brevet major general in command of 
western Louisiana, complained of a lack of qualified officers and while “the white regiments 
may manage somehow to get along without officers, [...] the colored regiments 
cannot.”91From early 1866 onward, however, blacks comprised the vast majority of troops 
stationed in Louisiana, and this caused issues for the military beyond a mere lack of 
manpower. About 90 per cent of the forces that remained in Louisiana were colored troops, 
with the vast majority of white forces being mustered out post haste. This made good military 
sense, as most white units had seen far longer service, and most Northern soldiers had little 
interest in occupational duties.  
 Black troops, on the other hand, had far more incentiv s to stay in the service. They 
had few other opportunities to earn a comparable salary, while at the same time obtaining 
valuable skills and education. The freedpeople alsohad an immediate and personal interest in 
policing Reconstruction. As a result, the black troops stationed in Louisiana showed far better 
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morale and discipline than many of the white units. On an inspection tour of northwestern 
Louisiana, J. Schuyler Crosby found the 80th USCI at Shreveport, under Lieutenant Colonel 
McFadden, unsurpassed “by any regiment in this Department” in “efficiency, discipline, and 
general appearance and intelligence of officers.” The 652 colored soldiers at Alexandria, 
while not top-notch, were well drilled and disciplined. In comparison, he found many white 
units, particularly cavalry, to be demoralized, poorly disciplined, and restive.92 
 Such reports notwithstanding, the preponderance of black soldiers inevitably led to 
tensions between the federal authorities and the local white population. Following the muster-
out of almost all white volunteers, Canby reassured G neral A. J. Smith, commanding forces 
in western Louisiana, that he was “impressed with the necessity of white troops in western La 
and therefore [had] requested a battalion of regular forces for the purpose.” Colored troops 
frequently clashed with the local white population a d an inspection report in March 1866 
noted that around Shreveport “a colored soldier can scarcely travel on the boats, without 
danger to property and life.” Whites in the region, the inspector continued, felt that black 
troops “have a bad influence on laborers. They encourage idleness, breed discontent and carry 
off the women.”93 Such tensions only increased when, in the summer and f ll of 1866, the 
army began recruiting local freedpeople to fill the ranks of discharged soldiers. The state 
commander specifically prohibited recruiters from interfering in existing labor contracts, but 
along the Red River such restriction made recruiting almost impossible as “nearly all 
freedmen are under contract.” As a result, recruiting parties often disregarded their 
instructions, bringing them into conflict with planters who felt they intruded upon both their 
property and their prerogatives.94 
 Already in August 1865, even before the final discharge of all but a handful of white 
troops in the state, the citizens of Shreveport presented a petition to the military authorities, 
claiming that “the peace and quiet, order and security of our community is greatly disturbed 
and endangered by the conduct of the colored troops.” Colored sentinels allegedly fired on 
citizens almost every day “for violating some unknow  and unpublished order.” They also 
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accused the colored soldiers of undermining the fredp ople’s labor discipline, not just by 
encouraging, or even compelling, them to break their contracts, but also by supposedly 
“instigating the former slaves of the country to dee s of insurrection and massacre.” Worst of 
all, these soldiers, who had only just emerged victorious from a long and bloody war, had the 
audacity to “frequently walk four abreast on our sidewalks while off duty and compel all 
white persons to give way to them and take the streets.” If the military authorities did not 
remove the colored soldiers from the area, a “great public calamity, the nature of which we 
have alluded to above,” would be certain to occur, although it remains unclear whether this 
was intended as merely a warning or as a thinly veiled threat.95 
 In response, Canby wrote Wells that he believed that “at Shreveport, as I have found 
upon investigation to be the case at other places, that the prejudice against color is the 
substantial foundation of the complaints that are made. The complainants are unwilling to 
accept from a colored soldier what they would not object to if the sentinel conformed to their 
prejudices.” Wells, who shared these prejudices, nevertheless warned President Johnson of 
“the baneful influence exercised by the presence and insubordinate conduct of colored troops 
on the surrounding population of the same color,” claiming that “wherever colored troops 
have appeared, their very presence demoralizes the negro for all purposes of useful 
industry.”96 Fortunately for Wells, the rapid demobilization of the army meant that but very 
few places in the South saw troops of either complexion. 
 While defending his men to the governor, Canby nevertheless acknowledged to 
Hawkins, in Alexandria, the existence of 
a disposition on the part of the colored troops to avenge the wrongs they have suffered 
from the whites. There is no doubt that in many cases the exactions of the colored 
sentinels have been unwarranted by any necessity, and the practice of firing in the 
street of a city for an inattention to, or even disobedience of, the orders of a sentinel, is 
unwarranted, when, as is almost always the case, the means are at hand to secure the 
arrest of the offenders.97  
This hardly represented a ringing endorsement of the colored troops on whom the army 
depended. Canby, like many senior officers in New Orleans throughout Reconstruction, 
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preferred erring on the side of caution, rather than endangering the reputation of the military 
by forcefully opposing the racial or political prejudices of the local white populace.  
 By October, following a second petition from citizens of Bossier and Caddo parishes, 
Canby did not even attempt to defend the conduct of olored troops to the governor, instead 
promising him to “order an additional force of white troops to Shreveport and place the whole 
subject under the control of an intelligent and discreet officer.” He assured the governor that 
the “army already does all it can to see that post c mmanders are aware of feelings in their 
area” and “arrangements have already been made to disabuse the negroes of any wrong 
impression that may have been implanted upon them.”98 With the highest commander in the 
state kowtowing to conservative white prejudices, the freedpeople and white Unionists in 
northwestern Louisiana could hardly depend on the army for protection. By the fall of 1867, 
the army had given in to such pressure and removed all black troops from the South.99 
 Canby’s efforts at conciliation failed to resolve matters. A year later, he still received 
incessant complaints regarding alleged misconduct of colored troops in and around 
Shreveport. Robert V. Marge, the clerk of the Caddo police jury sent Canby a list of robberies 
and murders supposed by the local white community to have been committed by colored 
soldiers. Edward S. Leonard and others testified that six months prior “a party of negroes, 
whom he believes to have been US soldiers came to the house of his father and commenced 
stealing poultry and taking and killing hogs.” He chased them off with gunfire and followed 
them until they split up, “some heading towards the town and others towards the regimental 
camp.” He recognized them as soldiers from “the arms they had, from the words of command 
given, from their regular order of marching, and from seeing their uniform, though 
indistinctly at a distance of some fifty yards or s, by the light of a camp fire while following 
them.”100  
 Simultaneously, the Shreveport Semi-Weekly News published an editorial complaining 
of nearly perpetual outrages by black troops. The wites had, by necessity, “learned to excuse 
our military commanders from any effort to protect our property or persons from their utter 
want of ability or their indifference to ‘d--d rebels.’” The newspaper made particular notice of 
a recent raid by a party of fifteen blacks, “dressed in US Uniforms,” on the house of a Mr. 
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Cane, near Shreveport. They took over $200 in gold an  valuables, shot his dogs, and then 
murdered Cane’s stepson and severely wounded his room-mate. The editors had no doubt that 
“these robbers belong to General Mudgett’s command[and] that he had failed to perform his 
duties.” 101  
 General William S. Mudgett himself was temporarily absent from the Shreveport post 
at this time, but his second-in-command, Major Charles M. Lowell offered a firm rebuttal to 
all these accusations. The editorial cited above was merely a specimen of similar ones 
“constantly appearing in this sheet.” These kept the w ite populace in a “state of excitement 
and prejudice against us [and] talk is continuously made of driving ‘nigger soldiers’ out of the 
country, having another war, etc.” As to colored soldiers’ involvement in any wrongdoings, 
the editor was “grossly mistaken in his information r maliciously intend[ed] to excite the 
populace.” In the two months that Lowell had commanded the post, he had made every effort 
to “keep the men close at hand and avoid all collisi n with citizens, as I knew the bitter 
prejudice and malignity that exist towards all US Troops and especially colored troops.” As a 
precaution, he and other officers made nightly inspections of the barracks and held 
unannounced roll-calls “out of regular hours.” Whites blamed soldiers for nearly every crime 
committed, despite the fact that “the whole country is armed, white and black, and more or 
less firing may be heard every night.” Numerous outrages against the freedpeople went 
unreported, but the newspapers  
are very particular to publish in gleaming colors and in exaggerating everything when 
it is possible for a soldier to be engaged in any wrongful act, and as the country is 
filled with old army clothing, these thieves and robbers would very naturally assume 
the disguise of colored soldiers.102 
 Around the same time, a little over a hundred miles to the South, near Alexandria, 
McFadden encountered similar opposition to black troops. When citizens applied to him for 
help in strengthening the levees, he sent seventy men under Captain Potter, who divided them 
into several squads, each led by a non-commissioned officer. At one point, a citizen 
“attempted to make a [black] corporal, in charge of a squad, go to work; a row ensued, of 
course, and but for the prompt interference of [Freedmen’s Bureau Agent] Bvt. Major 
Williams [...], who happened to be present, it would have ended in bloodshed.” McFadden 
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had two of the white men involved arrested, but did not detain them longer than to give them 
a good lecture on the altered condition of affairs, and the absurdity of attempting to treat 
colored soldiers as slaves.”103 
 In the same report, just three weeks after he took command, McFadden reported 
several cases of cruelty against freedpeople. A month later, things had only gotten worse. 
White Unionists, both Northern and Southern, “are living in extreme jeopardy of their lives.” 
The freedpeople had it even worse and came to his camp in droves  
from this and adjoining parishes with complaints which indicate a state of things 
disgraceful to humanity and which must prove destructive to the material prosperity of 
the country. The supervisors of labor on most of the plantations go armed and hold the 
hands in complete intimidation. Whipping - if that is the proper name for knocking 
down, kicking, and shooting men - is still practiced and there seems to be, with a large 
class, an unyielding determination to reestablish practically, if not in theory, the 
defunct ‘peculiar.’ Civil authorities did little to prevent such outrages, and even if 
negro testimony were admitted from political necessity, juries would give it little 
credence.  
As a result, even those “who are really friendly to the negro and seem to deprecate the 
lawlessness of others, [appear] to have no confidence i  the civil law and seldom dare do 
anything further than give the freedmen good advice.”104 
 Officers such as Lowell and McFadden clearly understood the threat that conservative 
white recalcitrance posed to the physical safety of freedpeople, white Unionists, and even 
colored soldiers, in the rural South - let alone to any effort to enforce the political and civil 
rights of the black population.105 However, with few troops at their disposal and hardly any 
mandate to interfere with civil government, these officers could do little more than use their 
informal influence to mitigate the worst of the abuses and report their observations to their 
superiors in the hope that the federal government would take a more forceful stance. Other 
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officers, however, did not even do that much, and from indifference, incompetence, or 
ideological conviction provided conservative whites with the implicit support of the army. 
 We have already seen how Colonel Scofield allowed the white elites in Rapides to 
appoint Confederate veterans, notorious for their violence against Unionists, as militia 
commanders in Rapides. Scofield understood Haynes’s position and sincerely praised him for 
“his loyalty in a community and state where to be so was the greatest crime, punished most 
summarily with loss of life and property.” He nevertheless dismissed the Unionist’s 
objections to the militia captains appointed, relying instead on the recommendation of the 
traditional elites. Scofield simply could not imagine that such men would favor unrepentant 
Confederate veterans, who had committed atrocities against Haynes and other more ardent 
Unionists during the war. Haynes’s accusations, he felt, were the result of his bitterness as he 
could not “reasonably be expected to show much charity to those who robbed [him] of all [he] 
possessed and then sought [his life], hunting [him] through the swamps.”106 
 Brevet Brigadier General B. L. Domblasser, in command at Shreveport from late 1865 
through early 1866, went even further than Scofield n his support of the conservative white 
militias, giving them implicit permission to disarm the black population in Bossier and Caddo 
parishes. General Canby initially dismissed rumors t  that effect, informing Governor Wells 
that Domblasser had in fact reported critically on militia activities, warning that “the frequent 
and flagrant outrages committed by the militia, or pa ties claiming to be such, are driving the 
negroes to desperation and if an insurrection does take place - of which I see no prospect - it 
will be brought about by the whites denying to them their right to life, liberty, and 
property.”107 
 As it turned out, however, Domblasser had indeed given the militias authority “to take 
from the negroes all government arms and also theirprivate arms, in case they (the militia) 
apprehended insurrection.” The general himself expected no such insurrection, but by leaving 
that judgment to the militias themselves, he effectiv ly gave government sanction to their 
illegal actions. Canby immediately replaced Domblasser with Brevet Brigadier General J. A. 
Sheets, instructing him to revoke Domblasser’s order. Canby explicitly reminded Sheetz that 
“the right of American citizen, white or black, to bear arms is undoubted,” and “that the same 
laws which govern the whites, govern the blacks, and that in all matters of their rights under 
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the law, you will treat them equally.”108 The damage, however, had been done by then, as the 
military had no means to force the militias to retun the arms already confiscated. 
 Scofield’s and Domblasser’s support for conservative white militias resulted from 
naivety and indifference, rather than disregard for the rights of the freedpeople and white 
Unionists. Brevet Lieutenant Colonel J. M. Cutts, however, actively and deliberately 
supported the local white elites during the political struggles that followed the passage of the 
Reconstruction Act in March 1867. While other military commanders, Freedmen’s Bureau 
agents, and local Republicans reported incessant violence and intimidation by the 
conservative white majority, Cutts claimed in April 1867 that the “kindest feeling exists on 
the part of the citizens, and no antagonism whatever has arisen between citizens and soldiers.” 
He showed his support for the conservative element in Caddo Parish by trying - 
unsuccessfully - to use his influence to have the Republican registrar C. L. Sweet replaced by 
the more conservative J. B. Thompson. Cutts claimed Thompson was “a citizen of high 
character,” who had been “always an opponent of secession and rebellion,” although, in 
reality, he had served on the last Confederate police jury of the parish in early 1865.109  
 Cutts also resorted to bureaucratic infighting in support of conservative white elites. In 
May, he refused to comply with Freedmen’s Bureau agent Thomas Monroe’s request for a 
detachment of troops. Monroe wanted to arrest planter William Harrison for interfering with 
his employees’ voter registration and then shooting a black youth for “not pay[ing] attention 
to him.” Although standing orders clearly authorized Bureau agents to call on the military for 
assistance in such cases, Cutts claimed he could not provide the detachment without “an 
elaborative statement and endorsement from headquarters,” that proved the civil authorities 
had failed to act. Any subsequent communication, he advised Monroe, would have to go 
through the Bureau’s sub-assistant commissioner for the egion, making it even more difficult 
for the local agent to secure military assistance i a timely fashion.110  
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 By June, complaints about Cutts began to reach the military command in New Orleans. 
According to the New Orleans Republican, “the country on Red River, from Alexandria to 
Shreveport, seems to be the most rebel-cursed corner f the American continent,” a situation 
the editorial blamed on a failure of the local military commanders. Around the same time, a 
local white Unionist named G. W. Smith complained that Cutts had rudely sent away both his 
wife and himself when each had gone to the camp to request payment for a load of firewood 
delivered on credit during the harsh winter. The executive committee of the Caddo 
Republican Club wrote to General Sheridan to warn him of the pervasive insecurity facing the 
freedpeople and white Republicans, “owing principally to the commandant of this post, Bvt. 
Lt. Col. J. M. Cutts, who has affiliated with disfranchised Ex Confederates to such an extent 
as to utterly destroy that confidence which the presence of Unites States Troops is intended to 
convey to a newly enfranchised people.”111  
 Cutts disregarded any and all criticism directed towards him. He not only denied the 
allegations in the Republican, which had singled out his command for criticism, but also went 
out of his way to respond to a Republican state convention committee report that claimed 
“that freedom and security for freedmen [is] only to be found in four parishes,” to wit: 
Orleans, St. James, St. John, and West-Baton Rouge. Although the article mentioned Caddo 
as a particularly violent parish, it also included many others. Cutts nevertheless considered the 
report a “personal affront” and an “assault and malign nt slander” on the entire military 
administration. A freedman named John Jones had told him that James H. Ingraham, a Caddo 
member of the Republican convention and chairman of the committee that wrote the report, 
was nothing but “a self-constituted delegate and absolutely unworthy of belief.” Although 
Cutts admitted that he had since learned that Ingraham “was given assent by the Republican 
Party to act as delegate,” he nevertheless enclosed Jones’s statement in a backhanded attempt 
to discredit the entire report.112 
 In July, Cutts was finally relieved and subsequently permanently removed from his 
command after attacking B. H. Peterson, a federal prisoner suspected of attempted tax fraud 
on board a New Orleans bound steamer. He attacked the prisoner in a drunken rage, and later 
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went “about the boat in nothing but his shirt.”113 The leading Republicans of Shreveport 
applauded his removal and protested the disgraced colonel’s attempts to have himself 
reinstated. Benjamin McLevan, a former US Soldier and corresponding secretary of the local 
Republican club accused him of being “notoriously intemperate,” and hoped the state 
command would permanently “remove this viper from our midst.” In September, Cutts once 
again petitioned his superiors to have him reinstated, but he never again served in 
northwestern Louisiana during Reconstruction.114 
 By then, however, Cutts’s actions had severely damaged the military’s reputation. His 
implicit support for white conservatives caused Republicans to face increasingly violent 
opposition to their attempts to organize for the first biracial elections in the state. McLevan 
wrote Ingraham in August that “the military are of no avail, while civil authorities are hostile. 
[...] The truth is, it looks rough. The colored peole will support us to the extent of their 
abilities,” but “it may be best if we do not realize what we expected.” So little security existed 
for Republicans in Caddo, Bossier, and DeSoto parishes, that anyone elected risked being 
beaten, driven off, or even killed.115 Indeed, the political violence in these parishes in the 
summer of 1867 sowed the seeds for the far more vicious and widespread political terror a 
year later. Cutts’s support for white conservatives, while exceptional in its degree, exemplifies 
how the lack of effective military authority fostered an atmosphere of lawlessness and 
impunity in which political terrorism could develop and eventually flourish. 
 
Conclusion 
The first two years following the surrender of the Confederate forces shaped the Southern 
political, economic, and social landscape in ways that had a crucial impact on the subsequent 
development of Reconstruction. Military defeat and emancipation left Southern whites not 
only economically, but also ideologically and mentally, devastated. Nevertheless, from the 
very outset many whites showed a tenacious recalcitran e towards any reforms that either 
benefited the black population or increased federal interference in local affairs. President 
Johnson readily obliged them, embarking on a policy that limited the scope of federal 
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oversight to a bare minimum and returned the Southern states to self-rule as quickly as 
possible.  
 As a result of Johnson’s leniency, Southern whites’ s lf-confidence burgeoned, along 
with their recalcitrance. Conservative Unionists and outright conservatives, dedicated to 
upholding white supremacy, took control of state and local government within months of the 
surrender. The elections of November 1865 returned an even more conservative legislature, 
which quickly enacted the Black Codes and forced Wells to hold local elections the next 
spring which returned equally conservative local officials. The military, initially more 
involved with its own demobilization than with policing Reconstruction, lacked both the 
resources and the mandate to prevent conservative whites from rapidly reestablishing 
economic, political and racial control, especially in remote areas such as the Red River Valley, 
where the federal presence was limited. These developments, combined with the economic 
and social dislocation caused by the war, fostered a climate of lawlessness and impunity in 
which some conservatives resorted to violence in settling personal and political scores with 
their Unionist neighbors and to abuse and oppress the newly freed black labor force. This 
violence presaged the more overtly political terror that erupted across Louisiana following the 
passage of the Reconstruction Acts and the enfranchisement of the blacks. By then, however, 
federal authorities and local Republicans faced an uphill battle to reclaim the political control 
that they had ceded to the white conservatives in the immediate postwar years. 
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3. Between Too Much and Not Nearly Enough 
The Freedmen’s Bureau, Free Labor Ideology, and Freedmen’s Rights, 1865-1868 
 
Just after sunset, on April 17, 1867, gunshots rangout near Benton, the parish seat of Bossier 
Parish. Some white men quickly went to investigate nd found Sullivan Drew, a local 
freedman, shot in his leg and abdomen. Drew died from his wounds that same night. Nearby 
bootprints matched a pair that William A. Hargus had purchased shortly before, along with a 
bottle of whiskey also found at the scene. Civil authorities quickly issued warrants for the 
arrest of Hargus and his companion James McCanly. Though initially apprehended, they 
escaped before a justice of the peace could hear thir case, and made their way to Arkansas. 
Although Hargus and McCanly had done the shooting, no one in Benton doubted that Lee 
Arick, a local planter, had hired both men to commit the murder. He had resented Drew ever 
since the freedman had married Arick’s former slave Charity, with whom the planter had, in 
her words, had intercourse “as man and wife […] occasionally and sometimes twice a week 
before the surrender.”  
 Once free, Charity had insisted that they either end the relationship, or that Arick “live 
with me and let other women alone.” He refused, fearing for his reputation if he openly lived 
with a black mistress. Charity, by necessity, continued to live on his place, since “I was sickly 
and had no home and did as he wanted me to.” In the summer of 1866, however, she met 
Sullivan, who proposed to live with her, to which se consented on condition that he get a 
license and legally marry her. When Arick heard of her plans, he threatened to beat her if she 
married a colored man, but she did so anyway on November 1. A few weeks later, Arick told 
the freedman Andrew Scott that “Charity is doing mewrong, such men as [Sullivan Drew] 
ought to be killed. If you will break it up between them I will give you twenty-five dollars or 
more. [Drew] must and shall be killed.” Although Scott refused the offer, a few months later, 
Sullivan Drew lay dead.1 
 Despite Radical Republicans’ political victories over President Johnson and the 
passage of the Reconstruction Act just a month prior to Sullivan Drew’s murder, limited 
security in fact existed for the freedpeople in remote areas of the rural South. Conservative 
whites not only controlled local government, they also monopolized the resources that 
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provided de facto political power: land, arms, money, ducation, and military training and 
experience. Although the federal government had made a formal commitment to protect the 
freed slaves, the army was preoccupied with its owndemobilization and not suited to such a 
police task. In many places, the only institution that stood between the recently freed black 
population and Southern whites’ desire to reestablish their political, economic, and social 
dominance was the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, better known as 
the Freedmen’s Bureau.  
 We must thank the diligent work of local Freedmen’s Bureau agents that testimonies 
such as Charity Drew’s have been preserved. In the Bur au’s absence, she and countless other 
freedpeople would have had no appeal from the nearly indiscriminate terror perpetrated by 
conservative whites who wished to reestablish their racial hegemony. At the same time, the 
Bureau’s records testify to the inherent weaknesses of the agency. Despite the good intentions 
and conscientious efforts of many local officers, they could often do little more than record 
the victims’ testimony. In the Drew case, as in so many others, there is no record of the 
perpetrators facing any formal legal proceedings for their crime. 
 Dunningite historians saw the Bureau as an oppressive agent of Northern and Radical 
Republican domination of the South. In Louisiana, Ficklen concluded, it was both “a failure 
and as an unwelcome agent between employer and employee.” Fleming is slightly more 
nuanced, admitting the good intentions of at least the senior leadership and lauding the 
Bureau’s economic relief efforts – at least for whites – in the immediate aftermath of the war. 
The supposed incompetence, Republican partisanship, and greed of most local agents, 
however, ensured that “it failed to exert a permanently wholesome influence” and contributed 
to the “alienation of the two races […] and the ill feelings then aroused were destined to 
persist into a long and troubled future.”2 
 George R. Bentley’s 1955 overview of the Bureau’s history offered a somewhat more 
nuanced perspective, but over the following decades revi ionist scholars radically reevaluated 
the institution. Two years before the publication of Bentley’s study, John and La Wanda Cox 
had already concluded that “even the most friendly studies of the Bureau have exaggerated its 
weaknesses and minimized its strength.” Subsequent revisionists praised the Bureau for its 
support of the freedmen, while others reversed the Dunningite narrative entirely and accused 
the Bureau of not being Radical enough. This development exemplifies the rapid development 
                                                 
2 Ficklen, Reconstruction in Louisiana through 1868, 137; Fleming, Sequel of Appomattox, 15, 117, and chapter 
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in Reconstruction and Freedmen’s Bureau historiography in just a few short decades. Whereas 
earlier authors had criticized the Bureau for interfering too much in the South, many 
revisionist scholars believed its greatest fault lay in not doing enough to help the emancipated 
slaves.3 
 From the 1970s on, historians of the Freedmen’s Bureau began to take a more 
moderate approach to their subject. This new Freedmn’s Bureau historiography paralleled 
the post-revisionist developments in the broader fild of Reconstruction scholarship. It 
emphasized institutional and ideological constraints that hampered the Bureau, the essentially 
moderate character of even its more radical programs, and increasingly studied the 
functioning of the Bureau at the state and local level, rather than its national leadership. 
Robert Harisson, in a review of this recent literatu e, concludes that although the Bureau 
“made an important difference to the lives of freedp ople and left its mark on the social and 
economic institutions of the postbellum South,” theBureau nevertheless failed to achieve 
many of its original goals. This failure was “as much a consequence of the ‘almost 
insuperable obstacles’ that the agency faced as of it wn inadequacies.”4 
 Such a critical narrative, which emphasizes the Burea ’s shortcomings, raises an 
analytical conundrum of its own. If the Freedmen’s Bureau and its agents acted as moderates 
who sought to mediate an equitable and balanced compromise between the interests of 
laborers and landowners, why then did contemporaries in the South, both white and black, 
view them primarily as allies of the recently freed slaves? In reality, as Foner notes, “most 
Southern whites resented the Bureau as […] a barrier to the authority reminiscent of slavery 
that the planters hoped to impose,” while blacks remained committed “to the Bureau as an 
embodiment of the nation’s responsibility.” To understand the firm commitment of the 
freedpeople to the Bureau and the Southern whites equally passionate hatred, involves more 
                                                 
3 George R. Bentley, A History of the Freedmen’s Bureau (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1955); 
John Cox and LaWanda Cox, “General O. O. Howard and the ‘Misrepresented Bureau,’” The Journal of 
Southern History 19, no. 4 (1953): 428; McFeely, Yankee Stepfather, especially 304–316. Other works in this 
vein include: Oubre, Forty Acres and a Mule; Martin Abbott, The Freedmen’s Bureau in South Carolina, 1865-
1872 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967); John A Carpenter, Sword and Olive Branch: 
Oliver Otis Howard (New York: Fordham University Press, 1999); LaWand Cox, “The Promise of Land for the 
Freedmen,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 45, no. 3 (1958): 413–40. 
4 The term ‘New Reconstruction historiography was coined by John David Smith: “‘The Work It Did Not Do 
Because It Could Not’: Georgia and the ‘New’ Freedmn’s Bureau Historiography,” The Georgia Historical 
Quarterly 82, no. 2 (1998): 331–49. For a recent collection of essays that reflect these developments see: Paul A. 
Cimbala and Randall M. Miller, eds., The Freedmen’s Bureau and Reconstruction : Reconsiderations (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 1999). For Louisiana: Howard A White, The Freedmen’s Bureau in Louisiana 
(Louisiana State University Press, 1970). An overview of this historiography can be found in Robert Harrison, 
“New Representations of a ‘Misrepresented Bureau’: Reflections on Recent Scholarship on the Freedmen’s 
Bureau,” American Nineteenth Century History 8, no. 2 (2007): especially 212, 213. 
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than a reference to “the irreconcilable interests of former masters and former slaves as each 
sought to define the meaning of emancipation.” While undoubtedly true, such ‘irreconcilable 
interests’ merely explain why the kind of mediation the Bureau attempted failed, not why 
Southerners of both races consistently felt that it operated to the benefit of the freedpeople, 
regardless of how moderate or even conservative its policies may appear in retrospect.5 
 To resolve this apparent paradox, we must take into account the fundamentally 
asymmetrical power relations that characterized racial relations in the postwar South. In the 
immediate aftermath of slavery, the black population lacked the economic, educational and 
institutional resources necessary to negotiate effectively with the landowners, even in the 
absence of endemic racism. Without federal interfernce, Southern whites could and would 
quickly have reduced the freedpeople to a condition that, in Charles Schurtz’s words, “would 
not be exactly the re-establishment of slavery in its old form, but as for the practical working 
of the system with regard to the welfare of the fredmen, the difference would only be for the 
worse.” Under such conditions, any federal interference that sought to provide some measure 
of economic and legal security for the freedpeople encroached on what Southern whites 
considered both their interest and their prerogative. As Ted Tunnell puts it, whenever an 
“agent balanced a landowner’s word on the scales of truth against a freedman’s, he 
transgressed a cardinal rule of white supremacy. Even if the agent decided in his favor, he was 
unlikely to be grateful.”6 Indeed, no matter how equitably the Bureau agents tried to balance 
the interests of the freedpeople and the planters, the result of their interference inevitably gave 
more to the black population than they would have obtained in its absence. 
 This returns us to the case of Sullivan Drew’s murder. The case is drawn from a report 
by the Shreveport Bureau agent Martin Flood and reflects the kind of dilemmas agents faced 
time and again in adjudicating conflicts between freedpeople and planters. Although slavery 
had ended, Lee Arick used his economic leverage, as employer and landlord, to pressure 
Charity into remaining as his occasional concubine against her expressed will. Charity, 
meanwhile, clearly understood emancipation to entail freedom from such sexual exploitation 
but had no course of appeal open to her. The arrangement was hardly likely to have been 
                                                 
5 Foner, Reconstruction, 143, 168, 169, 170.. Foner himself notes the tension between the critical assessment of 
the Bureau by many revisionist scholars and the “unrele ting hostility” that Southern whites felt towards it. His 
conclusion that the Bureau acted as “the agent of the northern free labor ideology” however places too much 
emphasis on conflicting ideologies, while ignoring the fundamental power asymmetry and racial antagonism that 
was the context of Southern labor relations. Eric Foner, Politics and Ideology in the Age of the Civil War (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 101. 
6 CSS, 39-1, Sen. Ex. 2, 24; Ted Tunnell, “Marshall Harvey Twitchell and the Freedmen’s Bureau in Bienvlle 
Parish,” Louisiana History 33, no. 3 (1992): 249. 
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formalized in a contract, placing it beyond the cognizance of the Bureau agent. She hoped to 
find security from Arick by marrying Sullivan Drew, but even then their economic situation 
made them vulnerable to retribution, as they continued, from necessity, to live on Arick’s 
plantation. He could easily mobilize his resources, reach out to desperadoes, and have 
Sullivan Drew murdered in cold blood.  
 While his hired thugs fled the state, Arick himself l ft for New Orleans where he 
could avoid any difficult questions Flood might wish to ask him. Flood urged his superiors to 
have all the parties involved arrested and tried in New Orleans, since they “never will be 
brought to justice by Civil Authorities” in Shreveport. No record exists, however, of the case 
being prosecuted, and given the Bureau’s limited resources it is unlikely that Hargus and 
McCanly were ever caught. Given the circumstantial nature of the evidence against Arick, 
moreover, even a federal court would have difficulty convicting him, so long as at least one 
white juror sat on his case. Flood therefore, despit  his best intentions, could do little more for 
Charity than record her testimony and urge his superiors to forceful action that he most likely 
knew would be futile.  
 Despite his apparent powerlessness, the whites involved would still have seen the 
Bureau as an unwarranted interference. In its absence, Arick, had he not been able to prevent 
the marriage in the first place, might have avoided the expense of hiring others to do his 
killing for him. Neither would he have needed to take the troublesome precaution of leaving 
for New Orleans after the fact. Less tangible, but perhaps even more important, the Bureau 
offered black victims such as Charity a venue to legitimately and officially present their 
grievances. However limited its subsequent actions, the Bureau thus helped substantiate the 
freedpeople’s claim to citizenship by giving official sanction to their voice. In such ways, 
despite the obvious shortcomings of the Bureau from our twenty-first century perspective, it 
nevertheless acted as a curb on the impunity with which whites otherwise might dominate the 
recently freed slaves.  
 
A Promise Betrayed 
Before his appointment as the first assistant commissioner for the Freedmen’s Bureau in 
Louisiana, Thomas Conway had gained much relevant experience as head of the wartime 
Bureau of Free Labor, with responsibility for the fr edpeople in Union areas of the state. His 
final report on the Freedman’s Bureau’s institutional predecessor offers a tantalizing preview 
of many of the problems and dilemmas which the Burea ’s agents would face on a much 
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larger scale, as well as reminding us of the potential for significant change which the Bureau 
embodied and which its later shortcomings tend to obscure. 7 
 Conway complained of a lack of funding and other resources at his disposal, despite 
his responsibility for “thousands of destitute freedmen [that] came through our lines.” He 
nevertheless succeeded in establishing four ‘home colonies,’ plantations on which freedmen 
worked for their own account. The large crops produce  there, “showed a triumph of the free 
labor system,” proving the “freedmen to be not idlers but industrious.” Conway had high 
hopes for future prosperity based on the redistribution of at least 60,000 acres of land to the 
freedpeople, which promised “greater profits, and by far more happiness, to the white and 
colored populations of the State, under the influence of free labor, and in a very few years, 
than was ever before enjoyed.” 
 Conway also reported on the numerous obstacles he ncountered, most of which could 
be traced to the persistent resistance by the local white population to policies aimed at 
substantiating the liberty of their former slaves. A meeting of planters in November of 1864 
drew up a series of rules and regulations to govern labor relations, which, according to 
Conway, “would have brought the freedmen again into bondage, in fact, if not in name.” 
These regulations gave planters complete control over the laborers, who could not leave the 
plantation, own stock, or grow produce for their own account except with the permission of 
the landowner. Although light offenses might be punished by fines, the planters insisted on 
the necessity of corporal punishment in “obstinate c ses” on the premise that “the whole study, 
aim and object of the negro laborer now is, how to av id work, and yet have a claim for 
wages, rations, clothes, etc.” 
 Instead of these regulations, the commanding general, Stephen A. Hurlbut, issued 
orders which closely resembled General Banks’s wartime system of contract labor. These 
orders incorporated what officials considered a reason ble wage to working freedpeople, in 
addition to prohibiting corporal punishment and guaranteeing them “just treatment, 
wholesome rations, comfortable clothing, fuel and medical attendance, and the opportunity of 
instruction of children.” On the other hand, the system compelled the freedpeople to work 
faithfully for the planter they contracted with, bywithholding half their wages until the end of 
the year as well as instituting a system of fines and penalties for time lost. Such a system was 
                                                 
7 The following paragraphs derive from: Thomas W. Conway, Final Report of the Bureau of Free Labor, 
Department of the Gulf, to Major General E.R.S. Canby, Commanding (New Orleans: Times Book and Job 
Office 1865). 
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a far cry from the free labor idyll of small farmers working independently on redistributed 
lands that Conway envisioned for the future. Instead, it aimed to balance the interests of both 
laborers and planters in order to get cotton production up and running again in the wake of the 
war. 
 Although many planters expressed public support for Hurlbut’s system when proposed, 
they opposed its implementation, in particular the collection of a three dollar poll tax on every 
hand employed, two-thirds of which the planters had to pay. Those who had been the 
strongest supporters of the Confederacy, “with sons in the rebel army as Colonels, Generals, 
etc.” objected most forcefully to the new labor system and complained most bitterly of 
oppression by the federal government. They paid the freedpeople their wages grudgingly and 
where possible would take “advantage of the freedmen, and the freedmen, knowing this, 
distrusted them.” Nor could the freedpeople expect succor from the state authorities who 
ignored “the orders of the Commanding General of the Department, the laws of Congress, and 
the orders of the War Department […] as far as they could.” Conway feared that “if the 
freedmen were left to the mercy of the people who formerly owned them as slaves, or to 
officers of their selection, we might with one count of the fingers of our hands number the 
years which the race would spend with us.” 
 Despite these obstacles, Conway expressed a decidely optimistic prospect for the 
future of free labor. Under the guidance of the Burea , and the influence of entrepreneurial 
and unprejudiced Northern planters, he believed the fre  labor system would bring to the 
South greater prosperity than it had ever known under slavery.8 Early developments in the 
Red River region seemed to support Conway’s optimisic prognosis. In early July, a month 
after Kirby Smith’s surrender, Conway’s subordinates in Alexandria and Shreveport found a 
white population highly resistant to the very idea of free labor. Whites anonymously 
threatened their peers who might hire black labor for wages and made sure they informed the 
agent in Shreveport of the freedpeople’s “incapacity to take care of himself; of his indolence, 
stupidity, his thievish disposition, his utter disregard of all forms of law and order, of the 
impracticability as well as the impossibility of cultivating the country without some means of 
‘controlling’ the persons of the laborers.” 
                                                 
8 Conway also noted the presence of Northerners who came to the South out of sheer opportunism, caring only 
for their own “pecuniary interests,” precisely the class which Southern propagandists would soon deride under 
the ‘carpetbagger’ moniker. 
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 Not much later, however, the same officer reported that under the Bureau’s pressure to 
get the freedpeople back to work on their former plantations, the planters and freedmen had 
entered into written contracts for the remainder of the year, either on the basis of cash wages 
or for a share of the crop. If such strides could be made so quickly in a region that had held 
out against the Union effort longer than any other in the South, Conway indeed might have 
felt justified in predicting “greater profits, and by far more happiness, to the white and colored 
populations of the State, under the influence of free labor, and in a very few years, than was 
ever before enjoyed.”9  
 After the Bureau of Free Labor had become part of he Freedmen’s Bureau, the 
transition from slave to free labor would prove far more difficult and ultimately less 
successful than Conway had envisioned. One of his earliest circulars as assistant 
commissioner warned that “many men go about inflicting personal violence upon freedmen, 
and, in some instances, murdering them.” He ordered his agents to have the Emancipation 
Proclamation read aloud at every plantation, authorized them to adjudicate “in all cases 
arising within their respective districts, between freedmen themselves, or between freedmen 
and white persons, when the civil officers, by reason of old codes, fail to do the impartial 
justice.”10  
 A month later, on August 10 1865, an optimistic Conway forwarded to his agents in 
the field a directive from Commissioner Howard which set aside confiscated lands “for the 
use of loyal refugees and freedmen.” They would receive up to forty acres, and “be protected 
in the use and enjoyment of the land” for three years, during or after which period they might 
purchase the land and “receive such title thereto as the United States can convey.” For this 
purpose, Howard and Conway explicitly exempted abandoned and confiscated property “set 
apart for refugees and freedmen” from those lands to be returned to planters under Johnson’s 
proclamation of amnesty.11 
 The wording ‘as the United States can convey’ indicates that Howard foresaw possible 
legal and political difficulties in redistributing confiscated and abandoned lands. As it was, 
just six weeks later President Johnson forced Howard to issue a circular revoking the above 
                                                 
9 ‘Extract from Report of Lieut. Stickney, Assistant Superintendent at Shreveport, July 2, 1865,’ ‘Extract from 
Another Report by the Same Officer,’ ‘Extract from Report of Lieut. L. S. Butler, Asst. Supt. Of Freedmen, 
Alexandria, La., July 10, 1865,’ in Conway, Final Report, 20-22. 
10  ‘July 14, 1865, New Orleans, Headquarters Freedmen’s Bureau, Circular 2,’ in Rights of freedmen : 
Circulation of Emancipation Proclamation, Duties of Superintendents of Freedmen (New Orleans: Freedmen’s 
Bureau, 1865) [Hereinafter: Rights of Freedmen]. 
11 ‘August 10, 1865, Conway and Howard, Circular No. 7,’ in CSS, 39-1, HOR. Ex. 70, 16-18. 
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policy and giving priority to restoration of abandoned lands to their original owners. Conway, 
seeing his more radical ambitions frustrated, instructed his agents to temper the freedpeople’s 
expectations, as to “avoid the evils attaching the belief, now almost universal among 
freedmen of the state that the government is going to divide up the greater portion of the 
abandoned land in its possession to them.” Instead, Bureau agents were to encourage the 
freedpeople to “make agreements with all who offer th m fair wages and good treatment.”12 
Nevertheless, land redistribution had been no pipe-dream peddled by unscrupulous 
Republican politicos to gullible freedpeople. However briefly, it had constituted official 
Bureau policy in Louisiana. 
 Even before the bitter conflict over land reform, the conservative Governor Wells had 
complained to his ally Andrew Johnson regarding Conway’s labor policies. Wells assured the 
president that the vast majority of whites in Louisiana accepted abolition as “fixed and 
irreversible,” and wished to give the system of free labor “a fair trial by strict compliance with 
all its regulations.” Conway, however, undermined the planters’ good will by  
allowing the negroes to go where they please and to work for whom they please. The 
effect of the order will be to utterly demoralize the negroes, besides the ruin brought 
on the planters in withdrawing the labor necessary to the gathering of their crops now 
in the ground, to say nothing of the dangerous and vengeful spirit that idleness and 
want may engender in the breasts of the negroes towards the whites.13 
 Free labor, in Wells’s interpretation, implied a system that bound laborers to their 
employer for the duration of the planting season, rega dless of whether such a condition had 
been contractually stipulated. Wells went on to recommend Conway’s removal as assistant 
commissioner of the Louisiana Bureau, painting him  
A radical negro suffrage man – [who] thinks the black better than the white man [...] 
Inoculated as he is with these ideas, he cannot perform the part of an impartial agent 
in representing the general government and particularly under the conservative policy 
of your administration, Mr. President, who, while securing to the black man his rights 
as a freeman, have emphatically told him ‘that freedom means work.’14 
                                                 
12 ‘September 25, 1865, Howard, approved by Johnson, Circular No. 16,’ NARA, RG 105, M1905, reel 53, 
frame 920. 
13 ‘July 28, 1865, New Orleans, Wells to Johnson,’ Wells Microfilm. 
14 Ibid. 
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 Johnson agreed, and by the fall ordered Conway relieved of his duties and temporarily 
replaced him with his trusted associate James S. Fullerton. Fullerton proceeded to stake out a 
far more conservative policy in an extensive ‘Address to the Freedmen of Louisiana.’ His 
harsh admonishment and condescending tone illustrate the limited conception of freedom he - 
and by extension Johnson, Wells, and the vast majority of Southern whites - envisaged for the 
former slaves. Although Fullerton himself served but very briefly in Louisiana, his program 
neatly encapsulates the conservative vision that would set the relatively narrow policy limits 
within which Bureau agents would subsequently have to operate: 
The government has made you free. You can now work for such employers as you 
may desire; you can control and use your own wages, and you can sue and obtain 
justice in the state courts […] For what more can you ask? […] Slavery has passed 
away and you are now placed on trial. It is for you t  prove that you are able to take 
care of yourselves, and that you deserved to be made free. […] It is not the intention 
of the officers of the Bureau to nurse and pamper you, to feed and to cloth you, or to 
give you any privilege that others do not enjoy. […] You cannot always have this help 
which a generous government has offered you. Soon it will be withdrawn, and if you 
cannot then live without it you do not deserve to be free. 
[…] 
Do not believe the idle and malicious stories that have been told you by bad men as to 
what the government intends to do for you. All had been done for you that you can 
expect. […] No land will be given to you. Already a large quantity of land […] had 
been returned to its owners, and even if it had not been returned to its owners it would 
not have been given you nor divided among you.15 
Fullerton’s remarks regarding the redistribution of land appear particularly disingenuous, as 
he castigates the freedpeople for believing what but a few months earlier had been 
promulgated as official government policy. 
 The few extant Bureau reports from this period from northwest Louisiana illustrate 
how poorly Fullerton understood – or wished to understand – the reality of race relations in 
the state. A few days after Fullerton issued his address, D. H. Reese, agent for the Bureau in 
Shreveport, reported that planters near the Texas border forced illegal contracts on the 
                                                 
15 ‘New Orleans, October 20, 1865, Fullerton, Circular 24, Address to the Freedmen of Louisiana,’ NARA, G
105, M1905, reel 53, frame 925. 
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freedpeople and he requested mounted troops to arrest th  parties involved. While Fullerton 
emphasized that the freedpeople needed to expect no more from the government than their 
white neighbors, Marshall Harvey Twitchell, the agent for Bienville, dryly noted that “an 
equal number of free white laborers subjected to similar treatment at work for the same pay, 
forced into contracts the content of which in many cases were entirely concealed form, or 
grossly misrepresented to them, would have given thir employers and the authorities trouble 
much more serious than have the freedmen.”16 
 Fullerton paid scant attention to such reports, blaming them on the prejudices of his 
agents. In his final report to Howard, he decried their “want of tact, conciliation, and sound 
judgment […] it appears as though they went to the south to foster disunion, rather than to 
cure and heal.” Such agents, he continues “listen to the story or the complaint of the black 
man alone, refusing to hear his white neighbor on the same subject, or if they did listen, with 
the determination not to believe.”17 He cared little for the fate of the freed slaves. In tead, he 
strove to achieve a rapid reconciliation of the white population and restoration of southern 
states to full participation in the union. 
 Although Fullerton only headed the Bureau in Louisiana for two weeks in October 
1865, his brief tenure had a huge impact, permanently u dermining the more radical course 
set out by Conway. Louisiana Bureau historian Howard White and army historian Joseph 
Dawson agree that Absalom Baird, Joseph Mower, and Robert C. Buchanan, who headed the 
Bureau for most of the following years, were moderate to radical.18 However, with the 
possibility of land reform off the table, Bureau courts severely restricted (see below), and the 
threat of removal by Johnson a permanent reality, they could do little more than oversee the 
fairly rapid transition to a contract labor system based on sharecropping, while attempting to 
protect the freedpeople from the worst excesses of violence and abuse perpetrated by their 
former masters.  
 In part as a result of Johnson’s unwillingness to adequately fund the Bureau, agents in 
the field faced numerous practical obstacles to achieving even these modest goals. Local 
agents had to operate under a limited and often ambiguous mandate, with few means to 
enforce what authority they did have. The Bureau, even more than the army, suffered from a 
                                                 
16 ‘October 25, 1865, Shreveport, Reese to Parsons,’ NARA, RG 105, M1905, reel 100, frame 367; ‘December 1, 
1865, Bienville, Twitchell to Baird,’ NARA, RG 105, M1027, reel 13, frame 225. 
17 ‘December 2, 1865, Washington, DC, Fullerton to Howard,’ in CSS, 39-1, HOR. Ex. 70, 393-403: 394. 
18 White, The Freedmen’s Bureau in Louisiana, 25, 28; Dawson, Army Generals and Reconstruction, 38, 66, 75–
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chronic shortage of funds and resources, most notably manpower and adequate 
transportation.19 In Bienville Parish, bureaucratic obstructionism took Kafkaesque forms after 
the Bureau’s horse there died in November 1867. Successive agents made almost weekly 
requests for either a replacement or funds to hire a horse locally, but to no avail. At the end of 
June, 1868, Edward Bean finally received a note from his superiors asking him to sign a 
receipt for a new horse, but the animal itself did not arrive for another six weeks. For ten 
months the agents in the parish had been unable to inspect plantations or investigate various 
crimes reported, including the attempted murder of William Honneus, a former Union soldier 
who had run for Sheriff on the Republican ticket.20 
 Bureau agents also faced a local white population that fundamentally questioned the 
agency’s legitimacy. Michael Ryan, district judge of Rapides parish, neatly summed up 
conservative whites’ attitudes towards the Bureau in his charge to a Rapides grand jury in 
October 1865. He generously admitted that the local agent was in no way objectionable and 
had performed his duties admirably. However, “the institution itself is calculated to render 
unhappy the former slave now made free; to put him in some particulars above the white race.” 
The grand jury, in their report a week later, parroted Ryan’s praise of the local Bureau agent 
and then proceeded to condemn “the obnoxious, oppressive, crudely digested, and inefficient 
Law, unproductive of real good to anyone whilst it is multitudinously productive of injury 
and evil to all, and against the Institution created under it.” They judged the contract system 
enforced by the Bureau a farce, claiming the agents lacked either the means or the will to 
enforce performance of contractual obligations on the freedpeople.21 
 The conservative press evinced a similar opposition to the Bureau. After the Louisiana 
legislature passed the Black Codes, the Bienville Messenger accused the Bureau of “providing 
special agents to see that the negro is not swindled; while they are further robbing the down 
trodden poverty-stricken white laborers in their own highly civilized communities.”22 A few 
months later, in its commentary on Johnson’s veto of the bill to extend the Bureau’s life, the 
                                                 
19 ‘Veto of the Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill’ in Bruce Frohnen (ed.), The American Nation: Primary Sources 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008), http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/2282/216252; Randall M. Miller, 
“Introduction,” in The Freedmen’s Bureau and Reconstruction : Reconsiderations, ed. Paul A. Cimbala and 
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20 ‘May 31, 1868, Sparta, Bean to Warren,’ ‘June 10, 868, Sparta, Bean to Warren,’ ‘June 30, 1868, Sparta, 
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editor of the Louisiana Democrat proudly proclaimed his ignorance of the particular 
provisions of the bill. He nevertheless praised the Pr sident for his veto and its accompanying 
message, “pregnant with meaning, and […] full of hope for the Southern people.”23  
 White conservatives did not necessarily disapprove of the Bureau because of any of its 
particular policies, but because it symbolized their d feat and powerlessness. With the rapid 
demobilization of the army, Bureau agents rapidly replaced soldiers as the visible token of 
Northern interference in local affairs. Nevertheless, while editors and other spokesmen for 
white political sentiment lambasted the Bureau, many planters – albeit often grudgingly - 
sought out agents’ assistance in organizing, regulating nd disciplining their newly free labor 
force.24 By 1868, as opposition to Reconstruction became increasingly violent, the Bossier 
Banner, in an attempt to undermine such cooperation with a hated institution, urged planters 
to decline Bureau aid and to let their crops fail rther than become dependent on its 
assistance.25 
 While conservative whites broadly rejected the legitimacy of the Bureau in principle, 
they differed as to their practical attitude to theagency and its personnel while in place. The 
Editors of the Louisiana Democrat leavened their harsh criticism of the Bureau in general 
with surprisingly generous praise for the actual conduct of local agents, while the 
Natchitoches Times imply urged its readers to avoid difficulties by having Bureau agents 
approve contracts as required. The Bossier Banner took a far harsher line, calling Bureau 
agents “Australian rats” and “good-for-nothing, lazy, lousy, mangy curs.” The Banner insisted 
that the Bureau not only harmed the interest of the w ite planters, but was equally obnoxious 
to the freedpeople, who would be as glad as the whites to see the agents leave:  
You [i.e. Bureau agents] will never have an opportunity of swindling, robbing, 
oppressing and lying to [the freedpeople] again. [...] The sight of your bloated 
carcasses will never again disgust our citizens. No longer will the ‘saddle-colored’ 
maidens court your smiles, or the dark-hued sip nectar from your whiskey-perfumed 
lips.26  
                                                 
23 LD, 66-02-28. 
24 See, for example, ‘July 24, 1866, Lodi Plantation, Wells to Williams,’ NARA, RG 105, M1905, reel 53, frame 
449; ‘March 11, 1867, Monett’s Ferry, Bost to Cromie,’ NARA, RG 105, M1905, reel 91, frame 396 
25 BB, 68-03-07. 
26 LD, 66-11-28, NT, 66-02-07, BB, 66-07-07, 68-02-29. 
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In DeSoto Parish, opposition to the Bureau was so fierce that, after one agent had been run out 
of the parish, his successor, Edward Henderson, pretend d to be a Democrat and refused to do 
anything to help the blacks for fear of having his “chunk put out.” 27 
 Besides organizational problems and white opposition, their own ideological 
perspective constrained the officers of the Freedmen’s Bureau at all levels. Foner has 
emphasized how the ideology of free labor influenced the activities of the Bureau, which “was 
not, in reality, the agent of the planters, nor was it precisely the agent of the former slaves. It 
can best be understood as the agent of the northern free labor ideology itself.” Its introduction 
into the former slave states, however, fundamentally ltered the nature of the free labor 
doctrine. Originally, its supporters had emphasized the importance of “independence founded 
on land ownership,” an interpretation to which the freedpeople continued to adhere. But with 
land reform effectively off the table by late 1865, most Bureau agents stressed a more 
conservative strain of free labor thinking that posited an essential community of interest 
between laborers and planters. They believed – or at least hoped - that a system of labor 
contracts would ensure both the economic and social stability of the region as a whole, while 
simultaneously guaranteeing the interests of all clsses equally.28  
 Free labor thus evolved “from a doctrine that championed the ownership of productive 
property as the bedrock of economic independence to one that celebrated the freedom of the 
laborer to sell his or her labor for the best possible terms on a free and open market.”29 Many 
Northerners, including Secretary of War Edward Stanton, worried more about guarding 
“against a national system of pauperism that might foster a horde of idle officials or dishonest 
agents, and engender vice, sloth, and improvidence among a large class of persons,” than they 
did about protecting the freedpeople from violent persecution and enforcing their civil and 
political rights. The ambiguity in this interpretation of free labor is encapsulated in an early 
circular order from Conway, instructing his subordinates “in all cases [to] give the freedmen 
to understand that they are entirely free to work where and for whom they please, and at the 
same time that a life of idleness will not be encouraged or allowed.” President Johnson well 
                                                 
27 CSS, 41-2, HOR. Misc. 154, part 1, 474, 674. 
28 Lanza, “Freedmen’s Bureau, Reconsiderations,” 67; Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The 
Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); Foner, 
Politics and Ideology in the Age of the Civil War, 101, chapter 6; Foner, Reconstruction, chap. 4; Michael Les 
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History 9, no. 2 (1981): 179–185; Miller, “Introduction,” xix–xx. 
29 John C. Rodrigue, “The Freedmen’s Bureau and Wage Labor in the Louisiana Sugar Region,” in The 
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understood the conservative implications of such an interpretation of free labor, when he 
argued in his First Annual Message to Congress that the interdependence between (black) 
labor and (white) capital in the South might better guarantee the protection of the freedpeople 
than direct federal supervision. The assembled Repres ntatives and Senators, he urged, ought 
to “avoid hasty assumptions of any natural impossibility for the two races to live side by side 
in a state of mutual benefit and good will.”30 
  
With Few Acres and No Mules 
Some planters refused to acknowledge the legality of emancipation even after the Confederate 
armies were defeated. On July 7, 1865, for instance, E. V. Tully gave the freedman Calvin a 
note, permitting him to “ hire to whom he pleases, but I shall hold him as my property until 
set free by Congress.”31 Despite such recalcitrance, the inevitable realization that the black 
population really was free sank in soon enough. Once the Christmas Day Insurrection Scare of 
late 1865 had passed, the vast majority of Southerners of both races also realized that the 
federal government had no intention of redistributing large amounts of land among the freed 
slaves. With re-enslavement and redistribution both ruled out, the future of free labor revolved 
around a system of landless black laborers working for white landlords. For the next few 
years, officers of the Bureau spent the bulk of their time approving contracts between 
freedpeople and planters and adjudicating conflicts that inevitably arose between both classes. 
 Contracts based on a share of the crop, rather than a fixed wage, soon dominated in the 
Red River region.32 Only sporadic evidence exists regarding labor relations in 1866, but that 
evidence indicates that the share system took root f m the very start of Reconstruction. In 
November of that year, Flood, the Shreveport agent, noted that most freedmen in his district 
worked on shares. Charles Miller in Natchitoches received complaints early in 1867 from 
various freedmen who did not receive the share agreed upon for the year past. Montfort Wells, 
the brother of Louisiana’s governor and one of the largest planters in Rapides, also contracted 
on shares with his laborers, although in this parish such an arrangement was still the exception, 
with a minority of the plantations adopting the system. In Bienville, in August and September 
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of 1866, an unnamed agent intervened in a few dispute , where the “written contract was 
informal and illegal,” requiring the freedpeople to d  any and all work the planter required 
without stating their recompense. In all these cases the agent formalized the agreement 
guaranteeing the laborers a share of the crop.33 By 1867 and 1868, the system had become 
ubiquitous throughout the region. Bureau officers from Winn, Rapides, Bienville, 
Natchitoches, and Shreveport reported all or most freedmen to be working on the basis of 
shares.34 
 John C. Rodrigue has shown that the freedpeople in the sugar planting areas of 
Southern Louisiana succeeded, with support of the Freedmen’s Bureau, in negotiating a 
relatively advantageous wage labor system. This provided them with a reasonable income and 
relative autonomy in the first decades following emancipation. Rodrigue’s argument 
contradicts Ralph Shlomowitz’s claim that sharecropping “represented, in large measure, a 
convergence of the interests of planters and freedmn.” In fact, sharecropping arrangements 
that developed in the cotton growing areas, such as t e Red River Valley, had less to offer the 
black population than cash wages, both in terms of material rewards and substantive 
freedoms.35 The freedpeople themselves readily perceived the advantages of “stipulated 
monthly wages” and Bureau agents advised them to contract for monthly pay rather than 
shares whenever possible, “as there is less opportunity for embesslement [sic.] if planter is so 
disposed.” After crop failures in 1866 and 1867 deprived planters of the ready cash needed to 
pay monthly wages, Bureau agents conceded that sharecropping remained the only viable 
option, even if they believed it detrimental to thefreedpeople.36  
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 Labor conditions in northwestern Louisiana had such an abysmal reputation 
throughout the state, that when Caddo and Bossier parishes experienced an acute shortage of 
labor in early 1868 freedmen from Concordia refused to come up the Red River, despite 
widespread unemployment in that parish.37 In Rapides, labor was available, but planters 
refused to offer any contracts, hoping to force the fre dpeople to accept lower wages. Only 
when agents from other parishes, mostly in the sugar region, came north to snatch up the 
surplus labor did planters hire freedpeople for the ensuing year. In one case, the Bureau agent 
in Alexandria sent 200 laborers to Lafourche Parish to elp break a strike, because, as the 
local Bureau agent put it, “the negroes in this section have been enormously misled and 
demand enormous wages & refuse to enter into contracts altogether.”38 
 Sharecropping entailed three distinct risks for the freedpeople. First, as planters often 
advanced them their rations, clothing and other necessities throughout the year, a poor crop 
could easily leave the laborer with little or no cash, or even indebted to his employer, at the 
end of the year. Second planters, who controlled th sale of the crop, often defrauded their 
laborers, by refusing to pay their share under some pretext or another. Finally, and particularly 
in the northernmost parishes, planters routinely resort d to violence against their laborers. 
They drove the freedpeople from the plantation once the work was completed, leaving them 
not only without their rightful wages, but also destitute and homeless.  
 Both freedpeople working for wages as those on share  risked finding themselves 
indebted to the planters they worked for at the endof the year for advances made. Those 
working on shares, however, faced the additional risk of losing their entire income due to 
floods, drought or cotton worm, leaving them with nothing at year’s end but an unpaid bill. 
Moreover, those on wages often received part of their wages each month, allowing them to 
purchase provisions for cash, rather than on expensiv  credit. Those working on shares, on the 
other hand, found themselves at the mercy of planters, who did not hesitate to take advantage 
of the freedpeople’s lack of education and experience i  doing business. Bureau agents often 
found it impossible to dispute the accounts kept by planters and one agent even accused his 
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colleagues of taking bribes from planters in return for adjudicating disputes in their favor. The 
Bureau records reveal numerous complaints from freedp ople for non-payment of wages, 
where on investigation the agent found that the fredp ople actually owed their employers 
money. Laborers who found themselves destitute after toiling for a year were naturally 
distraught, and even when they “acknowledge that they owe the farmers what is charged 
against them, they seem to think that they should have some money coming them.”39 
 Freedmen’s Bureau agents often blamed the freedpeople’s penury on their supposed 
extravagance, rather than on the inherently unfair system under which they worked. Even 
though Delos W. White in Winn Parish realized that laborers’ indebtedness resulted from “the 
failure of the cotton crop (with which they expected to pay their debts),” he nevertheless 
concluded that “the great fault with all is their extravagance.” In Natchitoches, James Cromie, 
sub-assistant commissioner for the fourth district, eported in the summer of 1867 that those 
working for shares “lost all from the overflow”. His subordinate, Charles Miller, responsible 
for the Natchitoches office, nevertheless considere th  main problem to be that the laborers 
“have lived very extravagantly and their advances during the present year exceed their 
shares.”40  
 This ‘root, hog or die’ attitude reflected agents’ free labor conviction that, as Foner 
puts it, “participation in the marketplace honed those very qualities that distinguished 
northern labor from that of the slave – efficiency, productivity, industriousness.” This 
ideology pervaded the Bureau throughout the Red River Valley and agents feared the 
potential disorder that might result from the freedp ople’s unrealistic expectations of 
receiving land from the government. In 1867, S. G. Williams, the agent in Alexandria, harshly 
criticized William B. Phillips, an aspiring young Republican politician, for “having misguided 
the colored people by deceiving promises” including “forty acres land, two horses and faring 
implements, also one hundred dollars in cash.” The agent immediately visited the areas where 
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Phillips had given speeches to disabuse the freedpeople of any such expectations and notified 
him to refrain from making promises on behalf of the federal government which he could not 
possibly deliver on.41 
 As agent for the Bureau in Bienville, Twitchell - who would go on to become the 
Republican leader of Red River Parish and see most of his family murdered by the White 
League - similarly urged planters and laborers to compromise and cooperate. He issued a 
number of circulars emphasizing that, while planters were to treat the blacks as free laborers, 
the freedpeople themselves ought not to count on redist ibution of land nor rely on 
government charity, but instead should find employment to support themselves. The 
conservative Bienville Messenger gratefully accepted his support in disciplining the newly 
freed labor force and urged its readers to have their employees attend a meeting organized by 
Twitchell  
for the purpose of instructing them in regard to their duty toward their employers, and 
advise them, for their own good, not to labor under th  belief that the government will 
give them lands or render them any pecuniary assistnce, whatever; but as long as 
they are able to work they shall earn their living by their own industry, and instruct 
them to seek employment for the coming year.42 
 Many Bureau agents combined a sincere empathy with the plight of the freedpeople 
with a profoundly held belief in the efficacy of the free market. In January 1867, Martin Flood, 
the Bureau’s agent in Shreveport, applauded the discipline of the market when labor shortages 
induced higher wages and prevented abusive planters from finding enough hands to work 
their land. “It is a source of satisfaction to all lovers of justice, to see cases of outrages upon 
the freedmen, which could not be reached and punished by the proper authorities, punished 
more severely and surely, by the stern and unbending laws that govern labor and capital in all 
free countries.”43 The same logic, however, precluded agents from interfering when market 
forces increasingly pressured the freedpeople into signing disadvantageous contracts for 
shares rather than cash wages. 
 While Bureau agents did little to prevent planters from exploiting their advantageous 
bargaining position, they did intervene whenever possible to protect the freedpeople from 
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outright fraud on the part of their employers, since fraud undermined the free labor contract 
system they sought to promote. In October 1867 White, the agent for Winn, wrote an 
impassioned note to a local justice of the peace acusing planters of inflating their laborers’ 
debt, as “chicanery to procure the labor of the freedmen free for the ensuing year.” The 
freedpeople, “a much more honest class […] than those who are trying to get their labor and 
not pay them for it,” placed far too much confidenc in the honesty of their employers. Two 
weeks later, he reported, somewhat optimistically, that “the freedpeople have been cheated so 
much since the close of the Rebellion that they look ut for themselves much better than 
heretofore.” Without access to the civil courts, however, there was little they could do to 
procure their rightful dues.44 
  The scope of fraud is most clearly revealed in the complaints registered in the 
Bienville Parish office’s ‘Journal of Business’ by Edward W. Dewees between April 1867 
and February 1868.45 The very first entry, on April 10, 1867, relates a complaint by the 
freedman Ben Champion. In 1866 Champion furnished 18 hands, who made 19 bales of 
cotton and 1040 bushels of corn for planters named Howell and Bradwell in Jackson Parish, 
who now refused to pay him. Although Dewees took the complaint seriously, there was little 
he could do as Jackson lay beyond his jurisdiction and the bureau had no agent stationed there. 
In cases within his jurisdiction Dewees had more success. He regularly noted securing 
payment for freedpeople who came to him for help. If planters still refused to pay up what 
they owed, Dewees might call on the military authorities, have property seized, or assist the 
freedpeople in civil court by entering a suit on their behalf.46 
 Complaints increased markedly around late June and July, when the planting season 
ended, and again from late October through Christma, after crops had been harvested. With 
relatively little work to be done around the plantation during the summer months, planters 
wished to avoid the expense of housing, feeding, and clothing idle hands and when it came 
time to settle up in the winter they hoped to keep as much of the proceeds from the cotton 
sold for themselves. They either dismissed their hands without pay, or refused them their 
share based on trumped up charges and expenses. Generally, Dewees insisted that planters 
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keep hands on for the full year, or at the very least he tried to make sure that they received 
their rightful wages for time already worked. In one typical case, Louis Madry complained in 
September 1867 that his employer, A. M. Wallen, still owed him 60 dollars for his work in 
1866. Dewees threatened Wallen with a lawsuit if he refused to settle, but the freedman 
returned two weeks later complaining that his employer now refused to pay him his share for 
the current year, claiming a charge of 100 dollars fo  “board and washing.” The Bureau agent 
promptly voided the bill as the contract stated that W llen was to provide these services.47  
 The following summer, Dewees’s successor, Edward Bean, had a similar experience. 
In the summer he reported several cases “in which employers have taken advantage of the 
ignorance of the freedmen, to purchase their shares of the crop for little or nothing,” as well as 
cases “in which planters have endeavored to make the most trivial offense of the freedmen 
cause for breaking their contracts with them, and sometimes without any cause have 
endeavored to drive them from their places hoping thereby to possess themselves of the entire 
crop.”48 In September he found that both planters and merchants tried to sell the crops and 
keep the proceeds, despite laborers’ first lien provided by law.49 In Neighboring Natchitoches, 
E. H. Hosner received numerous complaints in the fall from freedpeople turned off on some 
pretext or another “now that the crops are made. It seems that many employers have recently 
discovered that certain laborers would not work, were impudent, useless, and not to be 
endured.” Hosner saw no other explanation, except an effort among planters “to swindle or 
defraud the freedmen out of their just dues.”50 
 Although less detailed than the Bienville records, a register of complaints from 
Alexandria, stretching from the summer of 1866 through the spring of 1868, reveals many 
similar complaints. As in Bienville, freedpeople complained of planters refusing to pay wages 
agreed upon, providing insufficient or unwholesome rations, firing freedmen for no apparent 
reason and without pay. 51 Although agents had little formal power to coerce planters, they 
could act on freedpeople’s behalf to ensure them reasonably fair treatment within the civil 
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courts. Usually the threat of legal action proved enough to persuade planters to settle amicably, 
but sometimes they stubbornly resisted the Bureau’s informal pressure. In October 1866 
Richard Anthony complained to the Bureau that his employer, Mr. Morris, owed him four 
months wages and 19 bushels of corn and at the agents r quest the matter was settled. 
Anthony returned in May of 1867 because Morris owed him 80 dollars in wages and 27 
dollars for corn and molasses. He promised to pay, but three months later, Anthony had not 
received a dime and this time the agent referred th matter to a local justice of the peace. The 
outcome of this case is not recorded, but in at least one similar case where planters owed over 
100 dollars in back wages the agent succeeded in procuring a judgment for nearly the entire 
amount for the freedman involved.52 
 While the vast majority of complaints of fraud came from freedmen, Bureau agents 
did not blindly choose sides in favor of the former slaves. Whites, particularly in Rapides and 
Natchitoches parishes, also requested the Bureau’s assi tance in cases where freedpeople did 
not honor their contracts. Even in cases brought by blacks, agents might on investigation 
decide the complaint to be unfounded. In Alexandria, on August 6, 1866, Williams received 
three separate complaints from freedpeople claiming to have been fired without cause. In two 
cases there was no proof that the freedpeople involved had violated their contract and he 
ordered the planters to take them back. In the case of Hannah Biddy, who worked as a cook, it 
turned out she had stolen rations and he let the dismissal stand.53 
 Albeit reluctantly, many planters accepted the mediating role agents might play. 
Though many planters disapproved of the Bureau on princi le, they quickly realized that 
having its agents adjudicate disputes could provide legitimacy in the eyes of the freedpeople, 
making an appeal to the Bureau the surest and cheapest way to discipline their labor force. 
Shortly after the surrender, Lieutenant L. S. Butler had accused Montfort Wells, the 
governor’s brother and a leading conservative voice in Rapides, of sending off his former 
slaves once the crop was ‘laid by’ in the summer. The following year, however, Wells and his 
overseer regularly called on Butler and his successor Williams for assistance in disciplining 
their labor force. Generally, such complaints concer ed laborers who refused to work and 
instead lived by stealing and poaching. He requested Williams to visit his plantation “and 
look into their conduct and the conduct of several others. I can drive them off but I do not 
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wish to do so. I hope to get them to work again. And might with your assistance if they were 
told by you that they could be taken up as vagrants they would go to work.”54  
  The very success of the Bureau’s contract system d pended on convincing often 
skeptical planters that they could indeed depend on market forces, rather than physical 
coercion, to discipline their labor force. One Rapides planter, complaining of carelessness, 
indifference and disobedience among his hands, wrote t  Williams in Alexandria that he 
hoped “a lecturing from you and some friendly advice would be of great advantage to them.” 
In Natchitoches, Cromie received a plea from a local pl nter, who complained that “I have 
dealt fairly with them. I have paid them every cent I owe them up to this time and the most of 
them their entire wages. I never tried harder to deal fair and satisfy hands and yet they quit 
when they please, without any complaint or saying aything to me.” A year later, Cromie’s 
successor, Hosner, wrote that  
a Mr. Fontenot asked me to come to his plantation and settle a difference with the 
freedmen. The contract, read twice to the freedmen, gave them one fourth of the corn 
crop but they now claimed half. Witnesses to contract were not interested in the matter 
and Fontenat has reputation among freedmen and whites as just man. Thus ordered the 
contract complied with and freedmen accepted my decision.55  
 The Bureau had good reasons to attend to such complaint by planters, in order to 
prove the efficacy of the free labor ideology it espoused. In Bienville, Dewees, who 
vigorously defended the freedpeople against abuse by their employers, was clearly angered 
when Oliver Sanders contracted with a local justice of the peace, Mr. Noles, only to abscond 
to Natchitoches the next day, after receiving a part of his wages in advance. He wrote an 
urgent note to his colleague Cromie, asking him to arrest and return Sanders, as “something 
should be done to make both the planters and freedmn stand to their agreement.”56 By early 
1867, these efforts began to have an effect. Even th  conservative Natchitoches Semi-Weekly 
Times, which until only weeks earlier had staunchly advocated replacing black labor in the 
South by white immigrants, admitted that the freedpeople “are beginning to comprehend at 
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last that freedom does not by any means imply emancip tion from the necessity of labor, and 
a glimmering idea of thrift and of moral responsibility seems to be dawning upon their dull 
intellects.”57 
 While planters appealed to the Bureau’s authority when it appeared in their interest, 
they did so reluctantly and often intimated that they much preferred more ‘traditional’ means 
of controlling the black labor force. Since the Bureau itself made that impossible, or at least 
difficult, planters turned to its agents as the next best alternative. Planters’ deference to 
Bureau authority thus remained conditional at best. In one instance a planter simply informed 
an agent that he had had to run an employee off the plantation for insubordination. In other 
cases, planters accompanied a request for assistance with a threat to “take the law in my own 
hands” if the agents efforts proved insufficient or unsuccessful.58 
 What such a threat might entail becomes clear once we turn our attention to the 
northern part of the Red River region. Although violence and the threat of violence pervaded 
the entire area, there was a marked difference between the downriver parishes of Natchitoches 
and Rapides and the upriver parishes of Caddo, Bossier, DeSoto, and Winn, with Bienville 
falling somewhere in between. In the former, planters were willing to at least try the contract 
system. Although fraud was endemic in these parishes, and planters might attempt to dismiss 
their laborers for no good reason, they generally acquiesced in Bureau agents’ judgments and 
did not routinely resort to violence against their employees. Upriver, however, Bureau records 
teem with references to freedpeople being whipped, shot, beaten, and driven from the 
plantation at gunpoint. 
 In these parishes, whites attempted to restore their dominant position through force. 
While in 1868 violence would take on more overtly political tones, in the first years it was 
directed mostly at reestablishing economic and social ontrol over the former slaves. In 
December of 1865, just six months after the surrender of Kirby-Smith in Shreveport, the agent 
in that city reported that “the militia organized in the parishes of Caddo and Bossier […] are 
now going through the parishes above and therein committing gross and outrages 
depredations upon freedmen.” They not only systematically confiscated their arms, but also 
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committed flagrant acts of highway robbery, in once case taking “by force […] thirty-five 
dollars from a freedman.”59 
 By the summer of 1866 violence had become commonplace and the Bureau struggled 
to maintain its authority. Flood, the Shreveport agent, began a register of complaints in June 
of 1866 and recorded abuses on a nearly daily basis. One planter drove an elderly 
freedwoman from his place because she claimed to bephysically unable to plough and asked 
him to be allowed to hoe the fields instead. She had been on the place since Christmas and he 
paid her only ten dollars for six months work. Dozens of freedpeople, from Caddo, Bossier, 
and especially DeSoto parishes similarly reported bing whipped and beaten or driven off the 
land without recompense for minor infractions or for n  apparent reason at all. One planter 
blandly refused to acknowledge the reality of emancipation and stated “he should continue to 
whip his hands when he chose to do so.” On William Ayer’s plantation, the overseer Cloy 
Holt felt the same way. He hit one freedwoman over th  head with a stick, threatened to slash 
a freedman’s throat and gave another six or seven lashes for failing to properly measure a 
cotton stalk. Even when an employer did not maltreat his laborers himself, freedpeople could 
not expect protection from violence. A freedman by the name of Walker reported being 
whipped with a hickory stick by a neighboring planter and then beaten senseless with a fence 
railing by a white employee of the plantation. He reported these incidents to his employer, Dr. 
Cary, who replied simply that “that was good for him.”60 
 Only the presence of US soldiers allowed the Bureau agent for Bossier and Caddo to 
restore order. By the end of 1866, he could report that  
the feeling existing between the freedmen and whites […] is rapidly approaching the 
condition desired by the government. The change is a great one from [slavery] to 
citizenship. The entire public sentiment of a country does not change in a day, it may 
in a year. A very great change has taken place since last June in the public mind with 
regard to the freedmen.  
Although both freedpeople and whites as yet had but “an indistinct idea of the rules that 
govern free labor,” Flood believed that the races would learn to cooperate based on their 
mutual economic interests. Despite the flare-up of political violence surrounding the 1868 
elections, the Shreveport agent continued to report improvements in relations between 
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freedpeople and planters, as the latter “learn it is in their interest to treat them fairly and 
kindly.”61 
 Not all Bureau agents, however, succeeded equally well in enforcing the contract 
system. In May of 1867, the agent in Bienville relay d reports from Winn that “the citizens 
compel [the freedpeople] to work, whip them at their pleasure, refuse to pay them, and 
threaten to shoot them if they report them.” The next month, Delos White established a 
Bureau office in the parish. Initially he succeeded in calming the tempers and within a year 
“the little feeling that existed between the whites and the freedmen [….] has greatly 
diminished, and now there seems to be the best of feelings and the freedmen by their industry 
and good character have done much towards doing away with the ill feelings.” By August of 
1868, White continued to report good feelings betwen the races and successful establishment 
of a freedmen’s school. But in the violence that accompanied the November 1868 elections 
the school was broken up by angry whites and what progress White had achieved quickly 
collapsed in the face of renewed violence. By the end of the year, following the murder of one 
of Winn’s leading black Republicans and threats against his own life, White had fled the 
Parish.62 
 Nowhere, however, did the Freedmen’s Bureau fare as poorly as it did in DeSoto. 
Local whites blatantly disregarded the Bureau’s authori y and abused the freedmen with near 
impunity. In June 1866 Flood reported that  
continual complaint is being made to this Bureau by freedmen from the parish of 
DeSoto. I have done all I could to remedy those crying evils and […] defiance of the 
US authority, for I consider it to be such, by a portion of the whites of that parish. It is 
so far removed from this office, that it is impossible to effectually reach them under 
the present arrangement of the troops. 
He insisted that only with cavalry and temporary martial law might the federal government 
restore order and allow the Bureau to resume functio ing in that parish. Meanwhile, “in case 
the freedmen become dissatisfied with their employers from violation of contracts on the part 
of the whites and leave contracts made by themselve they are pursued by armed parties who 
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force them back and by whipping compel them to work for them.” Two years later the 
situation had hardly improved and the local agent complained that without a permanent 
military presence to enforce his rulings he was “considered a mere humbug in the estimation 
of the planters of this parish.”63 
 The violence in Winn and DeSoto resulted in part from geography, as these parishes 
were relatively inaccessible by water and far removed from army posts. DeSoto, moreover, 
lay on the border with Texas where conditions were, if possible, worse. Flood reported in 
June of 1866 that an armed party came from the neighboring state to DeSoto and forcefully 
kidnapped a number of freedpeople. Six months later, h  reported rumors that planters 
patrolled the state line to prevent freedpeople fleing to Louisiana because “the treatment of 
these people has been such in north-eastern Texas […] that they are trying to escape as they 
would from death.” The violence and anarchy in northeastern Texas easily spilled over into 
DeSoto, while the state line provided perpetrators with an easy avenue of escape, making 
infantry forces even less effective than they were els where.64 The experience of DeSoto and 
of Winn prior to White’s arrival provide an indication as to what the situation for freedpeople 
might have been like throughout much of the rural South in the absence of the Bureau. It 
shows that despite the moderate aims of agents and their limited resources, they protected the 
freedpeople from the worst exploitation by planters and provided a framework for a labor 
market that, however imperfect, proved a substantial improvement over the virtual 
reestablishment of slavery envisioned by Southern whites. 
 
 
The Law of the Land 
One of the central tasks of Bureau agents, according to Commissioner Howard, involved 
“obtaining recognition of the negro as a man instead of chattel before the civil and criminal 
courts.”65 Local agents often succeeded in arranging a settlement of labor disputes between 
freedpeople and planters by using a combination of persuasion, moral authority, an appeal to 
parties’ best interests, and the threat of seizure if n cessary. If push came to shove, however, 
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the Bureau mostly lacked the authority as well the m ans to enforce its decisions. 
Occasionally an agent might seize a planter’s property, but more often he would refer cases 
that he could not settle amicably to the local courts. In civil suits, Bureau agents had some 
success in assisting the freedpeople and using their informal influence to obtain a measure of 
justice for them. In cases involving violence and other criminal offenses, however, the Bureau 
had far more difficulty in enforcing equal justice on behalf of the freedpeople.  
 Like the initial plans for widespread land reform, the Bureau initially pursued an 
ambitious and quite radical course in securing justice for the freedpeople. On May 30, 1865, 
Howard issued a circular setting forth the basic rules and regulations for the recently 
established Bureau. Section VII explicitly authorized officers of the Bureau to adjudicate “all 
difficulties arising between negroes themselves, or between negroes and whites.” But, just as 
land redistribution had depended on ‘such title thereto as the United States can convey,’ so 
Howard limited the Bureau tribunals to such “places where there is an interruption of civil law, 
or in which local courts, by reason of old codes […] disregard the negro’s right to justice 
before the laws, in not allowing him to give testimony.”66 In Louisiana, as elsewhere in the 
South, Assistant Commissioner Conway initially ignored these formal limitations and 
instructed his agents to try any cases involving blacks in case civil authorities denied them 
substantive justice.67 
 Johnson and his conservative allies soon made it clear that the Bureau might only 
intervene where the law formally discriminated betwen whites and blacks. As a result, the 
Bureau had no authority to organize tribunals in Louisiana, where free blacks had been 
allowed to testify even before the Civil War, a privilege now theoretically extended to all 
blacks in the state. As early as September, in response to the Weems case, General Edward 
Canby wrote the commander of the Western District of Louisiana, that  
neither the law, the regulations of the Freedmen’s Bureau, nor military orders warrant 
any interference with the criminal process of the civil courts of the states if they 
confine themselves to their appropriate and legal jurisdiction and in the administration 
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of justice secure to the negroes equal rights with the whites under the laws of the state, 
as modified by the laws of the united States and the President’s proclamations.68 
 In his last days as assistant commissioner, Conway attempted to compromise with 
Johnson’s demands by instructing agents to allow cases to be tried by civil officers who had 
shown “by his proceedings that he is disposed to deal as justly with freedmen as with white 
persons […] The cooperation of such officers assist ra her than retards the work of the 
Bureau.” Agents however retained the right to intervene, not only if civil authorities denied 
black testimony, but also when “by reason of old coes or disregard of new ones, impartial 
justice is denied on account of the color of the person applying for it.” This broad language 
allowed the Bureau officers ample wiggle room to prtect the freedpeople not only from 
explicitly discriminatory laws, but from what Donald Nieman has termed the “discriminatory 
administration of justice.” Nevertheless, even under Conway’s lenient interpretation, a 
shortage in both quantity and quality of manpower hampered the implementation of his 
policies in the thinly populated rural areas of the state.69 
 On taking over from Conway, Fullerton quickly put an end to what limited judicial 
authority the Bureau had. In his address to the fredmen he informed them that they now 
might “sue and obtain justice in the state courts, as other freedmen did when you were in a 
state of slavery.” With no formal discriminatory statutes in place, the Bureau had fulfilled its 
mission to “protect you when you were debarred from the benefit of the law.” He formally 
promulgated his new policy ten days later, in a circular to all agents in Louisiana, which 
stated that “no legal disabilities rest on [the freedmen] due to color. They may sue and be sued 
in all tribunals.”  
 Fullerton ordered “courts of any description established by officers of this Bureau in 
Louisiana [to] be abolished.” Although Bureau agents might still act as attorney or amicus 
curiae for freedpeople before the civil courts, they were to refrain from making arrests or 
otherwise interfering with judicial processes. Only in cases where courts refused to “offer 
relief or take notice” of outrages against freedmen, might agents report the case to the nearest 
military commander who then might make an arrest. He also warned the freedpeople to “not 
take it for granted that the courts will not protect them in their rights, if, in some cases, 
immediate hearing or justice is not obtained. The delays of the law are proverbial. Judges and 
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juries are not infallible. Where wrong decisions have been made, appeals can be taken or 
other legal remedies obtained.”70 Considering the pace at which the military was demobilizing 
itself, however, the army lacked the time or the manpower to effectively police race relations 
in the South and legal appeals often proved beyond the means of the poor and uneducated 
freedpeople. 
 Fullerton hoped that civil officers would act “justly and temperately” towards the 
freedmen, reminding them that “civil tribunals cannot suffer from being just to all men.” In 
that case “there will no longer be cause or pretext for military interference in such civil 
matters.” Few reports remain from local agents from this period, but those that do show that 
while local agents were willing to try the new system, many remained decidedly skeptical. 
Twitchell in Bienville reported a “decided increase” in difficulties between the races “since 
publication of circular 24.” He tried to be present whenever freedpeople brought a case before 
the local magistrate, but this was not always possible. In Shreveport, D. H. Reese informed 
the DeSoto provost marshal that he was “perfectly wi ling civil courts should try cases, even 
for violating contracts, if they admit the validity of the contracts,” but if during civil trials “the 
legality of the contract is made a question my opinion is that provost courts will have to be 
established again.”71 
 The following year, alarmed by continuing reports of outrages against freedpeople, the 
Bureau attempted to reclaim some of its judicial authority. In July, General Grant authorized 
the military to arrest anyone suspected of violence against a Bureau agent or any other citizen 
where civil courts failed to act. In November, General Sheridan, then in command of the 
Bureau in Louisiana, issued a circular based on this order, instructing agents in “cases of 
murder or extreme cruelty committed on freedmen, where the civil authorities neglect to take 
action [to] call upon the nearest military commander for a sufficient force to arrest the party 
or parties committing the outrage.” The small number of troops, and the almost entire lack of 
cavalry, took much of the bite out of these measures. Agents were to send anyone thus 
arrested to New Orleans, to be tried before the only federal court in the state. In practice, the 
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Bureau lacked the means to provide transportation – a d presumably the guards needed – for 
such a trip.72 
 Around the same time, Howard attempted to reinstate Bureau courts. These tribunals 
would consist of three judges; a representative selct d by the whites of the parish, one by the 
blacks and the agent himself the third member. These tribunals would try smaller cases and 
turn larger ones over to either the civil authorities or the military. President Johnson did not 
approve of such an expansion of Bureau authority and Howard, rather than ordering assistant 
commissioners to establish such courts, merely permitt d them to do so. Only in South 
Carolina, Florida and Arkansas was the project attemp d at all. Even there, Bureau courts 
proved short lived, with Johnson quickly putting ane d to them following the Ex-parte 
Milligan decision by the Supreme Court.73 
 When William H. Wood, a lieutenant colonel who briefly headed Louisiana’s Bureau 
in December 1867, issued instructions regarding the judicial powers of local agents, he in fact 
merely summarized the status quo as it had developed more than a year earlier. Agents were 
to try and effect amicable settlements of all minor c mplaints and disputes, but were “not 
empowered to make final disposition” of any cases cognizable by civil authorities. If no 
settlement could be reached, they would have to refer the case to the local courts, “and should 
the exigencies of the case demand it, they will appe r as the freedmen’s friend, or attorney.” 
In disagreements over payment, the agents were to ptition the same courts for a seizure of 
crops and property, “as may be required to secure the freedmen their just dues.” Only in the 
face of “clear and positive” evidence that “the Civil Courts have failed or refused to take 
action,” might the agents seize and hold crops on their own authority. Agents might still call 
on military authorities in cases of outrages on freedpeople, but only if “the civil Authorities 
have failed, or have refused to perform their duties as the law directs.”74  
 Despite their limited formal powers, local agents frequently succeed in getting at least 
a modicum of justice for the freedpeople in civil disputes. In March 1866, General Sheridan 
informed Oregon Senator and future Attorney General George H. Williams that the Bureau in 
Louisiana, despite its limited powers, succeeded in providing “a feeling of security to 
freedmen, by looking after and advocating their interests.”75Although actual interference by 
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the military was unlikely, agents used the threat of increased federal interference, as well as 
their authority to personally seize crops and propety if necessary, to pressure civil authorities 
into granting a fair hearing to the blacks at least some of the time. Moreover, they could 
pressure planters into making an amicable settlement, rather than risking a potentially costly, 
time consuming, and embarrassing court case.  
 Most times, such pressure remained implicit, but in July 1866 Flood explicitly 
threatened a Bossier justice of the peace with military interference if he did not attend to the 
complaint of an unnamed freedman that a man named Jackson refused to pay him for five 
months work. Flood “respectfully” reminded the magistrate that “nothing will so much injure 
the present good feeling existing between the governm nt and this state as any resort to the 
military at this time in adjusting cases like the above.” A year later in Bienville, Dewees also 
had to call on military authorities to ensure a white man paid a freedman for having rented his 
wagon and a team of horses. Occasionally, civil and military authorities might even cooperate, 
as in a case of assault and battery against a freedman from Rapides. The victim reported the 
incident to the Freedmen’s Bureau officer, who ensured that the court issued a warrant under 
the authority of which the military forces effected an arrest and turned the suspect over to the 
civil authorities.76 
 In cases involving civil disputes and minor property crimes, Bureau agents usually 
urged the parties involved to reach an amicable settlement. If that failed, they could petition 
the civil authorities to issue a writ of provisional seizure to protect the freedpeople’s interests. 
In Natchitoches, in early 1868, the agent recorded s veral instances in which the court 
complied with such a request after planters had abandoned the plantation or merchants had 
taken the crop before settlement was made with the laborers.77  
 Around the same time the conservative judge W. B. Lewis excluded seed cane from 
such a writ in a case involving around $18,000 in wages owed to the freedmen on A. B. 
Compton’s estate. Since the exclusion effectively nullified the order, Assistant Sub-Assistant 
Commissioner Buttrick wrote to New Orleans to confirm whether he might seize said seed 
cane on his own authority, as he considered it “a case in which the Civil authorities have 
refused to do justice of the freedpeople, as it is impossible to say what could be seized on a 
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plantation apart from the crop if seed cane cannot.” The Bureau’s attorney found ambiguities 
in Louisiana law, to which the agents actions had to conform. He advised Buttrick to seize the 
seed cane only if it was part of last year’s crop and to make a formal exception to Lewis’s 
decision as to allow an appeal to the state Supreme Court. By time these instructions reached 
Buttrick, however, he had already informed the agent for the estate, T. A. Hyams, that he 
would seize the seed cane if necessary. This threat had prompted Hyams to make an 
immediate settlement with the freedmen’s attorney, obviating the need for the seizure and 
rendering the legal question moot.78 
 In criminal matters, particularly those involving violence by whites against blacks, 
Bureau agents had far less informal leverage. They could do little more than refer the 
complaint to civil authorities and monitor the subsequent outcome. Usually they would report 
the incident to a local justice of the peace, who might issue an arrest warrant and hold a 
preliminary hearing. If he found sufficient cause for the complaint, the justice would then 
place the suspect under bond to appear at the next term of the district court, which convened 
in each parish twice a year. They also might bond the defendant to keep the peace. Those who 
could not afford to post a bond, usually black defendants, would be confined in the parish jail 
for weeks or months until the district judge arrived in the parish.  
 In theory, the passage of the Reconstruction Act in March of 1867 placed the civil 
courts of Louisiana under military supervision. Only in exceptional cases, however, might a 
suspect be taken to New Orleans for trial by military commission. One such case resulted 
from the murder on June 3, 1867, in Natchitoches, of the prominent white Republican Cyrus 
W. Stauffer. The main suspect, John T. Jones, quickly made his escape to Texas after a deputy 
sheriff refused to arrest him. But his accomplices and brothers, one of them a former state 
supreme court judge, were confined in the parish jail. Prominent Natchitoches Republicans, 
including Bureau agent Cromie, immediately got up a letter writing campaign to have them 
tried by the military, fearing that “these men will either escape or be acquitted” in a parish 
where three quarters of the grand jurors were recently disenfranchised whites. In a letter to 
General Sheridan, state Attorney General B. L. Lynch, a friend of Stauffer, listed the 
numerous difficulties which such a trial before civil authorities in northwestern Louisiana 
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confronted.79 Only a trial by military commission had a chance of bringing the murderers to 
justice, owing to 
 the laxity and inefficiency with which the criminal laws of the state are now 
administered in many of the parishes on Red River; […] the demoralization and 
lawlessness of jurors in this parish; the corruption and tricks resorted to in selecting 
them at communal trials; the social and pecuniary influence brought to bear on them 
by influential and well to do offenders; the fear of the vengeance by desperate 
criminals; the poverty and isolation of the widow of the deceased and [his] well 
known uncompromising principles of loyalty and devotion to the government.80 
 Governor Flanders also endorsed the request, and on June 20 Sheridan ordered both 
men transferred to military custody and by the end of the month they passed by Alexandria en 
route to New Orleans, eliciting the outrage of the Louisiana Democrat’s editor. The third 
brother remained in Texas, while a fourth man implicated in the murder succeeded in 
escaping from the parish jail a few days later.81 Even such a limited success, however, was an 
exception. The vast majority of victims of white violence and intimidation, particularly the 
freedpeople, lacked the social and political connections of Stauffer to influence the military 
authority. They remained dependent on the civil authori ies for whatever justice they might 
hope to receive. 
 No records remain from any of the district courts of the Red River area for these years, 
but a report from the Bureau’s state headquarters in New Orleans in March 1867 clearly 
reveals that blacks could expect little protection from the courts. The Bureau had records on 
eighty cases of freedpeople murdered by whites and an additional 210 whipped, shot or 
assaulted. “In not a single of foregoing cases was a white man punished for killing or ill-
treating a freedman,” though a few remained in jail awaiting trial. “The majority have either 
been justified by a coroner’s jury, acquitted, or admitted to bail.” In the northwestern portion 
of the state, in particular, “many murders and outrages have been committed which will never 
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be brought to light and it is thought the aggregate number of murders given above would be 
more than doubled had all the cases been reported to the agents of the Bureau.”82  
 In August of 1866, N. B. Blanton, The Bureau’s agent for Bienville, had similarly 
reported that  
Cruelties of all kinds inflicted on the Freedmen are greatly on the increase in the 
Parish. Complaints are made almost daily of beating, whipping and tuning them off 
without pay and in nearly every case their lives are threatened if they should dare to 
report the matter to me, very many cases of cruelty are not reported, having hunted 
them up myself, and hear of many more not yet investigated. Public opinion is against 
enforcing the laws against the whites for the protection of the colored people and the 
whipping and beating of a colored man or woman is considered as no offence worthy 
of notice 
Freedpeople reported being severely beaten for such minor offenses as playing cards, 
allegedly stealing a chicken, or simply, in the words of Nelson King, to “teach us we are not 
[free], that we must pick our master and mistress and live with them and get a pass every time 
we leave home. They said they would not allow black people to leave off to the places, that I 
must select my master and live in his yard for protection.”83  
 Not only did many cases remain entirely unreported, he judicial process also offered 
whites numerous opportunities to prevent their crimes ever coming before the district court, 
despite agents’ best efforts. In some cases, defendants sought out a sympathetic justice of the 
peace even before a Bureau agent could get involved and confessed to their offense while 
pleading extenuating circumstances. Once the magistr te had either acquitted the perpetrator 
or sentenced him to a symbolic fine, the principle of double jeopardy precluded any further 
action before a justice’s court. In Shreveport, for instance, after a man named Rayburn shot 
and killed the freedman Tom Ford, the killer immediately went to the local justice to make “a 
voluntary statement which was corroborated by the fiv  men who were with him, claiming 
that he killed Ford to save the life of one ‘Winnie Gouch’ whom Ford was assaulting with 
intent to kill, by chasing him with a large butcher’s knife. The justice of the peace rendered a 
verdict of justified homicide.” Bureau agent Thomas Monroe, who had been ordered to have 
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Rayburn arrested, could no longer bring him before a different justice, although he might 
appeal the decision to the grand jury at the next time erm of the district court.84  
 In other cases, whites did not hesitate to use intimidation, perjury, or outright violence 
to shield themselves and each other from criminal prosecution. In DeSoto, the murderers of a 
freedman named Livo forced the only black witness, James Campbell, to swear a false 
statement before the justice of the peace that the victim had fired the first shot. Fearing for his 
life, Campbell fled the Parish the following day, leaving behind his family, his blacksmith 
tools, and stores of foodstuffs, which whites immediately confiscated under the pretense of 
his being indebted to merchants. Campbell made his way to Shreveport, where he reported 
these occurrences to the Bureau officer, who concluded that “his only fault is that of being 
present at the shooting and they fear his testimony. He left the place for fear he would be 
assassinated.”85  
 In Caddo Parish, after a black man whipped a white man in an altercation over a hog, 
some twenty whites assaulted the homes of a number of freedmen at night, forcing them to 
flee to the woods and killing one of their number. The local justice issued warrants for sixteen 
of the white men involved and the Bureau agent “witnessed the trial throughout.” He did not 
doubt that it was “conducted with impartiality by the magistrate, but the defendants succeeded 
in securing an alibi in each case.” As a result, the justice had no choice but to release them, 
despite their almost certain guilt.86 
 Even without such shenanigans, Bureau agents depend heavily on the willingness of 
local magistrates to give cases a fair hearing. At the end of 1866, Flood reported that in the 
city of Shreveport the civil authorities usually proved willing “to assists and cooperate with 
me in attaining justice for the freedmen,” but in the countryside difficulties abounded: 
“Neighborhood influences, prejudices of caste, ignora ce and inefficiency, corruption and 
clannishness on the part of those holding the office of justice of the peace in the country all 
tend to render the protection of the freedmen by said courts almost of no use to them with but 
few exceptions.” William Kelly, for instance, a justice of the peace from Bossier Parish, had 
the “habit of reading what he calls law” to blacks seeking his advice. His rules resembled 
nothing so much as antebellum slave codes, including an injunction forbidding blacks “to 
Carry arms for the purpose of hunting or for any purpose whatsoever, without permission 
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from their owner,” and to “go visiting from one plant tion to another without permission from 
their owner.” The Bureau was the only institution that stood between the freedmen and such 
civil officers recruited “from among those who were th ir former owners and oppressors.”87 
 One of the few avenues of influence open to Bureau agents, was to selectively refer 
cases to certain justices only. Winn magistrate David Hardy refused to take action against 
white vigilantes who illegally searched the cabins of blacks for stolen goods. In another case 
he refused to hear a freedman’s complaint because he was too busy playing cards. White 
informed his superiors of these facts and requested that Hardy, who held his position despite 
being disfranchised, be removed, and in the meantime he referred all cases to other justices.88  
 In Natchitoches, similar reasoning helps explain why the Bureau agents referred 
nearly every case of violence reported between July1867 and July 1868 to the same 
magistrate, Charles Bullard, justice of the peace for ward twelve, which comprised the town 
of Natchitoches. Bullard was a local white Unionist, whom Governor Wells had appointed in 
February 1866; in the elections later that year he stood as an independent candidate, receiving 
support from the white establishment of Natchitoches. He nevertheless retained sufficient 
respect in the black community to chair a joint meeting of prominent whites with the local 
Republican Party, which expressed the parish’s desire to abide by the terms of the Military 
Reconstruction Act. When James W. Little, who had pretended to act as constable or deputy 
sheriff in the area without any legitimate authority, shot and killed a colored man named Jim 
Harris, Bullard not only had him arrested, but initially confined Little to the parish jail to 
await his trial. This was rare in cases of whites accused of violence against blacks, even if 
Little was released on $3000.00 bail a few weeks later.89 
 Even where justices of the peace were willing to hear cases of violence against 
freedpeople, bringing suspected perpetrators before them could prove difficult. Suspected 
offenders could easily escape to the numerous marshes and woods surrounding the plantations 
on the river, or else cross the state line into either Texas or Arkansas. Without an active police 
force and with no mounted soldiery in the region, agents depended on the cooperation of 
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regular citizens to make an arrest. Southern whites, however, rarely if ever handed over one of 
their own for crimes committed against the former slaves. Cromie believed the violence 
against blacks was “in a great measure attributable to the way justice is administered by the 
civil authorities. As soon as warrants are issued against parties they are informed and make 
their escape.”90  
 Getting justice for the freedpeople often proved a hopeless endeavor. After Joseph 
Texada shot a thirteen year old colored boy in Rapides Parish, in the spring of 1868, a local 
magistrate issued a warrant. But the Bureau agent dspondently reported that, even though 
Texada was “a notorious brawler” and had frequently committed assaults upon negroes, he 
had thus far always eluded punishment at the hands of the civil authorities. A few months 
earlier, in the same parish, Blas Despalier, accused of stabbing the freedman Westley Thomas 
to death, made his escape immediately after the murder..91 
 Suspects who did not escape before facing a justice of the peace, often did so after 
posting bail, which very rarely exceeded a few hundred dollars. In Shreveport, William 
Leonard was bound to keep the peace for 100 dollars, after he threatened to kill one freedman, 
Ambrose Eagle, for testifying against him in a trial for attempted murder on another, John 
Boyd. Ignoring Justice Thomas Beal’s injunction, he shot at both freedmen that very night. 
They returned fire and were arrested immediately. Leonard was left free until the following 
morning, but he felt no need to flee and eventually he too was arrested and put in jail. Beal 
admitted to Eagle and Boyd that he could “not protect hem further and they must protect 
themselves.” The Bureau agent urged the military to arrest Leonard and take him to New 
Orleans for trial by military commission, as “justice has not been given to the freedmen and 
unless the military takes the matter in hand I am afraid something serious will occur.”92  
 Even in the rare cases when magistrates confined them o jail, whites often succeeded 
in escaping. In the case of Little, the pretended constable, the Bureau agent warned that he 
was lodged in an unsafe jail and urged his superiors t  have him moved to a safer place. 
Eighteen month earlier, Thomas Freeman had escaped from the same Natchitoches jail, where 
he was confined after he murdered John Blackburn, a freedman in his employ who refused to 
                                                 
90 ‘November 30, 1866, Shreveport, Flood to Hayden,’ NARA, RG 105, M1905, reel 100, frame 384; ‘August 20,
1867, Natchitoches, Cromie to Parker,’ NARA, RG 105, M1905, reel 90, frame 67. 
91 ‘April 30, 1868, Alexandria, Buttrick to Sterling,’ NARA, RG 105, M1905, reel 52, frame 512; ‘Register of 
Complaints [December 26, 1867],’ NARA, RG 105, M1905, reel 54, frame 224; ‘December 30, 1867, 
Alexandria, Buttrick, trimonthly report,’ NARA, RG 105, M1905, reel 53, frame 985. 
92 ‘July 7, 1867, Shreveport, Monroe to Cutts,’ NARA, RG 105, M1905, reel 100, frame 400. 
3. Between Too Much and Not Nearly Enough 
 112  
 
sell Freeman his share of the crop.93 In Rapides, Thomas McNeely murdered the freedman 
Ned Jefferson on July 23 1867, putting “fifteen buckshot into the colored man’s left side and 
stomach, killing him almost instantly.” J. C. Morantini, a justice of the peace, had him 
arrested, but refused to admit testimony by Jefferson’s wife on the grounds that she was an 
Native American. Bureau agent Williams ordered the s riff to rearrest McNeely and report 
to Colonel Bates, commanding the post at Alexandria in his (Williams’) absence. Bates 
ordered the suspect confined until witnesses could be summoned. That same evening, 
McNeely escaped with the connivance of the sheriff, who allowed him to leave his presence 
although he knew his horse stood saddled nearby. Six weeks later was still at large and 
presumably had left the parish.94 
 The freedpeople not only experienced infinite difficulties in obtaining justice from the 
civil courts, but simply trying to do so might itself pose grave risks to them. Planters regularly 
threatened freedpeople with murder if they dared to report lesser offenses to the Bureau or the 
civil authorities. When Jerry Ford reported being whipped and almost shot by Joseph Texada 
in May of 1867, the Bureau agent sent him with a letter of referral to the justice of the peace, 
but before he arrived unknown parties stopped him, took his letter and told him to report the 
matter in New Orleans, after which the agent heard nothing more from the freedman. A year 
later, in Bienville, the freedman Simon Peter went to see the Bureau agent after being illegally 
dismissed by his employer, Dan Norton. En route, two white men on horseback attacked him 
and shot him in the shoulder. Although two drunken met were arrested on suspicion of the 
attack, Peter could not positively identify them and the justice of the peace let them go free.95 
 Few freedpeople, however, suffered such severe reprcussions for their assertiveness 
before the Bureau agents and the civil authorities as did Durinda Huffman and her relations 
near Catahoula Lake in Rapides Parish. She first came to see the Bureau agent in Alexandria 
on September 16, 1867, after Jefferson Crooks beat her over the head with a corn stalk. The 
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agent referred her to the justice of the peace, who dutifully issued a warrant. A few days later, 
Huffman’s daughter reported that Crooks now threatened her mother’s life for reporting him. 
She too was sent to the justice, who again issued a warrant for Crooks’s arrest. Two months 
later, Huffman again appeared at the Bureau’s office. This time a group of white men, led by 
Larkin D. Cowley, had taken Henry Corlies, who lived in Durinda’s house, into the woods. 
They accused Corlies of stealing a cow belonging to Cowley. Cowley wanted to hang the 
freedmen on the spot, but the others in his party tlked him out of it and instead they turned 
him over to the justice of the peace. The whites also forced Durinda’s husband, Edward 
Huffman, and another freedman, Spencer Davenport, t accompany them to Pineville to 
testify. Durinda’s action in notifying the Bureau resulted in warrants being issued for the 
white men, who were bonded to appear at the district court for false imprisonment and 
Assault and Battery. The justice also placed Corlies under bond, to face charges for theft of a 
cow. That March, Cowley and three other white men took revenge on Durinda Huffman. They 
hung her, Corlies, and a third freedman, Mose Huffman. A fourth they shot and killed. 
Although Justice John Osborne again issued warrants for the whites involved, there is no 
record that any of them faced trial.96 
 The severe limitations under which Bureau agents operated often frustrated their 
attempts to get justice done for the freedpeople. Occasionally an agent might make a 
difference, such as Williams, in Alexandria, who appeared as attorney for a freedwoman 
accused of biting off the finger of a white man named Watkins. By cross-examining the 
prosecution’s witnesses he proved that “Watkins kicked and beat her first and she did the act 
in self-defense.” The justice of the peace now had no choice but to dismiss the case, while 
“without my appearance, [he] would have committed hr to jail to await trial at term of the 
district court in May.”97 Agents did not often book such success, however, especially when 
the roles were reversed and freedpeople accused whites of aggression or abuse. Some months 
after the above case, Cromie investigated charges from an anonymous source that Williams 
did not handle freedpeople’s complaints adequately and found these charges entirely false, as 
the blame lay with the civil authorities. “It is a notorious fact that from the lowest to the 
highest civil officer there is no justice done to the freedmen.” Like his colleagues, Williams 
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referred all cases to the local magistrates who put them under bond to appear at the district 
court. “Result: grand jury never finds a true bill. Consequence is they go out (I might say) 
with a license to commit as many outrages as they se  proper to do.”98 
 In DeSoto, where the Bureau agent held almost no authority, the situation was even 
worse. Michael Cary reported that a white man, William Pitts, had been before a justice of the 
peace several times for stabbing a freedman. “It islooked upon by the [justice] as a good joke 
and dropped at that.” White ruffians confronted any freedpeople who complained to Cary, 
threatening to kill them if they testified in court. “No persuasion on my part would induce the 
freedmen to give testimony against their would-be murderers. I can give no other reason than 
the freedmen think me insufficient to protect them, as they see that I am subject to insult 
myself when I appear on the street.” Although whites n DeSoto considered a trial before the 
civil authorities “an amusement,” they still took harsh measures against freedpeople who 
reported them to the Bureau, fearing that too many complaint would result in the permanent 
stationing of troops in the parish. They needed not have had such fear, as Cary’s superiors 
responded to his repeated reports of violence that the civil courts were the law of the land and 
that he must rely on them and not the military in discharging his duty.99 
 
Conclusion 
Such flagrant disregard of the Bureau and the rights of freedpeople as in DeSoto was an 
exception. Even so, the Bureau’s agents throughout the Red River Valley generally failed in 
their efforts to provide substantial legal protection to the freedpeople. The Bureau’s most 
important legacy therefore was its economic program. It oversaw the transition from a slave 
economy to a system of free labor, albeit one based not on small land ownership, but on labor 
contracts. In the cotton dominated Red River Valley, sharecropping very quickly became the 
prevailing relationship between planters and laborers. Despite the drawbacks inherent in such 
a system, the Bureau insured that for the first fewyears black laborers had at least one 
impartial institution to which they might appeal when unfairly treated. Often more through 
informal influence than any formal powers, the Bureau succeeded in restraining the worst 
abuses by planters of their employees.  
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 Outside the economic arena, Bureau agents’ authority remained limited. Only for a 
few months in late 1865 did they try criminal cases themselves. After that they could only 
refer matters to the civil authorities, which for the first years of Reconstruction were 
dominated by the white conservatives. A justice of the peace might place white offenders 
under a small bond for appearance in the district courts, but white grand juries would be 
unlikely to indict, white district attorneys unlikely to mount a forceful prosecution, white 
juries unlikely to convict, and white judges unlikey to pass harsh sentences for crimes 
committed against the former slaves. Whites could thus shield their own from the full force of 
law, while at the same time adhering to its formal procedures. Agents could rarely do more 
than record the freedpeople’s complaints and hope that the trouble of legal proceedings, 
economic interdependence, and the distant threat of military intervention might restrain the 
worst violence by whites. 
 Despite these severe limitations and their own ideological moderation, Bureau agents 
acted as an important curb on the attempts by Southern whites to reestablish unfettered 
control over their former slaves. DeSoto Parish, where agents never succeeded in establishing 
their authority, illustrates just how much worse thsituation for the freedpeople might have 
been in the rural South if the Freedmen’s Bureau had not operated at all. Although the 
sharecropping system that developed in the Red River region inherently disadvantaged 
laborers, Bureau agents ensured that planters could n t indiscriminately defraud them of their 
dues. Even in the arena of criminal justice, where the Bureau’s powers were far more limited, 
the possibility of having atrocities reported to the Bureau probably curbed whites tendency to 
resort to violence in dealing with the black population. Although a formal conviction and 
punishment remained unlikely, planters would wish to avoid the inconvenience, and possibly 
the embarrassment, of having to face a magistrate and possibly even a jury for crimes 
committed against the freedpeople.  
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4. Towards a ‘Reign of Terror’ 
Political Violence and the Collapse of Congressional Reconstruction (1867-1868) 
 
In DeSoto, shortly before the elections, Charles Reynolds used brickbats to beat Stephen 
Humphreys, a freedman and the Republican candidate for he state legislature from the parish. 
A few days later, a local shopkeeper, Captain Hawkins, unsuccessfully tried to hire a black 
man to murder Humphreys. After the election, which he won due to his opponent being 
disqualified, Humphreys received threats on a daily basis and in June he fled the parish for the 
relative safety of New Orleans. On the day of the election itself, whites in Mansfield mobbed 
Freedmen’s Bureau agent and Republican candidate Jam s J. Walsh, threatening him with a 
knife. Conservatives, armed with knives and guns, formed a ‘dead line’ in front of the 
Mansfield polling station, “outside of that line was  crowd of white men who examined all 
voters coming there, and made them show their tickets b fore they came near the window to 
vote, and if they had a Republican ticket they were not allowed to vote or they tried to 
substitute democratic tickets for them.” Although federal soldiers came to town during the 
election and many blacks tried to avail themselves of the opportunity to vote, the commander 
of the detachment sent them away for coming to town in formation.1 
 Such scenes appear familiar to any student of Reconstruction in Louisiana. Once 
congressional Republicans took over the administraton of Reconstruction from Andrew 
Johnson and replaced his conservative policies withfar more radical alternatives, which 
included the enfranchisement of the black population in the Southern states, the role of 
violence in social life both dramatically increased and acquired a more explicitly political 
character. The persecution of white Unionists and incessant violence directed against blacks 
in the early postwar years had political undertones, but with conservative whites firmly in 
control of state and local political power, its primary function had been to reassert the 
traditional social, racial and economic hierarchy. Now, with many whites disenfranchised and 
the Republican Party ascendant thanks to federal support, whites increasingly used violence 
and intimidation to attempt and restore their political supremacy, or, failing to do so, to 
undermine any substantial changes in the race relation that the Republican regime might try 
and effect. 
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 What might surprise that same student of Reconstruction, however, is that the 
elections referred to in the above vignettes were not those of November 1868, when a virtual 
‘reign of terror’ gripped the state, but those of April 1868. Most historians of Reconstruction 
in Louisiana have either explicitly echoed Henry Clay Warmoth’s observation that in April 
“the canvass passed off quietly,” or implicitly endorsed it by simply not discussing the 
existence of political violence and intimidation.2 Joe Gray Taylor notes that “only in East 
Baton Rouge, Caddo, Bossier, and DeSoto parishes was there evidence of systematic coercion 
and intimidation of the type that was to be so common in future elections,” and Tunnell 
mentions the fact that “whites coerced ninety-two blacks into opposing ratification” in 
Bienville parish, but neither author. attached much significance to these statements beyond 
the local election outcomes.3  
 In reality, the violence and intimidation that erupted on a limited scale in northwestern 
Louisiana prior to the April 1868 elections and thestatewide reign of terror during and after 
the presidential campaign in November were intimately connected. The success that many of 
these parishes experienced in reducing or overturning the Republican majorities that had 
elected delegates to a constitutional convention in September 1867 showed conservative 
whites throughout the state just how effective such a strategy could be. The halfhearted 
response by the federal government, moreover, indicated that whites might pursue such a 
strategy with relative impunity. The Red River region, as would be the case throughout 
Reconstruction, served as an incubator where conservative whites developed, experimented, 
and honed their political strategies, both legal and extra-legal, in order to reclaim power 
statewide and locally. 
 
Simmering Tensions 
In September 1867, the (male) black population of Luisiana, most of them only recently 
freed from slavery, voted for the first time ever in the federally supervised elections for a new 
constitutional convention. For the first two years following the surrender, the army and the 
Freedmen’s Bureau had had to deal with state and local governments under the control of 
white conservatives. President Johnson, moreover, supported these governments in their aim 
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to restore the South to full political independence as quickly as possible on the basis of white 
supremacy. Then, on March 2, 1867, congressional Republicans passed the first of a series of 
Reconstruction Acts. The law divided the former Confederate states – with the exception of 
Tennessee, which had already approved the Fourteenth Amendment - into five so-called 
military districts. Louisiana and Texas together formed the Fifth Military District, 
commanded by Phillip H. Sheridan, a general of strong Radical convictions. Existing civil 
governments would remain in place, but would be “deem d provisional only, and in all 
respects subject to the paramount authority of the United States at any time to abolish, modify, 
control, or supersede the same.”4 
 To be restored to political independence and readmitted to Congress, the former 
Confederate states had to meet a number of conditios. First of all, they had to elect a 
constitutional convention based on equal suffrage for blacks as well as the electoral provisions 
of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, which disenfranchised all those who had held office 
prior to the Civil War and subsequently participated in the Rebellion. Secondly, the new 
constitutions had to enshrine the same electoral provisions for future elections. Thirdly, this 
electorate had to approve of the constitution thus drafted as, fourthly, did Congress. Finally, 
the legislature elected under these provisions would have to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Once states met these conditions, Congress would readmit Senators and Representatives from 
these states into its ranks and lift military supervision over civil government. 
 Conservative whites loathed the Reconstruction Act and immediately attempted to 
circumvent it. Even before its final passage, the state legislature in New Orleans, dominated 
by Conservative whites, ordered elections for a constitutional convention in early April, based 
on the existing, exclusively white, electorate. Although Wells vetoed the Act, the legislature 
succeeded in passing it over his veto. The conservative press applauded such a course, and 
urged Louisiana lawmakers to “proceed, at least for he present, as if no [Reconstruction] Act 
was in existence,” until it had been challenged in court.5 Congress quickly responded by 
passing the Second Reconstruction Act on March 22, ordering all military commanders to 
organize the registration and election mandated by the original act. Those wishing to register 
not only had to be eligible under the original law, but also swear an oath to that effect. All 
                                                 
4 ‘March 2, 1867, An Act to Provide for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel States,’ in United States 
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officials appointed by the commanding general to enact the registration and conduct the 
election, moreover, had to swear to the even more restrictive Ironclad Oath.6  
 Initially, the conservative press in the Red River r gion furiously denounced the 
Reconstruction Acts. The Louisiana Democrat predicted that military commander “so 
accustomed to tyrannise [sic] over the South” would abuse their “almost unlimited powers.” 
The Bossier Banner, the most outspoken of the region’s conservative papers, denounced the 
initial act as “a mockery of free institutions” and treason enveloped in the forms of law.” It 
approvingly cited a Democratic Representative Andrew J. Rogers from New Jersey who 
advocated violent resistance to the law if necessary. The Banner published an even more 
scathing response to the Supplementary Act, “the odious military ‘butcher’ bill […], by which 
edict of unprecedented brutality and outlawry the iron heel of a military despotism is to be 
remorselessly placed upon the neck of the already prostrate and submissive South.”7  
 Once the reality of the new situation sunk in, however, conservative whites quickly 
changed their tune. Although they undoubtedly abhorred the new laws, and particularly the 
prospect of black political participation, they soon turned from an all-out rejection to a debate 
on how to preserve as much of their political power as possible while ostensibly adhering to 
the new congressional mandates. This reflects the trend, apparent throughout the South, that 
Michael Perman has described as a turn from ‘masterly inactivity’ to an ostensible compliance 
with Radical Reconstruction, in fact “tantamount to qualified opposition, since the explicit 
purpose behind cooperation was to undermine and blunt, rather than fulfill, the intentions of 
the Republican legislators in Congress.”8 After first lambasting the Second Reconstruction 
Act, the Banner published a speech by Confederate war hero P. G. T.Beauregard, an address 
by Louisiana’s conservative state legislature, and  letter by George Williams, elected to the 
US Senate by that same legislature, all of whom counseled submission in the face of superior 
force. These conservative luminaries, as well as the editors of the Banner, the Democrat, and 
the Natchitoches Semi-Weekly Times, urged whites to take the requisite oath, regist r, and 
vote. They believed that Southern whites would be al  to control the black votes and thus 
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retain political control of the state and local governments, while at the same time ostensibly 
adhering to the demands of Congress.9 
 Conservatives, correctly as it turned out, predictd that the very stringency of the new 
laws would backfire, causing the military authorities difficulties in carrying out their 
provisions. The Second Reconstruction Act authorized the commanders of the Military 
Districts to appoint as many registrars and commissioners of election as necessary, every one 
of whom would have to swear the Ironclad Oath. The editor of the Democrat wryly noted that 
Rapides would require over a hundred such officers, while, at best, “by a thorough search, two 
or three respectable and competent men may be found, who can take the oath.”10 This 
prediction involved more than mere bluster or conservative propaganda. Whatever anti-
secessionism and Unionism had existed before and during the Civil War, had not nurtured 
much widespread support for the Republican party among Southern whites - in part because 
“uncommon endurance and fortitude have been necessary to enable them to live here this long, 
they have all felt the heavy hand of Rebel oppression, and are still the subject of threats, 
slanders, and insults, and in fact, all the annoyances their Rebel neighbors can heap upon 
them.”11 
 The military authorities ordered Martin Flood, Freedmen’s Bureau agent for Bossier, 
Caddo and Desoto, to compile a list of six suitable candidates from each election district in 
those parishes. On April 9, Flood wrote to a Mr. Dean in DeSoto, to notify him that he would 
send his name in as registrar and election commissioner. He also asked Dean to please supply 
him with additional names. Although DeSoto would require at least a dozen (and perhaps 
twice that many) officers, Flood knew of not a single other eligible candidate in the parish. In 
Bossier, James Dobie, the chairman of the board of egistration for the parish, found no more 
than twenty whites who could take the Ironclad Oath and at least one of those was murdered 
shortly after being appointed as commissioner of election. As a result of such difficulties, 
Flood failed to compile a complete list of candidates, submitting mostly the names of 
outsiders rather than local residents. In DeSoto and most of Bossier, he explained, “non-
resident registers would be the only chance by which the freedmen […] would have their full 
rights under the Bill secured to them.” None would have an opportunity to register and vote in 
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those areas “if the registration is left to those who say they accept ‘the military bill under 
protest.’”12  
 In most parishes, the military authorities succeeded in finding at least some competent, 
qualified and sincerely Republican officers, but rarely enough to fill all the offices required. 
In Rapides, the chairman of the board of registration, Azariah F. Wilde, complained that both 
his colleagues, George Dorman and John Stroeber, were unfit for their task. Dorman quit 
voluntarily, but Stroeber wished to stay on despite being hardly able to read or write, leaving 
Wilde and his clerk to do all the actual work. In DeSoto, two registrars notified the military 
supervisor that their chairman, John Cheneyville, had loudly proclaimed that he “did not care 
how the registration progressed as long as he receiv d his $8 per day for being idle.” In Winn, 
one of the registrars, T. S. Bacon did not join the board until several days after it convened, 
and after a few days claimed he had to leave to see to his other duties as Freedmen’s Bureau 
agent in Winn and postmaster in Alexandria. The chairman, William Wright, requested Bacon 
removed, since “if the board can do the work for such a length of time, I trust it can be 
completed without further assistance.”13 
 Despite such difficulties, registration commenced throughout the state on May 1. The 
conservative press continued to broadcast a conflicti g message, rejecting military 
Reconstruction on principle, but urging whites to participate in the election fully in order to 
minimize its repercussions. Whites complained that boards of registration interpreted the 
Reconstruction Act too strictly by refusing to register those whom they considered ineligible, 
even if they had taken the requisite oath. An opinion by Johnson’s attorney general, Henry 
Stanbery, in early June, supported their contention that registrars had to accept all those who 
would swear the oath. Only a legal charge of perjury could then prevent those swearing 
falsely from voting, a procedure that most likely would last until well past the election date.14 
The mostly Republican registrars, to the whites’ chagrin, ignored the ruling and continued to 
refuse registration to those whom they believed ineligible. They even petitioned the military 
authorities to strike men from the list whom they discovered to be disqualified after having 
previously registered them. The registrars quickly became the particular target of conservative 
whites’ anger against military Reconstruction. One disenfranchised resident of Rapides 
                                                 
12 Ibid.; ‘April 9, 1867, Shreveport, Flood to Dean,’ and ‘April 18, 1867, Shreveport, Flood to Sterling,’ NARA, 
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exploded when the board refused to register him, even after repeated applications: “I don’t 
care a D... and I am going to register or I will doall I can to tear the United States 
Government to pieces.” The US Congress, as far as he was concerned, might “sink into the 
bottom of Hell and the quicker the better.”15 
 By the end of May, registered blacks outnumbered whites by wide margins in every 
parish along the Red River except Winn. Conservative whites publicly continued to express 
their acquiescence in the political process and Lieutenant F. E. Pierce, stationed in 
Natchitoches, reported “a feeling on the part of respectable citizens to cheerfully do all in 
their power to aid in the reconstruction of their rspective parishes.” He assured his superiors 
that “if any rowdies should attempt to interfere with any one of the boards, that there are good 
citizens enough to immediately quell and crush any such movement.” Troops, he was 
confident, would not be needed to keep the peace during either registration or the election.16 
Under the surface, however, tensions mounted, as itbecame increasingly clear to the white 
population that they would not be able to control the black vote. The conservative press 
increasingly insisted that “submission to these laws does not necessarily imply approbation or 
an acknowledgment of their justice.” Conservative whites also complained about the 
demoralizing effect that political organization had on black laborers, even while they 
maintained to have “no wish to prevent the negroes from exercising their right of suffrage 
under the law, according to the best of their light and knowledge.”17 
 As blacks began to register en masse, such tensions did not remain confined to the 
pages of the press. In the southern portion of Rapides Parish, near Bayou Boeuff, a white man 
named Hase accosted some freedpeople leaving a political meeting. The freedpeople fired 
some warning shots and Hase fled, but they followed him to his house, briefly arrested him, 
and soon released him unharmed. In Bossier, the planter William Harrison refused to allow 
his freedmen to leave the plantation to register. The freedmen chose to leave their homes, 
rather than give up their newfound political rights. While they gathered their belongings from 
their cabins an enraged Harrison “took a double barreled gun from Joe Robinson and called to 
Isaac Crawford to stop and the boy did not stop quick enough for him and he shot him twice.” 
He then proceeded to beat the murdered boy’s father with a stick. Throughout the region, 
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Bureau agents received complaints from freedmen dismissed by their employers for no other 
reason than registering and intending to vote the Republican ticket.18 
 In Rapides, a quarrel between Registrar Wilde and the Democratic sheriff, James R. 
Andrews, nearly came to blows after letters from Wilde to General Sheridan and Provisional 
Governor Benjamin F. Flanders became public. He complained of Andrews’s unwillingness 
to prosecute whites for crimes against freedpeople, particularly following the murder of Ned 
Jefferson by Thomas McNeely in which Andrews allowed the prisoner to escape after he had 
been remanded to jail to await trial. Wilde urged Flanders to have Andrew removed and a 
Republican, A. J. Sypher, appointed in his stead. A little over a week later, Andrews entered 
the office of parish recorder Moore, where the local military commander, Colonel J. C. Bates, 
Wilde and others were gathered. Andrew spat on Wilde who then put his hand to his breast 
and partly drew out his pistol. Bates quickly defusd the confrontation and Andrews left the 
room. As soon as he learned that the cause of the argument was an official act by Wilde, 
Bates had Andrews arrested, releasing him on bail only after he learned that his presence was 
required for upcoming court business. Wilde took the insult seriously, asking the departmental 
command in New Orleans to provide him with protection, or else to allow him to make it a 
personal matter, allowing him, under the honor code, to challenge Andrews to a duel.19 
 Despite such tensions, interference in the election in Natchitoches and Rapides 
parishes remained limited to occasional incidents and to complaints by whites of the 
freedpeople’s neglect of their work in favor of attending political meetings. Although the 
Democrat endorsed a call by the Ouachita Telegraph to no longer employ any freedpeople 
who joined the Republican Party, there is no indication that white planters implemented such 
a boycott on a large scale. In both these parishes t  registration and election passed off 
without major incidents, returning large majorities n favor of the convention. In Natchitoches, 
in fact, following the elections, Freedmen’s Bureau agent James Cromie complained only that 
a few white Republicans had “marshaled up [the freedm n] in ranks and took all opposition 
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tickets from them and caused them to vote their ticke ,” thus preventing them “to exercise 
their right as freemen.”20  
 Further north, white opposition to black political participation coalesced over the 
summer into what a petition from Caddo Republicans termed “a general sense of insecurity 
[...] in this locality, to such an extent that there is practically no freedom of speech” or of 
assembly. The Shreveport agent for the Freedmen’s Bureau similarly reported that whites 
threatened and abused all loyal men. A “party of ruffians” whipped a “respectable and orderly” 
Northern man in broad daylight and publicly insulted a justice of the peace for advocating the 
removal of certain officials.21 In early August, Edward B. Benton, a Unionist who m ved to 
Shreveport after the war, wrote General Sheridan to complain of an attack on him by a 
“notorious ex-guerrilla captain John Jacobs” and his associates. They choked, beat, and 
attempted to stab him, as punishment for a petition Be ton had presented requesting the 
removal of some of the conservative city officials.  
 Despite the intentions of the Reconstruction Acts, onservative whites still dominated 
local government, protecting Jacobs and his ilk from the legal consequences of such a 
politically motivated assault. A justice of the peac  who witnessed the assault fined the leader 
a mere 25 dollars for breaching the peace. He refused to take the victim’s statement, warning 
him “in a threatening tone and manner [...] that as I had come here since the war, any speech 
had better be guarded.” The military authorities had neither the resources nor the jurisdiction 
to interfere in such cases and, according to Benton,  
threats are daily made by these desperate rebel outlaws to rise suddenly and clean out 
the handful of soldiers stationed here, massacre the negroes, and escape by flight to 
Mexico, and this class of desperadoes, in this parish and vicinity, so far outnumber the 
soldiers that they appear to be prepared and preparing to execute their threats and 
leave the country which they consider will be of no use to them after Reconstruction.22  
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It is unlikely that conservative whites ever seriously considered such a scorched earth strategy, 
but Benton’s words accurately capture the desperate and recalcitrant mindset, which, over the 
ensuing months, would lead to a virtual reign of terror throughout much of the South as 
whites sought to reestablish their political, economic, and racial dominance. 
 Similarly, in neighboring Bossier, “the Rebel spirit is not extinguished,” according to 
election registrar Dobie. Although the white population had received him and his colleagues 
“with a kind of politeness,” it was “often of a cringing kind, that reminds me more of ghastly 
grins than smiles, and more of fear than love.” Curtis A. Boon, the only local man to receive 
them with sincere courtesy and respect, was “treated with the utmost contempt and insult 
wherever we have been, yet his most inveterate enemi s charge him with no other offence 
than his unswerving loyalty to the Union and now acting in the capacity of a US officer.” He 
went on to warn Sheridan that “every plan and trick that can be invented by the ablest minds 
of the country are being practiced upon [the freedpople] to induce them to vote with the 
Rebel party and without strong protection (military the best) no one dare publicly advise them 
of their interests.”23 
 Nothing, however, caused so much tension as the mass political meetings of 
freedpeople organized in local Republican clubs. Whites both resented and feared these 
meetings, which were a visible reminder of the free blacks’ newfound autonomy. In the white 
imagination, freedmen attended these meetings armed and the clubs served no legitimate 
political purpose, but functioned as a training ground for a supposed black insurrection. In the 
face of such a threat - however unrealistic - even military interference seemed a desirable 
alternative. In DeSoto, R. J. Boarman wrote to Judge James J. Weems to get troops sent to the 
parish as he feared “to leave the helpless women and children to be slaughtered and butchered 
in a war of race against race.” The local commander, Lieutenant Thomas Latchford, 
forwarded the request, but noted that the freedmen had not “committed any overt acts” to 
warrant interference and that the only troops he needed were on account of possible violence 
by jittery whites.24 The local Bureau agent, Thomas Carey, confirmed Latchford’s assessment, 
reporting “no hostile demonstrations made in this parish by the freedmen” and “no military 
companies or secret organizations.” The only time any came armed it was because of threats 
from whites to break up their meeting. Carey met thm outside of town and requested they 
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leave their weapons in the military camp to avoid provocation, which they did. All other 
meetings he attended had been “quiet and orderly.”25 
 A few weeks later, on August 16, tensions surrounding political meetings in Bossier 
nearly erupted into violence. According to a ‘statement of facts’ signed by dozens of 
prominent whites, hundreds of armed freemen attended th  meeting, posting armed guards 
around the perimeter. They harassed the whites who tried to attend, briefly disarming two of 
them, B. B. Matlock and Thomas Smith, at gunpoint. Following the meeting they “marched 
from the grounds in military order” stopping and searching passing whites. They also released 
a black horse thief, arrested on warrant, from an acting constable’s custody. These incidents, 
claimed the petitioners, “prove the widespread spirit of lawlessness and incendiarism, which 
is caused by the example and teaching of two or three ir esponsible white men.” Here too, the 
perceived threat of a black uprising, overrode the w ites dislike of military interference and 
the petition requested “a small detail of troops to be stationed at Benton, at least temporarily.” 
Around the same time, near Black Bayou, in the northwestern tip of Caddo, a party of whites 
abused the freedmen “for holding political meetings. One was shot, 15 or 20 taken to 
Jefferson [Texas] and turned over to the post commander.” Thomas Monroe, the local Bureau 
agent, tended to sympathize with the whites in these matters, blaming the excitement on the 
political clubs, at which freedmen attend “all armed, parade and drill like soldiers, they have 
their pickets and patrols and stop all whom they have  suspicion of.” Although he deemed 
both races at fault in Black Bayou, he particularly blamed “the members of the political club 
[...] for all the disturbances which took place.”26 
 Generals Sheridan and Joseph A. Mower, who commanded the District of Louisiana, 
distrusted these reports. Although they ordered the local military commanders to investigate, 
they also gave explicit instructions to find out whet er whites had not themselves provoked 
the black militancy they complained of.27 Latchford reported at the end of October that the 
arrest of Matlock and Smith had been committed by some “evil disposed freedmen” and one 
of the black leaders, James Hickory, immediately had t em released. The release of the horse 
thief had also been committed by a few individuals en route to the meeting, but with no 
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known connection to the Republican leadership. Latchford further concluded that the only 
reason the freedmen attended armed and posted guards, was because of reports that the 
meeting was to be broken up, their American flag to be taken away from them, and their 
registration papers and weapons to be confiscated. The freedmen had determined “that no 
body of men should take them away without a fight.” Since then, no troubles had occurred, 
which “goes conclusively to show, that the arming of themselves (freedmen) at the meeting 
was done only for self-defense, as the rumors were of such a character as would justify it.”28  
 By September, as the date for the elections approached, military officials in charge of 
the Fifth Military District received conflicting signals as to what to expect. Lieutenant F. E. 
Pierce, the military supervisor for the registration in northwestern Louisiana, expected no 
difficulty except possibly in DeSoto, where “the rowdy element seems to have obtained the 
mastery” over the “disposition manifested by the respectable portion of the community to 
quell all outbreaks of lawless conduct.” General Mower, commanding the District of 
Louisiana, on the other hand, warned that “serious trouble may be reasonably anticipated at 
the coming election,” which he had not enough troops to deal with. The reports of trouble he 
forwarded clustered around two areas: the Florida parishes above Baton Rouge and the Red 
River region.29 
 Following the election, Dobie reported from Bossier on “the failure of a legal election 
at three or four precincts in this parish.” At Collinsburg and Rocky Mount precincts, local 
whites arrested the commissioners of election under false pretenses on the morning of the 
election. At Cotton Valley, a colored commissioner was induced to resign and the returns 
from Cane precinct were not signed by all three commissioners. In Caddo, the registrar and 
commissioner F. J. Burgess fled from Summer Grove precinct after Andrew Pickens ordered 
him to vacate the building designated for elections. Although later investigation showed that 
Burgess had been drunk and probably overreacted, no votes could be cast in his precinct.30 
 Complaints from Spring Ridge, where planters dismis ed numerous freedmen who 
voted the convention ticket, appeared more serious. Lieutenant Latchford sent a detachment to 
investigate. During the investigation, a party of eight white men rode up to the two privates 
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guarding the detachment’s wagon. After a brief exchange they “drew their revolvers and 
presented them to the heads and breasts of the soldi r , compelling them to give up their arms 
[...] and cutting the four mules from the wagon and taking the same away with them.” This 
incident is particularly noteworthy, as it is one of very few cases in which militant whites 
directly attacked federal troops. Throughout Reconstruction, soldiers generally remained safe 
from aggression, as conservatives feared the increased intervention that a direct attack on the 
military might provoke. Not surprisingly, in an are where even federal troops were not safe, 
no one dared confirm the complaints of freedmen beig discharged for voting, including a 
number who had come to Shreveport days earlier to sign an affidavit to that effect.31  
 Such incidents did not affect the outcome of the elections, even in the most troubled 
parishes. Bossier, Caddo, and DeSoto all returned substantial majorities in favor of the 
convention and elected large numbers of Republican delegates. In most of the Red River 
Valley, and throughout the state, the elections passed off without any large scale violence 
against black voters. With large numbers of whites disfranchised and many others refusing to 
participate, the Republicans won a huge victory, ensuri g their dominance at the 
constitutional convention. However, the various incidents and tensions surrounding these first 
biracial election in Louisiana would prove an ominous portent for the massive violence to 
come in 1868. 
 
 
Rehearsal for Terror 
At the end of November 1867, a change in military command took place in Louisiana that 
significantly affected the administration of the state over the next year, including the elections 
in April and November. Philip. H. Sheridan had commanded either the state of Louisiana or 
the Fifth Military District since May of 1865 until Joseph Mower succeeded him in 
September 1867, a few weeks before the elections. Both these generals had behaved 
sympathetically towards the Republicans in the state, in ervening when necessary in the voter 
registration and election process and removing officials who did not adhere to the terms of the 
Reconstruction Acts. On November 29, Winfield S. Hancock, a conservative Democrat, 
assumed control and immediately restored control of the state to the civil authorities. He used 
his appointive powers to place conservative whites n many key positions, including the 
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governorship. He also loosened Sheridan’s restrictions on voter registration for whites, 
allowing numerous minor antebellum officials to register. These changes in voter registration 
“speeded the recovery of the Democratic Party and the eventual demise of the Republicans.”32 
 Hancock’s conservatism quickly brought him into conflict with Grant, and at the end 
of March 1868 he resigned in favor of his subordinate, General Robert C. Buchanan. 
Buchanan assumed command less than a month before the elections scheduled for April 16 
and 17, when voters would cast ballots for ratification of the constitution as well as elect state 
and local officials. He allowed the changes in registration initiated by Hancock to continue, 
earning him the enmity of Republican organizer Stephen B. Packard, who chaired the 
statewide board of registration appointed by the constitutional convention. In response to 
Hancock’s conservative policies, this board had appointed a board of supervisors for each 
parish, to gather evidence of any Democratic fraud that might be perpetrated. In its final 
report, Packard and his associates blamed the “hostile a titude assumed by the two 
Commanding Generals” for “much of the unfairness and outrages perpetrated by a class of 
men who lay such high claims to capacity for self-government.”33 
 The report by the Republican board stands in sharp contrast to Dawson’s conclusions 
that Buchanan “was perhaps the most objective and fir-minded commander to serve in the 
state during the postwar years.” More generally, it contradicts his and other historians’ 
conclusion that these elections passed of quietly with little or “no reports of violence 
associated with the election even though blacks report dly voted in large numbers.” Packard 
and his associates, on the other hand insisted that violence, intimidation, and fraud marred the 
elections, costing the Republicans their majority in numerous parishes throughout the state, 
including DeSoto, Caddo, and Bienville. In other paishes, including Bossier, Republicans 
saw their majority drastically shrink compared to September 1867.34  While Packard 
undoubtedly had partisan motivations for reporting disorders in parishes lost by the 
Republicans, there is ample evidence that the April 1868 elections did not pass of as 
peacefully as Dawson and other historians have claimed. In the northwestern parishes, in 
particular, conservative whites experimented with strategies of resistance that would 
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subsequently spread across the state in the months leading up to the Presidential elections in 
November. 
 Although some few blacks may have voted against the constitution voluntarily, the 
vast majority of such votes, as well as blacks’ signif cant levels of abstention, almost certainly 
represented the result of illicit white pressure. Whites, on the other hand, voted against the 
constitution nearly unanimously. Only in Winn, whic had harbored significant numbers of 
Unionists during the war, did more than a handful o whites vote in favor of the constitution.35 
Even here, though, white support for Republicanism decreased sharply, from over 300 votes 
in favor of calling the convention in September to just 113 in favor of ratification in April, 
ensuring the defeat of the constitution and the election of Democratic officials in the parish. In 
Bienville, where blacks had held only a tenuous advantage over whites in the 1867 
registration, 92 black votes against the constitution assured Republican defeat in that parish. 
In Bossier, about 300 fewer blacks voted in April than had in September and of the remainder 
about a quarter voted against the constitution. Although blacks outnumbered whites by two to 
one, the constitution passed by only 229 out of 1749 votes cast. Conservative whites’ greatest 
victories, however, came in Caddo and DeSoto. Here, blacks had held an advantage in 
registration of 2210 and 1080 voters and won by 1828 and 1354 votes respectively in 
September 1867. In April, both parishes returned majorities of nearly 500 votes in opposition 
to ratification, with hundreds of blacks either staying away from the polls or voting with the 
Democrats. Only Natchitoches and Rapides parishes saw little or no decline in Republican 
support between September 1867 and April 1868.36  
 Equally significant, the April elections saw the political organization of conservative 
whites under the banner of the Conservative-Democratic Party, aligned with the national 
Democracy. In the South, Democrats remained essentially a one-issue party, focused 
exclusively on overturning and undermining Reconstruction and reestablishing white 
supremacy. In Bossier, for instance, the parish party platform conceded equal protection of 
the law in rights of property and person for the fredpeople, but went on to claim that “the 
interest of neither [race] will be promoted by conferring upon the negro the power of an 
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elector or juror, and we will use all lawful means to thwart the efforts of those who would 
place the intelligent white race of the South at the mercy of the ignorant negro.”37 Blacks, in 
other words, were to enjoy only so much equal protection as a whites would grant them, 
without the privileges of citizenship that would ensure them the power to enforce such rights.  
 Since blacks formed a majority of the electorate in Louisiana, the party of white 
supremacy faced a dilemma, even in the absence disfranchisement of large numbers of white 
voters. Some whites sincerely believed they might attract sufficient black votes to overturn 
the constitution, “so soon as the negro was satisfied that he could do as he pleased, and that 
his doing as he pleased would not endanger his freedom, or bring upon him the authority of 
the government, he was immediately ready to unite wh the old citizens of the state.” Many 
die-hard white supremacists, however, did not “believe in stooping to that, and I shall perhaps 
die with that feeling. I believe that God made a difference between the white man and the 
negro, and I do not believe that any law of the United States can change that.”38 The logical 
consequence of such a position implied that a Democratic victory would involve either 
preventing large numbers blacks from voting or forcing them by violence or intimidation to 
vote against their inclinations. Throughout Reconstruction, conservative whites experimented 
with both strategies, trying to get blacks to vote for them voluntarily, but often resorting to 
violence, intimidation and economic blackmail when the freedpeople proved unamenable to 
persuasion. 
 In Natchitoches and Rapides parishes, whites tended to prefer persuasion over 
violence and intimidation. In Natchitoches, as elsewh re, whites founded a Democratic-
Conservative party around which to organize their opposition to the constitution. The 
Natchitoches Spectator, a Democratic paper launched a few months before the election, 
attacked the entire federally supervised process as unconstitutional, but its opposition 
remained relatively civilized compared to that in surrounding parishes. The Bureau agent in 
the parish reported the elections to have passed off quietly, except for planters’ complaints of 
freedpeople neglecting their duties in the week prior to voting.39  
 In Rapides, the elections also passed off quietly. The local Bureau agent reported no 
disturbances in Alexandria except that a “few of the colored people had, owing to the idle talk 
of some worthless whites in the parish, anticipated violence on their way to the polls and 
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came to town armed.” Some freedmen also reported thir employers having threatened to fire 
them if they voted the Republican ticket, but the ag nt doubted such threats would be carried 
out.40 The absence of physical intimidation or violence, however, masked a marked increase 
in rhetorical aggression towards Republicans in particular and blacks in general in the weeks 
and months leading up to the election. In November, a meeting of planters chaired by former 
governor Wells’s brother Montfort adopted resolutions that not only sought to undermine the 
freedpeople’s bargaining power by regulating wages, but also urged planters to refrain from 
hiring any freedpeople who “have organized themselves in political clubs and by their general 
demeanor on the plantations and at the ballot box discover a manifest opposition to the peace 
of society and the quiet enjoyment of our rights of property, advocating confiscation of our 
lands, whilst they are employed by us.”41 
 By February over a hundred prominent whites in theparish established a local 
Democratic-Conservative party to organize the “opposition to the destructive Radical Party” 
and “restore to the country constitutional governmet, and to ourselves our personal and 
political rights.” The newly minted party immediately denounced black enfranchisement as an 
“infamous scheme to subject the whites of the South to t e domination of their former slaves.” 
Over the next weeks, the party appointed commissioners for each ward in the parish and 
together with the editors of the Democrat the party urged whites to take advantage of the less 
restrictive registration rules. As a result, over 458 additional whites compared to 138 blacks 
availed themselves of the opportunity to register. The conservatives, however, failed to strike 
from the lists the “thousands of fraudulent votes” they claimed had been enrolled by “corrupt 
individuals sent through the country by Sheridan.” Although no widespread aggression 
against black voters occurred, white voters in Rapides faced enormous pressure to vote the 
Democratic ticket. A few days before the election, the Democrat insisted that every white 
man should vote an open ticket, so that any whites voting for the Republicans could easily be 
identified. As a result, of 960 whites who voted, only 19 supported the constitution, nearly all 
of them candidates for office.42 
 The virulence of the Democrat’s white supremacism paled beside that of the Banner. 
With the elections still months away, the editor proudly proclaimed that 
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Before we would give our consent to such political degradation in Louisiana, before 
we would vote to open the white man’s ballot-box in any State - the jury-box in any 
white man’s court - the school rooms of Louisiana or elsewhere dedicated to white 
children, or the parlor of any white man’s house, prepared for the comfort of white 
men, women and children, upon a political, education l r social equality with a negro 
mulatto or quadroon - male or female - we would herd all the negroes in America [...] 
and all their negro-equalizing aiders and abettors on ome barren island, plant there a 
thousand fathoms in guano, picketed and posted with Greek fire on the inner lines, 
and with cholera, yellow fever, seven year itch andsmall-pox on the outer ones.”43 
 As in Rapides, Bossier Parish whites organized themselves under the Democratic-
Conservative banner, in the hope of voting down the constitution. No means, fair or foul were 
to be shunned and the Banner urged its reader to kill the constitution “as you would kill a 
snake, with whatever you can lay your hands on - fire, ence-rails, mud, brimstone, Kluklux 
Klans, or the devil’s walking cane.” These means included publically slapping the Republican 
organizer John H. McVean from Shreveport - a “wholesa  vender [sic] of radical poison, 
rape, murder, arson etc.” when he tried to give a campaign speech in the towns of Bellevue 
and Benton.44 Under such pressure, only two whites dared vote in favor of the constitution, 
while almost 350 blacks voted against it. 700 more registered blacks did not vote at all, but 
with a 1500 voter advantage in registration the Republicans still managed to carry the election 
by over 200 votes.45 
 In Bienville, where whites had only a relatively small disadvantage in registration, 
they succeeded in voting down the constitution in part by getting 92 blacks to vote against it. 
According to whites this was the result of a stringe t but peaceful effort by whites to convert 
blacks to their cause, but Packard’s board reported that “bodies of armed men rode through 
the country, threatening to kill colored men if they went to the polls.” Election supervisors 
feared for their lives and concluded that “the general conduct of the election, so far as an 
expression of the popular will is concerned, was the most perfect farce imaginable.” Packard 
undoubtedly had partisan motivations for wanting the elections in Bienville revised, so that 
the Democratic representative to the state legislature and possibly Democratic local officials 
might be replaced by Republicans. Other evidence supports his contentions that at least some 
unwarranted influence was exercised by the whites to prevent the freedmen from giving the 
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Republicans a majority. The Bureau agent for the parish initially reported the elections 
peaceful “although some unprincipled, desperate chara ters of the white population here 
would not hesitate to resort to force and violence in order to prevent freedmen from casting 
their votes.” Once the election had passed, however, h  received scattered reports of 
freedpeople who had been dismissed by their employer for voting the Republican ticket. 
Moreover, a month after the election the Republican didate for sheriff, William H. 
Honneus, was shot, though not fatally, for his political activities.46 
 While evidence of violence and intimidation in Bienville and Bossier is somewhat 
circumstantial, it is far clearer in Caddo and DeSoto. No more than half a dozen Republicans 
dared to campaign politically in those parishes andwith good reason. When McVean, W. S. 
Mudgett and C. C. Antoine went from Shreveport to Mansfield to campaign there, four 
notorious murderers followed them, hoping to ambush them along the way. Only with the 
help of a local black man, who guided them through a swamp at night, did they evade their 
pursuers. After giving their speeches, under the protection of an army detachment, they 
quickly left Mansfield to return home. On the way back they picketed their campsite with 
armed freedmen, who repeatedly halted whites intent o  murdering the Republican 
organizers.47 The troops stationed in Mansfield had been sent at the request of Stephen Hill, 
the chairman of the parish’s board of registration, who had warned the military command that 
“but very few freedmen will have the courage to vote in favor of the constitution. The white 
men, almost to a unit, are bitterly opposed to it, and make open threats to the freedmen if they 
vote in favor of it, in fact, they are completely intimidated ad threats against their lives are 
made, if they should attempt to hold political meetings!” The very few white Unionists in the 
parish fared no better than the freedpeople. Conservative whites beat them up in broad 
daylight and openly threatened the Freedmen’s Bureau agent and the registrars with 
violence.48 
 In DeSoto, as a result of the widespread violence cited at the beginning of this chapter, 
the constitution was defeated by nearly 500 votes, d pite an overwhelming black majority in 
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registration, and most local offices went to the Democratic candidates.49 In Caddo, whites 
employed similarly blatant strategies in their efforts to swing the election. In one precinct, the 
planters simply refused to allow the registrars to use their land for the election. Elsewhere, “a 
band of armed men [stood] near the polls, who deterred voters from casting ballots except as 
they directed, actually taking in some instances th ballots offered by voters and tearing them 
in pieces in view of the commissioners and the voter.” Around Shreveport, armed whites 
guarded the roads into the city, while they laid up the ferries and skiffs on the river to prevent 
freedmen from the countryside coming into town to vote. Under such circumstances, about 
half of the 3000 blacks who had registered in 1867 did not vote at all and of the remainder 
about a third voted against the constitution, turning potential 2200 majority into a 500 vote 
loss for the Republicans.50 
 
The Organization of Terror 
In the months leading up to the Presidential election in November of 1868 the political 
tensions that had gradually built up over the preceding electoral contests exploded into an 
orgy of violence aimed at white Republicans and black voters that engulfed much of 
Louisiana. The Red River, where conservative whites had experimented with strategies of 
violent resistance during the preceding elections, lay at the epicenter of this explosion. The 
experience of the preceding year contributed to conservative whites’ willingness to use 
violence in a number of interrelated ways. First, they responded aggressively to the loss of 
local political power as a result of Republican success at both the state and local level in the 
April elections. White militants particularly targeted elected officials and Republican 
organizers of both races. Secondly, the effects of military Reconstruction convinced Southern 
whites that only by regaining power at the national level could they secure a continued white 
dominance of the South. A Republican president, on the other hand, entailed the threat of 
further federal interference. Finally, the outcome of the earlier elections proved that but very 
few freedmen would vote the Democratic ticket voluntarily in majority-black Louisiana. Only 
by preventing blacks from voting through violence and economic coercion, might 
conservative whites reclaim political dominion over their former slaves  
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 The Democrats made little effort to hide their intention of overthrowing Republican 
rule by any means necessary, although they remained careful to avoid explicitly advocating 
violence, instead alluding to it through indirect or vague language. William H. Scanland, 
editor of the Banner and prominent local Democrat, came closest to an explicit call to arms, 
when he decried Radicalism as 
a demon whose dangerous and destructive agencies must be counteracted and 
destroyed by the worst remedies that can be administered No ‘medicine’ is so 
efficacious as that which is leveled with concentrated fury. Our code of warfare 
corresponds with that of our oppressors - no concession - no truce as long as the black 
flag is unfurled upon the ramp of fanaticism.51 
  Two concomitant developments during the summer and f ll of 1868 gave conservative 
whites the means and opportunity to turn the sporadic violence accompanying the earlier 
electoral contests into a virtual ‘reign of terror’ throughout much of the state. First, whites 
began to organize themselves in clandestine organizations that promoted the use of violence, 
most notably the Ku Klux Klan and the Knights of the White Camelia. Secondly, the military 
authorities in Louisiana increasingly refused to interfere in the political turmoil, particularly 
after Louisiana formally returned to civil rule on July 13, 1868, following the approval by 
Congress of the new state constitution and the legislature’s ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 The Klan came to northwestern Louisiana relatively late, in the summer of 1868, and 
it never gained much organizational coherence or centralized leadership. Instead, militant 
white conservatives throughout the region appropriated various performative elements 
associated with the Klan in their ongoing campaign of intimidation of the black populace and 
white Republicans. Although one freedman, Solomon Thomas, testified to witnessing men 
“wrapped up in white sheets” hang two black women, most incidents involving Klan-like 
disguises were in fact relatively harmless. Morgan Burton, a freedman from Mansfield, 
DeSoto, reported a man “with a white shroud and a gre t long hat” who came into his cabin, 
but left when Burton called to his wife to get his gun. Whites in Klan disguise would pretend 
to be rebel soldiers raised from the dead. They rode out from graveyards and played parlor 
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tricks to enhance the illusion, appearing to remove their heads from their bodies and to eat and 
drink in impossible quantities.52 
 Conservative newspapers made every effort to reinforce the image of the Klan as little 
more than a theatrical performance doing no more harm than giving supposedly gullible 
blacks a good fright. The Shreveport Southwestern eported that “ these bloody moon fellows, 
in full costume, headed by the grand cyclops entered th  market house. [...] on their first 
appearance they appeared about the size of ordinary humans, but they suddenly shot up to the 
height of ten or fifteen feet.” They proceeded to drink “gallon after gallon of the boiling hot” 
coffee and ate “all the raw steaks in sight in less than no time” In April, the Banner, while 
falsely claiming the Klan to be still confined to Tennessee, quoted the testimony of a black 
man who claimed to have seen a Klansman unscrew his head both as evidence of the Klan’s 
harmlessness and blacks unreliability as witnesses. The next month the paper reprinted an 
editorial from the Columbus Dispatch that avowed the Klan to be essentially a practical joke 
and an inevitable reaction to the establishment of Loyal Leagues by Republicans throughout 
the South.53  
 As Elaine Frantz Parsons has argued, the Klan and it supporters consciously 
emphasized the theatrical aspects of the organization, rooted in Southern minstrel tradition. 
They strategically used such “trivialization through comic or sensationalist framing” as a 
smokescreen for the very real violence being perpetrated. The claim that white men wrapped 
in bed sheets might be the ghosts of dead Confederat  soldiers was not meant to scare the 
black population, who rarely if ever believed such claims. Instead, it provided whites with 
plausible deniability towards a Northern audience that feared a resurgent militancy of the 
South.54 A. L. Hay, the editor of the Shreveport News, pursued such a strategy when he told 
congressional investigators, only “silly people” believed in the Klan: “We look upon ghosts as 
imaginary beings and we look upon Ku-Klux as imaginry.”55 Banking on such misdirection, 
various conservative newspapers printed a call to violent resistance in the late spring and early 
summer of 1868 cloaked in seemingly comical references to the Klan:  
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The Ku-Klux klan are kalled upon to kastigate or kill any kullered kusses who may 
approve the konstitution on being konkocted by the kontemptible karpet-baggers at 
the Kapitol. Each klan is kommanded by a karnivorous kernul, who kollects his 
komrades with kare and kaution kommensurate with the magnitude of the kause. 
Whenever konvened they must korrectly give four kountersigns. these are: kill the 
kullered kuss; klean out the karpet-baggers; krush the konvention; karry konservatism; 
konfusion to kongress; konfederates will konquer. Of kourse the klan kreates 
konsiderable konsternation among the kongos and their kunning konductors, who 
kalculate that their kareer may be kut short by katastrophies. Kowardly kurs, they 
kan’t complain.56 
 The Klan’s intended victims took a very different view of these activities. Blacks and 
white Republicans interviewed by congressional investigators unanimously disclaimed 
believing in either the supernatural provenance or the harmless character of the Klan.57 While 
conservative whites downplayed the Klan, some Republican witnesses emphasized the extent 
to which they believed it had penetrated northwestern Louisiana. Charles Keeting, a former 
deputy US marshal and Republican organizer from Shreveport, considered all whites in the 
area to be Ku-Klux. The DeSoto agent for the Freedmen’s Bureau, similarly reported that a 
purported planters’ association was in fact “a branch of the Ku Klux Klan, an organized band 
of murderers and swindlers.”58 Merrill Gardner, a freedman from Natchitoches, insisted that 
the Klansmen were landowning farmers and businessmen, not just the “wild, reckless young 
men” various white witnesses implied. Gardner also claimed to have seen men go out ‘Ku-
Kluxing’ on the night Republican politicians Alfred Hason and Richard Faulkner were 
brutally attacked.59 
 Given the secrecy surrounding both organizations, it remains almost impossible to 
determine the exact relationship between the Klan and the Knights of the White Camelia 
(KWC). The Klan - or at least Klan-like activities - existed throughout the South, but the 
KWC remained unique to Louisiana (and possibly a few bordering areas in Arkansas and 
Texas). Former Confederate colonel and prominent antebellum politician Alcibiades DeBlanc 
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from St. Mary Parish, together with local newspaper ublisher Daniel Dennet, founded the 
KWC in May of 1867, long before the Klan had reached the trans-Mississippi states.60 
 The KWC served as a bridge between the formal Democratic Party organization and 
the violent, illegal, and disreputable Klan. Although nominally secret, numerous prominent 
whites, including local political elites throughout the state, freely admitted to its existence, as 
well as their own membership, while dismissing the Klan as a figment of the overworked 
imagination of the blacks. James G. Dauphine takes this testimony as evidence that precludes 
“the possibility of any co-existence between the KWC and the KKK in Louisiana.” A 
contemporary report by the Republican state legislature, on the other hand, concluded that the 
KWC is “the real organization which is known to the public as the ‘Ku Klux.’” A white 
Unionist testifying some years later similarly identified “what was called by some the White 
Camelia organization, and by others the Ku Klux” as one and the same thing.61 Whether the 
KWC displaced the Klan in Louisiana or was in fact identical with it, is merely a semantic 
distinction. The Reconstruction era Klan lacked organizational unity everywhere outside of 
Tennessee, and the adaptation by established KWC chapters, or individual members, of 
typical Klan practices was not dissimilar from the way the Klan spread throughout the 
South.62 
 The existence of the KWC, meanwhile, allowed whites to further confuse the Northern 
public as to the reality of the Klan, attributing reports of a secret organization to the existence 
of the more placid KWC, rather than the militant Klan. White witnesses from the Red River 
region who admitted to membership of the KWC generally claimed that it was a civic 
organization, which aimed to preserve “the superiority of the white race over the black, to 
prevent amalgamation, and keep the races pure, if possible.” Only the “purest white blood” 
might gain membership. Others claimed the organization was purely defensive, to protect the 
whites from “a rising of the colored people” and the Loyal Leagues condoned by Warmoth. 
Although some admitted that the Knights’ objectives included the maintenance of a white 
man’s government, most insisted that its purposes wre purely social, rather than political. 
Eugene R. Biossat, the editor of the Democrat, mayor of Alexandria and prominent 
Democratic kingmaker in Rapides, only reluctantly admitted that the oath he took upon 
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entering the order included a pledge to “do all in your power to prevent the political affairs of 
this country, in whole or in part, passing into thehands of negroes, or other inferior race.”63 
 As conservative whites stepped up their opposition, both legal and extralegal, to 
Reconstruction, the army continued to disengage itslf from the political process and 
administration of the state. The military bill had placed Louisiana under direct military rule, 
but this was a constitutional anomaly that not only i furiated Southern whites, but also made 
many Northerners and military officers themselves profoundly uncomfortable. Therefore, as 
soon as Congress had readmitted Louisiana to representation and Warmoth had formally 
entered upon his duties as governor, General Buchanan took a step back. Although Buchanan 
gave his full support to Warmoth and Dawson credits him with preventing major disturbances 
in New Orleans like the riot of 1866, the army proved far less effective at keeping the peace in 
rural areas. Despite reports of increasing violence and lawlessness in remote areas such as 
DeSoto parish, Buchanan decided to concentrate the small number of troops he had at a few 
larger towns on the major riverways.64  
 Buchanan could count on the President’s support as he withdrew military support for 
Reconstruction. Since the April election, Warmoth had received numerous reports of violence, 
intimidation, and electoral fraud from his informants along the Red River and in other 
troubled areas of Louisiana.65 On August 1, the recently inaugurated governor sent a letter to 
President Johnson through his trusted associate John F. Deane, outlining the situation and 
warning that such disruptions now threatened to engulf the entire state as the presidential 
elections approached. Deane was to verbally brief the president on the details of the secretive 
KWC, which, according to Warmoth, existed “for the purpose of placing and keeping the 
colored people in a condition of inferiority, and, with a view to this end, contemplates and 
designs the precipitation of a conflict between the two races.” The young governor, 
deprecating the expediency of a possible state militia, went on to request at least two 
regiments of federal cavalry and one of infantry, and an artillery battery, “with orders to 
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cooperate with me in suppressing disorder and violence, arresting criminals, and protect the 
officers of the law in trying them.”66  
 Within a week, Dean reported to Warmoth that Johnsn had received his request with 
skepticism. The president “somewhat sarcastically commented on the late anxiety to be 
relieved from military control as compared with my present cry for military help.” Although 
not denying the request outright, Johnson seemed in no hurry to take action, instead preferring 
to await of Secretary of War John Scofield’s return to Washington a week later. Meanwhile, 
Warmoth’s letter had leaked to the press, and conservative editors and politicians loudly 
denounced his allegations as “a positive misrepresentation of facts and a libel upon the 
character of the people of Louisiana,” both in the pr ss and in private letters to the president.67 
 Back in Louisiana, Buchanan proved determined to narrowly interpret what mandate 
he did have for assisting civil authorities. When Warmoth requested him to send a few dozen 
soldiers to assist the judge and sheriff of an unnamed parish, Buchanan claimed his orders did 
not allow such “precautionary steps.” He claimed he could provide the governor with military 
assistance only “should any special case of resistance to the rightful antiauthority of the State 
occur, and I be properly informed that the authority of the State in the premises has been 
exhausted.” This reply was particularly disingenuous, as Buchanan had received orders just a 
few day s previous allowing all officers to give military assistance to civil authorities such as 
sheriffs or federal marshals, so long as he deemed such assistance “lawful and necessary and 
compatible with the proper discharge of his ordinary military duties.”68  
 Over the following years, however, Buchanan’s line would come to dominate the 
policy of the military leadership in Louisiana. Military commanders would only send troops 
to a locality after a serious disturbance had occurred and rarely, if ever, would allow the army 
to assist civil officers in the day-to-day maintenance of law and order. White militants 
effectively exploited this reactive policy of the military, by temporarily limiting their 
activities in areas where military forces had been stationed, while ratcheting up the violence 
elsewhere. In the ensuing game of cat-and-mouse, the military always lagged a step behind 
Southern militants, who enjoyed widespread support among the white population. This 
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increasingly fostered the impression that the army was helpless to prevent the violence that 
wracked the South, demoralizing Northern public opinion, Southern Republicans, and the 
army’s own personnel.  
 Once Louisiana had returned to civil rule, the new state authorities became responsible 
for organizing the Presidential elections in Novembr, including a new registration under state 
law that posed far less severe restrictions on whites than had the rules imposed by Congress. 
Only those who had held office for a year or more under the Confederacy, had signed the 
ordinance of secession, had led guerrilla units, or had actively promoted treason remained 
disenfranchised - and even they could have their pol tical rights restored by filing a written 
statement that “he acknowledges the late rebellion to have been morally and politically wrong, 
and that he regrets any aid or comfort he may have given it.” Though many whites found the 
required oath distasteful, most complied with it, in order to “put down negro equality, negro 
supremacy, and place Seymour and Blair in the White House.”69  
 The subsequent registration proceeded extremely chaoti ally, as numerous obstacle 
plagued the inexperienced Republican state government. By time the requisite laws had been 
passed and the necessary administrative preparations completed, no more than two weeks - 
and in some places just one - remained for the parishes along the Red River to conduct the 
actual registration. The military authorities exacerbated this delay by refusing to provide the 
secretary of state with the records of the previous registration. The board of registration, 
moreover, suffered from a chronic lack of funding due to the state’s poor credit. This caused 
additional delays in having the necessary registraton books printed and complicated the 
already difficult task of finding qualified registrars, as these would be obliged to pay their 
own expenses.70 
 Although the statewide voter rolls grew from 1867 as a result of the far more lenient 
conditions imposed on whites, registration nevertheless dropped in fifteen parishes, including 
four parishes - Bienville, Bossier, Caddo and Winn - of the seven on the Red River, while in a 
fifth, DeSoto, the registration increased by a mere 41 voters. Unlike in 1867, the board of 
registration published no racial data, but it is safe to assume that white registration increased 
throughout the region, meaning that in these five parishes a significant number of blacks were 
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prevented, or at least discouraged, from registering. The Republican majority of the board 
emphasized in their report that registration remained i complete particularly in those parishes 
where  
for some time past there has existed such a state of society, as to deter many from 
offering to register. It is not reasonable to expect that men who are dependent upon 
their labor for their daily bread, will consent to expose themselves to the loss of 
employment, and incur the hatred of those who, whenev r they feel disposed, will not 
hesitate to shoot or stab those who differ from them politically. The terror is 
aggravated by the confidence the lawless feel of escaping unwhipt of justice, while the 
poor and helpless become more and more timid when ty fail to find that protection 
and security from the law they are entitled to, andhave a right to expect.71 
In northwestern Louisiana, registration increased significantly only in Natchitoches and 
Rapides, the two parishes that remained relatively fr e of violence. Local election supervisors 
from Winn, Caddo and Bossier, all reported that many freedmen either declined to register or 
else “voted as their masters did.” Whites did not limit their violence to potential black voters, 
but also threatened, and in at least one instance cow-hided, Republican election officials who 
encouraged blacks to vote. In Caddo, many blacks refused to register, having become 
“disgusted with politics” as a result of the widespread violence, while others “were afraid 
their old registration papers would be taken from them, which some of them looked on as a 
kind of free paper.”72 
 
‘An Everyday Occurrence’ 
The effects of violence, intimidation, and economic blackmail on registration would prove 
marginal compared to the havoc they wreaked on actual voting results. Whites succeeded in 
reducing Republican turnout to a single vote in Caddo, Bossier and Bienville and eliminated it 
entirely in DeSoto. In Winn, where a white majority made suppressing Republican votes less 
urgent, whites nevertheless reduced the 232 Republican votes of April to just 43 in November, 
while the Democratic total shot up from 281 to 711. Only in Natchitoches and Rapides, both 
of which continued to avoid large scale violence, did Republican voting approach the levels of 
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April, securing a victory for the Grant and Colfax ticket in both parishes despite large 
increases in white registration and consequently in Democratic voting.73  
 These general trends, however, mask a variety of strategies pursued by conservative 
whites in various parishes. Desoto, with little or n  military presence and with Democrats in 
control of local government, saw a massive crackdown n all black political organizing, while 
in Bossier and Caddo militant whites used a combinatio  of large scale riots, severe economic 
pressure and targeted murders of Republican leaders to overwhelm the military forces 
stationed in Shreveport. In Bienville and Winn, meanwhile, where a white majority ensured a 
Democratic victory regardless, many blacks opted to support the party of white supremacy in 
return for protection and employment. In Rapides, too, Democrats made an all-out effort to 
lure black voters into the Democratic fold. Although blacks gratefully attended barbecues 
hosted by conservative whites, and a small number of blacks apparently campaigned actively 
for the Democracy, the vast majority of the black electorate nevertheless voted for the 
Republicans come election day. In Natchitoches, finally, the lack of large scale violence and 
the Republican victory obscure the fact that shortly before election day white militants 
attacked prominent black political leaders in the northern end of the parish, as the violence 
from DeSoto spilled over into its more peaceful neighbor.  
 In DeSoto parish, in particular, Republicans suffered from a lack of qualified 
leadership. Charles Lowell, the chairman of Caddo’s board of registration, reported to 
Warmoth in May that the sole Republican member of DeSoto’s board of registration, John 
Beaty, and the Freedmen’s Bureau agent for the parish, J. J Walsh, “are neither of them men 
of much stamina.” Although he had sent John McVean, the veteran organizer from Shreveport, 
to assist them, he doubted whether there would be enough politically reliable and competent 
election commissioners who could qualify as such. He considered the parish a “perfect den of 
pirates” where it would be difficult for blacks to vote as they wished. A month later, Walsh 
left the parish to take up a seat in the state legislature, fearing for his life were he to return.74 
In his first report from Mansfield, Walsh’s successor, Michael Cary, expressed his shock at 
the state of the parish:  
From my experience as a soldier through Virginia, North Carolina and Texas, I never 
witnessed such bitter hatred towards Union men and freedmen as I have experienced 
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for my short stay in this Parish. [...Outrage on freedpeople in this parish is looked 
upon as a common necessity and an everyday occurrene, without some notice of 
these outrages is taken by the proper authorities it will be impossible for a Union man 
or freedman to live in or near this parish, the freedpeople in this Parish are almost 
considering themselves again in bondage as it appears the planters are doing as they 
please with them.75 
 At Cary’s request a small detachment of troops was sent to Mansfield, commanded by 
Lieutenant Charles O. Bradley, to assist the Bureau agent and the civil authorities. Bradley 
confirmed that the freedpeople suffered grave injustice  which the Bureau agent was 
powerless to stop “from a system of terrorism held by the whites over the freedmen.” 
Although the detachment’s arrival temporarily “had the desired effect of cooling their 
heretofore boisterous conduct,” Cary saw no point in requesting Bradley’s assistance in 
bringing guilty parties to justice. The detachment had orders to remain but ten days, and 
without permanent reinforcements he feared any action they might take would result in 
repercussions as soon as they returned to their camp in Shreveport. Bradley fruitlessly wrote 
his superiors in support of Cary’s request for a permanent detachment military force to 
provide him with “the moral support which he needs.” 76 
 The temporary presence of troops only served to further enrage white conservatives 
who began to openly threaten Cary with his life after Bradley and his men returned to 
Shreveport. In response Bradley dispatched another detachment to Mansfield, commanded by 
Sergeant Ryan, with orders to protect Cary from anypersonal harm. Trouble continued 
despite the troops’ presence, and Bradley promised Cary that when Ryan’s detachment 
returned to camp, another would be sent to relieve him. Although sympathetic to Cary’s plight, 
Bradley also reprimanded him for employing the troops in discharging Bureau duties. He 
reminded the agent that “civil law predominates in the land and until different instructions 
received you must go to civil authorities for aid in discharging your duty.” Despite his 
promise, orders from higher up forced Bradley to withdraw all soldiers from Mansfield less 
than a week later, leaving DeSoto without any military presence in the two months before the 
election. Left without protection, Cary soon had to flee the parish in fear of his life and his 
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replacement, Edward Henderson, saw no other choice than to keep his head down and pretend 
to be a Democrat in order to save his own skin.77 
 With no effective federal presence, conservative whites had free play to prevent blacks 
from voting. Most Republican clubs had already been broken up prior to the April election; 
white planters threatened to dismiss any freedman who attended meetings or voted the 
Republican ticket. White militants, meanwhile, waylaid Anderson West, a courier sent from 
Natchitoches with Republican tickets for Sabine and DeSoto parishes. They not only 
destroyed the tickets, but also severely beat up West and hung him by the neck until he told 
them who had sent him. The few freedmen who risked coming to Mansfield despite these 
threats and the lack of Republican tickets, did not succeed in voting as they wished. Armed 
whites either turned them back at gunpoint before they reached town or forced them to vote 
for Greeley.78  
 Although Caddo and Bossier did not suffer the complete collapse of federal and state 
authority that DeSoto did, the small number of soldiers stationed just outside Shreveport and 
the single Bureau agent responsible for both parishes proved woefully inadequate to deal with 
the widespread violence that wracked the northwestern tip of the state. The Southwestern 
kicked of the campaign for the presidential election n April 15, even before the state 
elections commenced. “Radical legislation” the editor insisted, necessitated a new “system of 
electioneering [...] to keep no one in our employ who votes against our interests.” He urged 
planters to “refuse any longer to grind the hatchet which is to be used to chop off our heads.” 
Any freedpeople joining Republican clubs or voting for Republican candidates should be 
dismissed immediately.79 
 Such threats were no idle boasting. A month after this publication, Shreveport Bureau 
agent Monroe reported that “freedman have been prosecuted with unrelenting vigor since the 
election,” with the white population “determined to avoid everything which tends to give the 
freedmen justice unless he has voted against the constitution.” Monroe continued to report 
“very bitter” feelings against the freedmen throughout the spring and summer, due to growing 
political tensions. In May, Democratic clubs used “coercive measures towards the colored 
people to force them to join, and those who have the courage to refuse, they endeavor to drive 
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from their home.” By July such economic pressures had devolved into outright murders, with 
freedmen “taken from their homes at night and murdere  in cold blood.” By August, when the 
crops had been laid by and planters had less work to be done around the plantation, any 
laborers still determined to vote Republican had difficulties remaining on their land to harvest 
the crop in which they had an interest.80  
 Those blacks that continued to attend political meetings only dared do so armed, 
further fanning white fears of a black insurrection. On Monday morning, August 24, the 
sheriff of Bossier, W. H. Hill, a conservative appointed by Wells almost two years earlier, 
called on Captain Charles C. Farrand, commanding the post at Shreveport, for assistance in 
suppressing an impending riot by armed blacks near Bossier Point. Conservatives claimed 
that Isaac Williams, a freedman and local Republican le der, had summoned the members of 
various Republican clubs in order to take control of the parish and “kill the white people 
‘from the cradle up.’” By the time Farrand, Monroe and a detachment of soldiers arrived at 
the scene, a posse of 150 whites had already commenced arresting the leaders of this 
supposed insurrection.81 
 Democrats quickly turned the Bossier Point ‘riot’ into a perfect public relations coup. 
They arrested dozens of blacks without resorting to violence and brought 49 of them before 
two justices of the peace within days. Although numerous black witness insisted that the 
intentions of the meeting were entirely peaceful, others confirmed whites’ claims that the 
blacks had been plotting an armed insurrection. Many of the freedmen testifying for the 
prosecution--whom no one bothered to cross-examine-- answered in stock phrases culled from 
the editorial pages of the conservative press. Two witnesses specifically claimed to have 
heard the leaders of the insurrection threaten to kill the whites ‘from the cradle up,’ a phrase 
first reported in the Banner three months earlier in an excerpt from the Sparta Rural Times. 
Years later, conservatives would claim that blacks had made threats in very similar language 
to justify the massacre at the Colfax courthouse.82 
 The justices remanded twenty defendants to the parish jail to await trial before the 
district court in October, while a similar number were allowed to remain free in the interim, as 
a “humanitarian gesture” to prevent overcrowding of the jailhouse. At the subsequent trial, a 
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jury of eight blacks and four whites found over thirty of them guilty, and the judge sentenced 
those convicted to a year in the state penitentiary at Baton Rouge. The Banner printed the 
testimony before the justices in full, as evidence of the danger posed by a black population not 
controlled by the whites as well as of the forbearance of the local elites. White witnesses 
before congressional investigators emphasized that a mostly-black jury had passed down the 
final verdict. Even the Bureau agent sympathized with the whites, describing the black leaders 
as criminals who used the political clubs as protection against arrest.83 
 Whatever the justification for the Bossier Point arrests, they resulted in the destruction 
of what Republican organization had remained in the area. With much of the black leadership 
in jail or on the run, whites ratcheted up the leve of violence against the freedpeople. One of 
the first victims of this new wave of terror was Henry Jones, one of the leaders of the 
supposed insurrection who had succeeded in evading capture and prosecution. On September 
2, a group of whites took him from his home and after being shot he was “placed upon a brush 
pile which had been fired and left there, by his would be murderers supposing him to be dead. 
He succeeded in crawling off, but not until he was b dly burned.” By the end of September, 
freedmen in northern Caddo, near Texas, were “constantly being taken from their houses at 
night by gangs of desperadoes and either killed or forced to leave their crops and everything 
they possess. There is not the least sign of any law being enforced.”84 
 The tensions that had mounted in northwestern Louisiana over the preceding months, 
exploded at the end of September. At Shady Grove Plantation, blacks resisted attempts at 
political intimidation more forcefully than usual during Reconstruction, and in response 
whites unleashed a bloodbath that left scores, possibly hundreds, of blacks dead. This would 
prove a recurring pattern throughout the era, as blcks and white Republicans faced a stark 
dilemma of either giving in to violence and intimidation, thereby forfeiting their legitimacy in 
the eyes of many Northern observers, or attempting to resist against superior force and 
thereby risking a bloody massacre. 
 The affair began on September 27 or 28, when a drunken Arkansan named Gibson 
rode up to Shady Grove and demanded “if there was any Radical niggers there.”85 Someone 
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pointed in jest to an old freedman named Bradley, whereupon Gibson immediately fired off a 
shot at the old man, though failing to harm him. A number of freedmen from neighboring 
plantations chased Gibson down the road and apprehend d him near J. M. Vance’s plantation. 
Vance tried to mediate, offering to hold Gibson until the arrival of a magistrate, but the 
freedmen refused to relinquish their prisoner whom they took back to Shady Grove where 
they chained him to a tree and took about two hundred ollars from him.  
 That evening, a party of white citizens came to Shady Grove and secured the release 
of Gibson. They brought him before a justice of thepeace, but no witnesses came forward, 
either out of fear of retribution or because they distrusted the local magistrates. The justice of 
the peace had no choice but to release Gibson, who soon returned with a large party of men 
from his home state. On the night of the September 29, they captured and killed a number of 
freedmen from Shady Grove and the plantation of Dr. Vance for their alleged involvement in 
capturing and robbing Gibson. Blacks responded the following day by arresting two white 
youths, Beverly Ogden and James Brownlee, who had played a part is releasing Gibson and 
possibly in the murders the previous night. The blacks held a summary trial of Brownlee and 
Ogden before fatally shooting both men, setting of a rampage by local whites that lasted for 
weeks and left dozens, and possibly over a hundred, blacks from Bossier and Caddo parishes 
dead.  
 Despite a significant military presence near Shreveport, federal authorities remained 
largely powerless to interfere. On September 30, Charles W. Keeting, the deputy US marshal 
and a prominent white Republican from Shreveport, requested military assistance to quell the 
breach of the peace at Shady Grove. The Shreveport post commander, Captain Farrand, sent 
Captain John M. Coe with about 40 men, to assist Keeting. However, on the arrival of Hill, 
the Bossier sheriff, Keeting returned home, leaving the military with no authority to interfere 
except at Hill’s request. The sheriff initially requested Coe to station his troops near Benton, 
but then, on October 2, informed him that “the persons (supposed to be Arkansas men) who 
had committed the outrages in Bossier parish, and who he had hoped to arrest at that place, 
had left and gone in the direction of Arkansas.” Although local whites continued to murder 
any and all blacks suspected of involvement in the killing of Ogden and Brownlee, Coe could 
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do nothing and he returned his detachment “without having been called on to assist in 
quelling any disturbance or making any arrest.”86 Although violence accompanied the fall 
campaign throughout the state, no other locality saw c rnage on the scale of the Shady Grove 
massacre, except possibly St. Landry parish, the birthplace of the KWC, where a supposed 
negro insurrection led to similarly bloody retaliation just a few days before the explosion of 
violence in Bossier.87 
 Conservative whites from Bossier and Caddo conveniently blamed the killing spree on 
the strangers from Arkansas, claiming that the local citizens only targeted “the murderers of 
Messrs. Ogden and Brownlee and dispersed armed negroes.”88 Two weeks after the events, 
the Southwestern was more concerned with the effect of the ‘Bossier War’ on the productivity 
of the plantations than with the number of blacks “actually killed.”89 In reality, local whites 
not only unleashed an unparalleled reign of terror on the black population, but also used the 
ensuing chaos as an excuse to specifically target the local Republican leadership for violent 
retribution. In Bossier, Charles Keeting fled the parish following the Shady Grove massacre. 
He had believed himself “protected by the better class of people, but when these disturbances 
took place a great many stories were circulated that I instigated the riots, and the better class 
of men then, though they would not take an active part in such proceedings themselves, I 
thought would protect those who did.” Around the same time, George Harris, a black preacher 
and Republican leader from Bellevue, fled to New Orleans after receiving numerous death 
threats and witnessing numerous fellow freedpeople murdered for their political principles.90 
As a result of all this, both Bossier and Caddo each polled but a single Republican vote come 
November. In Caddo, moreover, the sole freedman whodared defy the white terror, Sam 
Watson, was promptly murdered.  
 In Bienville, where the races were near equally divided, whites had already succeeded 
in securing a victory in April, through a combination of intimidation and economic pressure. 
Following the election they nearly murdered the Northe n born Republican candidate for 
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sheriff, W. H. Honneus, and beheaded local black Republican leader Moses Lawhorn. Some 
freedpeople from the parish, moreover, reported being driven off their land for having voted 
the Republican ticket in April.91 Whites combined such violence and intimidation with an 
active campaign to coopt blacks into the Democratic Party. Not all conservatives, many of 
whom openly admitted to membership in the white supremacist KWC, approved of 
organizing such 
barbecues and big meetings, and have them attended by negroes and have negro 
speeches made, and use the same mild persuasion with the negroes as we heretofore 
used over white men, to get them to vote the democratic ticket. I did not believe in 
stooping to that, and I shall perhaps die with thatfeeling. I believe that God made a 
difference between the white man and the negro, and I do not believe that any law of 
the United States can change that.92 
 Despite such objections, the strategy succeeded to a great extent, probably because 
blacks realized they could never win the elections a d opted to buy their personal safety by at 
least publicly supporting the Democratic Party. Freedmen’s Bureau agent Bean estimated that 
ninety percent of the freedmen had joined Democratic clubs by the end of July, securing “a 
better feeling between the whites and blacks then has existed heretofore.” Bureau Inspector 
Jesse M. Lee also found Bienville the quietest of the parishes he visited in northern Louisiana. 
Bienville’s peacefulness was a reflection more of its political homogeneity, than of any 
willingness on the part of the white population to tolerate dissenting political opinions. All the 
freedmen Lee spoke with told him they planned to vote the Democratic ticket only “in order 
to save themselves” and he encountered not a single whit  Republican in the entire parish, the 
result of a campaign of intimidation against any “white men who it is supposed will vote the 
Republican ticket.”93  
 Similarly, in Winn parish, the white majority of which guaranteed a Seymour and 
Blair victory, many freedmen joined the Democratic Party over the summer. Some were even 
enthusiastically “traveling about among the plantations, talking politics, and calling 
themselves ‘champions of Democracy’ and are trying their utmost to persuade the freedmen 
to join Democratic clubs.” Delos W. White, the local Freedmen’s Bureau agent, complained 
                                                 
91 Supplemental Report, 109; CSS, 41-2, HOR. Misc. 154, part 1, 656-657; ‘May 31, 1868, Sparta, Bean to 
Warren,’ NARA, RG 105, M1905, reel 102, frame 22. 
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that this political activity distracted the freedpeo le from their work on the land. White, a 
Republican activist and the parish registrar, might not have minded political organization by 
the blacks had he not been convinced that “both the fre dmen and the whites will vote 
unanimously for Seymour and Blair.”94  
 Conservative whites in Winn Parish targeted both white and black Republican leaders. 
The most prominent victims were the black Republican leaders Hall Frazier, a free-born black 
who had successfully established himself as the owner of a saw mill, and his son Brantley 
Allen, who briefly taught the only freedmen’s school in the parish. At the end of August a 
party of whites came to Hall Frazier’s house, where his son was staying, and opened fire 
through the window, forcing Allen to give up his work as a teacher. A month after the election, 
two unidentified whites murdered Frazier and his employee Jesse Robinson, mistaking the 
latter for Brantley, who had voted the Republican ticket despite relentless intimidation. The 
murderers came to Frazier’s Mill pretending to place n order, and when Frazier rose up after 
drawing a plan on the ground, “one man blew out his brains and the other killed the engineer 
[Robinson] in the mill.”95 
 The small clique of vocal white Republicans from Winn that centered around local 
planter Willie S. Calhoun, Bureau agent White, and Republican organizer William Phillips 
also faced increasing pressure. Calhoun’s residence across the parish line in Rapides and his 
status as a scion of a prominent planter family protected him from direct threats; Phillips was 
in New Orleans during the election as a member of the state board of registration. White, 
however, had to flee the parish in fear of his lifeshortly after the murder of Frazier and 
Robinson. He and Phillips did not return until Calhoun’s landing had been rechristened as the 
town of Colfax, the seat of the newly formed parish of Grant, gerrymandered to ensure a large 
black and therefore Republican majority.96 
 Natchitoches long avoided the systematic political vio ence that plagued many of the 
parishes surrounding it. An outbreak of racial hostility had appeared imminent in September, 
after a colored constable named Labazan had shot and critically wounded two young white 
men suspected of brutalizing a freedman. Bureau agent Hosner predicted that “it will require 
the interposition of the bayonets, or of divine providence, to prevent a serious disturbance,” 
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but Labazan and members of his posse were arrested and tried by the parish judge within a 
fortnight, preventing any further escalation. The parish’s Bureau records contain some other 
scattered reports of political intimidation, though none of them lethal, but as late as August 31 
the local agent, Charles Miller, concluded that the freedmen “when not interfered with by 
politicians and political meetings” worked diligently and “generally, could not be better 
treated by whites than they are.” The parish results appear to confirm the peacefulness of the 
parish, with only about 200 - roughly ten percent - fewer Republican votes cast than at the 
April election. 97 
 On the night prior to the election, however, white vigilantes, some from Sabine and 
DeSoto across the parish line, targeted two leading black Republicans in the remote fifth ward 
of Natchitoches, murdering one and severely beating the other. These attacks resulted from 
the earlier assault on Anderson West, the courier sent to deliver Republican tickets to Sabine 
and Desoto. After taking the tickets he was carrying, the whites tortured and nearly killed him, 
until he gave them the name of the man who had sent him. To save his life, West finally gave 
up Richard L. Faulkner, the president of the Republican club in the fifth ward of Natchitoches, 
a member of the parish police jury, and a teacher of a freedmen’s school.  
 On the night of November 2, a party of at least eight to ten armed men surrounded 
Faulkner’s house. Although he hid under a floor board, the whites searched the house and 
finally found his hiding place. After taking all his money, his personal papers, and the 
Republican tickets he still held in his possession, they dragged him out to the nearby woods 
and “whipped and beat him until they were satisfied,” letting him go only after he promised to 
resign his office and vote the Democratic ticket the following day. They then went on to 
Alfred Hason’s house, a mile away, whom Faulkner had identified as his adjutant in the 
Republican club. Here too, the white men demanded th  tickets he had in his possession, and 
after firing a load of buckshot through the window, Hason’s wife went out and surrendered 
them. They demanded Hason come out, which he refused in fear of his life. Only when the 
whites commenced to set his house on fire did he go out to save his family and the whites 
immediately fired three shots at him, killing him instantly before the eyes of his wife and 
children.  
                                                 
97 ‘September 20, 1868, Natchitoches, Hosner to Warren,’ and ‘September 30, 1868, Natchitoches, Hosner to 
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 While the elections in the rest of the parish passed off quietly, hardly any Republicans 
dared vote in ward 5, accounting for as much as three quarters of the 200 votes lost relative to 
the April election. Militant conservatives, moreover, broke up the Republican clubs “by 
threatening to kill them” in the area, undermining the party’s ability to organize in the 
future.98 As violence and lawlessness spilled over from neighboring Sabine and DeSoto, these 
incidents provided a dangerous example of the effectiveness of political intimidation to 
conservative whites in Natchitoches. Although they had lost the elections in 1868, 
conservatives had laid the groundwork for ‘bulldozing’ the parish’s Republican leadership in 
the future. 
 In Rapides, as in Bienville and Winn, conservative whites made a concerted effort to 
gain black support by organizing barbecues for the fre dpeople throughout the parish at which 
white and black Democratic orators spoke. Blacks attended these festivities in large numbers, 
at least according to the conservative D mocrat.99 Unlike Winn and Bienville, however, 
Rapides had a large black majority and the freedpeople had enough experience with white 
supremacy to realize that whites might easily “feed you with the corn and choke you with the 
cob.” They were more than happy to eat the Democrats’ food, but had no intention of 
relinquishing political power by voting the Democratic ticket.100 Nevertheless, whites in 
Rapides did not resort to personal violence, althoug  the printing press of the Republican 
Rapides Tribune in the parish was vandalized both shortly before and gain shortly after the 
election.101 
 Despite the absence of widespread violence in Rapides, the parish received extensive 
attention from the congressional investigation prompted by the elections. At the November 
elections, voters not only cast ballots for President and Vice-President, but also for members 
of the House of Representatives. Most of the parishes on the Red River fell into the fourth 
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congressional district, and the Democratic candidate for this district was Michael Ryan, a 
longtime resident and prominent planter of Rapides, who had served as a state senator before 
the war and was appointed district judge by Wells after the surrender. While Grant and Colfax 
easily won their election even without Louisiana’s seven electoral votes, the intimidation and 
violence ensured victory for Ryan over his Northern born Republican opponent Joseph P. 
Newsham. Newsham challenged the results, claiming first of all that Ryan was ineligible 
under the fourteenth amendment, because he had held office prior to the war and then 
supported the Rebellion. Secondly, Newsham argued that he only lost the election due to the 
“reign of terror, intimidation, fraud, and lawless violence” in Caddo, Winn, Bossier, DeSoto 
and Sabine. He had received a total of just 46 votes from these parishes, compared to over 
3000 for Warmoth a few months before, and 6000 in favor of the constitution in 1867.102 
 Where the testimony in other parishes relates mostly to episodes of violence, fraud and 
voter intimidation, the main question in Rapides was the eligibility of Ryan. In nominating 
Ryan, the Democrats had hoped to have found a compromise candidate who was conservative 
enough to appeal to white voters while at the same ti being eligible under the fourteenth 
amendment. Since Ryan’s having held office prior to the Civil War was not in dispute, the 
question revolved around his loyalty or disloyalty during the conflict. Although Ryan never 
actively participated in the hostilities, numerous witnesses confirmed that he had given a 
speech of encouragement to a company of Confederate soldiers, had publicly worn a 
Confederate uniform, and had acted as officer to a unit of home guards in his parish. Although 
the evidence indicates that he never enthusiastically supported secession and had feared for its 
success from the outset, he never suffered persecution by the Confederate authorities as did a 
number of outspoken Unionist in the area. The committee particularly drew a comparison 
with Ryan’s friend and neighbor James B. Sullivan,  elderly and sick man whom the Rebels 
arrested and imprisoned under harsh circumstances for a number of months. Although 
Sullivan and other conservative whites testified onRyan’s behalf, the congressional 
committee concluded that “Mr. Ryan did, by the facts recited, give aid and comfort to the 
enemies of his country” and was therefore ineligible to his a seat in Congress. Even had Ryan 
not been disqualified, the committee recommended discarding the entire vote of Caddo, 
Bossier, Winn, DeSoto and Sabine as well as specific precincts in other parishes where 
violence marred the election.103 
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The violence that erupted throughout Louisiana leading up to the presidential elections of 
November 1868 did not appear out of thin air. As soon as Congress passed the Reconstruction 
Acts in early 1867, conservative whites set out to reclaim the political dominance they felt 
they were entitled to. With black enfranchisement guaranteed by the federal government, 
conservative whites in majority-black Louisiana could not expect to regain political powers 
simply by galvanizing white voters around the issue of white supremacy as occurred in many 
other states in the South. Instead, they either had to move towards the political center, in the 
hope of siphoning of enough black votes from the Republicans to regain control of the state, 
or else they had to directly control the black electorate through force and economic coercion.  
 Only in Bienville and Winn, where blacks did not form a clear majority of the 
population, did whites succeed in gathering significant black support, in exchange for relative 
safety and employment for the freedpeople. In Caddo, Bossier and DeSoto parishes, white 
militants quickly began experimenting with the violent and extralegal strategies, even during 
the reputedly peaceful elections of September 1867 and April 1868. These parishes, along 
with the Florida parishes above Baton Rouge, were the epicenter from which much of the 
violence spread across the state in the summer and fall of 1868. In Natchitoches and Rapides, 
finally, conservative whites attempted, but failed, to garner black support through mostly legal 
means throughout the 1867 and 1868 elections. Blacks consistently voted almost unanimously 
for Republican candidates in all three elections, while the more violent parishes succeeded in 
almost entirely eliminating Republican voting. 
 Although conservative whites had demonstrated their ab lity to dominate the black 
voters and Republican leaders through violence and economic pressure, by the beginning of 
1869 they faced not only Republican controlled state nd, in many parishes, local 
governments, but also a national government dominated by the party of Reconstruction. 
Conservative whites realized that in order to regain power, they not only had to effectively 
eliminate or control the black vote, but also do so in a way that would not provoke 
interference by the federal government. As a result, subsequent elections during 
Reconstruction never saw the same levels of widespread violence. Instead, conservative 
whites more selectively targeted Republican leadership of both races for intimidation, a 
strategy that provoked less public outcry but eventually proved at least as effective in 
undermining the party’s political effectiveness. The reign of terror that had swept the state in 
the fall of 1868, however, would continue to serve as a reminder to the freedpeople and their 
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white allies of the extremes to which conservatives w re willing to go if they felt it served 
their purposes. Its legacy, moreover, would severely complicate the brief period of political 
stability under Republican rule discussed in the following chapter.  
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5. Implementing Equality 
The Limits of Republican Power in the Warmoth Era (1869-1872) 
 
Sam Watson, a freedman who ran an apple stand in Shreveport, cast the only Republican vote 
in the entire parish of Caddo at the November 1868 presidential elections. On the evening of 
election day, two young whites named Hinley and Pittman stopped at Watson’s apple stand, 
called him out, and shot him dead. Aaron B. Levissee, the recently elected district judge, was 
just then holding his first term of court in the parish. Major Ashton, a young, ambitious 
district attorney, suggested that Levissee have the grand jury indict the murderers and then let 
the sheriff arrest them on a bench warrant while court was still in session. Levissee did so, and 
a biracial grand jury of ten whites and six blacks, recently empaneled under the new state law, 
passed down its first indictment for a politically motivated murder. The ensuing court case 
quickly became a test of wills between the novice judge and the conservative white 
establishment of the parish, as L. M. Nutt, a prominent lawyer and reputed Ku-Klux Klan 
captain, took up Hinley and Pittman’s defense.  
 Unlike his predecessor, James J. Weems, Levissee enforc d a law precluding bail in 
murder trials, and in response Nutt pressed for a speedy trial. The trial commenced on a 
Monday and the judge found his courtroom “crowded with young men from the country, 
usually if not universally armed – their pistols buckled around outside the clothes. In this I 
could see Nutt’s design to have the house full of Ku-Klux from whom to select jurors, when 
the regular venire was exhausted.” Levissee forestall d Nutt’s strategy by explicitly 
instructing the sheriff to select only “the best and most substantial men in Shreveport” as 
potential substitutes, ignoring the “Ku–Klux gentry” in the public. When a prospective juror 
came to the stand for examination “with a six-shooter buckled around him” Levissee’s 
patience was exhausted and he ordered all those armed to clear the courthouse.  
 Levissee’s efforts paid off and the jury found a verdict of guilty without capital 
punishment. Nutt immediately entered a motion for a new trial. The night before Levissee was 
to rule on the motion, a known Klansman, Dock Jones, came to the judge’s home and 
threatened his life if he did not grant it. Levissee refused to be cowed and sentenced the 
defendants to hard labor for life. As soon as they left the court room, however, both men 
escaped with the connivance of the deputy sheriff who held them in his charge. Pittman 
subsequently vanished, but Hinley was arrested a year later in Texas and served about five 
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years of his sentence before Governor William Pitt Kellogg pardoned him in the winter of 
1874-75.1 
 It is impossible to verify Levissee’s claim that Hinley was “the only one ever punished 
in Louisiana for a political murder,” but such convictions were certainly rare. The events of 
the case, moreover, exemplify the difficulties involved in locally implementing the greater 
racial equality envisioned by Republican lawmakers in Washington and New Orleans. 
Conservative whites, who enjoyed widespread support within their communities, had 
numerous opportunities to shield one of their own from being effectively prosecuted at the 
various stages within the judicial process. Only the perseverance of Levissee, even in the face 
of personal threats and subsequent social ostracism, allowed a conviction to be obtained at all. 
Even then, a sympathetic deputy sheriff could subvert th  judgment, allowing one convict to 
escape punishment entirely and delaying the punishment of the other. Had the court not been 
is session at the time of the murder, moreover, it is unlikely that a conviction would have been 
obtained at all. Hinley and Pittman might have let th mselves be tried by a sympathetic justice 
of the peace, or else would have fled the area before any action could be taken. 
 Republican political power in Louisiana reached its apex between 1868 and 1872. The 
party swept all statewide and most local offices at the elections in both April 1868 and 
November 1870. Governor Henry Clay Warmoth, although initially disliked by many 
conservative whites, gradually succeeded in winning a rudging measure of respect from 
them. He certainly never faced the kind of challenges to his legitimacy that would plague his 
successor. As a result, these years also saw a lull in political violence, allowing blacks to 
participate relatively unimpeded in the political and judicial process, thereby giving substance 
to their newly won citizenship. Even so, white conservatives continued to obstruct changes in 
the entrenched racial hierarchy whenever possible, and Republican success on paper did not 
always translate into substantial improvements for blacks’ civil and political rights, 
particularly in rural areas far from New Orleans. Many of the local officials elected were 
moderate white Republicans, with limited interest in challenging received notions of white 
supremacy. Conservative whites, moreover, used their economic leverage, social pressure, 
and, when necessary, continued violence and intimidation, to minimize the practical effects of 
Reconstruction. 
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Federal Retreat 
Inspired by their success in ‘winning’ the November 1868 presidential election through the 
widespread use of violence and intimidation, militant whites in northwestern Louisiana 
increasingly challenged the authority of local military commanders stationed in the Red River 
area. Many of these commanders did all in their power to support local Republican leaders 
and officials, who often lacked the resources to deal with both political terrorism and the 
numerous outlaws who specifically targeted blacks and white Republicans in order to retain a 
measure of support and protection from the local community. Eventually, however, the lack 
of men and material resources, as well as the very limited mandate granted them by their 
superiors in New Orleans, severely hampered the ability of these officers to operate 
effectively. Under these circumstances, local military commanders often became frustrated 
and bitter, eventually withdrawing from any interference in civil affairs. The experiences of 
Napoleon McLaughlin, a brevet general who commanded the post at Grand Ecore near 
Natchitoches, and of Captain Joseph Kerin, in charge of the troops at Greenwood near 
Shreveport, illustrate the difficulties that plagued military officers who attempted to enforce 
Reconstruction. 
 About a week before Christmas 1868, McLaughlin personally set out from his camp at 
Grand Ecore, accompanied only by his orderly, to investigate the murders of the freedmen 
Hall Frazier and Jesse Robinson in Winn Parish. En route, the news reached him that William 
and Lawson Kimball could be found at their father’s house near the hamlet of St. Maurice, in 
Winn near the Natchitoches line. The Kimball brothers were notorious outlaws with 
outstanding warrants in both Natchitoches and Winn, the oldest of which dated back thirty 
months to the murder of a freedman in April 1866. Suspicion also rested on William Kimball 
for the 1866 murder, in Winn, of army officer and Freedman’s Bureau agent Lieutenant J. C. 
Butts, with whose watch and chain he was seen shortly after the murder. Neither the local 
civil authorities, nor federal officers had ever succeeded in apprehending the Kimballs, who 
divided their time between Texas and Winn parish, were the civil authorities refused to take 
action, and local whites forewarned them of any attempts to arrest them by federal officials or 
military personnel. While there is no evidence to suggest that politics served as the primary 
motivation for the Kimball’s and similar gangs, they xploited the widespread animosity 
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against blacks, northerners, and federal officers, whom they could victimize indiscriminately, 
without losing the support and protection of the white community.2 
 On hearing of the Kilmball brothers’ presence, McLaughlin decided to attempt the 
arrest himself, hoping to profit from the element of surprise. The brothers nevertheless got 
wind of his presence, and by time he reached their house he was met by their mother, who 
informed him they had left for Texas that morning. McLaughlin continued on his way 
towards Winnfield, followed by the outlaws’ younger brother, Thomas Kimball. Less than a 
mile down the road, McLaughlin came across William Ki ball, talking to a neighbor. Before 
McLaughlin could surprise him, Thomas shouted out a warning to his brother, who jumped 
onto his horse and, taking a stick from a bystander, whipped his mount as he took off towards 
the woods.  
 McLaughlin gave chase through the forest and just as he was about to overtake 
Kimball, the outlaw’s horse lost his footing in a mud hole, forcing him to dismount. Kimball 
took cover behind his mount, and as McLaughlin approached fired off a shot, hitting the 
soldier’s horse in the neck. McLaughlin, still mounted, returned fire with his shotgun, 
wounding Kimball in the face with a burst of light birdshot. They exchanged fire with both 
shotgun and pistols, before Kimball threw down his weapon and surrendered with two bullets 
left in his six-shooter. The orderly had not been able to keep up with the chase, forcing 
McLaughlin to lower his weapon and dismount in order to effect the arrest. Kimball saw an 
opportunity to get away and quickly seized it. Snatching his revolver off the ground he 
jumped on his horse and took off once again. McLaughlin quickly remounted, and, despite his 
horse’s wounded neck, once again overtook Kimball, who fired at him at full speed, missing 
with his fifth shot and misfiring the final round. McLaughlin returned fire, fatally wounding 
Kimball with a shot to the chest. 
 McLaughlin returned to the road, where he found his orderly, as well as Thomas 
Kimball and several other residents of the neighboro d. He tried to get someone to notify the 
nearest coroner, but the locals refused, insisting instead that he take them to see the body. 
When they reached the spot, Kimball’s father was already there with several men, armed with 
shotguns, who “had turned the body on to its back, taken the blood off its face and tied up its 
jaw.” Considering “the desperate character of the family, and not liking the appearance of 
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affairs, [McLaughlin] felt to remain would be death.” Instead, he rode nine miles to inform 
the coroner of events “telling him I did not propose being arrested in Winn parish, but would 
return to my camp, where I could be found at any time.” He similarly informed his superiors 
in New Orleans, that “I am ready and anxious to be tried by any tribunal, civil or military, 
anywhere in the world, except for Winn, which is filled by just such desperadoes as this Wm. 
Kimball, and where my life would not be safe one moment.” To ensure his own safety, 
McLaughlin went to Natchitoches on December 24 to surrender to Winn sheriff W. T. Barnett, 
who was in town with a warrant for his arrest, “immediately however suing out a writ of 
habeas corpus [...] under which I was taken before judge Osborne of this judicial district, now 
holding court in this parish.” The Republican district judge, John W. Osborne, released him 
on bail for his appearance on December 29, when he dismissed him unconditionally, “as he 
appears not guilty, it being a case of justifiable homicide.”3 
 In the long run, McLaughlin’s vigorous attempt to enforce the law against two 
notorious outlaws may have done more to hinder thano help the viability and legitimacy of 
Republican rule backed by military force The conservative state military commander Robert 
C. Buchanan’s first reaction was to reprimand his subordinate for attempting “the arrest when 
not accompanied by civil authorities or in possession of warrant.” McLaughlin himself, 
moreover, concluded it would now be impossible “to again go to Winn, unless with a large 
detail, which I cannot spare. [...] So my investigation of the murder of Frazier and the other 
man will rest for the present.” His failure to further prosecute the killing of Frazier and 
Robinson had dire consequences for Albert Farkenton, a freedman from Natchitoches. A man 
“calling himself Davenport, but bearing the aliases Carpenter, Baker, etc. made a murderous 
attempt” on Farkenton, “shooting him three times and leaving him apparently dead.”4 
 This time, McLaughlin left the investigation to the civil authorities. The ward 
constable J. J. Kimball (no relation, apparently, of the Winn outlaws) summoned a posse and 
succeeded in apprehending Davenport in Claiborne parish, just before he crossed the state line 
into Arkansas. On their return to Natchitoches, however, a party of nine heavily armed whites, 
including Lawson Kimball, met the constable and his po se and forcibly rescued the prisoner 
from custody. As he rode off, Davenport boasted to his would-be captors that “he was the 
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Neil,’ and ‘January 9, 1868, Grand Ecore, McLaughlin to Neil,’ NARA, RG 393, part 1, entry 4501, box 2; CSS, 
43-2, HOR. Rep. 261, 584. 
4 ‘December 22, 1868, Grande Ecore, McLaughlin to Neil [including Buchanan’s Endorsement]’ and ‘January 
21, 1869, Grand Ecore, McLaughlin to Neil,’ NARA, RG 393, part 1, entry 4501, boxes 2, 4. 
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man who killed Hall Frasier and son [...], had killed, or if not, intended to kill, Farkenton; and 
had taken three mules away from the freedmen in Winn a few days ago.” A frustrated 
McLaughlin complained that the increase of troops in northeastern Texas had driven these 
outlaws back into Louisiana, where they “can perpetrat  all kinds of outrage with the most 
perfect impunity [...], whilst the civil authorities are paralyzed with fear, and I powerless to 
interfere.”5 
 Less than a hundred miles north of Grand Ecore, near Shreveport, civil and military 
authorities faced similar problems with a gang of robbers and horse thieves operating around 
Greenwood Caddo, just across the border with Texas. Like the Kimball gang, these outlaws 
specifically targeted freedmen and white Republicans, ensuring that the majority of whites 
turned a blind eye, if not supporting them outright. Caddo’s conservative sheriff John J. Hope, 
who was rumored to have sold blacks freed by the army back into slavery during the war, 
undertook nothing to impede these desperadoes.6 By May 1869 Hope had resigned as sheriff, 
and in his stead Warmoth appointed John J. O’Connor, a 23 year old Irish immigrant and a 
Union army veteran, unknown to the people of the parish. Presumably a Republican, 
O’Connor soon initiated a vigorous attempt to restore rder to the area, supported by cavalry 
Captain Joseph Kerin, detached from forces stationed i  Jefferson Texas, who reestablished a 
cavalry post at Shreveport on June 9, 1869 , just five weeks after it had been ordered broken 
up.7 
 The immediate reason for Kerin’s stationing in Caddo, was a complaint from Ross 
Wilkinson, a former Union officer, Caddo registrar, nd Republican candidate for the state 
legislature, who owned a plantation near Greenwood that hugged the Texas line. As soon as 
the outlaws from Texas had appeared in the area, Wilkinson had “protested and tried to get 
the citizens to put a stop to it, but without avail.” On March 29, he himself had a horse stolen 
and immediately arranged for a warrant to be issued for two of the perpetrators, who were 
subsequently arrested in Jefferson, Texas. They succeeded in escaping and returned to Caddo, 
where they joined with the rest of their gang and lai  siege to Wilkinson’s home for two 
weeks, swearing to kill him and destroy his property in revenge for his legal actions. 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 ‘June 16, 1867, Shreveport, McVean et al. to Sheridan,’ enclosed in ‘August 13, 1867, New Orleans, Flanders 
to Sheridan,’ NARA, RG 393, part 1, entry 4575, box 3. 
7 No explicit mention is made in the available sources regarding O’Connor’s politics, but his actions and 
background indicate his Republican politics. 
http://www.ancestry.com/rd/viewrecord.aspx?dbname=&dbid=7163&rpid=30601509;  
SW, 69-05-07; ‘October 15, 1869, New Orleans, Mower to Fry,’ NARA, RG 393, part 1, entry 4482, vol. 266C. 
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Wilkinson urgently requested protection from Brevet Brigadier General Buell, commanding 
the cavalry forces at Jefferson, who sent a small squad of cavalry to the Texas side of the 
border near Wilkinson’s property, informing the beleaguered planter that he had no authority 
to send troops into Louisiana, which, unlike Texas, had reverted to civilian rule. Wilkinson 
then sent a letter to General Mower in New Orleans requesting assistance. Warmoth 
confirmed Wilkinson’s claims that “the civil authorities are powerless to protect life and 
property in Caddo parish.” Mower, however, had no troops left to spare and first needed to 
telegraph his superiors in Washington to get troops from Texas transferred to his command. 
As a result of the army’s bureaucracy and deference to civil authority, it took over six weeks 
for a single company of cavalry from Jefferson to be stationed where it was needed in 
Shreveport, just 50 miles away.8 
 In the meantime, Wilkinson depended for protection on young sheriff O’Connor, who, 
upon hearing of Wilkinson’s predicament, “immediately proceeded to capture [the outlaws], 
but all efforts were fruitless, as they are scattered in the woods.” He arrested one local 
accomplice, whom he soon released on bail, but “the principals have decamped for Texas, 
swearing vengeance, for the purpose of collecting more of the gang, and return to murder 
major Wilkinson and all others who have aided me in their rout.” By the end of May, having 
spent a week in the Greenwood area, he could no longer remain to protect Wilkinson, as court 
business in Shreveport required his presence. He wrote to Warmoth in support of Wilkinson’s 
request for troops, urging the governor to have at le st fifty soldiers sent to Shreveport “the 
better to afford protection to the citizens whose liv s are in danger on the Texas border.”9 
 The arrival of Kerin with a full company of cavalry satisfied O’Connor’s request 
numerically. For the time being, however, the operation l effectiveness of the unit was 
severely hampered, due to its being “dismounted and in need of 90 horses, ordnance and 
ordnance stores, clothing and garrison equipage,” none of which Kerin received until early 
September. Until then he could only send a small guard detachment to Greenwood, with 
orders to protect Wilkinson and assist the civil authorities if so called upon. The bulk of his 
force, meanwhile set up camp at an old arsenal building, just outside Shreveport.10  
                                                 
8 Ibid.; ‘May 28, 1869, Caddo, Wilkinson to Mower,’ and ‘May 22, 1869, New Orleans, Warmoth to Mower,’ 
NARA, RG 393, part 1, entry 4501, box 4. 
9 ‘May 27, 1869, Greenwood, O’Connor to Warmoth’ enclosed in ‘June 5, 1869, New Orleans, Warmoth to 
Mower,’ NARA, RG 393, part 1, entry 4501, box 4. 
10 ‘June 10, 1869, Shreveport, Kerin to Baldey,’ NARA, RG 393, part 1, entry 4501, box 5; ‘June 5, 1869, New 
Orleans, Mower to Commanding Officer Co. F, 6th Cavalry,’ NARA, RG 393, part 1, entry 4482, vol. 266. 
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 Without horses, the soldiers’ radius of action was reduced to the town of Shreveport 
and its immediate surroundings, meaning they could do little to assist the civil authorities in 
combatting the gang of horse thieves that roamed th border region. Instead, Kerin assisted 
the new sheriff in guarding prisoners lodged in the parish jail. A month after Kerin’s arrival, 
O’Connor called on him to provide a non-commissioned officer and four privates to help 
guard the poorly secured jail, because the conservative police jury refused to pay for a guard 
as they had heretofore done under conservative sheriff Hope. General Mower, however, soon 
informed the sheriff that he had “no authority to use troops as guards for convicts to state 
penitentiary” and suggested the sheriff swear in deputi s to perform the duty. O’Connor 
followed the general’s advice, deputizing Thomas R. Simpson, a former sheriff himself, 
appointed by Wells shortly after the surrender. Although presumably no Radical, Simpson 
sincerely thanked Kerin and his men for their service, while censuring the police jury for 
politicizing parochial law enforcement.11 
 In mid-July, Kerin requested and received permission to temporarily move his forces 
“to a more healthy place in Caddo, near the Texas border,” in response to the prevalence of 
“malarial fever” among his men. A lack of transportation, however, delayed the movement for 
another month. Not until August 23 - and only after the post surgeon urgently warned that his 
quinine was exhausted, threatening a severe epidemic a ong the men - did Kerin receive 
authorization to locally hire the necessary transportati n.12  Shortly after his departure, 
O’Connor again requested soldiers to help guard the jail, which now housed 17 prisoners, 
including 7 murderers, many of whom could call on “utside friends, who would not hesitate 
to assist them in escaping from the vengeance of the law if the opportunity is offered.” Kerin 
did not reply until a month after the request was originally sent. Despite Mower’s earlier 
disapproval of such a use of federal troops, the cavalry commander was willing to comply 
with the request in principle. However, as a result of he disease and the rapid discharge of 
men whose three years of enlistment had come to a cl se, Kerin’s command was reduced to 
less than fifty men, only a dozen of whom were fit for active guard duty. Between 
                                                 
11 ‘July 10, 1869, Shreveport, Simpson to Kerin,’ enclosed in ‘July 1, 1868, Shreveport, Kerin to Baldey,’ 
NARA, RG 393, part 1, entry 4501, box5; July 6, 1869, New Orleans, Mower to O’Connor,’ NARA, RG 393, 
part 1, entry 4482, Volume 266C. 
12 ‘July 22, 1869, New Orleans, AAG to Kerin,’ and ‘August 23, 1869, New Orleans, AAAG to Kerin,’ NARA, 
RG 393, part1, entry 4482, Volume 266C; August 12, 1869, Shreveport, Harvey to Kerin,’ NARA, RG 393, part 
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maintaining his own camp and caring for the horses, which had finally arrived, Kerin could 
not spare the men until new recruits arrived.13 
 Kerin expected to receive additional forces at anymoment from 105 new recruits 
enlisted at Jefferson. On October 8 he personally went to see General Buell to request 
reinforcements, but he returned disappointed to have learned that the disposition had already 
been made with no recruits assigned to his company. With neither extra troops, nor mule 
teams for transportation, Kerin wrote his superiors that it would be useless to permanently 
station his forces on Wilkinson’s plantation. Wilkinson had suggested such a move, even 
offering to provide the necessary lumber for quarters. Simply rationing the men and horses at 
such a distance from the river would be a full-time occupation and strain the available mule 
teams beyond their capacity. Kerin went on to complain of the sickly condition of both men 
and horses, accustomed to neither the heat nor the heavy rain of the Southern clime. As a 
result, he concluded that his force’s 
usefulness as a cavalry company for active service is entirely inefficient, it is simply 
the moral effect of having the troops stationed here that has quieted this parish up to 
the present time. I have not been called on to assist the civil authorities to enforce the 
laws, except by the sheriff to guard the parish jail - duty that at all times takes the 
trooper from the care of his horse. 
He recommended to his superiors that they send up infantry to relieve him from his present 
duty, allowing him to return to New Orleans to recruit his company to full strength. The state 
command in New Orleans agreed that permanently stationing the cavalry at Wilkinson 
plantation would be inefficient and costly, but ignored Kerin’s request for relief, instead 
ordering him to return to his camp at Greenwood, near Shreveport. He was to leave a 
detachment behind to guard Wilkinson’s plantation, as had been the case before the 
company’s move.14 
 On November 15, Kerin finally received eight new recruits. Although not nearly 
enough to bring his company up to full strength, these reinforcements did allow him to 
comply when O’Connor next requested him to supply a detail of three or four enlisted men 
                                                 
13 ‘September 30, 1869, Shreveport, O’Connor to Kerin’ a d ‘October 1, 1869, Post Shreveport, Kerin to 
O’Connor,’ both enclosed in ‘October 1, 1869, Post Shreveport, Kerin to Baldey,’ NARA, RG 393, part 1, entry 
4501, box 4. 
14 ‘October 7, 1869, Post Shreveport, Kerin to Baldey,’ ‘October 8, 1869, Post Shreveport, Kerin to Baldey,’ and 
‘October 10, 1869, Post Shreveport, Kerin to Baldey,’ NARA, RG 393, part 1, entry 4501, box 4; ‘October 9, 
1869, New Orleans, AAAG to Kerin,’ and ‘October 13, 869, New Orleans, AAAG to Kerin,’ NARA 3293, part 
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and a non-commissioned officer. Such “good men and true are necessary,” the sheriff wrote, 
“for the purpose of guarding the parish jail tonight and in preventing an attempt at rescue of a 
prisoner charged with murder tomorrow, when his trial for the crime will take place.” The 
sheriff had positive information that such an attempt was to take place, most likely when he 
transferred his prisoner from the jail to the courthouse. He sorely needed the soldiers “as a 
prisoner was taken from my predecessor in the manner mentioned and which I anticipate they 
will attempt with me.” Kerin not only provided the detachment asked for, but also sent “two 
non-commissioned officers and a private in plain clothes to remain in Shreveport until 
midnight,” to report on any possible attempt at rescu . Just in case he kept his entire company 
under arms that night and subsequently supplied the jailer with a detachment of two privates 
every night.15 
 Despite continually lacking men, funds, transportation, and equipment, Joseph Kerin 
had done everything within his limited means to assist the civil authorities in Caddo to restore 
a measure of order and the rule of law since being stationed early in the summer of 1869. 
Such military interference in civil affairs of a rural community used to a high measure of self-
government inevitably led to tensions between the soldiers and the white population. In early 
December, almost exactly half a year after his arriv l, these tensions eventually boiled over, 
creating a crisis of authority that pitted Kerin against the local officials he had heretofore 
assisted. The ensuing conflict permanently soured Krin’s relationship with the local civil 
authorities, hampering his future willingness and ability to effectively participate in enforcing 
law and order. 
 The trouble began on December 3 1869, when Kerin we t into town in an attempt to 
arrest deserters from his unit. He called on the local ffice of the railroad company to gather 
information, when an unknown man, seeing his army uniform, insultingly told him that his 
men had not been there. When Kerin politely told the man that he wasn’t addressing him, “he 
told me again the same and said ‘call on me and see me’ in a very supercilious tone and 
manner, so much so as to cause me to be the ‘laughing stock’ of a crowd of persons, Texans 
and others.” Aware of the South’s culture of honor, which potentially made “a personal 
quarrel with a citizen in this country [...] death,” Kerin responded by making the insult an 
official matter. He had his guard arrest the man for disorderly conduct and interfering with an 
officer. This incident was far from the first insult Kerin and his men had received - he found it, 
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in fact, impossible to “appear in the streets of Shreveport in uniform without being insulted” - 
but this incident was “the first time that I have ben able to resent it without a personal 
quarrel.”16 
 Kerin’s action in arresting the man, who turned out to be a Texan named Revison, 
hardly succeeded in reestablishing respect for the military in Shreveport. The Republican city 
recorder and future mayor, Moses H. Crowell, fined Revison ten dollars “for his misbehavior.” 
However, that same afternoon sheriff O’Connor came to the military camp “as though simply 
on a visit,” but soon sheepishly admitted to Kerin that he had come to serve a warrant on him 
for his immediate appearance before parish judge Creswell.” Kerin did not protest the arrest 
and voluntarily accompanied O’Connor, despite doubts as to the warrants legality and 
propriety. Creswell, however, could not be found at the courthouse and Kerin had to wait until 
after nightfall to be taken before District Judge Levissee at his home. He spent the intervening 
hours in the sheriff’s office, “I presume a prisoner - to be gazed at by the so called loyal 
people, who were waiting around the court house.” Lvissee quickly released the officer on 
his own recognizance to appear the following morning, but the long wait in the evening chill, 
and subsequent nightly ride back to camp had left Krin with a severe case of laryngitis, 
forcing him to request a continuance. No further mention of the final outcome can be found in 
the records, but it is highly unlikely that Levissee, a northern born independent, sympathetic 
to Reconstruction, would have convicted Kerin.17 
 His humiliating arrest, combined with the various frustrations he had encountered over 
the preceding months, left the cavalry commander bitter and disillusioned. In his report on his 
arrest, he pointedly addressed the hypocrisy of the civil authorities arresting him, while they 
depended on his support to enforce their own authority. How, he demanded, is  
an officer on duty here to protect himself from insult such as I rec’d on the 3rd inst.? 
The civil authorities are powerless to protect anyone in this city [...] Judge Creswell, 
who issued the warrant for my arrest at night has told me on his honor that the parish 
cannot guard its prisoners. That it is absolutely necessary that soldiers should do it, 
and joined in request with the sheriff for a guard to prevent the rescue of a murderer, 
and to prevent a repetition of a sheriff of Caddo Parish being locked up in his office 
and his prisoners taken from his custody, and out of a court of justice. These 
                                                 
16 ‘December 3, 1869, Shreveport, Kerin to Baldey,’ and ‘December 5, 1869, Shreveport, Kerin to Baldey,’ 
NARA, RG 393, part 5, Post Shreveport, Letters Sent 1869-1871, vol. 1. 
17 Ibid. 
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gentlemen have had me arrested for the violation of state laws - laws which neither of 
them can enforce without my assistance.18 
 Kerin, whose unit continued to be plagued by desertion, once again requested to be 
transferred out of the Red River Valley. This time, however, instead of suggesting 
replacement by an infantry unit, he cynically recommended that superiors “let these people 
here take care of themselves.” Kerin would, in fact, remain in Shreveport for nearly eighteen 
more months, but his correspondence through May of 1871 reveals no further involvement 
with the civil authorities and is limited merely tor utine administrative matters, such as 
housing, supplies, and sanitary reports.19 
 The relatively brief period of direct military supervision, from the spring of 1867 
through the summer of 1868, had allowed Republicans in Louisiana to pass a new constitution 
and elect state and local officials. However, as soon as Congress readmitted Louisiana under 
Republican civil rule in the early summer of 1868, the military authorities began a process of 
disengagement from civil affairs, which not only contributed to the statewide explosion of 
political violence leading up to the November elections, but also undermined the legitimacy 
and authority of both the local Republican officials and the national army. Local army 
commanders, such as McLaughlin and Kerin, expended considerable energy to assist the 
fledgling Republican regime, but found their hands tied at every turn by the limited mandate 
they received from New Orleans and a chronic shortage of manpower and materials. By early 
1870, the military forces in northwestern Louisiana represented little more than a token 
presence, with little or no involvement in the day-to-day administration of civil affair by the 
officials elected two years earlier under their protection. 
 
Governing in the Shadow of Terror 
Although Republicans achieved a statewide victory in the April 1868 election for state and 
local officials, they did not succeed in winning in a number of parishes along the Red River. 
Democrats had won the local elections not only in the majority-white parishes of Bienville 
and Winn, but through violence and intimidation also in majority-black Caddo and DeSoto. 
Even in parishes which Republicans had carried, the viol nce that erupted in the summer and 
fall following the April elections disrupted attempts by Republican officials-elect to take 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
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possession of their offices. Warmoth was inaugurated s governor on June 27, but along the 
Red River, the conservative officials elected and appointed during the preceding years used a 
variety of stratagems, from legal finagling to outright murder, to hold on to political power as 
long as possible.  
 The Democrats’ subsequent successful campaign of terr r over the summer and fall of 
1868 only reinforced their conviction that they ought not cede local power to the Republicans 
if at all possible. Following the statewide Democrati  victory in November, J. C. Wise, a 
leading Democrat in Rapides, urged his neighbors to vig rous action, warning them that  
it will not do to loose [sic] the fruits of our victory by inaction at this particular time. I 
look upon the negro question as settled in Louisiana forever if the white men will only 
follow up their late success. The whites have now everything in their own hands and 
can control the negro element to suit themselves.20 
 Even though the military assured Republican control of the state government, 
conservative whites vigorously, and often violently, contested the reigns of local power that 
often had a more immediate impact on their lives than the political intrigues in New Orleans. 
The office of parish sheriff was a particularly coveted prize in these struggles. Sheriffs played 
a critical role in the administration of law and orde  in the rural nineteenth century South. The 
most senior executive official in the parish, the sheriff held responsibility for maintaining 
order in the parish, executed judicial writs and warrants, and organized the jury selection 
under the direction of the district judge. He held implicit authority over any and all able 
bodied men, whom he could summon as a posse comitatus at any time to assist him in the 
execution of his duties. Sheriffs, together with justices of the peace, functioned as gatekeepers 
to the decentralized, community-based legal culture hat characterized rural Louisiana - and 
most of the United States - in the nineteenth century.21 
 In Bossier Parish, W. H. Hill, the sheriff instrumental in ‘suppressing’ the Bossier 
Point ‘riot,’ had stood for reelection on the Democratic ticket in April 1868, but he lost to 
Republican opponent William McDonald. Conservatives in Bossier, however, were not about 
to give up such an influential position. For unknow reasons, but quite likely to remain in the 
good graces of his white neighbors, McDonald declind the position he was elected to. 
Warmoth subsequently appointed another local white Republican, William Luper, who had 
                                                 
20 ‘November 11, 1868, Alexandria, Wise to Gentlemen,’ Wise Papers, box 2, folder 13. 
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been elected to the state senate from the district in April. Although elected on the Republican 
ticket, the Southern born Luper was no Radical. In 1867, he had joined numerous prominent 
conservatives from Bossier and Caddo in signing a petition to the military authorities, 
complaining of the disturbances caused by black political meetings in the area.22 
 Nevertheless, the Bossier Banner, reflecting conservative opinion in the parish, 
objected vehemently to the appointment. The editor argued that Luper, as senator-elect, was 
ineligible as sheriff, and insisted that if McDonald refused the position either the incumbent 
Hill or the Democratic coroner elect, J. L. Biggs, should receive a commission as sheriff. To 
buttress the Banner’s legal arguments, a “gentleman of this place” gave Luper a “genteel cow-
hiding,” on which Luper, “finding out that our citizens would not be imposed upon by such a 
contemptible cut-purse, did not accept the appointme .” Warmoth subsequently appointed “a 
nondescript – Frank P. Clark” who did not arrive in the parish in time to enter upon his duties. 
As a result, the conservative Democrat Hill continued to act a sheriff, until another Warmoth 
appointee, E. K. Russ, finally took office in May of 1869, more than a year after the election 
in which Hill had been defeated.23 
 In DeSoto, just across the river from Bossier, militant whites had prevented a single 
Republican vote from being cast in the parish at the Presidential elections, but this was not 
enough to satisfy William Longmire, a local stable k eper, who had lost a bid to become 
justice of the peace at the April election to the freedman and local Republican leader George 
Washington. In December, after Washington had finally qualified for the office, Longmire 
confronted him in a Mansfield store, armed with a gun and a cowhide, and “put the pistol 
right to his breast and asked him which he would do, die or take the whipping? He said he 
would take the whipping, and I gave him the whipping.” Washington fled to New Orleans, 
where he joined Stephen Humphries, the state legislator driven off in April. A year later, both 
men remained in New Orleans, afraid to return to their omes.24 In a similar incident a few 
months earlier in Caddo, another black majority parish that the Democrats won in April 1868, 
a white man identified by a witness as local constable Charles Worsel, murdered the mulatto 
Robert Gray, a black justice of the peace for the first ward, in broad daylight in a grocery 
store on Texas street. The local chief of police and deputy sheriff arrived at the scene, but 
refused to take any action. Despite numerous witnesses being present to identify the killer, the 
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conservative Shreveport Southwestern insisted that the murderer’s identity remained 
unknown.25 
 Even in Rapides, one of the few parishes along the Red River to give Republicans a 
solid victory in April 1868, conservatives still maintained a stronger hold on local government 
than the election results for parish and statewide officials would suggest. Democrats, 
significantly, continued to dominate the police jury¸ the legislative body with fiscal and 
budgetary authority over the parish. It is not entir ly clear why Republicans failed to win a 
majority of the seats on the police jury, despite handily winning the parish as a whole, but the 
returns for the individual election precincts do suggest an explanation. Republicans received 
two thirds of their total vote in Alexandria, presumably by black voters coming in from the 
countryside. Police jurors, as well as constables and justices of the peace, however, were 
elected per ward. Blacks coming in to the parish capital to vote may have been ineligible to 
cast a vote for their local police juror, or simply unable to do so because the available ballots 
did not included those candidates. Because of this concentration of black votes, Republicans 
won only four of the eight election precincts, while just one Republican vote was cast at the 
other four precincts combined. In Alexandria itself, where over 1200 voted were cast in favor 
of the constitution, the Republican candidate for the police jury received just 219 votes and 
the Republican municipal candidates just 56 votes, while the Democratic ward and municipal 
candidates received over 300 votes each. Democrats thus not only maintained a majority of 
seats on the police jury, but also provided most of he parish’s justices of the peace and 
constables, allowing them to retain control of much of the day-to-day administration of law 
and order.26 
 In any event, the police jury that met in June of 1868 comprised mostly the same men 
who had served on the body since before military Reconstruction began. Others replaced them 
by the February 1869 meeting, but Democrats still dominated, as evidenced by the fact that all 
officers appointed by the police jury were active mmbers of the parish Democratic Party, 
who had served in various positions during the postwar conservative restoration. They 
included W. W. Whittington, as clerk; John Clements, who would defect to the Republican 
Party in 1872, as officer of the jury; Charles W. Boyce, as jury president; and the ubiquitous E. 
R. Biossat, who combined his editorship of the Louisiana Democrat and the mayoralty of 
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Alexandria with a third job as parish treasurer. When a new police jury met in May of 1870, 
Biossat and Clements retained their offices, while three other Democrats - former sheriff 
James R. Andrews, W. J. Calvit, and Robert P. Hunter - s rved as president, clerk and parish 
attorney respectively.27 
 Conservatives also retained control of the municipal government of Rapides’s capital, 
Alexandria, where Democrat editor Biossat served as mayor of an all-Democratic municipal 
board. In early 1869, Republicans made an attempt to wrest control of these offices from the 
Democrats elected in April of the previous year. The Republican state legislature issued a new 
charter for the town on September 29, that included a provision removing all municipal 
officeholders and allowing the legislature and governor to appoint interim officers prior to the 
first election under the new charter in January 1869. Warmoth commissioned William F. 
McLean, the publisher of the Republican Rapides Tribune as mayor to replace Biossat. 
According to Republican coroner and future sheriff John DeLacy, McLean was intensely 
disliked by Biossat and the other conservatives of the parish, despite the fact that his paper did 
little in practice to promote the Republican Party. The first of two vandalizations of McLean’s 
printing press took place just two weeks after his appointment as mayor, and may have been 
due to the struggle over control of the municipal government as much as or more than a 
campaign tactic for the upcoming presidential election. In any case, McLean felt it unsafe to 
accept his appointment, leaving Biossat in control of the mayoralty and thus free to organize 
the elections in January 1869, in which he was elect d as a regular councilman and his fellow 
Democrat James W. Osborn obtained the mayoralty.28 
 Even in places where Republicans did succeed in taki g possession of their offices, 
they did not always vigorously pursue the enforcement of Reconstruction. In Natchitoches, 
Republicans had swept the parish offices, and, on July 13, W. H. Heistand entered upon his 
duties as parish judge, along with fellow Republicans Samuel Parson as sheriff, N.A. 
Robinson as district attorney, and V. A. Barron as justice of the peace for the town of 
Natchitoches. Following the murder of Alfred Hason a d the beating of Richard Faulkner, 
Freedmen’s Bureau agent E. H. Hosner, together with General McLaughlin, reported the facts 
of these cases to Heistand and Robinson. “These two gentlemen,” Hosner reported two weeks 
later, “took time to consider and take counsel, andI believe they are still considering and 
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counseling, while the murderers are at large making inquiries and leaving the state.” 
Meanwhile, a Democratic justice of the peace for the fifth ward, where the attacks had taken 
place, cleared one of the suspects, Jim Lewis, of all charges - despite an affidavit, by a 
freedwoman who had been in the house at the time of the murder, identifying him as one of 
the murderers. According to Hosner,  
the whole proceeding before this [justice’s] court (if it can be dignified by that name) 
were illegal, censurable, and irregular. The alleged criminal was released upon his 
own declaration and that of another man who is not free from suspicion. What 
murderer will not declare himself innocent if by doing so he can get clean?29 
 Heistand’s and Robinson’s background may have contributed to their inaction in this 
case. Both were Southern white Republicans, though neither of them was a native of 
Natchitoches parish. Robinson was a shoemaker from Winn parish, who, according to various 
Democratic critics, had no legal experience prior to his nomination. Conservatives repeatedly 
accused him of corruption and incompetence, claiming he would let any suspect off for a 
payment of fifteen dollars. Robinson himself disinge uously claimed he could not prosecute 
in the Hason and Faulkner cases because no one came forward with the names of the 
suspected perpetrators. In fact, Hosner’s report listed the names of “several ‘high-toned’ 
gentlemen living in this portion of the country and at pleasant Hill,” Suspected of 
involvement in the assaults.30 Heistand was probably the son of Ezra Heistand, a prominent 
New Orleans wartime Unionist and co-founder of the Fr e State party.31 Despite their political 
convictions, such men likely shared the pervasive racial prejudices of their class and often did 
little to promote the interests of the freedpeople on whose votes they depended come election 
time.  
 Other evidence similarly suggests that the white Rpublican leadership in 
Natchitoches did not inordinately exert itself to protect the rights of its blacks supporters. In 
June, General Buchanan officially declared the results of the municipal elections held in April, 
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which included two blacks, Henry Burns and Washingto  Brady, elected as councilmen for 
Natchitoches town. Both these men, however, resigned th ir position before the council was 
installed on July 6. The council quickly ordered a special election ten days later at which J. M. 
B. Tucker and M. H. Carver were elected “without opp sition” The editor of the conservative 
Natchitoches Spectator, applauded this “wise and judicious selection” of “two old citizens 
and in every way identified with the interests and prosperity of the community.”32 No reason 
is given for the resignation of Brady and Burns, but in combination with the apparent inaction 
of Robinson and Heistand, these events indicate that Republican control of local government 
did not by any means imply an immediate or substantial improvements for the black 
population in Natchitoches. 
 Conservative whites objected to black jury membership at least as vehemently as they 
did to black voting and office-holding, and they made every effort to obstruct and delay the 
implementation of racial equality in the judicial process.33 The first struggle over this issue 
arose late in 1867, when General Phillip H. Sheridan issued special order 125, which excluded 
from the jury lists anyone disenfranchised under th Reconstruction Acts. An abstract of the 
law circulated by the military authorities caused confusion among local officials, including 
the sheriffs responsible for drawing up jury venires prior to the district court’s term in their 
parish. On the one hand it stated “the only real requisite” for jurors was to “be [a] duly 
qualified voter of the state of Louisiana.” On the other hand, it prescribed a procedure in 
which “eligible jurors shall be selected from the tableaux of assessment.” Natchitoches’s 
conservative sheriff Hughes asked Sheridan’s successor Mower for elucidation, whether he 
should draw the jury “from the assessment role, rejecting those that are not registered” or 
rather “from the registrar’s list of voters.” The latter procedure would result in a jury venire 
that included numerous, if not a majority of, blacks, while the former would reduce the jury 
pool to those whites - and a very few blacks wealthy enough to pay taxes - who remained 
eligible to vote.34 
 Two judicial districts covered most of the parishe along the Red River. In both, 
conservative judges appointed by Wells used their discretionary power to adopt the more 
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conservative interpretation of Sheridan’s order, so a  to ensure that whites continued to 
dominate the criminal justice system. The ninth district, under Judge William B. Lewis, 
included Natchitoches and Rapides (as well as Sabine and Vernon) and the tenth, under Judge 
James J. Weems, comprised Caddo, Bossier and Desoto parishes.35 Lewis, especially, was a 
staunch conservative, earning him the enmity of the Natchitoches Republicans, who had 
urgently advocated his removal. The soon-to-be-murdered Cyrus Stauffer warned Republican 
officials in New Orleans that “a loyal man never could get impartial justice by any arrogant 
rebel, which judge Lewis is known to be.” Even a number of more moderate conservatives - 
including former judge R. B. Jones, a suspected accomplice in Stauffer’s murder - expressed 
doubts as to Lewis’s competency, after he called an extra court term that many considered 
costly and unnecessary. Former district attorney James J. Cunningham, who considered Lewis 
a personal friend, objected to the racial prejudice pervading his court, possibly in an effort to 
forestall more forceful federal intervention. He wrote Sheridan that “in justice to the freedmen, 
[the district court] cannot be held as ordered to consist entirely of white jurors,” as he saw no 
reason why blacks “should not at least be able to try their own color, as jurors.”36 Lewis, 
however, retained his office until his unexpected death in June of 1868 and did all in his 
power to prevent blacks from serving on juries in his court. 
 The sheriffs in Bossier and Rapides, the first to hold court under Sheridan’s order, 
initially adhered to the more liberal interpretation, selecting jurors from the new lists of 
registered voters. The Banner reported that “a new venire was drawn in accordance with the 
royal mandate of king Phillip, ex-Barnburner of the Shenandoah valley, and late Autocrat of 
Louisiana and Texas, notwithstanding the jury had already been drawn and summoned 
according to law, order and decency!” To conservatives’ dismay, blacks comprised a majority 
of this new venire. “However,” the Banner editorialized, “the fires are now under the new 
judicial cauldron, and we will soon witness the scum that will arise to the top, when the big 
black pot boils.”37 The editor of the Democrat similarly complained that the jury for Rapides 
had been drawn “not according to law, but in obedience to the late Phillip, Duke of Orleans!” 
resulting in a venire of six whites, one antebellum free black and 40 freedmen, all of whom 
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the editor presumed to be illiterate, providing “a fair test for the newly enfranchised to show 
their learning and intelligence.”38 
 Weems promptly dismissed the majority black jury impaneled under its provisions in 
Bossier. Ostensibly he did so because it had not been convened at least 30 days prior to the 
court session as he had ordered, but the real reason was the panel’s racial make-up. This 
became evident when Weems again canceled the special term he had ordered for October 25, 
because the new venire still contained too many freedmen for his liking. He now explicitly 
directed the sheriff to select potential jurors only from “the list of registered voters found on 
the tableaux of assessment,” a measure that ensured just two blacks being summoned. The 
Banner’s editor gently upbraided Weems for postponing the court, thus causing four juries to 
be summoned within a few months’ time, creating extra expenses for the parish. When 
Weems finally did hold his court in December, however, the conservative newspaper 
complimented him on his performance, which included s ntencing eight freedmen - and not a 
single white - to the state penitentiary and three more to shorter sentences in the parish jail. 
Weems’s conservative interpretation of Sheridan’s order, moreover, inspired conservative 
judges throughout the state. Judge Cazabat, a former Alexandria lawyer who presided over the 
second district, similarly threw out a jury drawn oly from the list of registered voters in St. 
Bernard, as did a an unnamed judge of the twelfth district.39 
 A yellow fever epidemic in Alexandria prevented Lewis from holding his October 
term in that parish, but when he sat on the bench i Natchitoches in early December, he went 
even further than Weems and Cazabat had in resisting Sheridan’s orders. Following the 
precedent set by Weems, the jury had already been drawn according to the more conservative 
interpretation of Sheridan’s order, encompassing only those whose name appeared both on the 
assessment rolls and the new registry books. Lewis, however, flat-out rejected Congress’s 
“power or authority to regulate the mode of drawing or empaneling juries [or] to fix their 
qualifications within any of the States.” He argued that since the Reconstruction Act - on 
which Sheridan’s order was based - referred to “state  lately in Rebellion,” Louisiana was still 
a state with all the rights inherent thereto, including the right to determine voter an jury 
qualifications. As such, he concluded, “The said Act of Congress is [...] unconstitutional and 
void.” He dismissed the jury and proceeded to try onl  the civil docket.40 
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 Lewis’s own conservatism undoubtedly influenced his actions, but he also correctly 
read the changing political situation in Louisiana. A few days before his decision to dismiss 
the jury, Winfield Scott Hancock had taken over as military commander in Louisiana and 
issued an order affirming the superiority of the civil authorities. Local military commanders 
might only interfere after receiving explicit permiss on from the commanding general in New 
Orleans. A week later, while Lewis’s court was still in session, Hancock formally revoked 
Sheridan’s order on jury selection and issued instructions for juries to be drawn according to 
state laws, thereby effectively justifying Lewis’s decision after the fact. Just as Hancock’s 
appointment undermined the nascent success of black voting rights, it also reversed 
Sheridan’s attempt to allow the recently freed slaves to effectively participate in the judicial 
process, one of the key marks of citizenship in nineteenth century America. Following the 
general’s order it would be nearly a year before blacks would have the opportunity to serve on 
juries following new legislation passed on September 29, 1868 by the Republican legislature 
elected the previous April, which explicitly qualified for jury duty all eligible voters “without 
regard to race, color, or previous condition.” 41 
 As the military rapidly retreated from involvement i  civil affairs, the implementation 
and enforcement of Reconstruction fell on local Republican officials elected in April 1868. 
However, the reign of terror unleashed by militant whites in the summer and fall of 1868 not 
only resulted in a Democratic victory in the November elections, but also severely 
undermined the legitimacy of local Republican leaders. In practice many officials elected in 
April never took possession of their offices, or quickly resigned under pressure from local 
white elites. Even in parishes where Republicans nomi ally controlled the local government, 
they faced numerous difficulties in enforcing national and state Reconstruction policies aimed 
at securing civil and political rights for the black population. The white Republican leadership 
often proved either unwilling or unable to enforce racial equality in the face of staunch 
community opposition from a white population that controlled nearly all the economic 
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All Politics is Local 
Despite stubborn white resistance, constricted resources, and limited support from the national 
government, Republicans achieved some political success in the early 1870s at both the state 
and local level. At the state level, Warmoth combined what Ted Tunnell has called a “policy 
of force” with a “policy of peace” to optimally levrage the limited resources available to his 
regime. The policy of force included the establishment of a so-called metropolitan police 
force, under the governor’s direct command, with jurisdiction in New Orleans and the 
surrounding parishes. The Metropolitans would effectiv ly serve as a praetorian guard to both 
Warmoth and Kellogg, protecting the interests of the governor and the Republican Party. The 
other major element in Warmoth’s policy of force was the creation of a set of election laws 
that allowed a so-called returning board, effectively under the governor’s control, to review 
all election returns and throw out any returns it deemed tainted by violence, fraud or voter 
intimidation.42 
 The policy of force proved most effective in and around New Orleans. Prior to their 
defeat at the Battle of Liberty Place, in September 1874, the Metropolitans exerted effective 
control over the city and its immediate environs. Their jurisdiction, however, remained 
limited to the capital and the surrounding parishes, while beyond those limits the governor 
depended on the state militia. Established in April 1870, under the command of a former 
Confederate general turned Republican, James A. Longstreet, this militia never became a 
credible instrument of state power. Longstreet initially recruited and stationed the vast 
majority of the militia force, four of five regiments, in New Orleans, with one regiment 
divided among Plaquemines, Lafourche, and East Baton R uge parishes. The only militia 
forces in northern Louisiana were four unattached companies, two infantry and two cavalry, 
from Monroe, a hundred miles east of the Red River.43 
 Not only the geographical distribution, but also the racial makeup of the militia posed 
a problem for Warmoth. Not nearly enough sincerely loyal whites could be recruited in the 
state to staff the 5000-man force, creating a dilemma for the Republican state government. 
One option was to fill the ranks, at least in part, wi h former Confederate soldiers. Longstreet 
initially pursued this strategy, claiming that the voluntary service by “the class of citizens 
supposed to be in opposition to the National and State authorities […] gave greater moral tone 
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and effect to our organization.”44 Nevertheless, an all-white militia could hardly be expected 
to vigorously enforce the racial equality envisioned by Reconstruction’s architects. The 
alternative was to establish a mostly black militia, but such a force would lack any legitimacy 
whatsoever in the eyes of conservative whites. A black militia force, often more poorly armed 
and trained than local Confederate veterans, also risked exacerbating any racial conflicts it 
was sent to quell, while embarrassing the state government in the process. Warmoth 
encountered exactly these issues when in 1871 he expanded the militia into rural Louisiana, 
including a company recruited and stationed in Colfax captained by black Civil War veteran 
William Ward. In pursuing the suspected murderers of local white Republican leader Delos W. 
White, Ward collided head on with conservative white militants who resented his authority. 
By 1872, Longstreet, presumably on orders from the increasingly conservative Warmoth, first 
suspended and subsequently dismissed Ward for suppoedly exceeding his authority.45 
Kellogg, fearing a similar fiasco, refused to send militia to Colfax in 1873 to prevent an 
impending massacre there.  
 The policy of force acted as a stick to prevent conservative whites from repeating the 
explosion of violence that engulfed the state in the summer and fall of 1868. The policy of 
peace, on the other hand, was a carrot extended to more moderate whites in the hope of luring 
them into the Republican fold and thus broadening the party’s base. Most importantly, 
Warmoth liberally used his patronage power to give plum positions to ostensibly penitent 
former Confederates at both the state and local level. If prominent members of the white elite 
had a stake in his regime, he hoped, the Republican Party would “gain the respectability and 
acceptance that would make a repetition of the 1868 terror unthinkable.”46 
 Eventually, both the policy of force and the policy of peace would embroil Warmoth 
and his Republican allies in insuperable dilemmas and contradictions. The election laws and 
the establishment of a highly partisan police force “subverted democratic government as 
surely as the tactics of their opponents,” thus undermining the legitimacy of the Republican 
regime in the eyes national politicians on whose support it critically depended. Warmoth’s use 
of patronage to gain conservative white support, meanwhile, alienated his core constituency 
of both black and white Republicans who had suffered t mendously and run great risks in the 
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1868 campaigns. Eventually these contradiction would lead to a fierce intraparty struggle that 
would drive Warmoth into the arms of the Democracy.47   
 In the meantime, however, for about three years, Warmoth succeeded in establishing a 
reasonably stable and effective state government that commanded a modicum of respect and 
obedience even from much of the white population. This period coincided with the brief but 
relatively vigorous federal prosecution of Southern white terrorists following the passage of 
the Enforcement Acts. The direct impact of this policy remained limited in Louisiana, as 
James R. Beckwith, the federal district attorney for the state, instigated only a handful of 
proceedings based on the Enforcement Acts prior to the landmark Cruikshank case resulting 
from the Colfax massacre.48 However, the forceful prosecutions elsewhere in the South 
dismantled what organizational infrastructure the Ku-Klux Klan had - not much in Louisiana 
to begin with - and convinced conservative whites that now was not the time to forcibly resist 
the Republican ascendancy. 
 Warmoth’s dual policies achieved their most tangible success at the 1870 elections for 
the state legislature as well as for most local offices. Statewide, Republicans achieved a 
victory similar to that of the April 1868 elections, beating the Democrats by nearly 25,000 
votes, reinforcing their domination of the state legislature, and sweeping all five congressional 
districts. Historians agree, moreover, that compared to Louisiana’s other electoral contests 
during Reconstruction, the 1870 election “was a quiet, orderly, and reasonably honest one,” if 
not, in Warmoth’s words, “the quietest and fairest lection ever held in the State of Louisiana 
up to that time.” Tunnell, however, correctly emphasizes that the Republican success owed 
more to the political apathy of whites than to Republican success in extending their electoral 
appeal. The Republican vote tally only barely exceeded the total votes Warmoth received in 
April 1868, presumably from the same, overwhelmingly b ack, constituency. Conservative 
whites, “instead of converting to Radicalism, simply failed to vote.”49  
 The apathy among conservative whites resulted in part from dissension within their 
own ranks. A convention in January had urged the founding of a new party that could more 
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easily attract former Whigs to join in the opposition to Radicalism. Although the Democracy 
generally remained at the nucleus of the party organization, the nominating convention in 
September included a number of black delegates and adopted a relatively moderate platform 
that included a resolution to “accept and acquiesce in the fifteenth amendment [...] in good 
faith.” The Republican Party, meanwhile began to shw the first signs of the internal tensions 
that would nearly tear it apart over the following years. Conservatives, such as the editor of 
the Democrat facilely believed that between Republicans’ divisions and Democrats’ 
moderation and embrace of “all the rights to which [the colored population] are entitled under 
the constitution and laws” they would secure sufficient black votes to ensure a victory.50 
Instead, blacks again voted almost as a bloc for the Republican ticket, while the moderate 
course of the Democratic Party failed to draw out many white voters. The Democrat’s editor 
saw no fault in the Democratic leadership - with which he was closely aligned - instead 
blaming the “remissness and indifference of some of the Democratic voters, of whom we had 
a right to expect better things.”51 
 In nearly all the parishes along the Red River, Republican candidates for local offices 
benefited from their party’s statewide momentum. Republicans obtained majorities in every 
single parish, except the majority white Bienville and Winn. Even in DeSoto, where violence 
and intimidation had marred the April 1868 elections, Republicans secured their only 
undisputed victory during all of Reconstruction. In Caddo and Bossier, which had each given 
just a single vote to Grant two years earlier, Republicans eked out narrow victories of about a 
hundred ballots. Natchitoches and Rapides showed results similar to those of 1868, while the 
first elections held in the newly created parish of Grant went to the Republicans by nearly two 
votes to one.52 
 The effect of Republican victory in 1870 was most pronounced in DeSoto and Caddo , 
the two majority blacks parishes that had returned D mocratic majorities in April 1868, but 
now reverted to the Republican column. In Desoto, however, the victory also laid bare the 
emerging divisions, often along racial lines, within the Republican Party. The parish 
convention had nominated George Washington, a black school teacher, as one of the parish’s 
candidates for the state legislature, along with former Freedmen’s Bureau agent E. W. 
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Dewees.53 The parish Republican committee, however, headed by the white northerners 
Dewees and Marshall Harvey Twitchell, replaced Washington’s name on the ticket with a 
white Republican operative from New Orleans named Mortimer Carr, who never spent more 
than a few weeks in the parish during the campaign. Carr claimed that Washington had 
declined the nomination, because he could not be spared from his teaching. Irregularities in 
the printing of the tickets and the fact that Washington subsequently came to New Orleans at 
his own expense to contest Carr for the seat, suggets that he was instead outmaneuvered by 
white Republicans who did not wish to share the spoil  of offices with the freedmen on whose 
votes they depended. Washington was bought off and returned to DeSoto, but such 
shenanigans ultimately weakened the party’s credibility and legitimacy, not only with the 
black electorate, but also with Northern Republicans.54 
 The minutes of the Caddo police jury, which conservative whites had theretofore 
controlled, most clearly reflect the change in Republican fortunes following the 1870 
elections. A number of members, including A. J. Pickens, Isaac McKee, and William 
Thatcher had held a seat on the police jury continuously from the close of the war through the 
1870 elections, when Republicans succeeded in winning a majority of the seats. On June 5, 
1871, a Republican police jury met in Shreveport fo the first time ever. The conservatives, 
however, did not relinquish their power easily, and the new police jurors had to instigate legal 
proceedings against their predecessors to “obtain possession of the archives, records and 
property of the parish.”55 
 Not satisfied with controlling the parish, Republicans in Shreveport set out to gain 
control of the municipal government, which had remained in conservative hands even after 
the 1870 elections. In 1867, Republicans from Caddo had made a similar attempt, petitioning 
General Sheridan to remove then-mayor Aleck Boarman, Chief City Constable George W. 
Sherod, and the only two remaining trustees. Republicans labeled all them “men of the most 
ultra rebel principles,” who abused their office for personal profit, failed to provide “adequate 
protection to the lives and property of the citizens of Union principles,” and whose terms of 
office, moreover, had expired. Boarman and the trustees protested their removal by Sheridan, 
but to no avail. Sheridan replaced the mayor, constable and the entire board of trustees with 
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men recommend by J. H. McVean, the chairman of the parish’s Central Executive Radical 
Republican Committee. These included McVean himself, as trustee for the fourth ward, Lewis. 
S. Markham, a truly loyal “old citizen and large real estate holder” as mayor, and R. C. 
Register as police constable.56 
 Conservative whites, however, mounted a concerted campaign against the new 
Republican city officials. Over seventy Shreveport citizens, including prominent lawyer 
Albert H. Leonard, Caddo sheriff John Hope, police jury president William Thatcher, and city 
attorney J. W. Jones petitioned Sheridan asking him for “a competent and unobjectionable 
board of trustees.” The city assessor, W. S. Lewis, meanwhile, refused to hand over the 
assessment rolls to the new board, objecting to the “utt r imbecility an incompetence of the 
old man Markham.” He warned the military authorities that taxpayers would prove unwilling 
to pay taxes into the “irresponsible hands [of] persons who own no real estate and are not 
know to our citizens or not known as citizens.” Martin Tally, a conservative Unionist and 
large landholder, wrote governor Flanders that the mayor and numerous trustees did not meet 
the legal property qualifications for holding office in Shreveport.57 
 It is impossible to gauge the truthfulness of these accusations, but the sources of the 
complaints indicate partisan motivations. Although a Unionist, Tally had been elected city 
trustee under the restoration regime in 1865, serving under mayor John L. Gooch, who had 
held the same office prior to the Confederate surrender. Tally - who had also been 
instrumental in the 1867 campaign against Boarman - was not disinterested, moreover, in the 
outcome of his lobbying, as he recommended himself as a replacement for Markham. Lewis, 
meanwhile, was a holdover from the old conservative city leadership, who had serves as 
assessor under both Gooch and Boarman. Nevertheless, Flanders endorsed Tally’s 
recommendation to Hancock, the conservative general who by then had replaced Sheridan. 
On December 14, 1867, Hancock issued a special order reli ving Markham of his duties and 
appointing Tally in his stead, along with the trustees he had recommended to Flanders as 
“responsible citizens, who can take the required oath.” Following Tally’s appointment, 
numerous members of the old conservative clique onc again filled the same offices they had 
prior to Markham’s brief tenure. These included Lewis as assessor and F. P. Leavenworth as 
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the city surveyor, while the board created a new office - over Tally’s personal objections - of 
street commissioner, which was filled first by former (and future) police chief Sherrod, and 
later by former mayor Gooch. However, in a nod to the changing political winds, a resolution 
passed on July 7, 1868, requiring the chief marshal, a position now held by Jason P. Brice, to 
appoint colored men to at least two of the six positi ns as assistant marshal.58 
 Tally’s moderate regime lasted until May of 1869, when elections were held in 
Shreveport and the majority white city elected a conservative Democrat, J. R. Gilmore as 
mayor, to the great approbation of the Southwestern.59 Gilmore’s board of trustees included 
prominent conservative lawyer J. C. Moncure, who would go on to head the Democratic state 
ticket at the1874 elections. Gilmore was reelected in May 1870, and the city officers he 
appointed included the most prominent ‘ultra Rebels’ r moved by Sheridan three years earlier. 
Alec Boarman, the former mayor, now served as parish attorney, G. W. Sherrod once again 
headed the city police, and W. S. Lewis remained assessor.60 In Shreveport, Republicans 
simply did not have the votes to gain control of local government, and at the next elections, 
on May 1, 1871, the Democrat William R. Shivers defeated the Republican candidate Moses 
Crowell by 371 votes to 347.61 
 Warmoth and the Republican dominated legislature in New Orleans, realizing they 
could not gain control of the Shreveport government through elections, instead issues a new 
charter for the city that replaced the elective board of trustees with a board of administration, 
to be appointed, along with the mayor, by the governor. So long as Republicans occupied the 
governor’s mansion, they would be able to determine the local government of Shreveport. Not 
surprisingly, the Democrats stringently objected to such a process, and the old board of 
trustees under mayor Gilmore refused to relinquish their power and vowed to “remain in 
office until all legal remedies are exhausted to maintain our legal rights and those of the City 
of Shreveport whom we represent.” A large number of prominent Shreveport Democrats, 
most of them also the leading lawyers of the town -including former mayor Boarman, city 
attorney W. B. Egan, Moncure, and Leonard - supported Gilmore and his board, advising 
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them to “retain their present offices and administer th  affairs of the city until they are legally 
dismissed or superseded.”62 
 On May 27, both W. R. Shivers, the Democrat elected earlier that month and Crowell, 
appointed by Warmoth, applied to Gilmore for possesion of the mayoral office. Gilmore 
refused them both and a three month legal contest ensued between Crowell on the one hand 
and Gilmore and Shivers on the other. During this period, both Gilmore and Crowell and their 
respective boards pretended to act as the legal authority of Shreveport, perhaps the earliest 
example of contested government in Louisiana. Crowell not only fought his Democratic 
opponents in court, but also appealed to public opini n, giving a long mayoral address at the 
first meeting of his new board on May 27. He studiosly avoided the issues of racial equality 
central to Reconstruction, presenting himself, instead, as a reformer in the Liberal Republican 
mold, intent on improving public services and streamlining government, rather than a Radical 
bent on upending the existing racial hierarchy.63 “The old and cumbrous forms of city 
government,” announced Crowell,  
by which the masses are either blinded by the intricacies of the system or left in entire 
ignorance of important actions has given place to a simpler and necessarily more 
satisfactory and economical regime and it behooves us, as representatives of the new 
form of government, to strain every nerve to improve by the best means at our 
disposal the financial, sanitary, and moral condition of our beautiful city. 
He promised to build schools, repair the streets, and restore the financial health of the city, 
while ensuring the “maintenance of harmony and order.” The central plank of his law-and-
order platform was not a guarantee of equal justice for the freedpeople, but rather a plea for 
the separation of male and female prisoners and for the provision of modern uniforms to the 
police.64 
 Crowell’s government soon gained a measure of legitimacy, when Shreveport’s 
perennial police chief Sherrod, perhaps anticipating the outcome of the legal struggle, 
defected from the Gilmore regime on May 30 to accept appointment under the Republicans. 
Sherrod’s political instincts proved accurate, and i  late September both parties accepted a 
compromise overseen by District Judge Levissee that ceded to Crowell and his board the 
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“possession of all offices, franchises, and privileges [...] together with all property, real and 
personal, books, archives, papers, monies, rights, and credits belonging to said city.” In his 
first address as undisputed mayor, Crowell again emphasized the issues of economic reform 
and progress associated with Liberal Republicanism, particularly stressing the need for 
railroad construction for the future prosperity of the town. Crowell implicitly acknowledged 
his shaky standing among much of the city’s white elites and asked for “the confidence and 
cooperation of the good citizens,” which he promised to merit “by honesty, industry, and 
energy” and “by prudent and wise legislation.”65  
 Over the next few years, Republicans achieved a mesur  of success in Shreveport, 
formally controlling the city government until the summer of 1874, when White League 
activists wrested control of the town from them. A few months later, in November 1874, the 
mayoralty again became an elective office and promptly reverted to Democratic control.66 The 
Shreveport records contain no evidence to support Democratic claims of Republican 
corruption and profligacy during these years. Although under Republican rule the municipal 
tax increased from 1.25% over 1871 - the last tax set by Democrats - to 1.75% over 1872, this 
merely reflected a trend of gradually increasing taxa ion over the foregoing years and was not 
much higher than the 1.5% tax levied by the Confederate city government in 1865. A 
seemingly larger increase in 1873, which raised the taxation to 3.1%, was mostly the result of 
a special 1.3% tax levied to service the existing city debt, most of which had been incurred 
long before Republicans assumed control over the city. Indeed, after the Democrats returned 
to power, they lowered taxes only marginally to 2.5% - mostly by eliminating the school tax 
(and presumably the public schools it funded) establi hed by Republicans - a level the city 
would maintain throughout the remainder of Reconstruction.67 
 It should come as no surprise that the Republican officials appointed by Warmoth 
pursued moderate policies associated with Liberal Republicanism, rather than advocating 
radical reforms and racial equality. Tensions within the Republican Party had gradually 
mounted since Warmoth’s election, pitting his state regime against the Custom House 
Republicans, who controlled federal patronage. Custom House Republicans objected to 
Warmoth’s patronage of moderate whites and “lackluster upport of racial equality,” instead 
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advocating a more radical course aimed at cementing the support of the black majority in the 
state. More than from policy differences, however, the “division of the party [originated] In 
personal ambition” and over the following years “continued to increase until nearly all its 
prominent members have been forced to be classed with one side or the other.” In May of 
1871, the Gatling Gun convention - which would seal the break between Warmoth and the 
Custom House Republicans and drive him, via Liberal Republicanism into the arms of the 
Democratic Party - was still some months away. Nonethel ss, Warmoth’s appointment of 
moderate Republicans like Crowell to important loca offices can best be understood in the 
context of these intraparty struggles.68 
 Warmoth’s appointments, around the same time, to the Rapides police jury make it 
even more abundantly clear that his patronage policy served motives other than promoting the 
racial equality envisioned by Reconstruction’s architects. Democrats had continued to 
dominate the Rapides police jury and when Warmoth appointed new police jurors in June of 
1871 - following a law reorganizing the police jury s stem throughout the state which allowed 
Warmoth to appoint five new police jurors in every single parish - he might have used his 
power to swing the parish government into the Republican camp.69 Instead, although some of 
the personnel were new, the Rapides police jury remained firmly Democratic. Biossat 
remained entrenched as treasurer, John Clements moved from officer to member of the police 
juror, while former Democratic parish recorder J. N. Rhorer assumed its presidency. The new 
clerk, J. Mulcahy, had no prior political experienc, but would support Robert P. Hunter a 
year later in refusing to join the Fusionist movement and running for recorder as an out-and-
out Democrat instead. Only the new officer of the jury, John DeLacy, can undisputedly be 
identified as a Republican.70 
 As a result of these appointments Warmoth succeeded in remaining in the good graces 
of Democrat editor Biossat, who offered only a mild rebuke to Warmoth’s wholesale 
reorganization of the police jury system. Nor did he complain when the state supreme court 
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supported the Warmoth appointees in a suit brought a ainst them by the former, elected police 
jury, simply expressing the “hope that they will now go to their work in a good and proper 
spirit, and for the sole good of Rapides.” Earlier that same year, Biossat had already 
complimented Warmoth “for his sound discretion and good sense” in appointing the 
conservative Henry L. Daigre as parish judge, despit  being “under the pressure of his party 
friends.”71 Such political spade work paid off for the governor in the 1872 campaign, as the 
Democrat - albeit reservedly - endorsed the Liberal Republican Party spearheaded by 
Warmoth.72 
 
The Limits of Equal Justice 
The apex of Republican power around 1870 also affected the judicial branch of local 
government. Following the April 1868 election, Republican judges took control of the judicial 
districts in northwestern Louisiana. John Osborne, who had owned over a hundred slaves 
before the war, but had joined the Republican Party by 1868, replaced Lewis as judge of the 
ninth judicial district. The Northern born lawyer Levissee took over the tenth district from 
Weems. A resident of Louisiana since 1847, Levissee had opposed secession and avoided 
participation in the Southern war effort until the t reat of conscription forced him to volunteer. 
When military Reconstruction began, he opposed the ratification of the Republican 
constitution, but “if it is ratified,” he urged, “let us organize under it.” At the April 1868 
elections, Levissee, who had “always opposed partisan politics being involved in judicial 
elections,” ran as an independent candidate for judge of the tenth judicial district, which 
comprised DeSoto, Bossier and Caddo parishes. He defeated Weems, who, according to 
Levissee, “had never practiced law and was totally ignorant of the law and practice.” This 
earned him the enmity of a clique of prominent Shreveport Democrats, who supported Weems 
and did not approve that “a mere private citizen should ‘constitute himself a candidate’ in 
contempt and opposition to their ‘united wisdom and counsel’”. They included many future 
White League leaders, such as Albert Leonard, L. M. Nutt, and Weems’s wartime predecessor 
Roland Jones.73  
 Other conservatives, however, endorsed Levissee’s independent candidature, 
including W. H. Scanland, editor of the Banner. His paper had characterized the April 1868 
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elections as a “fraudulent farce,” a “Radical fraud,” and even “the social and political death–
knell” for Louisiana, but Scanland nevertheless appl uded the election of Levissee, a 
gentleman “eminently qualified to wear the ermine with honor to [himself] and justice to [his] 
constituency” and later complimented the proceedings i  his first court session in Bossier 
parish. The Caddo Gazette also endorsed Levissee, calling the candidature of Weems - who 
promised to refuse an oath on the new constitution, which included a commitment to equal 
rights regardless of color - merely “a political statement.” Levissee’s willingness to take such 
an oath, the editor argued, did not necessarily signal his approval of its provisions: “A man 
may, as an officer, consistently and conscientiously swear to support [...] a constitution which 
he sincerely believes to be unwise, impolitic and unjust.” When a constitution, in fact, is 
forced upon a state, all citizens are nevertheless “bound, not by an oath, it is true, but by the 
great law of social order, to accept and support it until it is superseded in the legal way.” Such 
conservative support for Levissee, however, quickly evaporated, following his participation in 
the vigorous prosecution of Hinley and Pittman. From then on, conservative whites 
unanimously condemned and socially ostracized Leviss e, whom they labeled a Republican, 
and a radical one at that, even though he resisted formally joining the party until September of 
1874.74  
 Although both Osborne and Levissee used their considerable influence with some 
success to promote greater racial integration of the courts, both also suffered serious 
opposition from entrenched white elites who in some parishes still controlled the local 
government and in all cases dominated the legal profession. Records of criminal proceedings 
from the Louisiana district courts from this period have generally not been preserved, making 
it difficult to recreate an accurate picture of the functioning of these courts under the 
Republican judges, except when exceptional circumstances prompted reports in the 
newspapers or congressional testimony.  
DeSoto Parish is a fortuitous exception to this rule, as for a period of fifteen years, 
including much of the Reconstruction era, the clerk recorded the minutes of criminal cases 
tried before the district court in the same volume as civil cases. Since Louisiana law requires 
records of civil cases to be kept indefinitely, this volume had been preserved, providing a 
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record of criminal cases before the district court be ween 1870 and 1883. 75 These records 
provide a unique, if at times frustratingly limited, picture of the functioning of the legal 
system in the rural South during Reconstruction. For over 200 cases these minutes document 
the names – and in some cases the race – of defendants, the offense they were indicted for, 
and the outcome of the proceedings. They also list the names of grand and petty jurors that 
served the court during this period. Unrecorded, unfortunately, remain the names of the 
victims and the actual proceedings in the case, such as testimony heard, evidence presented, 
and arguments made.76 
 The majority of cases in which the victim’s race can be determined involved 
intraracial violence. Out of seven murder cases involving white defendants, four involved the 
slaying of other whites, none of which saw a trial.77 Of the two cases involving exclusively 
black victims, one ended in acquittal and the other, against Thomas Wilson (see below), in a 
conviction. W. N. Dobbs, indicted for a triple murde  of two blacks and one white, fled to 
Texas where he died a few years later. Of the murder cases against black defendants in which 
the victim’s race is known, all seven deal with intraracial violence. These account for five of 
the six cases where blacks were convicted for murder, with the addition of an acquittal and a 
case which never came to trial. We can identify just one case of the interracial, politically 
motivated violence so typical of Reconstruction in the DeSoto court records. Frank and 
Herbert Bell severely stabbed and beat Toney Shouge and then ran him off their mother’s 
plantation without his share of the crop. The Bell brothers were indicted and tried at the 
October 1875 term of court, and promptly acquitted by an all–white jury.78 
 The vast majority of cases involving murder, assault, intimidation, and fraud 
perpetrated by whites against blacks for political and economic purposes simply never made it 
onto the docket of the district court. The mid–nineteenth century rural South lacked any active 
constabulary force or other investigative institution. The legal culture, instead, depended on 
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citizen participation to identify suspects and furnish evidence, as well as to pass down 
indictments and verdicts.79 The officers of the court, moreover, held elective office and were 
thus beholden to public opinion.  
 Even though the district court remained functional through most of the Reconstruction 
era, the white population limited its involvement to hose cases which involved more 
‘conventional’ criminality. They did not consider it a criminal offense to oppose, even to the 
point of deadly violence, assertive freedpeople and Republican leaders of both races. By and 
large, the white community succeeded in shielding perpetrators of such violence from the 
criminal justice system. Like the freedpeople themslves, those who transgressed the 
community’s racial taboos had little to expect from a legal culture rooted in community 
participation. In a letter to his brother, Jephta McKinney, a planter from Rapides, recounted 
how “a shocking occurrence transpired in the parish of Natchitoches last November. Adam 
Camahan was shot dead in his bed and it has never ben ascertained by whom, but no great 
inquiry was ever made as he had for several years pst quit his wife and was living with a 
negro woman.”80 
 In the first to terms recorded in the minutes, after Levissee had taken over the bench 
from the conservative Weems, the first, and quite possibly both, grand juries were exclusively 
white. This explains why black defendants outnumbered whites by 2.2 to 1 during these terms 
compared to 1.7 to 1 during all of Reconstruction. O ly three whites were convicted over the 
entire year: Thomas Wilson, for murder; Ben Lafitte, on two separate charges of assault; and 
Frank Langmire, who pleaded guilty to carrying a concealed weapon. The Lafitte cases, 
however, offered a harbinger of changes to come. A different petty jury sat on each case, the 
first of which included at least six and the second at least five black members - the first juries 
in DeSoto with a large – perhaps even predominantly – black membership to convict a white 
defendant.81 
 In Rapides, meanwhile, Judge Osborne’s attempts to integrate the jury box faced stiff 
resistance by conservative whites. Osborne dismissed th  jury selected by the Republican 
parish officers at the fall term of 1868 for not complying with a law, recently passed by the 
state legislature, mandating that juries be selected from the voter rolls only. He again rejected 
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the jury venire at the spring term of 1869, this time for being illegally drawn from outdated 
voter rolls following the separation of Grant Parish from Rapides. The Democrat implicitly 
approved the judge’s action, as the jury pool had been “composed mostly of ignorant negroes,” 
but at the same time feared that “with the ignorant and inefficient Parish officers, now ruling 
in poor Rapides, the day of a Jury Term of our Court is further off than the millennium.”82  
 Then, at the fall term of 1869, Osborne approved the jury, despite renewed objections 
from both the Democrat and conservative members of the bar, led by Michael Ryan, who 
claimed that the same outdated voter rolls had been used. The resulting grand jury was 
composed almost entirely of blacks. Ryan interrogated the jurors, ostensibly to prove their 
incompetency, and then staged a walk-out of all the lawyers and every single white spectator 
in the court house, refusing, as he claimed, to “be a willing partner to the iniquity which the 
Court and its chosen jury were about to inflict upon the Parish of Rapides.” A few weeks later, 
the parish judge James H. C. Barlow had Osborne arrested on a charge of perjury. Although 
elected on the same Republican ticket as Osborne, Barlow was one of those Southern born 
white Republican officials whose primary loyalty lay with his racial and class background, 
rather than the interests and policies of his adopted arty, earning him high praise from the 
editors of the Democrat and a Masonic burial when he died some months later.83  
 Osborne, intimidated by these events, broke off the court and left the parish in fear of 
personal violence. The Democrat accused him of making political hay out of a purely judicial 
dispute, claiming that the objection to the venire had been on purely legal, rather than racial or 
political grounds - a claim belied by the emphasis the same paper’s earlier publications had 
placed on the racial composition of the grand jury that prompted Ryan’s action. In any event, 
the result was that no district court was held in the parish for at least another year, meaning 
that no criminal trials took place there whatsoever b tween at least the spring of 1868 and the 
fall of 1870. Osborne eventually returned to the bench and continued as district judge for 
another six years, even though the conservative press incessantly criticized his court, in 
particular accusing him of being overly lax in punishing black defendants.84 
 In DeSoto, meanwhile, Levissee had ensured that, by the spring term of 1871, blacks 
were reasonably well represented in the court, comprising, on average, a third of the grand 
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and petty jurors who served his court - although few juries had a black majority. These 
biracial grand juries indicted 23 whites, though only six cases resulted in a conviction, three 
of which involved guilty pleas for carrying a concealed weapon. Levissee did pass relatively 
harsh sentences on the few whites convicted of more serious crimes, sending all three to the 
state penitentiary, two of them with a life sentence.85 The small number of whites convicted 
resulted primarily from the fact that many of those indicted by the grand jury never saw their 
cases brought to trial. Either the district attorney dismissed the charges, or he simply never 
brought up the case until Levissee’s more conservative successors eventually put these cases 
on the so-called dead docket list. Conservative whites remained mostly shielded from legal 
consequences of violence, intimidation and economic bla kmail against the freedpeople, even 
under such a - at least reputedly - Radical judge as Levissee. Nor could conservatives accuse 
Levissee of condoning, let alone encouraging, black crime. Nearly half the cases brought 
against blacks during Reconstruction were initiated under Levissee, eighteen of which 
resulted in conviction. Thirteen cases against blacks, moreover, resulted in a trial by a mixed 
jury, in nine of which the jurors found the defendat guilty. Black jury membership certainly 
did not safeguard blacks from conviction.  
 Levissee’s success at integrating his court coincided with a relatively peaceful phase 
of Reconstruction in DeSoto. In 1871 and 1872, a ‘mere’ 17 killings in the parish were 
recorded in Use of the Army, an average of 8.5 per year - a marked decrease from the nearly 
14 murders per year between 1865 and 1870. After Leviss e left the bench, as the White 
League rose to prominence, DeSoto saw a staggering 48 murders between 1873 and 1874, or 
nearly a murder every fortnight in a parish of roughly 15,000 souls. Indeed, at the end of 
Levissee’s final term in DeSoto, in the fall of 1872, the grand jury reported a marked decrease 
in crime, “which we attribute in no small degree to the able efficient and prompt manner in 
which criminals have been dealt with by your honor, and the other zealous and earnest 
officers of the law in and for our parish”86 This does not mean that Levissee single–handedly 
put a stop to political violence in the parish. His court, in fact, convicted very few whites - and 
those it did generally for non-political crimes. Instead, Levissee’s judgeship in DeSoto 
reflected the more settled condition of the Red River Valley in the early 1870s. Under such 
favorable circumstances, Republicans established, at least briefly, a reasonably functional 
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biracial judicial system, even in one of the remotest, most conservative, and most violent 
parishes of northwestern Louisiana.  
 The willingness of biracial juries to convict defendants of both races undermines the 
propaganda put forward by conservative whites at the time – and by Dunningite historians 
since – that Republican rule implied a collapse of law enforcement and rampant black crime.87 
Quite the opposite picture, in fact, emerges. Only during the few years of Reconstruction in 
which Republicans were in relative firm control of the state, did DeSoto Parish experience a 
brief interlude from incessant political violence. On the one hand, the DeSoto court minutes 
clearly demonstrate that despite persistent violence and racial animosity, blacks did in fact 
participate, however briefly and tenuously, in the criminal justice system, even in remote rural 
areas of the Deep South. On the other hand, even at the apex of Republican power, 
conservative whites succeeded in shielding most of the perpetrators of political violence from 
prosecution before these biracial courts. 
 
Conclusion 
The widespread political violence of 1868 severely undermined the authority and legitimacy 
of the nascent Republican regime, which lacked the resources to project its nominal power 
and adequately protect the freedpeople and white Republicans upon whose electoral support it 
depended. At the local level, the violence delayed, and in some cases ultimately prevented, 
Republican officials from claiming the offices to which they had been elected. In those cases 
where they did take office, they often treaded light y, not wishing to provoke further violence 
by challenging the established racial hierarchy. 
 In New Orleans, meanwhile, Warmoth set out to cement his position, through a dual 
‘policy of strength,’ and policy of peace.’ Eventually, contradictions inherent in both policies 
- as well as the tensions that inevitably resulted from continued white hostility to Republican 
rule - would nearly destroy the state Republican Party. Nevertheless, from 1869 to 1872, 
Warmoth succeeded in establishing a fairly stable regime that commanded the acquiescence, 
if not the approval, of much of the white population f the state. At the local level, 
Republicans gained control of local offices in all parishes along the Red River, except for 
majority-white Bienville and Winn. However, attempts by Warmoth and his conservative 
allies to appeal to moderate white voters, and thusbroaden the appeal of the party, meant that 
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Republican political control did not automatically imply an improvement to the political, 
economic, and social position of the black population. Warmoth’s concessions to moderate 
whites meant that blacks held very few local political offices, while conservative whites 
continued to oppose black participation in the judicial process. Nevertheless, the years from 
1869 through 1872 saw a marked decrease in political and racial violence, as blacks voted 
reasonably unmolested in the 1870 elections and served on juries throughout the state, despite 
white opposition. 
 Meanwhile, the federal government increasingly disengaged from interference in civil 
affairs. Louisiana saw no more than a handful of prsecutions under the Enforcement Acts 
prior to the Colfax Massacre. The Freedmen’s Bureau closed most operations by December 
1868, just as Republicans took control of local government. The army, meanwhile, continued 
to reduce the number of troops stationed in Louisiana, until little more than a symbolic 
presence remained. These few troops, moreover, scrupulously abstained from interfering in 
civil matters, as senior officers quickly roped in local commanders who overstepped their 
very narrow mandate. As a result, the Republican ascendancy rested on very shaky ground. 
After the disputed 1872 gubernatorial and local elections, as militant whites once again 
launched an all-out attack on Republican politicians d the freedpeople who supported them, 
the party lacked both the intrinsic strength and feeral support that might have helped it 
weather such an attack. 
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6. Bulldozing the ‘Usurpers’ 
The Rise of the White League and Federal Enforcement (1873-1875) 
 
On Easter Sunday, April 13, 1873, two white men crept along the bank of the Red River some 
few hundred yards from the Colfax courthouse. They could clearly hear the gunfire being 
exchanged between the skirmish line of a force of whites attempting to take control of the 
Grant Parish court house occupied by an opposing force of entrenched blacks. They 
discovered a cut in the river bank from which their makeshift artillery could enfilade the 
blacks’ defensive position, while a small detachment could provide secure covering fire for 
the men operating the cannon. The heavy fire soon ruted the poorly armed blacks defending 
the court house. Some fled into the town or the surrounding fields, with mounted whites in hot 
pursuit, shooting down some of the fleeing blacks and taking others prisoner. The remainder 
fled into the court house and, for the time being, apparent safety.1  
 The whites, however, forced one of the captured black prisoners to set fire to the court 
house. The blacks inside soon exhibited a flag of truce and began to flee the burning edifice. 
The already violent day turned truly grim when two of the white leaders closest two the court 
house were shot down. Whether they were treacherously shot down by the blacks still inside 
the court house, as the white witnesses and press would persistently claim, or, as Charles Lane 
argues, by their comrades in arms who had already opened fire on the fleeing blacks, mattered 
little to the outcome. Seeing two of their own go dwn in a fight with their former slaves 
enraged the whites beyond reason and they opened fire indiscriminately on the blacks fleeing 
from the blaze.2 That same night, after the senior leaders had left th  scene, a smaller group of 
whites murdered most of the blacks taken prisoner i cold blood. By Monday morning some 
sixty to eighty blacks lay dead or mortally wounded in and around the charred rubble of the 
court house. James Hadnot’s death, two days later from wounds received, brought the total 
number of white casualties to three, two of them quite possibly the victim of ‘friendly fire.’3 
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 The massacre at Colfax - according to Eric Foner th  “bloodiest single act of carnage 
in all of Reconstruction” – marked a turning point in the statewide struggle for political power 
that had followed the disputed election of 1872. Warmoth had succeeded in maintaining 
relative political and social stability throughout most of his tenure. Conservative whites, 
however, did not intend to yield their preeminence indefinitely and they believed to have a 
chance to regain power at the state level, after th s ate Republican Party fell apart in the 
summer of 1871. As intraparty disputes boiled over in August, Warmoth and his state 
machine organized one party convention, and the Custom House Ring, led by Kellogg and 
Packard, organized another, known as the Gatling Gun Convention for the federal guns that 
protected it. P. B. S. Pinchback, the state’s most influential black politician, eventually joined 
Packard and Kellogg, allowing them to credibly claim the mantle of Republicanism. Warmoth 
initially sought a centrist position as a Liberal Republican, but by election time had joined the 
Democrats and a short-live, moderate party known as the Reform Party. They fielded a so 
called ‘Fusion ticket,’ headed by “last-ditch Bourbon Democrat” John McEnery, but also 
including Liberal Republicans D. B. Penn and George A. Sheridan, and even a black man 
from Caddo, Samuel Armistead, as candidate for secretary of state.4 
 Although the campaign and elections in 1872 did not see the widespread terror of 
1868, “both the Fusionists and the Republicans defrauded one another” to such an extent that 
“no one ever had any idea who had actually won.” Instead, the outcome of the election hinged 
on the returning board created by Warmoth, which itself soon split into two rival bodies, one 
declaring Kellogg elected and the other McEnery. On December 5, in a move of questionable 
legality, a federal judge, Edward H. Durrell authorized US Marshal Stephen B. Packard to 
take possession of the state house on behalf of the Kellogg regime. In January, both 
gubernatorial candidates took the oath of office and for a number of weeks rival legislatures 
met in New Orleans, but in late February, following a failed attack by McEnery’s militia, 
Kellogg’s Metropolitans seized control of New Orleans with the tacit support of the federal 
troops in the city. Although he now controlled the formal levers of state power, the white 
population of Louisiana would continue to resist Kellogg throughout his tenure. By April 
1873, just a few months after Kellogg’s inauguration, conservatives leaders throughout the 
state began organizing a statewide campaign of tax-resistance under the leadership of 
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conservative judge John Archibald Campbell, who hadcoordinated a similar effort in the 
early years of the Warmoth regime.5 
 Disappointed at their failure to gain control of the state government, and convinced 
that Kellogg had never legitimately been elected, militant whites increasingly turned to 
violence in order to ‘redeem’ their state once and for all. Organizing themselves in White 
Leagues, they rejected the kind of compromise that fostered the Fusion ticket. Instead they 
racialized political divisions, making it increasingly costly for whites to continue their support 
for Republican policies. They employed targeted violence and wide scale intimidation, 
challenging the authority of Governor Kellogg and myriad local Republican office holders. 
State authorities soon proved unable, and federal authorities eventually unwilling to meet this 
challenge, particularly in rural areas such as the Red River Valley. Although the military 
continued to prop up the facade of nominal Republican rule in New Orleans, they increasingly 
ceded power at the local level to conservative whites. 
 
Escalation 
Republicans and Democrats - as the Fusionists soon reverted to calling themselves - not only 
contested control of the state government, but also numerous local offices throughout the state. 
At the urging of men like Thomas C. Moncure, the Caddo representative-elect to the 
conservative state legislature, McEnery set out to “so perfect our government as to put it in a 
condition to assert and support its own pretentions.” This meant not only commissioning all 
parish and local officers elected on the Fusion ticket, but also the removal of those judges who 
did not recognize the McEnery regime, and the establi hment a militia. On February 8, a 
fortnight before the Metropolitans would defeat hismilitia force in New Orleans, McEnery 
sent out a commission to Rapides Democrat James Calvert Wise - and presumably to many 
others like him throughout the state - appointing him a militia colonel.6 This militia force 
would provide both the organizational structure and a claim to legitimacy for the White 
League that emerged throughout the state some years late . 
 The disputed elections of 1872 provided the immediat  pretext for the Colfax 
massacre, in which a force of whites, ostensibly acting as a posse for the sheriff elected on the 
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McEnery ticket, attempted to wrest control of the court house from a force of blacks, who 
similarly had been summoned as a posse by the Republican sheriff of the parish. This conflict 
fed on longstanding political tensions, which had simmered in Grant for many years previous 
to these disputed elections. In September of 1871 these tensions had provoked a murderous 
attack on William B. Phillips and Delos W. White, two young, Northern born, white 
Republican organizers. Phillips had moved to Northern Louisiana as a law student following 
the war, but soon took up a career as a Radical Republican political speaker, while Phillips, a 
former Union soldier, came to the Red River Valley as a Freedmen’s Bureau agent. Besides 
being outsiders, both shared a passionate conviction in support of equal rights for the freed 
slaves, well beyond what even many Republicans, let alone the vast majority of Southern 
whites, considered acceptable. Phillips, especially, had antagonized the local white population, 
both by openly living with a mulatto mistress and through his vigorous espousal of political 
positions which even White’s erstwhile colleagues at the Freedmen’s Bureau had found far 
too radical and inflammatory. An Alexandria agent, reported in 1867 that Phillips’s 
extravagant promises of land redistribution caused “some of the freedpeople to get excited 
and threaten, if they did not get the land promised th m, [to] fight the whites for it and cause a 
grand massacre of the whites.”7 
 After Republican legislators carved out Grant Parish as a Republican stronghold in 
early 1869, Warmoth appointed Phillips as parish judge and White as sheriff, though a year 
later he replaced them with more conservative white Republicans. Willie Calhoun, the heir to 
the largest estate in the parish, shared Phillips’s and White’s political persuasions, and used 
his considerable financial assets in support of the local Republican Party and its policies. He 
invested in schools on his plantations, offered his employees fair – if not generous – contracts, 
and saw that they were well treated. The most important black leader in the Republican Party 
was William Ward, a former slave and Union soldier from Virginia, who had served as a 
police juror and later became a captain in the state militia.8 
 This Republican leadership, which could count on the majority black population of 
Grant Parish for electoral support, soon alienated the vast majority of the native white 
population - not only those opposed to racial equality of any kind, but also a number of 
moderate whites who had joined the Republican Party in the hope of forging some sort of 
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racial and political compromise, and possibly of procuring lucrative parish offices. On 
September 25, 1871, a mob of local whites - led by two nominal Republicans, Alfred Shelby, 
who had replaced White as sheriff, and his deputy, Christopher Columbus Nash - set fire to 
the house shared by White and Phillips, murdering the former as he fled the building. It was 
in the aftermath of this attack that Ward rose to particular prominence. Using his authority as 
captain of an all-black militia company, he arrested Shelby, Nash, and others suspected of 
involvement in the attack, and forced them at gunpoint from the courtroom of Republican 
district judge John Osborne onto a steamer bound for New Orleans to face federal charges.9 
 By early 1872, Federal District Attorney James R. Beckwith had released the prisoners 
on bail, as political and legal obstacles made further prosecution unlikely. State militia 
commander and former Confederate general James Longstreet, meanwhile, had relieved 
William Ward of his militia command and in the summer of that year permanently dismissed 
him for exceeding his authority. Conservative whites had employed violence to undermine the 
authority of the Republican leadership in the parish, and hoped to reclaim control in the 
November elections. Although a superficial calm hadreturned to Grant Parish, the events of 
1871 severely polarized political landscape, with only the most Radical whites remaining 
loyal to the Republican Party. Ward’s actions, despit  his superior’s disavowal of them, 
reinforced the always simmering fears among the vast majority of Southern whites of an 
empowered black population taking up arms against them, reinforcing their determination to 
reestablish political control at the next election. 
 Nash led the electoral campaign, as the Democratic/Fusion candidate for sheriff on a 
ticket that also included Alphonse Cazabat for parish judge and James Hadnot for Grant’s sole 
representative to the state legislature. The Republicans nominated Ward as candidate for the 
legislature, perhaps hoping that his physical absence from the parish would diminish the 
tensions both within the Republican Party and betwen the Republicans and the white 
population, to whom Ward was anathema. For the most important local offices they 
nominated relatively moderate white Republicans, Daniel Shaw, who opposed Nash for 
sheriff and Robert C. Register who originally stood as candidate for Clerk, but would find 
himself a claimant for the parish judgeship when the original candidate relinquished his office 
shortly after the election.10 
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 As happened throughout Louisiana, both parties disputed the results of the election in 
Grant Parish, for which no official returns were ever announced. The Democrats/Fusionists 
claimed they had won the parish by a 240 vote majority, reversing a 360 vote Republican 
majority only two years before. By mid-January the Fusion candidates had taken possession 
of their offices under commissions issued by the lame duck governor Warmoth. Once it 
became clear, however, that Kellogg and not McEnery had secured the governorship both 
parties immediately began an intensive lobbying camp ign to convince Kellogg to 
commission the candidates of their choice. The new governor initially gave the Fusionists a 
sympathetic hearing and appeared willing to issue commissions to their candidates for all 
offices, except parish judge, for which R. C. Register had already qualified. Ward, however, 
soon convinced him that Nash was an unacceptable choice, and the Fusionist leaders refused a 
compromise that did not include the sheriff’s office. On March 24, Ward and Eli Flowers, 
another local black leader, returned to Colfax with fresh commissions for all the Republican 
candidates.11 
 The Fusionists, who had held the local offices for over two months, refused to 
relinquish possession of the Colfax court house, an old stable building on one of Willie 
Calhoun’s plantations, which housed the parish records and served as office space for the 
judge, sheriff and other local officials. On March 25, under authority of their Kellogg 
commissions, Judge Register and Sheriff Shaw had a small black boy climb in through the 
window and open the latch from the inside, thus taking possession of the physical space 
symbolizing state authority in the parish. It is unlikely that the conservative forces of the 
parish would have been willing to simply give up power without a struggle, but their 
recalcitrance was undoubtedly reinforced when two days later the New Orleans Republican, 
the official state journal, published a list of commissions issued by Kellogg that erroneously 
included the names of Nash and other Fusionist candid tes in Grant. According to the 
governor’s testimony, it had mistakenly been taken from the original petition on his desk, 
which he had at first favorably considered but eventually denied.12 
 This publication provided Nash, Hadnot and other white leaders with political cover to 
dispute the legal authority of the Republican officeholders. They intended to retake the court 
house, by force if necessary, on April 1, and summoned whites from the surrounding 
countryside to their aid, boldly promising to “hang all of the republican office-holders.” The 
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Republicans, however, caught wind of their plans and Shaw uses his authority as sheriff to 
summon posse of mostly blacks men to help him defen the court house. Hadnot’s force of no 
more than 25 white men encountered a similar number of blacks and, despite their bluster, 
they decided not to risk a fight.13 A standoff ensued, with a growing force of conservative 
whites encamped a few miles outside of Colfax and blacks from the area flocking to the court 
house.  
 A series of incidents and skirmishes escalated the tension over the ensuing two weeks. 
Both before and after the massacre, conservative whites harped upon the ransacking of 
William R. Rutland’s home by a squad of blacks and the alleged desecration of the remains of 
his infant daughter, which he had kept in a box in his home. The most reliable testimony, 
however, indicates that they had done little more than move the box to the porch as they 
searched the house. A few days later, a skirmish enued between a band of white militants and 
some local blacks, who exchanged shots, though at distance well beyond the range of their 
weapons. Such stories fanned the fears and prejudics of the white population that the blacks 
were both savage and organized enough to “go into the country to kill from the cradle to the 
grave.” The circulation of such stories in the press quickly brought large numbers of whites to 
Colfax, not just from the immediate vicinity, but also from surrounding parishes. They 
flocked to Nash and Hadnot’s camp, swelling their numbers to anywhere from “125 to 300 
men, well mounted and equipped.” Following the massacre, conservative whites throughout 
the state continued to blame events on the Republicans who “took possession as it were of the 
parish and resolved to make it a battlefield.” Rumors in New Orleans, moreover, “reported 
that this was but the beginning of what was contemplated for other localities.”14 
 In retrospect, such fears, to the extent that theyw re not merely propaganda to justify 
a power-grab, seem groundless to the point of ridicule. The local black population, meanwhile, 
had to deal with growing fears of its own, and with far more justification. The botched assault 
on the courthouse by Hadnot on April 1 and the skirmish a few days later, proved that the 
Republicans would have to defend their offices by force. When a local laborer, Jesse 
McKinney, was murdered by a squad of whites from Nash’s force, the trickle of blacks 
seeking protection in the courthouse turned into a flood. The first army officer to arrive at 
Colfax after the massacre estimated that at one point 400 to 500 freedmen had gathered at the 
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courthouse, but that due to a lack of provisions these numbers had dwindled to no more than 
150 by Easter Sunday.15 
 Significantly, by that point the entire Republican leadership of both races had 
abandoned the forces defending the court house. Register, Ward, Flowers and others had left 
for New Orleans, ostensibly in the hope of securing either state or federal troops to aid the 
embattled blacks in the courthouse, although it remains unclear why this required a delegation 
comprising all of them. Perhaps they had no stomach for the fight, like Daniel Shaw, a native 
Southern white and a moderate Republican. Following the massacre, Shaw publicly 
repudiated having been elected sheriff, undermining the legal authority on which the 
Republicans claimed to have defended the court house. This allowed the white press to claim 
that they had simply faced a mere mob, assembled “for no good reason except to plunder, rob, 
and murder.” In return, conservative whites publicly exonerated Shaw from any blame in the 
affair, claiming he was only a figurehead, shanghaied into joining a black insurrection. The 
presence of the senior Republican leadership, particularly of either Shaw or Register, might 
have mitigated subsequent events. Captain Jacob H. Smith, the first federal officer to arrive in 
Colfax after the events, certainly believed so. He reported that the blacks defending the court 
house would not entertain offers for a negotiated sttlement, “as they had been required to 
fight it out by the men who should have remained an counseled peace instead of war.”16 As it 
was, Nash’s forces encountered some 150 poorly armed black laborers, commanded by the 
relatively inexperienced Levi Allen, half of whom lay dead the following morning. 
 
Power Vacuum 
While the absence of the local leadership aggravated th  events of April 13, the absence of 
either state or federal authority in the region hadmade the conflict possible in the first place. 
Kellogg, whom the vast majority of whites considered an illegitimate usurper, received 
numerous indications in the weeks leading up to the massacre that trouble was brewing in 
Grant Parish. In theory, he had the authority to send a force of state militia to quell the 
disturbance and support the local officers he himself had recently commissioned. He did not 
do so, however, for two reasons. First, he “thought it not best to send a large force; and, 
second, if I wanted to send such a force, the conditi  of public sentiment was such that the 
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boats would not have taken them.” Neither could he purchase or charter a boat, as his 
administration lacked the financial wherewithal to do so.17 Kellogg, in effect, admitted that he 
could not maintain order in large areas of the state nominally under his jurisdiction, because 
the only transportation available was controlled by private citizens, who refused to respect his 
authority. Both Kellogg and departmental military commander General William H. Emory 
would encounter similar difficulties over the ensuing months, greatly delaying the attempts to 
arrest the perpetrators of the massacre. 
 Kellogg did not elaborate on his other stated reason, that even if he had been able to, 
he did not think it best to send a large force. We can therefore only speculate as to his reasons, 
assuming his statement was more than a mere justification after the fact. In all likelihood, he 
feared that a mostly black militia force, acting under the authority of a state government most 
whites considered illegitimate, would only have exacerbated an already explosive situation. 
Moreover, the militia’s involvement in a potentially osing battle would have irrevocably 
demonstrated his inability to project state power. Kellogg, who after all had only taken office 
a few months earlier, and whose position was shaky at best, may have considered the defense 
of Colfax as a test case best left to local forces. Had they won, the position of local 
Republican officeholders, and by extension his own authority would have been immeasurably 
strengthened. If they lost, he could disavow direct r sponsibility and use the incident as a 
pretext for requesting an increase of federal troops throughout the state to prop up his regime.  
 Such an interpretation casts a different light on two oft quoted editorials in the New 
Orleans Republican of April 12, which Lane interprets as a “hasty propaganda effort” by 
Ward, “intended to deter an attack on their men.” Less than a day before the fatal attack, the 
newspaper claimed that a well-trained and armed colored majority in Grant Parish was 
“prepared to clean out the local minority […] in twenty-four hours or less, if not interfered 
with.” And elsewhere: “The negroes, even plantation hands - are no longer the weak and 
simple creatures they were before the war. The years of freedom they have enjoyed, have had 
their effect; as also the training which many of them received in the United States army.”18 It 
is doubtful that Ward believed anything published in a Republican paper in New Orleans, 
which would take days to reach Colfax, would influenc  a fight that he must have known to 
be imminent. It also seems unlikely he could have ‘planted’ anything in the official state 
newspaper without, at the very least, Kellogg’s consent.  
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 More plausibly, Kellogg, perhaps after consultation with the Grant Parish leadership, 
hoped that the defenders of the courthouse would be able to fight the whites to at least a draw. 
Although such hopes seem far-fetched in retrospect, neither Kellogg nor Ward knew that the 
whites would have artillery at their disposal and be able to use it to such devastating effect. 
Without it, the whites might have balked at the casualties involved in attacking an entrenched 
position, even one defended by forces as poorly armed and inexperienced as the Colfax 
freedmen. In that case, the editorials in the Republican would have served as a rallying cry for 
embattled Republicans throughout the state. As it was, the whites used it as grist for their 
propaganda mill to blame the entire episode on the aggression of blacks and Republicans. 
 Factional struggles within the Republican Party also contributed to Kellogg’s 
reluctance to intervene. Postmaster Samuel E. Cuney and Henry Kearson, local black 
Republican leaders who had been loyal to Kellogg’s Custom House Republicans, had 
opposed Ward in the run-up to the 1872 election, and that summer the two factions had nearly 
come to blows. Cuney, like Shaw, would later provide statements to the white press in support 
of their contention that the entire affair was to blame on the local blacks and their pernicious 
Republican leaders.19 Perhaps Kellogg felt some trepidation in risking his reputation and what 
little authority he had in support of Ward, who appeared to be a loose cannon and the cause of 
more trouble than he was worth. 
 Although failing to send a large force to enforce his authority, Kellogg did dispatch 
two senior militia officers, Colonels Theodore W. DeKlyne and William Wright, “with 
special and written instructions for an adjustment, so that bloodshed might be prevented.” 
Such an adjustment would have included a division of the offices “so as to satisfy the people 
of the parish.” More, Kellogg insisted, he could not do, as there existed a “combination, 
formed with premeditation, to prevent United States troops going to Colfax to prevent that 
massacre,” as the whites attempted to “absolutely pr vent my sending troops up there.”20 
 If Kellogg’s position prior to the massacre was ambivalent, that of General Emory was 
quite clear. Following orders from William T. Sherman, no troops had been stationed in 
Louisiana north of Baton Rouge since the summer of 1871. As late as January of 1873, as the 
dispute over the contested elections raged, Emory advised his superiors in Washington that 
the  
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use [of] the US troops ‘to keep the peace’ have attained the object intended. The 
further use of the troops for that end will not lead to a permanent and satisfactory 
settlement of the difficulties which disturb this unhappy city and state, besides their 
use as now practiced might be invoked by the local authorities to compass, under 
cover of them, ends not intended should be accomplished. 
He further insisted that the governor “be made to understand that all requests must go through 
the president.” When Emory first heard of possible disturbances at Colfax, by his own report 
on April 10, it was from Kellogg directly. The governor at that time stated his intention of 
sending General Longstreet, commander of the state militia, with “a sufficient force of state 
police to quell the disturbance.” Whether or not Kellogg had such intentions at the time, 
Emory was not about to send any of his scarce troops hundreds of miles upriver without the 
governor’s explicit request.21 
 Following the first reports of the massacre, Republicans in New Orleans hoped that 
the “strong arm of the state and national government will take good care of these rioters.” In 
reality, the authorities had severe troubles to come up with an adequate response, even in the 
face of such massive violence. A month after the massacre, at Emory’s explicit insistence, 
Kellogg finally made a formal appeal for troops to the president “on advice of my party and to 
restore peace as speedily as possible,” although he continued to claim that state forces were 
strong enough to eventually quell the insurrection. By then, Emory had already ordered troops 
to be stationed at Colfax. Like Kellogg, however, the military encountered difficulty securing 
transportation upriver. Despite a determined effort, Emory reported being unable to get a 
steamer at “a reasonable rate” until April 19, four days after Kellogg first apprised him of the 
situation. A month later, Emory sent two more companies to be stationed near Shreveport, 
believing these necessary for the preservation of peace and order. He did so again upon the 
“urgent solicitation of the governor […] and respectable citizens from the parishes of Bossier 
and Caddo,” although not before Kellogg had shown him letters from the Secretary of War 
and General of the Army explicitly authorizing Emory to do so on his own recognizance. 22 
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 While he complied with Kellogg’s requests for military assistance, Emory clearly 
envisioned a limited role for US troops. He instruced officers commanding the troops sent to 
Colfax and Shreveport to “use all your influence in the preservation of peace and order” but to 
“carefully refrain from entanglements in the political dissentions between the two parties in 
this state” and furthermore to “limit your active intervention” to furnishing posses comitati on 
proper requisition by US marshals. These orders clearly reflect the legal understanding of the 
time that only two legitimate uses might be made of federal troops within the confines of an 
established state. One was to assist US marshals and their deputies in the exercise of their 
duties. The other was, in the words of District Judge Aaron B. Levissee, “to suppress an 
insurrection while in action,” but not “to prevent an insurrection or to punish those who 
participate.” Such an intervention, strictly speaking, could only be ordered by the president on 
the request of the governor of a state. In the absence of unambiguous orders from Washington, 
Emory acted on this latter principle and sent two companies to Colfax to prevent further 
bloodshed. Even with such a limited mandate, however, h  warned his superiors that more 
troops, and preferably cavalry, would be needed, as he feared a “general insurrection against 
the state authorities […] and if not promptly reinforced the United States authority may no 
longer be respected.”23 
 Captain Smith’s reports from Colfax, where he arrived on April 22 reinforced 
Emory’s inclination to limit federal involvement tosupporting federal law enforcement. The 
majority of blacks had fled the Colfax area and the “troubles have quieted down here with 
only the attendant excitement which necessarily follows such a fatal riot.” Although he had 
only arrived the previous evening, he concluded that any troops required by US marshals as 
posses comitati would be needed nearer to Alexandri, while in Colfax itself only a 
sufficient forced needed to remain “to represent the authority of the US and establish a feeling 
of security which can only be secured by the regular forces.” A few days later he reported that 
“people in and around Colfax seem to be getting over th  excitement, which was occasioned 
by the riot” and by April 29 that “the riot is only spoke of as an occurrence of the past. The 
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negroes are rapidly returning to work with some degre  of confidence that they will not be 
molested.”24  
 By May 9, Smith had moved his command to Camp Canby near Alexandria, leaving 
only a detachment of one Lieutenant, three non-commissioned officers and seventeen privates 
at Colfax. A week later Smith recommended – and Emory subsequently so ordered - that even 
this detachment might safely be withdrawn, since troops had been sent to Shreveport and “the 
entire country between here [Alexandria] and there will be controlled by their presence.”25 
Emory’s limited interpretation of his mandate for federal intervention resulted in a complete 
withdrawal of troops from Colfax a little over a month after the local whites had demonstrated 
the utter inability of local Republican officeholders and Governor Kellogg to project their 
authority there.  
 Three factors, besides possibly wishing to conform to his superior’s inclinations, 
contributed to Smith’s sanguine interpretation of the conditions in Grant parish. The first is 
that Smith relied heavily on white informants, including those involved in the fight at the 
court house. Although he reported being aware of Nash’s role as a leader of the white forces 
at Colfax, he did not dispute the latter’s claim to be the legal sheriff and he believed he could 
“get more information from him than from any others I have conversed with, as he was the 
leader of the white men and remained on the battlefield after the fight was over.”26  
 The efficacy of his small detachment of troops in restoring order in Reconstruction 
Louisiana reinforced Smith’s impression that the situat on in Colfax was under control. 
Although Smith reported some threatening rumors against his command and kept on the alert, 
he entertained “no idea that my authority will be resisted.” This is not surprising, as even the 
most rabid and violent white leaders, such as KWC founder Alcibiades DeBlanc of St. 
Martinsville, counseled surrendering to federal troops, rather than offering them a pretext for 
further intervention.27 Judge Levissee, looking back on the events of Reconstruction, wryly 
noted of this strategy that “in a state where insurrections are gotten up as systematically as 
party conventions, they are not likely to occur just where a body of troops is stationed. It is 
just as easy and much more judicious to have them take place elsewhere.”  
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 He went on to note that “troops, at best, can onlybe stationed at a few central points in 
a state,” while “midnight raids could be planned an executed within five miles of a military 
camp.” This scarcity of troops was the final factor motivating Smith’s advice to withdraw 
from Colfax. He felt his men could be most effective around Alexandria, where he expected 
most arrests in the wake of the massacre to take place. He knew he need not ask Emory for 
more troops, as the entire 19th regiment stationed in Louisiana had been distributed among the 
disturbed areas, leaving Emory worried about the situation in New Orleans, where “peace 
reigns, but it is not a satisfactory peace and I cannot say how long it will last.”28 
 Local Republicans soon felt the consequences of Emory and Smith’s decision to 
withdraw troops from Colfax. In July, District Attorney J. Ernest Breda and District Judge 
John Osborne, exasperated by the delays in federal prosecution, decided to assert their 
jurisdiction in the case. They empaneled a grand jury at Colfax, which found indictments 
against no less than 140 men suspected of participation in the massacre. Their efforts ended 
abruptly, however, when dozens of armed whites “openly and violently threatened to break up 
the court.” Breda complained that the troops, now stationed thirty miles away, did not 
interfere, despite his warning them of trouble. The proximity of troops, however, might not 
have made all that much difference, considering that local commanders, under restrictive 
orders from Emory, preferred not to interfere in civil affairs. The officer commanding the post 
of Greenwood, in Caddo Parish, for instance, refused to interfere when a judge’s life was 
threatened in open court in Shreveport, claiming that “the disturbance, however serious it 
might be to particular individuals, was not one to call for the interposition of troops, it being a 
court room disturbance of a kind frequently seen in Southern and Northern towns addicted in 
the way of whiskey and pistols.”29 
 That same night, Breda left Colfax to save his life, feeling “no disposition to offer 
myself as a sacrifice when the other officers, those f the US, would take no steps to protect 
or assist the courts.” In early August he wrote letters to the federal district attorney and 
marshal for Louisiana and to the US attorney general in Washington, recounting these events 
and asserting that no civil court could be held in Colfax without protection by the US military. 
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Even federal officers “are scorned, scoffed, and abused when they go to Colfax alone” let 
alone “those who have only a Kellogg commission for authority and no US troops to protect 
them.” The passive response of federal authorities, moreover, seemed to the whites as a 
“sanctioning of their acts.”30 
 Only federal authority, backed by military force, could ensure that Republicans would 
have more than nominal control over Louisiana and that the Reconstruction legislation passed 
in New Orleans and Washington would be enforced throughout the state. The Enforcement 
Acts, for the first time in history, made possible th  criminal prosecution of individuals before 
a federal court, which in the antebellum era had been strictly a state matter.31  The 
responsibility for such prosecution fell to the recently created Department of Justice, which in 
Louisiana was represented by Federal District Attorney Beckwith. Prior to the Colfax 
massacre, Beckwith had had little experience in prosecuting cases under the Enforcement 
Acts, having instigated less than a dozen proceedings under its provisions. The only two of 
these to go to trial, moreover, resulted in acquittals. It is not entirely evident why Louisiana 
saw so few cases under the Enforcement Acts, while states such as Mississippi and North 
Carolina saw hundreds of prosecutions, resulting in dozens of trials and numerous convictions. 
One reason may be that in the early 1870s, when the Department of Justice most vigorously 
prosecuted such cases, Louisiana experienced a period of relative quiet under Warmoth. New 
Orleans, moreover, as the largest port in the South, provided plenty of other duties for 
Beckwith, whose office was chronically understaffed.32 
 The Colfax case, however, could not be ignored. Even before the failed attempt by 
Breda and Osborne to try the case under state law, Beckwith had convened a federal grand 
jury which found incitements against 72 suspected prpetrators. He also agreed with Breda 
that only swift punishment would prevent a repetition of such violence in the future. Those 
indicted expected swift action, and as early as May of 1873 rumors circulated in Shreveport 
that “a large force of Metropolitan police had been expected to arrive on the Ozark,” a 
steamboat belonging to the state of Louisiana. Beckwith’s office, however, lacked the 
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resources to effect the swift justice he desired. He understood the situation in northwestern 
Louisiana well enough to realize that arrest might only be made by a mounted force, as “the 
worst of the accused will see to themselves in the pin woods in the rear of the parishes where 
they reside and defy arrest.” The US marshal, the executive arm of the Department of Justice, 
depended on fees for his payment and these were “so small that he would be ruined if he 
called on a mounted militia force” for which he himself would have to pay.33 As a result 
federal enforcement stalled throughout the summer. 
 Only in September, possibly in response to Breda’s letters, did Beckwith and US 
Marshal Packard renew their effort to secure a mounted force. Since they had insufficient 
funds, they set up an arrangement in which the stat and federal authorities would share the 
burden. Kellogg would supply the manpower out of the state militia and the state steamer 
Ozark as transportation, but as his regime was cashstarved, all operating costs, including 
rations for the men and horses and fuel and pilots for the boat, would have to come out of 
federal military appropriations. Packard also desired federal troops to guard the prisoners and 
as “reinforcements in case of a serious fight.” Emory did not feel authorized to meet such 
expenditures without explicit authorization from his superiors and only after repeated requests 
by Packard did officials in Washington approve the plan.34  
 So, on October 26, half a year after the murder of dozens of blacks, the Ozark finally 
landed opposite Alexandria and a detachment of troops j ined Deputy US Marshal DeKlyne 
and twenty-five mounted militiamen already on board. The Ozark continued on to Colfax and 
Montgomery, where the militia succeeded in arresting seven of the suspects, whom they 
brought on board to be guarded there by federal troops. Following a failed expedition to 
Harrisonburg, DeKlyne made a final attempt at additional arrests in Alexandria. None of the 
suspected whites were to be found in their homes, however, despite earlier assertions by white 
leaders that a single federal soldier or marshal would be sufficient to make any arrests 
necessary. Although Lane has qualified the mission of the Ozark as a partial success, the local 
army commander at Pineville emphasized that the militia did not succeed in making a single 
arrest outside of Colfax and “the smoke from her chimneys was still in sight, when the first 
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fugitives began to return to their homes.”35 The best mounted force that a joint effort of state 
and local authorities could cobble together hardly served to inspire respect for either among 
the white citizens of the Red River region. 
 While the Ozark expedition mostly failed in its attempts to bring the Colfax 
perpetrators to justice, the presence of black militiamen attempting to make arrests did 
succeed in fanning the flames of white indignation. Lieutenant George T. Towly, in charge of 
the forces near Alexandria, reported that the Ozark’s arrival destroyed the dead calm which 
had reigned over the area. Soon, reports and rumors of various crimes, either perpetrated or 
encouraged by the militia, began to circulate. The most vivid of these rumors involved the 
alleged rape of three white women by members of the state militia. The details of these 
rumors quickly proved exaggerated. The case involved th  rape of a single white woman, a 
relation of former governor Wells, perpetrated by a local black man named Hamp Henderson, 
who, along with four other blacks allegedly involved in the affair, was soon captured and 
lynched. Even though the militia was in no way involved, the local white press, led by the 
Louisiana Democrat accused the DeKlyne and the metropolitan police of applying selective 
justice in going after the whites’ suspected in the Colfax case and not attempting to arrest 
Henderson for his crime. Eventually, a greatly exaggerated version of the incident - which 
resonated with the sexualized fears of blacks that informed the post-Reconstruction 
imagination of Southern whites – found its way into popular accounts of the events leading up 
to, and therefore justifying, the massacre at Colfax, even though it took place month 
afterwards.36 
 Dosia Williams’s memoirs, which present one example of such an account, also recall 
how the Ozark moored near Alexandria for nearly a ye r while whites had to hide out in the 
woods to prevent arrest. In reality, the entire expedition only spent a little over two weeks in 
northwestern Louisiana. Her account, however, captures the intensity of the local resentment 
it inspired. The white citizens of Rapides quickly organized an ‘indignation meeting’ at which 
they passed numerous resolutions which, according to Lieutenant Towly, “were mostly no 
more than denunciations and a protest against the existing state of things political.” They 
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included a demand that Congress reverse President Gra ’s decision recognizing the Kellogg 
government; and expressions of sympathy with, and ple ges of legal support for, the arrested 
men “dragged from their peaceful homes by the Metropolitan Police [...] for political and for 
no other purposes.” The white press went even further. The Democrat accused the 
Metropolitans of searching homes without legal warrants, and proudly noted that the members 
of the expedition from “prudential motives refused to spend the night.” To emphasize the 
spirit of resistance to both state and federal authorities, the editors further insisted that 
“passivity under Metropolitan invasion [was] not tobe construed as acquiescence in or 
voluntary submission to usurped government”37  
 As soon as the Ozark left, General Emory ordered th  post near Alexandria broken up. 
One company was to return to barracks and the other to set up post at Colfax. In January the 
post at Greenwood was reduced to a single company and in March it was discontinued, 
leaving the company at Colfax the only federal presence in Louisiana north of Baton Rouge. 
These troops, moreover, operated under strict orders not to interfere except on requisition by a 
federal marshal. A request from Packard for troops to be stationed in “certain parishes in 
Louisiana to preserve the public peace” was summarily denied on the grounds that such a 
request had to be authorized by the president himself.38 The Colfax massacre and its aftermath 
had clearly shown the state authorities incapable of preserving law and order, or even of 
maintaining the integrity of legitimate local officeholder in the face of white violence. The 
army, while practically capable of filling this gap, roved unwilling to take on these 
responsibilities, beyond the minimal constitutional requirements of assisting federal civil 
authorities and suppressing large scale insurrections. Their meager resourced, however, 
proved hardly adequate even to such a limited task.
 
‘Peacefully If Convenient, Forcibly If Necessary’ 
The failure of authorities to respond vigorously to the events at Colfax and the continues 
campaign in the white press in opposition to Kellogg’s supposed ‘usurpation’ created a 
perfect breeding ground for further extra-legal, and often violent, opposition to 
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Reconstruction in northwestern Louisiana. Disappointed in the results of the strategy of 
accommodation pursued in the 1872 campaign, a growing number of white leaders began 
advocating in favor of an explicitly racial political program and resistance to the existing 
Republican order. In April of 1874 this resulted in the formation of the first of many local 
White League organizations, in Saint Landry Parish. T e ideas inspiring the movement 
originated earlier, however, and most historians trace the beginnings of the White League to 
the first publication of the Caucasian in Alexandria.39 Its salutary urged a 
fair, square, stand-up fight of the honest intellignt white people against negro 
incompetence and carpet-bag rascality; a white man’s party, seeking to secure and 
foster the interests of the white people, and turning the negro over to the tender 
mercies of his friend and boon companion the carpet-bagger40 
Other newspapers soon joined the Caucasian in advocating a strict adherence to this so-called 
white line strategy, including a number of publicatons from the Red River region, such as the 
Natchitoches People’s Vindicator and the Shreveport Times.  
 Their fight, so the Caucasian’s editors claimed, was “not upon the negro per se, but 
upon his political record […] not because his skin is black, but because his deeds have been of 
a darker hue than even the cuticle which his creato gave him.”41 Such verbal finesses 
mattered little to the black population in Louisiana, once the White League began its 
campaign of electoral fraud, economic intimidation a d outright violence. They served an 
important purpose, however, as the White League maneuvered along a fine line between 
appealing to the racist worldview of the vast majority of Southern whites, while justifying 
itself on such themes as good governance, law and order, and financial retrenchment, aimed to 
appeal to Northern audience as well as those whites who had been attracted to the Liberal 
Republicans in 1872.  
 The White League, as Carole Emberton argues, not oly had to outgun local 
Republicans, but even more importantly, they required “coordination and a politically viable 
justification for igniting armed conflict with the state authorities […] if Republicans’ greatest 
strength - federal support - was to be broken.”42 The White Leaguers themselves fully realized 
their predicament. “The public sentiment,” one White League activist privately wrote to a 
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confederate, “especially of the North has to be appe led to by a certain enumeration of 
wrongs, oppressions and exactions, that will unite the sympathy and public sentiment of the 
world.” The armed aspect of the League, he warned, must be kept secret. Such machinations 
did not fool all observers. In an unpublished report, State Senator Marshall Harvey Twitchell 
related how the League “intended to seize and possess the [local government] peacefully if 
convenient, but forcibly if necessary.” Republican congressmen who investigated the White 
League in 1875 published a pamphlet accusing the organization and its supporters of a 
“stupendous effort […] at home and abroad to conceal from the world the nature and designs” 
of the organization.43 
 Tax reform and good governance proved most effectiv  both as a rallying call for 
Southerners and a justification aimed at Northerners. Conservative whites repeatedly harped 
on exorbitant tax rates under supposedly corrupt Reublican state and local authorities as an 
excuse for what they claimed was justifiable civil disobedience.44 The validity of such claims 
remain disputed, as the evidence is clouded by partisan propaganda. Captain Allyn, 
commanding federal troops at Colfax in the summer of 1874 investigated such complaints and 
found “both state and parish tax (the latter payable in deprecated currency) to be relatively 
light.” J. Mills Thornton III, on the other hand, has argued that with end of the antebellum 
slave tax a larger percentage of the tax burden fell on the poorer and middling white farmer, 
who, he claims, were “correct in believing that he was paying much more in taxes, and was 
generally receiving no more - in fact, often less - in return than he had received before the 
war.”45 Even if the absolute fiscal burden was not exceptionally severe, taxes paid to a regime 
that most whites considered illegitimate in the first place undoubtedly provoked resentment, 
particularly if a significant portion of the expenditure of those taxes benefited the black 
population and the political opponents of the Southern whites. 
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 Tax resistance and opposition to supposedly corrupt Re ublican officials inspired the 
earliest tangible success of the White League, in June of 1874, in Natchitoches Parish. This 
parish, even Republicans admitted, had experienced relative stability and friendly race 
relations during much of Reconstruction. Simmering tensions, however, came to the surface 
in the spring and summer of 1874, sparked by what conservative whites considered an 
exorbitant level of parish taxation and an illegal takeover of the parish government by a clique 
of local white Republicans headed by the tax collector D. H. Boullt. Boullt, so the 
conservatives alleged, had used his influence to fraudulently enrich himself and his cronies at 
the tax-payers’ expense in schemes involving, among others, the building of a bridge, the 
commissioning of a map book for the parish, the remuneration of police jurors, and an 
immigration bureau. In the summer and fall Boullt found himself the target of various civil 
suits resulting from these affairs. Although the district judge for Natchitoches was a 
Republican, John Osborne, who had attempted to hold court in Colfax in the summer of 1873, 
he had proved willing to pass judgment in a number of cases against Boullt and his 
associates.46 
 Two events in early 1874 brought these simmering conflicts to a sudden boil. 
Following the disputed elections of 1872 and the violence in Grant Parish, the political 
leadership of both parties in Natchitoches had avoided a similar conflict by a negotiated 
compromise in which the parish offices and police jury membership was divided between 
Republicans and Democrats. In early 1874, however, K llogg appointed a new, entirely 
Republican police jury to replace the bipartisan body commissioned after the compromise. 
Conservatives alleged that Kellogg had packed the new police jury with political allies of 
Boullt, including a number of illiterate blacks. Around the same time the state legislature 
ordained a judicial reorganization in which Natchitoches was detached from the ninth judicial 
district and combined with Sabine, DeSoto and Red River parishes into the newly formed 
seventeenth district. This allowed Kellogg to appoint a new district judge of his choosing, for 
which position he selected Henry C. Myers, a Republican who had gotten the parish judgeship 
in the 1873 compromise.47  
 Like the new police jurors, Myers was a close political ally of Boullt. Members of the 
tax collector’s family, moreover, held numerous other offices in the parish: Boullt’s eldest son, 
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D. H. Jr., already a deputy sheriff, was appointed to the parish judgeship vacated by Myers; 
William H. Boullt served as both deputy tax collector and deputy parish judge, as well as 
holding the positions of surveyor and parish auctioneer; H. B. Boullt also was deputy sheriff, 
as well as deputy US Marshal; and an unnamed relativ  was supervisor of registration. With 
such a concentration of power in the hands of a small clique, conservative felt cornered. They 
had endured what they considered a barely tolerable degree of mismanagement by 
Republicans since 1871, but, following the dismissal by Myers of indictments against Boullt, 
renewed fraudulent appropriations by the police jury “came so thick and fast that the people 
could not really stand it.”48 
 Republicans, not surprisingly, told a different story. They emphasized that Democratic 
police juries incurred 80% of the debt for which taxes had to be raised; that the new 
Republican police jury in fact slashed by half the parish tax, which the Democratic 
compromise jury of 1873 had raised to two percent; a d they accused Democratic speculators 
in parish bonds of responsibility for “the most onerous taxation.” Myers also emphasized that 
the state supreme court cleared the tax collector of all accusations of corruption. Recent 
Republican convert Edward L. Pierson noted that while e had heard of corruption charges 
against Myers, as a lawyer he had never personally experienced any misconduct.49 
 Such justifications by Republicans made little impression on the white population, 
who determined to rid the parish of Republican rule once and for all. To this end, they 
organized themselves into a ‘taxpayers association,’ which first met on June 13, 1874. 
Michael Perman has argued that such taxpayer associtions represented a final attempt by 
centrist whites to regain control of the party from White League extremist. In Louisiana, 
however, they functioned more as a public, non-partisan smokescreen behind which the White 
League could organize its racist and often violent political campaign. In July of 1874, in fact, 
the Times explicitly opposed organizing the political campaign under the moniker of 
taxpayers’ associations, rejecting the notion that “the white movement must be cloaked or 
covered up. The call for the organization of a white man’s party,” after all, “is what has 
aroused the present enthusiasm of our people.”50 
 Around the same time, in Natchitoches, James Cosgrove founded the People’s 
Vindicator, a newspaper closely associated with both the taxpayer movement and the White 
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League. Its publications further fanned resentment against Republican rule, claiming that the 
white population paid 99% of the taxes, while reaping none of the benefits. The Vindicator 
played a pivotal role in mobilizing the white population to attend a mass meeting on June 27, 
to urge the resignation of the police jurors appointed earlier that year by Kellogg. The 
Republican police jurors complied, but the conservatives were not yet satisfied. They insisted 
that Kellogg appoint replacements of their choosing to fill the police jury. A month later they 
called another mass meeting to demand the resignation of Myers, Boullt, and other 
Republican officials.51 
 In the weeks leading up to this meeting, pressure was put on the Republican officials 
to resign, including threats of violence if they did not comply. To show the Republicans they 
meant business, the white conservatives claimed C. C. Nash, of Colfax notoriety, was at hand 
with 16 men “to do the murders and go to Texas.” Myers and Boullt Jr. took such threats 
seriously and fled the parish prior to the ‘mass meeting,’ in fact an invasion of the town by 
hundreds of armed whites, from both Natchitoches and many surrounding parishes. District 
Attorney J. J. Bossier and Boullt Sr. did not dare resist the overwhelming show of force and 
resigned the same day. The Vindicator jubilantly proclaimed that the “power of the Radical 
party is completely broken here, not one of the would dare attempt to organize a club of 
negroes, for he is known to be a corrupt man even by them, and his influence has passed away 
with his power.”52 
 Governor Kellogg - perhaps grateful that the conflict had not escalated into violence as 
in Colfax - offered a far from forceful response to the ousting of the Republican officials in 
Natchitoches parish. He implicitly recognized the resignations, by appointing others to fill the 
resulting vacancies, including Boss Burke as tax colle tor and Pierson, a recent convert to the 
Republican Party, as the new parish judge. Conservative whites did not lightly forgive Pierson 
his ‘betrayal’ and he quickly came to bear the brunt of their ire. He testified before 
congressional investigators that the white population ostracized him socially and that 
Democratic leaders informed him his life was in danger if he attempted to enter upon the 
duties of his new office. Pierson did not attempt to call their bluff and declined to act as judge. 
Colonel Levy, a leader in the Democratic Party and Pierson’s brother-in-law, urged him to 
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leave the Republican Party, warning him that he might “at any time […] be shot or have a 
knife run in your back” and that he could not begin to protect him, despite being family.53 
 As no violence was involved, federal authorities did not take formal notice of the 
events in Natchitoches. The leaders of the Natchitoes uprising could thus defend the 
legitimacy of their actions, while asserting their continued loyalty to the federal government, 
which, they argued, had no right to intervene with citizens merely exercising their right to 
self-government. Only when troops were sent to northern Louisiana in response to the 
Coushatta massacre some months later did the disturbed condition in Natchitoches come to 
the attention of federal authorities. Deputy Marshal J. B. Stockton reported a rumor that a 
Democratic meeting had selected twelve Republicans to be assassinated as soon as the cavalry 
would leave, including Boullt and his sons, District Attorney Breda, the black Republican 
leader Raford Blunt, and Pierson. The permanent mili ary post he recommended was never 
established, however, and a year later Vindicator editor Cosgrove murdered Pierson. 
Although ostensibly a personal feud fuelled by the South’s culture of honor, their clash, as 
Adam Fairclough has argued, was, in fact, “first and foremost a political conflict.”54 
 The ‘bulldozing’ of Natchitoches Parish – as such removal of Republican officers 
through intimidation came to be called - served as a further inspiration and rallying call for 
conservative whites throughout the region. Publications associated with the White League 
praised Natchitoches whites, both for their success in ‘redeeming’ the parish and their 
forbearance in not resorting to armed conflict. The Caucasian asserted that under similar 
circumstances in Rapides, the Democrats there would have “quietly hung up the scalawags 
and carpetbaggers and ring masters engaged in it to a lamp post as we would other highway 
men.” At the same time reports of the events in neighboring parishes became conflated with 
fears of black uprisings and rumors of arms being shipped by Kellogg to northwest Louisiana 
to arm the freedpeople for the purpose of “the indiscriminate murder of our people.”55 Such 
inflammatory language and deep seated fears of a rebellious black population proved to be a 
toxic mix, ensuring that the next attempt to rid a north-Louisiana parish of its Republican 
officials would end far more violently than the bloodless coup in Natchitoches. 
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 Red River Parish, like Grant, had been carved out of the surrounding parishes during 
Warmoth’s governorship and gerrymandered to ensure Republican control. Control of the 
parish rested with a small clique of mostly Northern born white Republicans, led by former 
Union soldier and Freedmen’s Bureau agent Marshall H rvey Twitchell. Following the rout 
of the Republican officeholders in Natchitoches, the White League turned its attention to this 
other Republican stronghold of northwest Louisiana. Influential whites of Red River had 
joined the mob in Natchitoches. One of them, Ben Wolfson, told Twitchell that militant 
whites had warned them that “if they did not go to w rk and clean out that radical stronghold 
of North Louisiana in Coushatta they would go and do it for them.”56 
 Ted Tunnell has painstakingly detailed the escalation of tensions in the parish in the 
course of the following month. Twitchell himself spent most of his time in New Orleans, but 
his associates, including the parish sheriff Frank Edgerton and the tax collector and Marshal’s 
brother, Homer Twitchell, felt increasingly threatened. Meanwhile, rumors began to circulate 
among the white population of an impending black insurrection, fuelled by a report of armed 
blacks gathering at Homer Twitchell’s house, under Edgerton’s command, and one of them 
firing at one of the many parties of mounted white sentries scouring the area in the night of 
Thursday, August 27. The next day, armed White Leagu rs arrested Twitchell, Edgerton and 
five other leading white Republicans, most of whom also held local offices. In the course of 
the following weekend, the White League pressured six of them into resigning their offices 
and pledging to leave the parish, never to return, while the seventh cooperated with the White 
League leadership and was released. On Sunday, August 30, 1874 these six men set off from 
Coushatta together with an armed escort of about twenty-five White Leaguers. Soon after they 
crossed the parish line into Caddo, they were overtak n by a second armed and mounted party, 
about twice the size who murdered all six of the Red iver Republicans in cold blood.57 
 The massacre at Coushatta was merely the most extreme and visible manifestation of 
the increasing lawlessness and violence raging through ut the Red River Valley as the White 
League wrested control from Republican officials in parish after parish. In June, a petition 
from a parish ‘taxpayer association’ in Caddo, signed by some 175 white citizens, pressured 
the police jury there into rescinding a contract it had made for the construction of a new parish 
jail, despite the poor state of the existing lockup. Then in August, in Shreveport, a similar 
‘tax-payer meeting’ induced Republican city officials to dismiss the paid police force. In its 
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stead, a ‘volunteer force,’ composed of dozens of White Leaguers, kept the peace in the 
largest town of the region, and probably the surrounding countryside as well. It also insisted 
that a citizens committee review the accounts of the Caddo police jury, while the city passed 
an ordinance prohibiting the issue of new municipal indebtedness, except for “certificates 
issued by the taxpayer association.” Although the ost nsible reason for this move was a lack 
of funding necessary to maintain a paid police force, the tax-payer meeting urged all white 
property holders to contribute a voluntary tax of one percent of their property value. Moreover, 
following the 1874 elections a new Democratic city board immediately reinstated a paid 
police force, with comparable salaries to the one dismissed a few months earlier. Whites were 
willing to pay for the enforcement of law and order, just not for enforcement controlled by 
Republicans.58 Although Republican officials in Caddo and Shreveport nominally retained 
their offices, the conservative white leadership controlled both the financial management and 
the enforcement of law and order. 
 The White League offensive also disrupted the operations of the district court in 
DeSoto, which, under Levissee, had operated reasonably effectively as a biracial institution 
for two years. Levissee’s personal and political enemies in Shreveport ensured he was 
counted out when he stood for reelection in 1872, counting in R. J. Looney in his stead. 
Although nominally a Republican, Looney attracted far less criticism from Democrats than 
Levissee had done. John C. Moncure, a prominent Democratic politician, admitted of the 
district attorney elected on the same ticket as Looney, that he was in fact a conservative, 
although “not a party man.” Levissee himself considere  his successor a likable personality, 
but a failure as judge due to his laziness and lack of ourage.59  
 Looney held court for just one term before the legislature removed DeSoto to the 
newly formed 17th judicial district under Judge Myers from Natchitoches, who never held 
court in DeSoto, however, as a result of the bulldozing of the Natchitoches Republicans. No 
district court whatever was held, in fact, for two years, until C. Chaplin, a conservative lawyer 
from Natchitoches gained the office as part of the Wheeler compromise. The lack of a district 
court did not overly bother the young Mansfield lawyer E. W. Sutherlin, who saw no 
connection between the breakdown of the court system and the violence and disorder caused 
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by the White League. Sutherlin, like the white population of DeSoto generally, were happy to 
be rid of the only outside force interfering with white control of the parish. As the 
Republicans conceded control over local government to whites, either as a result of outright 
violence or credible threats against the political leadership, blacks and the few remaining 
white Republicans in the region became increasingly insecure. The widespread violence and 
the forcible ouster of local Republican officials throughout the state belied Kellogg’s claim to 
the US attorney general that despite the absence of f deral troops, he had successfully 
“enforced and executed the laws, and maintained order […] in all the remote border parishes 
of the state.”60 
 Having learnt from the mistakes of the Ku Klux Klan, the White League pursued a 
strategy less likely to provoke federal interventio. The Klan’s secrecy and theatrical displays 
of wanton violence had shocked a Northern public still bi ter over the Civil War. The White 
League, often under the label of White Man’s Party or Tax-Payers Association, presented 
itself as a legitimate political organization, aimed at defending local autonomy, good 
governance and fiscal discipline. They preferred intimidation and economic pressure to 
outright violence and specifically targeted a small number of political leaders for their 
campaigns. In those instances when the White League did resort to violence, they usually 
targeted leaders of the Republican Party or the black community and went to great lengths to 
publicly justify their actions. In Caddo parish, for instance, they murdered a Spaniard named 
Manuel Muñes, a Republican recently moved there from New Orleans. They claimed Grant 
had sent him to Caddo Parish for the explicit purpose f arming the black population to 
prepare them to “make war on the whites.” Although Kellogg offered a thousand dollar 
reward for the capture of his murderers, there is no record of their ever being apprehended. 
Instead, the Times published a series of article applauding their actions on both political 
grounds and as a justified act of self-defense against the Spaniard, who supposedly fired at 
them first.61  
 In Northwestern Louisiana an atmosphere existed by the late summer and early fall of 
1874 in which whites could easily practice private violence against blacks and white 
Republicans with little fear of reprisals – in fact often increasing their stature in the 
community - while denying an immediate political motive to their actions. The White League 
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was thus both more dangerous and more effective than e Klan, while appearing less 
threatening to a Northern populace and federal governm nt increasingly weary of Southern 
entanglements. Federal authorities, however, would make one last attempt to salvage what 
remained of Reconstruction, before effectively surrendering to the White League strategy. 
 
The Government’s Last Stand 
The massacre of six white Republican officials from Coushatta was a clear break with the 
White League’s predominantly low-key strategy, and it immediately provoked a relatively 
vigorous response from federal authorities. Days before the murders, Kellogg alerted the 
attorney general in Washington that conservatives in Louisiana had reverted to terrorism in 
their attempt to reclaim political power in the state. McEnery, he warned, had toured the states 
on the Texas and Arkansas border, telling his audiences that the federal authorities had 
refused a requisition for troops and abandoned the Republican state regime to its fate. 
Although he was adding hundreds of handpicked whites to his militia force, he bluntly 
conceded that his forces remained “of course inadequat  to suppress or prevent domestic 
violence in the distant border parishes of the state.” If the black majority attempted to 
organize in its own defense, even when so authorized by state militia laws, “the cry of 
‘negroes arming’ and ‘war of the races’ is raised an  ‘negro riot’ is telegraphed north, with 
the usual result of ten, twenty, fifty negroes killed and perhaps one white man wounded.”62 
 In his letter, Kellogg also complained of the absence of troops in the state since the 
withdrawal of the 19th infantry months before. Indeed, as Emory reported to his superiors a 
few days after the Coushatta massacre, he had only two companies stationed in the entire state, 
one at Colfax and the other at Baton Rouge, with a det chment posted at Jackson Barracks 
outside New Orleans. Following the Coushatta massacre, Kellogg renewed his plea for troops, 
joined by Packard and a few days later Beckwith, who offered specific recommendations on 
the disposition of troops, including – in addition to the company already stationed at Colfax - 
two companies at Shreveport and two at Alexandria, as well as another seven companies to be 
stationed in parishes just to the south and east of those bordering on the Red River. Within a 
week of Beckwith’s request, Emory ordered troops to all but one of the points designated, 
albeit in smaller numbers than requested. A company originally designated for Catahoula 
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parish, moreover, was soon redirected to Coushatta. Thus by the end of September five 
companies of infantry were stationed in or en route to the Red River region.63  
 Although the increase in troops restrained the worst f the White League aggression, 
events in New Orleans soon drew the attention of both state and federal authorities away from 
northwestern Louisiana. On September 14, 1874, the W ite League violence which had 
plagued the more remote areas of the state erupted in its political center. A small army of 
well-armed, trained, and organized White Leaguers from throughout the state decisively 
defeated the state militia and Metropolitan police forces in pitched battle. Kellogg had 
abandoned the state house even before the violence rupted, surrendering control of the 
capitol to an armed coup. In the same way that the Colfax massacre and subsequent White 
League uprisings in Natchitoches, Shreveport and elsewhere had proven the inability of the 
state government to project authority in rural Louisiana, the Battle of Liberty Place, as the 
September 14 uprising became known, showed that Kellogg could not even maintain the 
semblance of a state government in his own capital w hout federal support.64 Only a forceful 
proclamation by President Grant, backed by federal troops, allowed Kellogg to return to at 
least nominal power within a week of the coup.  
 The coup in New Orleans had an immediate effect on he parishes in northwestern 
Louisiana. Conservatives claiming to have been elect d on the McEnery ticket in 1872 swiftly 
took control of local offices in numerous parishes. A  late as mid-October, General Emory 
received requests from Kellogg to have troops reinstate the Republican officeholders in, 
among others, Rapides, Bossier, Red River, DeSoto and C ddo parishes. In Colfax, the whites 
organized a mass meeting to demand the Republican parish officials to resign and openly 
threatened to fight federal troops should they interfer . The post commander, Arthur W. Allyn, 
took these threats seriously. He informed D. J. Compt n, chairman of a ‘citizens meeting’ that 
had resolved to reinstate the McEnery officials, of President Grant’s order for all citizens to 
retire peaceably and for the military to “under no circumstances [...] recognize the McEnery 
government.” Although Compton reassured him that the w ites had no intention of violently 
taking the parish offices or directly challenging the military, Allyn considered the situation so 
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volatile that he prepared for the possibility of fortifying and entrenching his position, fearing 
his “little force might prove a tempting morsel to try and swallow, in order to bring on martial 
law, an end which the people seem to desire.”65  
 Indeed, by this time the White Leaguers openly pursued a strategy aimed at forcing the 
federal government’s hand. As the Vindicator put it, “we are determined upon one of two 
things. That Louisiana must be governed by white ciizens, or that in sixty days she will be 
blotted from the map of free States, and a military force sufficient to conquer us shall be 
stationed in every neighborhood.” The conservative whites gambled that the northern 
electorate, and hence the federal government, would not be willing to expend the resourced 
needed to call their bluff. Emory’s recommendation t  President Grant that he pardon all 
those involved in the New Orleans street battle no doubt reinforced the White Leaguers’ 
conviction that the federal government lacked the stomach for a prolonged fight. Emory 
conceded that  
the outburst embraced nearly every white man in the community, but the promptness 
with which they yielded to the mandates of your proclamation, when they were made 
to know that it applied to them, even when laboring under the most maddening 
impulses, prompts me to make this request.66  
So long as conservative whites did not directly challenge federal authority, so it seemed, they 
hardly needed to fear serious repercussions from the army against even the most blatant and 
aggressive challenges to Governor Kellogg, let alone l cal Republican officials in distant rural 
parishes.  
 Once the situation in New Orleans had stabilized, f eral authorities could once again 
turn their attention to northern Louisiana, from where reports of lawlessness, violence, and 
intimidation against blacks and white Republican officials continued to come in. The 
authority of federal troops, as had been the case in the wake of the Colfax massacre, remained 
limited to quelling violent uprisings and assisting deputy US marshals in executing federal 
processes. Such limitations meant, for instance, that t e White League acting as volunteer 
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police force of Shreveport needed to fear no interfer nce from the federal troops stationed just 
outside the city.67 
 Despite the Vindicator’s appeal to provoke martial law, the White League in fact 
proved reluctant to engage in large scale violence or create serious disorder in the immediate 
vicinity of federal troops. As a result, the troops primary purpose would be to serve as posses 
comitati to federal marshals arresting suspects in he Coushatta murders. Both Beckwith and 
Packard realized that the infantry companies would be next to useless for such a task, and at 
their insistence Attorney General George Henry Williams reluctantly requested the Secretary 
of War to provide the marshal with mounted troops. In early October, Emory ordered two 
companies of the seventh cavalry, commanded by Major Lewis Merrill to Shreveport, with 
explicit orders to “execute criminal process in theR d River parishes or those adjacent at any 
point north or west of Natchitoches.”68  
 Merrill had already acquired a reputation for aggressively combating the Klan in 
South Carolina in 1871. J. Michael Martinez has argued that he and his men “arguably did 
more than any other person or entity to expose the identity of the Invisible Empire as a group 
of hooded, brutish, homegrown terrorists.” Merrill exhibited the same energy and employed 
the same, at times unconventional, methods against the White League. As a result, he 
succeeded, in the short term, in making a number of a rests and restoring a semblance of law 
and order to the region. In the long run, however, his aggressive strategy and at times self-
righteous attitude backfired and his mission failed in the all-important area of public 
perception.69 From the start, moreover, Merrill’s troops suffered from the usual lack of 
resources that plagued federal enforcement throughout Reconstruction. Following the 
September 14 coup, Emory could hardly afford to leave New Orleans unprotected and, to his 
chagrin, two additional companies that he had intended to dispatch north were ordered to 
Alabama by his superiors. Emory was also chronically short of mules and other means of 
transportation and the cavalry that did arrive in Shreveport first needed to have its horses shod, 
before they could be of any service.70 
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 Beyond these practical impediments, Merrill faced a more fundamental obstacle to his 
mission, when he discovered that civil law in northe n Louisiana had broken down to the 
point where victims hardly dared to swear out affidvits against the perpetrators White 
League atrocities, for fear of reprisals once the troops had again left the region. Merrill 
concluded that in Shreveport a small group of “reckl ss, passionate men of broken fortune,” 
led by Albert H. Leonard of Shreveport, enflamed the passions of the vast majority of whites 
in the hope of gaining political power. The community, he concluded, was little more than “an 
armed mob, governed by a few reckless men” where “for months no such thing as the 
existence of law, or of any authority, save individual will, has been recognized.” He believed 
that if he could somehow neutralize the most radical le ders, “which would give time for 
thought and for the influence of calmer minds, there was every prospect the leaders would fail 
of their purpose to precipitate violence.”71 
 Merrill found the pretext for implementing such a strategy in the publication in 
Leonard’s newspaper of an agreement by almost all le ding merchants of the town not to 
employ any blacks who would vote the Republican ticket at the upcoming election, nor to 
provide supplies to planters who employ them, and to ostracize any whites who did not abide 
by the requirements of this pledge. This boycott pledge clearly violated the Enforcement Acts 
and Merrill promptly instituted legal proceedings. Former district judge Levissee, now as US 
commissioner, supported Merrill’s strategy, but warned him that no one would be willing to 
risk swearing out an affidavit as it “would be certain death to any native here to initiate 
proceedings.” Under the circumstances, Merrill concluded, there was nothing else for it but 
for him to swear out the necessary affidavits himself. As his intention was to reduce tensions, 
Merrill took especial care not to further incite the white population. Together with Levissee he 
selected five of the leading figures for whom to have warrants issued as an example. They 
were not arrested, but merely requested to appear bfore the commissioner at their own 
convenience. Within a week, Merrill felt, his actions had begun to pay off and that it had been 
the only means of avoiding a “bloody fight” on the day of elections.72 
 Despite Merrill’s efforts not to further excite the situation, the white League press, 
particularly Leonard’s Times, could, in Merrill’s words, “be seen like bees, working to use 
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this act as a means of fomenting disorder.” Leonard claimed that Merrill intended to arrest all 
those who had signed the pledge, some 75 men, and his editorial threatened to have within a 
month a force of three hundred “white draymen and warehousemen, who will stand by us […] 
if the negroes continue their war on us.” The Times warned its readers that Merrill’s actions 
would result in the black population becoming “insulting, arrogant and intolerable, led by 
their chiefs, they will literally ride rough shod over the community and this section of the 
state will be carried by them in the election.” It went on to urge anyone arrested to refuse 
posting bond, as doing so would justify the proceedings. When the court issued warrants for 
only five men out of the ninety against whom Merrill had sworn affidavits, Leonard – who 
also served the suspects legal counsel – used Merrill’s moderation against him. He argued that 
the court could not pick and choose whom to arrest as such a policy violated the principle of 
impartial justice.73 
 Meanwhile, Leonard and others White League leaders worked hard to collect 
additional signatures to the boycott pledge that had set the entire matter off, knowing that 
Merrill, who had thought it best to arrest only a hndful of the original signees, certainly 
would hesitate to prosecute many hundreds. The caseagainst the five men arrested thus 
appeared even more arbitrary, while Leonard highlighted the inability of the federal 
authorities to effectively prosecute infringements of federal law, even when these were 
publicly perpetrated. When Merrill asked Leonard whether he intended to defy the federal 
government, Leonard simply asserted to be as loyal as the major himself and claimed that if 
the pledge were a “defiance of anything it is of radic l rascality and military lawlessness.”74  
 These press reports reached New Orleans and Washington DC, before Merrill’s own 
account of the events and Emory immediately telegraphed his subordinate to warn him that 
these reports “are exciting much discussion and comment, and are mischievous in their effect, 
and that the circumstances that would justify him in departing from an established rule of 
service and appearing personally as a prosecutor must be peculiar.” By that time Merrill had 
mailed his initial report, cited above, but it had not yet arrived in New Orleans. So on October 
26, a day after his initial report was written, he sent a lengthy telegram to Emory, in which he 
justified his actions as “the only course which promised to prevent future trouble” and 
asserted that “the effect has been in the highest dgree valuable in restoring respect for the 
law, and promises to prevent bloodshed.” He noted that no one else could be found to swear 
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out affidavits, and claimed any other course would have shown him “grossly lacking in 
foresight, prudence, and ability to cope with difficult circumstances.” In case Emory did not 
approve his actions, Merrill noted, he would be more than happy to be “relieved of a great 
responsibility which I did not seek, but shall not shirk.” The following day he sent an 
additional report by mail, emphasizing further the utter lawlessness prevailing in the Red 
River region on his arrival, and the soothing effect of his actions on the sentiments in 
Shreveport At a meeting of white citizens, a few days fter the initial hearing against the five 
men charged,  
instead of the usual cheers which have heretofore followed threats of resistance to law, 
and violence in certain events, these were received in silence, and were instantly 
followed by other speeches counseling quiet and good order, and respect for the law, 
and these were heartily cheered.75 
Merrill’s reports made their way up the chain of command and in early December the 
adjutant-general of the army briefly informed him that the secretary of war considered his 
actions justified by the circumstances.  
By then, however, other events within Merrill’s command had eclipsed his actions in 
Shreveport and further undermined the authority andlegitimacy of federal enforcement in 
northern Louisiana. While Merrill attempted to restore law and order in Shreveport, 
detachments from his command accompanied US marshals to various localities in northern 
Louisiana in an attempt to arrest persons connected with the Coushatta massacre. One such 
detachment, commanded by Lieutenant Donald McIntosh, accompanied Deputy Marshal 
Stockton to Coushatta and Natchitoches and arrested 25 men in the course of a month long 
campaign. Although McIntosh complained that Stockton, through a “want of energy” did not 
succeed in capturing as many of the White League leaders as might have been possible, the 
arrests still provided plenty of fodder for the White League’s publicity campaign.76 
 The press loudly proclaimed, first of all, that the arrests had no legal basis. Stockton 
and the troops assisting him had put “an end to law” by usurping the prerogatives of the local 
and state authorities and, to make matters worse, by arresting men without legal warrant. The 
Caucasian went so far as to publish a story, almost certainly fabricated, of an officer, on being 
asked his warrant for the arrest of Vindicator editor Cosgrove, answering by “slapping his 
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pistol “and claiming “that that was his warrant!” The Times encouraged its readers, in 
response to the arrests, to “resort to their own strong arms to protect themselves and their 
families from outrage.” Not only were the arrests illegitimate, but, according to the white 
press, federal officers treated their prisoner with unnecessary brutality. McIntosh vehemently 
denied such charges, noting that Cosgrove was treated by Stockton and himself with the 
utmost forbearance, despite his having spit in the marshal’s face. Stockton, meanwhile, 
advised Packard to have a company of infantry stationed in the area over the winter, as “there 
is more and greater disloyalty here openly avowed than […] In any other part of the US and 
the moment we leave […] a large number will be killed, because these White Leaguers say 
the leading Republicans have been at the bottom of these arrests.”77  
 Around the same time, just outside of the Red River region, another of Merrill’s 
Lieutenants, B.H. Hodgson, acting with his squad as po se comitatus for Deputy Marshal 
Edgar Selye, became the center of an incident even more damaging to the reputation of the 
federal forces. The civil authorities of Lincoln Parish accused Hodgson and Selye of illegally 
cutting a telegraph wire and the Lincoln Parish sheriff, with a posse of two hundred men, rode 
into Monroe in neighboring Ouachita Parish to arrest them, ostensibly for contempt of court 
in refusing to obey a writ of habeas corpus issued by the district judge. The case immediately 
became a cause célèbre throughout the region. The press not only accused Hodgson and Selye 
of the same abuses they had McIntosh and Stockton, but their arrest by local authorities 
offered the perfect pretext to vociferously assert the authority of local authorities and courts 
over federal officers.78 
 Making matters considerably worse, Merrill had to admit to his superiors George A. 
Head, the local infantry commander to whom Hodgson had been temporarily attached, 
seriously mismanaged the case. Instead of ensuring that it was removed to a federal 
jurisdiction, they allowed Hodgson to be convicted and sentenced to time served and a small 
fine by a local magistrate. As a result, Selye’s appointment as deputy marshal was revoked by 
Packard. Moreover, since Selye and Hodgson had formally been tried by the civil courts, the 
military was barred from further investigation, making it impossible to determine the facts of 
the case beyond what the White League claimed and, more importantly, 
                                                 
77 Ibid.; AC, 74-10-31; ST, 74-10-22, 74-10-24; ‘Extract from October 22, 1874, Natchitoches, Stockton to 
Packard,’ enclosed in ‘November 1, 1874, New Orleans, Packard to AG,’ NARA, RG 60, M940, reel 2, frame 
267. 
78 CSS, 43-2, Sen. Ex. 17, 32-34;The reaction to these events by the White League press is exemplified by ST, 
74-11-08. 
6. Bulldozing the ‘Usurpers’ 
 232  
 
what has been a judicial outrage upon two Government officers, concocted and carried 
out by the White League leaders here, aided by the S ate judge as their pliant tool, 
must fail of proper punishment, and instead of being made a conspicuous warning to 
corrupt judges not to lend their offices to illegal interference with and embarrassment 
of United States officers in the discharge of their duties, becomes an incentive and 
temptation to attempt the same thing whenever a posse goes out.79 
 As he was wrapping up the Hodgson affair, Merrill confronted yet another public 
outbreak of violence, this time in DeSoto Parish. A white man named Fisher, pretending to be 
an officer of the law, nailed up the corn crib of black man named Peter Alston, claiming to do 
so under legal attachment. Alston fled to Shreveport to seek help from Merrill, but his brother, 
John Alston, a leader among the black population and hated for it by the whites, remained and 
confronted Fisher and his gang when they returned to take away his brother’s corn. The 
whites beat Alston, took him prisoner, and, once thy thought they were out of sight, 
murdered him in cold blood, emptying their guns into his prone body. A few black bystanders, 
however, had followed the party by a roundabout roue and witnessed the murder, which set 
off a rampage of white violence throughout the parish, forcing numerous blacks to flee to the 
woods and swamps. The white press reported nothing more than that Fisher had shot and 
killed Alston in the legitimate exercise of his duty on Alston’s forcibly resisting arrest, a 
conclusion upheld by a local coroner’s jury.80 
 Merrill ordered a cavalry company under Lieutenant J. M. Bell to accompany Deputy 
Marshal O’Neal to make arrests in the case. The first night, they succeeded in making three 
arrests, but when they attempted to arrest Fisher and other ringleaders over the following days, 
they had all fled their homes and could not be found. Bell expressed shock at finding in 
DeSoto “a perfect condition of lawlessness, and the negroes [...] in a continual state of terror, 
and hopeless as to their prospect of obtaining justice from the parish court.” The whites 
universally belonged to the White League “and are bitter in their enmity to the blacks.” 
Unless the federal government took prompt and severe action to punish the brutal murder of 
Alston, “other crimes still more atrocious will unquestionably follow.” Merrill agreed, 
reporting that this incident merely represented an “episode in the general drift of events, and 
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indicated the not distant point toward which they are shaping themselves.” Eventually, he 
prophesied, such outrages could only result in the blacks turning on their persecutors, igniting 
a race war that might well conflagrate the nation.81 
 The continual disturbances and difficulties encountered by Merrill and the troops 
under his command, prompted him to request reinforcements from Emory. Although Emory 
promised to send him more troops as soon as some caavailable, he also received reports 
from other informants, “some claiming to be Republicans, [who] represent a different state of 
things and aver that any respectable deputy US marshal can travel through that country and 
serve writs without opposition or molestation.” He d cided to send a senior officer, Colonel H. 
A. Morrow, to the Red River area to provide an independent report and confirm whether 
reinforcements were indeed called for, as well as “the necessity of employing so large a 
number of troops as has been done as posse comitatus to US marshals in serving civil 
process.”82 
 Morrow, who was inclined to gather information mostly from what he called 
‘respectable’ and ‘prominent’ citizens, offered little support for Merrill’s robust policies. 
Although he agreed with Merrill that nearly the entire white population felt “violence to any 
extent will be justifiable, and should be resorted o, to secure the people a change of local 
administrators” and that the opposition to Kellogg’s regime would “manifest itself in open 
violence whenever and wherever it asserts itself” he also concluded that “there is not the 
slightest disposition to oppose the General Governmnt” and that an arrangement reached 
between the US civil authorities and prominent citizens ensured that there would be no more 
need for troops in assisting federal marshals. Nor did Emory need to fear “serious disturbance 
of any kind – at least for the present.”83 
 Morrow’s final report, sent out just before Christmas, essentially confirmed these 
findings. The immediate threat of mass violence hadabated, as law-abiding citizens had 
regained some control over their communities. He did not feel that any increase in troop 
strength was needed and even went so far as to recommend the withdrawal of forces from 
Alexandria, Colfax and Natchitoches. He also believd that few, if any troops would be 
needed in assisting federal marshals and recommended that such assistance only be provided 
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after the marshal had actually tried and failed to make arrests unassisted, so as to prevent 
charges of political interference such as had been l veled against McIntosh, Hodgson, and 
Merrill himself. All this, however, referred only to the necessity of troops for enforcing 
federal law. In order to compel obedience to state authority, “troops will be required […] in 
nearly every section of the State.”  
 Morrow considered the general condition of northwestern Louisiana to be 
unequivocally bad, the state government being unable to “maintain itself in power a single 
hour without the protection of federal troops.” Although he claimed to have spoken with 
prominent citizens of all political persuasions, his report clearly reflected the sentiment of the 
conservative whites, blaming such conditions primarly on the corruption of Republican office 
holder, oppressively high taxes and even concurring in their criticism of undue interference by 
federal troops. Morrow’s reports led Emory to conclude that the army’s exiting mission “to 
keep the peace without the power of removing the causes which disturb it has, I think, been 
carried as far as practicable.” He had earlier reminded Merrill that the state government and 
not federal troops held primary responsibility for “the peace and good order of the 
communities in which they are stationed” but the state authorities, even when kept in formal 
possession of their offices by the military, simply were not up to the task. He bluntly informed 
his superiors that they would have to either greatly expand the military’s mandate or else 
“some other measure be resorted to obtain the desired end.”84 
 
Conclusion 
The White League, through a combination of targeted violence, persistent intimidation, and 
effective ‘marketing,’ challenged both state and feeral authorities for the de facto control of 
rural Louisiana. Nowhere was this challenge more pronounced or more violent than in the 
Red River Valley, which witnessed the Colfax and Coushatta massacres, the first and most 
vehement of the White League publications, and persist nt attempts to overthrow Republican 
government, by intimidation if possible and by force if necessary. The state authorities, as the 
events in Colfax, and later at Liberty Place and Coushatta, amply demonstrated, lacked the 
resources to guarantee even the nominal power of its officers. Although even a small 
contingent of federal troops might restore order within its radius of action, the army, and the 
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political forces controlling it, proved unwilling to call the White League’s bluff to place 
Louisiana under effective martial law. Instead, they increasingly yielded local control to the 
conservative whites, who commanded the necessary resources to effectively project authority 
at the local level. 
 Republicans faced an agonizing dilemma. They could either give in to the mounting 
pressure brought to bear on them by the White Leagu, and thereby relinquish the control 
over local government, or else, they could resist, and run the realistic risk of sacrificing their 
lives. In either case, they increasingly lost legitimacy in the eyes of Northern politicians and 
federal officials, who felt disinclined to support a state government that could not effectively 
project its own authority. Southern whites’ propagand  provided them with a convenient 
excuse to justify their retreat from enforcing the civil and political rights of the black 
population that they had enshrined in federal law just a few years earlier. 
 Morrow ended his final report by prophesying that the organization of the new 
legislature in January 1875 would lead to renewed troubles. In fact, it led to a final 
embarrassment for the federal authorities in Louisiana, this time on the national stage, 
presaging an effective, though informal, withdrawal of federal interference beyond the 
absolute minimum necessary to prevent large scale riots and the collapse of the Republican 
state government. In combination with the results of the 1874 elections, which brought 
Democrats to local power in much of northern Louisiana, this spelled the effective end of 
Reconstruction in the Red River Valley. The combination of targeted violence and 
intimidation, masked behind a narrative of democrati  empowerment and good government 
that achieved this victory, had been honed along the Red River for the previous two years. 
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7. Towards ‘Redemption’ 
Federal Withdrawal and the Collapse of Reconstruction (1874-1877) 
 
On September 28, 1876, Charles Boothby, a Union veteran and Republican activist from 
Maine who had settled in New Orleans after the war, wrote his brother regarding the 
upcoming presidential and congressional elections. The Democrats, should they prove 
victorious, would “then have accomplished through the ballot what they failed to achieve with 
the sword. To be sure, they will not have destroyed the Union, but the 3,000,000 of colored 
people will be in a state of semi-slavery, enough of a condition of servitude to answer to all 
practical purposes.” In the South, he predicted, blacks would no longer vote, despite being 
counted for the distribution of congressional representation, giving Democrats 25 extra seats 
in the House of Representatives. “With the restorati n of the Democratic Party to power all 
the results of the war will be reversed. There willbe no Republican Party in the South.”1 
 Subsequent events, in large measure, proved Boothby right, even if the formal 
institutionalization of segregation and disfranchisement would not be completed for nearly 
two decades.2 By the late 1870s, the vast majority of Americans, and the politicians that 
represented them, preferred to abandon the cause of racial equality in the South in pursuit of 
political stability and national unity. Nevertheless, the election of 1876, and the subsequent 
political compromise that gave Hayes the presidency i  exchange for ‘home rule’ in the South, 
was less of a watershed than many historians have made it out to be. Even in those states, 
including Louisiana, that had not been ‘redeemed’ earli r, the compromise simply 
acknowledged a fait accompli, rather than a sweeping change in federal policy.3 
 For most Louisianans, the results of the 1876 elections and the formal withdrawal of 
federal troops made little practical difference, even if the conservative press celebrated it as a 
major symbolic victory. Effective Republican rule in the Red River Valley, as in most of rural 
Louisiana, had collapsed well before this time, and with it whatever enforcement of racial 
equality that existed. The violence and intimidation of the White League had already critically 
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weakened the local Republican Party organizations along the Red River. Following the 1874 
elections and the subsequent withdrawal of federal p otection, conservative whites soon 
reclaimed practical, if not always nominal, control over local government. For the daily lives 
of blacks (and for the few remaining white Republicans in northwestern Louisiana), the 
outcome of the 1877 compromise made little difference. They had already lost sight of the 
political and economic opportunities that Reconstruction had briefly, and however 
precariously, granted them. 
 
Balancing Terror and Politics 
The rise of the White League largely coincided with, and was intimately related to, the 
campaign for the 1874 midterm elections for local officials, the state legislature, and Congress. 
In order to secure an electoral victory in majority-black Louisiana, conservative whites had to 
pursue a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, they ne ded to ensure that a sufficient 
number of black voters either stayed away from the polls or voted the Democratic ticket in 
order to neutralize the ‘natural’ Republican majority. The economic intimidation and 
bulldozing of the White League served to achieve this purpose. The relatively limited scope of 
terrorism, compared with that of 1868, was intended to mollify Northern public opinion and 
avoid federal intervention. However, this cautious approach implied that a significant number 
of blacks would still vote the Republican ticket. The second prong of the conservatives’ 
strategy, therefore, involved uniting and mobilizing the white electorate to ensure a victory at 
the polls in November. 
 Michael Perman has argued that the rise of the White League in Louisiana, and similar 
organizations in other Southern states, signaled a turn from a ‘competitive’ to an ‘expressive’ 
electoral strategy. Following the unsuccessful attempt by conservative whites to regain 
control by violence in in 1868, both Republicans and the Democrats in the South briefly 
competed for the political center. This resulted a convergence of their platforms, as well as 
intense factionalism and divisions within both parties. In the Republican Party, this resulted in 
the emergence of the Liberal Republican movement, which in the South attempted to woo the 
moderate white electorate at the expense of its predominantly black core constituency. 
Meanwhile, former Whigs dominated the Democratic-Conservative Party. They appealed to 
the same moderate white electorate, while attempting to secure an electoral basis among the 
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freedpeople by ostensibly supporting limited civil and political rights for the black 
population.4 
 This convergence reached its culmination in 1872, when the centrist Republicans, led 
by Warmoth, joined the conservatives to field a Fusioni t ticket. The remaining ‘regular’ 
Republicans, now cleansed of their more centrist elem nts, pursued a more ‘expressive’ 
strategy, aimed at mobilizing their mostly black core constituency. Disappointed with the 
1872 result, but encouraged by Republicans’ national decline following the 1873 financial 
panic and political scandals, an increasing number of conservative whites argued that they 
should pursue a similar strategy aimed at shoring up and mobilizing their own base, rather 
than try to attract support from centrist Republicans. If the entire white electorate could be 
mobilized in support of the Democratic Party, than only a relatively small number of blacks 
would have to be ‘persuaded’ to join them or abstain from voting in order to restore white 
supremacy in the state. Advocates of such a ‘straight-out’ or ‘white line’ strategy gained their 
first victory in the summer of 1873, when conservative whites throughout the state 
overwhelmingly rejected the Unification movement, aimed at forging a “bipartisan and 
interracial” coalition that “wanted to provide a political vehicle for harmonizing the races, 
displacing the existing parties, and reviving the economic prosperity” of New Orleans and 
Louisiana.5 
 Perman argues that by the spring and summer of 1874, the White League and the 
straight-out strategy it represented had thoroughly defeated the Fusionists in their struggle for 
control of the Democratic Party. Events leading up to the Democratic convention in August of 
1874, however, show that internal divisions still threatened to tear the Democratic Party apart. 
Despite these internal divisions, conservatives successfully developed and carried out a 
carefully calibrated strategy during the 1874 elections – which they repeated in 1876 - that 
both mobilized their core constituency and prevented a sufficient number of blacks from 
voting the Republican ticket to ensure a white majority, while at the same time avoiding the 
kind of widespread and public violence that might have provoked renewed federal 
intervention. The federal government, meanwhile, increasingly withdrew its support for 
Republican officials in the Red River Valley, limiting its involvement in Louisiana politics to 
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propping up the state government in New Orleans, which remained largely powerless to 
project its authority beyond the city’s immediate environs. 
 As a result of The White League’s success in northwestern Louisiana, tensions 
developed between conservative political activists n the region and the more moderate 
Democratic political establishment in New Orleans. Energized by the White League’s 
effectiveness, political activists feared that an election campaign dominated by the more 
moderate Democratic Party apparatus in the state capital would dampen the momentum they 
had achieved. As the Shreveport Times editorialized, “the approaching canvass will partake, 
to some extent, of the character of a revolution [...] therefore we should put men in the lead 
who are not afraid of a revolution.” Although the Fusionist legislature had been “one of the 
ablest and most conservative” in recent history, “its vascillations [sic.] lost the cause; its 
timidity betrayed the trusts the people reposed in it.” 6 With the White League’s more radical 
strategy ascendant in northwestern Louisiana, local conservatives had no intention of 
repeating the same mistake. 
 In early June, the Times suggested holding the State Convention in Alexandri, instead 
of in New Orleans. Such a convention, it urged, should “unite democrats, reformers, liberal 
republicans and last-ditchers” - in other words: the entire white population of the state - “in 
one grand army, inspired by a single purpose, a comm n aspiration to redeem the State.” If 
held in New Orleans, its editor, Albert H. Leonard, warned, but few country delegates would 
attend. “Professional politicians,” who dominated the party in New Orleans, “must give way 
to an entirely different class of men, or the whole thing will be a dead failure.” The 
Alexandria Caucasian and Louisiana Democrat quickly endorsed the proposal, citing the 
central location and excellent facilities of their hometown. By early July, Democrat editor 
Biossat formally issued a call for the holding of a convention in Alexandria on August 3. He 
reiterated the Times proposal for “a Convention of the people, independent of all party ties, or 
names, or creeds” outside the state capital. As the Caucasian put it: “We ‘country bumpkins’ 
have a right to have things to suit us once at leasin a mighty long while.”7 
 Other newspapers in northwestern Louisiana applauded the initiative and 
enthusiastically endorsed the call for a convention in Alexandria. The Natchitoches People’s 
Vindicator identified itself as “another of the ‘country bumpkins’ that claim a little of the right 
in connection with our friend the Caucasian.” New Orleans, the editor noted, had hosted state 
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conventions “long enough, an as we have met with naught but defeat under the nominations 
made at her conventions, it is but fair that one trial should be made with a ‘country’ ticket.” 
Among the conservative papers published in northwest Louisiana, only the Bossier Banner 
initially withheld its support. The editor vehemently denied allegations that its lucrative state 
printing contract might influence its decision, but nevertheless refrained from endorsing of the 
Times’ proposal. He argued that “the ends that the Times would have brought about are […] 
proper enough, but the methods it advises […] are reprehensible.” By mid-July, however, 
after a mass meeting of the white population of the parish heartily praised the Times’ efforts 
and resolved that any state convention should be “held at some place to be designated outside 
of New Orleans,” the Banner had little choice but to follow suit.8  
 The Democratic establishment in New Orleans, however, was not about to give in to 
the ‘country bumpkins’ without putting up a fight. On the same day the Democrat published 
its call for a convention in Alexandria, the Democratic State Central Committee in New 
Orleans issued a call for a convention in the capital, also on August 3. The language closely 
echoed that used by the rural newspapers’ call for racial rather than party alignment, urging a 
convention of “all conservative voters, without reference to past political affiliations.” The 
campaign platform proposed by the New Orleans Democrats was also similar to that of the 
White League conservatives, centering on resistance to “the tendency of Louisiana 
Radicalism [...] to establish negro supremacy,” andopposition to “the incubus of excessive 
taxation” supposedly levied by the Republican state nd local Governments.9  With few 
organizational and programmatic differences between th m, the conflict over the location and 
nomenclature of the convention boiled down to a regional power struggle between the city 
and country wings of the conservative party. 
 Neither side, initially, seemed inclined to budge. Robert A. Hunter, a Rapides Parish 
delegate to the Democratic State Central Committee, published a searing rebuke to the 
Democrat’s call for a convention. By their opposition, he complained, the country parishes 
threatened the unity of the conservative campaign, at a time when “we cannot afford to drive 
one vote from us by imprudent denunciations.” Hunter published his letter in the Caucasian, 
of which his son, Robert P. Hunter, was an editor. The paper responded the following week 
with an editorial, arguing that a convention at New Orleans “had not and will not accomplish 
the object that was intended, that of uniting the white people under the Democratic 
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standard.”10 By then it had become increasingly clear that the opposition to a New Orleans 
convention had garnered widespread support throughout t e state. The Vindicator assured its 
readers that Natchitoches Parish would send no delegat s to the state capital. The Times 
registered unanimous support from the north Louisiana press as well as at White League 
meetings throughout the region, and the D mocrat claimed that four out of five country 
parishes would send no delegates to a convention held in New Orleans.11 
 The New Orleans faction had little choice but to concede to the mounting pressure, or 
else risk a political confrontation within their own ranks that threatened to tear the party apart 
and strengthen the Republican regime just as it had gr ually begun to crack under mounting 
White League pressure. On July 29, a group of Rapides citizens “identified in the past with 
the movement of the Democratic Party, and acknowledging still our allegiance to that Party in 
all its national and legitimate issues,” came out is support of the Alexandria convention. Their 
goal, they stated, was to prevent “the further ruleof the State by corrupt and ignorant officials, 
and to adopt such measures, and to take such steps,regardless of old party names and party 
lines, as may be deemed necessary to place the government of Louisiana in the hands of her 
intelligent and honest citizens.”12  
 A few days later, the Committee of Seventy, a body f prominent New Orleans 
conservatives, urged the State Central Committee to withdraw its call for a New Orleans 
convention and instead suggested a convention on August 24, at the compromise location of 
Baton Rouge, about equidistant from New Orleans and Alexandria. The Times immediately 
ramped up the pressure on the State Central Committee, noting that seventeen country 
newspapers had already endorsed the Alexandria convention, and urging parish delegates to 
ignore the New Orleans convention if the compromise were rejected. A day later, when news 
had reached Shreveport that the Baton Rouge convention had been accepted, the Times 
changed its tone. White League leader and Times editor Albert H. Leonard reassured his 
readers that the conflict had nothing to do with a “spirit of hostility to the principles of the 
democratic party, with no petty country jealousy of the city, and with no schemes of our own 
to further.” The White League accepted “most of the principles of the democratic party, and 
[...] when these principles are militant [my emphasis] we shall support them to the best of our 
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ability.” The other country papers similarly accepted the Baton Rouge compromise, ensuring 
conservative unity at the upcoming election.13 
 Party unity, however, did not signify universal agreement, and the White League 
organizers and newspaper editors along the Red River continued to exert pressure to ensure 
that the Baton Rouge convention would represent their views. A conservative mass meeting in 
Rapides only agreed to send a delegation to Baton Rouge after the convention dropped the 
Democratic label in favor of the White Man’s Party. “Had the call been made by the 
Democratic Central Committee alone,” the Caucasians speculated, “it is doubtful whether this 
meeting would have sent delegates, as anxious as it was o secure peace and harmony.” When 
Democrats in New Orleans prevented “liberals, the White Leaguers and independents - all 
opposed to carpet-bag and negro rule” from participating in the election for convention 
delegates, Leonard immediately voiced his protest, warning that “to attempt to wrap the great 
uprising of the people in the garments of Louisiana democracy, would be as vain as to attempt 
to robe a giant in in the swaddling clothes of an infant.”14 In the end, the White Leaguers from 
the country parishes dominated the convention, as indicated by the nomination of one of their 
own, Shreveport lawyer J. C. Moncure, for state treasurer, the only statewide office at issue in 
the election. A subsequent White League meeting in Shreveport, organized and headed by 
Leonard, quickly ratified the convention proceedings without much fanfare and went on to 
organize for the upcoming registration.15 
 
An Electoral Farce 
All those wishing to vote in November 1874 had to renew their voter registration, and 
conservative whites campaigned vigorously to ensure a full registration among their 
supporters. Without “the solid, compact voting of every white man,” the Democrat warned, 
“we can’t win. Beaten again by the inexcusable neglect of some few to do what is right and is 
expected of them, we may as well hang our harp on the willows, and search for the place 
where the wood[b]ine twineth.” Invoking the discourse of honor, Leonard’s Times noted that 
those who fail to register “may have physical courage to resent an insult, but nevertheless he 
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is but half a man.”16 This proved successful in every parish, except for Natchitoches, Rapides, 
and Red River parishes, where a significant military presence during registration - in response 
to the Coushatta massacre - encouraged blacks to register, while forcing many whites to go 
into hiding to avoid arrest.17 
 Indeed, conservatives loudly and repeatedly insisted that the arrests in the fall of 1874 
served no other than political purposes. Vindicator editor James Cosgrove’s arrest, in 
particular, was interpreted as an attempt to muzzle the freedom of the press. More generally, 
conservatives claimed, Republicans used the arrests, ju  a few days prior to the election, to 
promote their partisan objectives. They cited various incidents as evidence, such as Deputy 
Marshal J. B. Stockton’s inspection of registration books in Natchitoches and his speech to a 
Republican meeting there. The authorities, conservatives claimed, hoped to force those most 
strongly opposed to Governor William Pitt Kellogg to flee to the woods from fear of arrest, 
thus breaking up the Democratic leadership just prior to the election. US marshal Stephen B. 
Packard, who had to answer for the actions of his deputies, vehemently denied any such 
political motivations, noting that he explicitly ordered his deputies not to allow arrests to 
interfere with the rights of those arrested and to “see that they had an opportunity to vote.”18 
 Parishes without a military presence saw a relative increase in white registration 
relative to 1872. In Bienville and Winn, whites increased their registration advantage by 134 
and 468 respectively. In DeSoto a 402 black majority was reduced to just 12, and in Grant a 
114 black majority flipped to a white majority of 12. With White League pressure ensuring 
that whites would vote the Democratic ticket nearly unanimously, while at least some blacks 
could either be kept from the polls or persuaded to vote the Democratic ticket, a conservative 
victory was all but assured in these four parishes. In Bossier, Caddo, Natchitoches, Rapides, 
and Red River parishes, however, blacks still enjoyed a registration advantage of between 563 
and 1226 voters. In order to win these parishes, whites would either have to keep blacks away 
from the polls en masse, or otherwise else convince or force them to vote the Democratic 
ticket. 
 Leonard staunchly opposed the courting of black votes by conservative candidates 
through concessions or promises of racial equality.  
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Every man nominated should be required to make no ca vass with the negroes. The 
emphatic position taken in this and surrounding parishes by the whites, has set the 
negroes to scratching their wool, and the very effects we anticipated are being 
produced. But if any candidate of the white people, in his greed of office, shall go to 
hob-nobbing with these people, all the effects, or at least very much of the effects of 
the white movement will be destroyed. 
In the northernmost parishes, particularly Bossier and Caddo, the primary strategy for 
converting the black majority at registration into a white majority at the polls was the use of 
economic pressure, as evidenced by the boycott petiion that set of the political struggle 
between Major Lewis Merrill and the white conservati es of Shreveport. As a result, election 
day passed of relatively quietly, although Merrill warned his superiors that “threats of 
assassination and local disturbance, especially against leading men of Radical party, [are] 
constantly reported. Some, no doubt, will be carried out.” He conceded, however, that “no 
general Riot […] will occur at any point.”19 
 Even Leonard, though, had no objection to appealing to black voters to support the 
Democratic ticket, so long as this appeal was based on criticism of the existing Republican 
regime, rather than on promises of concessions regarding blacks’ civil and political rights. In 
October, a black man from Shreveport named Dudley Fox disappeared and was suspected to 
have been murdered. Suspicion quickly fell on Caesar Hamilton, who in 1872 had been 
convicted of the murder of a white man by a jury that included Fox. Hamilton’s attorney had 
written Lieutenant Governor C. C. Antoine, a black politician from Shreveport, who had 
prevailed on Kellogg to pardon Hamilton.20  
 The Times wasted no time in making political hay of Fox’s murde . Leonard profusely 
praised the White League volunteer police force for quickly arresting Hamilton and an 
accomplice, while supposedly preventing a negro mobfr m lynching the men. Moreover, he 
hoped the case would “teach [the freedmen of this city] how infamous is radical rule in 
Louisiana.” Would the black voters of Shreveport, he concluded, “not [be] perfectly well 
satisfied that Kellogg is responsible for the murder of the old man Dudley in having pardoned 
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Caesar Hamilton out of the penitentiary? And do they not know that had there been an honest 
white man’s government in Louisiana he would not have been pardoned?”21 
 As in 1872, the actual voting results of 1874 are impossible to determine, with 
Republicans and Democrats each reporting their own tallies. Following the bulldozing of 
Republican officials in the summer and fall of 1874, White Leaguers retained de facto control 
of the local government machinery in many parishes along the Red River. In Rapides, for 
example, the candidates on the 1872 McEnery ticket took control of the local offices on 
September 19, following the attempted coup in New Orleans, and did not relinquish them 
until after the election. Conservatives thus controlled the election process in many of these 
parishes and subsequently claimed victories, not only in Rapides, but also in black majority 
Caddo and Natchitoches, and, not surprisingly, in the four parishes where whites had 
succeeded in out-registering blacks: Winn, Bienville, DeSoto, and Grant. The only parishes 
along the Red River that conservatives conceded were R d River and Bossier. The Times 
blamed the loss in Bossier on a hundred whites who refused to vote and forty who voted the 
Republican ticket. Even so, conservatives lost the parish by a mere handful of votes, despite a 
black advantage in registration of over 1100, a remarkable achievement in itself. The loss in 
Red River Parish, on the other hand, the Times blamed on Republican fraud, reporting that the 
Coushatta box “contained a hundred more tickets than t ere were voters.”22 
 By Christmas, the Republican-controlled Returning Board, chaired by former 
governor James Madison Wells, had reversed every conservative majority reported along the 
Red River, as well as numerous other conservative victories throughout the state, providing 
the Republicans with a two seat majority in the state house of representatives.23 The long, well 
documented history of political fraud, violence, and i timidation practiced by conservative 
whites during Reconstruction - as well as the massive election frauds of the subsequent 
Bourbon ‘restoration’ – seem to amply justify the Rturning Board’s measures. The actual 
evidence from the 1874 elections in northwestern Louisiana, however, presents a more 
ambiguous picture. While the terrorism and economic pressure employed by conservative 
whites over the preceding years contributed to large numbers of blacks either staying away 
from the polls or voting the Democratic ticket, they did so largely in indirect ways that 
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allowed the conservative whites to portray the subsequent Returning Board proceedings as 
arbitrary and unjust. The Returning Board itself, moreover, contributed to this perception by 
making blatantly partisan decisions in order to ensure a Republican majority in the state 
House of Representatives. 
 The official results promulgated by the Returning Board suggest its partisan 
motivations in two distinct ways. The first is the extremely narrow margin by which the 
results favor the Republicans at all levels. Not only did the statewide results determined by 
the Board give Republicans a bare two seat majority in the legislature, but Wells and his 
colleagues also returned extremely slim Republican majorities in Caddo (132 votes), 
Natchitoches (312 votes), and Rapides (110), the thr e parishes where whites had claimed 
victory despite an average black registration majority of over a thousand. Republicans 
claimed that blacks, if left unmolested, would have voted the Republican ticket nearly 
unanimously as they had done in previous elections. However, if the Returning Board had 
consistently ‘restored’ all the votes supposedly lost due to intimidation, the Republican 
majorities would have ended up much higher. As it i, he Returning Board appeared to throw 
out exactly enough white votes to ensure a Republican majority in each parish, basing their 
decision on the number of votes needed rather than on concrete evidence of terrorism. The 
state senate race for the district comprising Natchito es, DeSoto and Red River parishes 
presents another striking example of this dynamic. Here, the Board threw out just enough 
votes to convert Joseph B. Elam’s originally reported majority of over 1400 votes into a 22 
vote majority for the Republican candidate Marshall H. Twitchell.24 
 The second indication of the Returning Board’s partis n proceedings is that they threw 
out the results entirely for four parishes along the Red River where whites had a majority (or 
in the case of DeSoto a near majority) of registered voters. In the case of Grant and DeSoto 
such action may well have been justified. In Grant, the blacks vividly recalled the courthouse 
massacre perpetrated just 18 months prior. By the time registration had commenced, 
moreover, Supreme Court Justice Joseph P. Bradley had granted a stay of judgment in the 
resulting court case, severely complicating enforcement prosecutions in Louisiana. In DeSoto, 
meanwhile, law and order had broken down almost entirely, giving whites free reign to use 
any means to prevent blacks from registering and voting. It seems highly unlikely, however, 
that conservative whites - who by this time carefully calibrated their activities to minimize 
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Republican and federal backlash - would have risked th  use of violence and intimidation in 
either Winn or Bienville, parishes that they had handily won at every election since 1868 
based on the comfortable white majorities in both parishes. Nevertheless, the Returning Board 
threw out the returns of these parishes in their entirety “for fraud and violence,” in all 
likelihood because no combination of individual polls would have resulted in a Republican 
majority.25 
 All this is not to say that the campaign of intimidation and violence pursued by the 
White League following the Colfax massacre did not play a critical role in determining the 
outcome of the 1874 elections. Indeed, the black leaders from northwestern Louisiana, after 
organizing their own investigation into racial violence in the region, sent a petition to 
President Grant in September, asserting it to be “impossible, Mr. President, for we colored 
people to live in the condition that we now stand i.” They warned that “in some parts of the 
southern states the colored people has nothing to do with the laws of the southern states.” A 
few weeks earlier, Governor Kellogg wrote both Presid nt Grant and Attorney General 
George Henry Williams to warn them of an “organized system of intimidation of colored 
voters and white Republicans.” Having failed in their attempts to woo black voters away from 
the Republican fold, Democrats now “returned to the policy of violence and intimidation 
which in ‘68 cut down the Republican vote in this states from 75,000 to barely 6,000.”26 
 Although racially and politically motivated violence and intimidation continued to 
plague the region, the strategy pursued by conservatives in 1874 differed subtly but 
significantly from the reign of terror in 1868. Despite the ongoing intimidation and repression 
practiced against the black and white Republican leadership, conservative whites had 
developed a public facade - as Kellogg’s termed it, a “flimsy attempt to cover up their real 
design” - that provided them with an electoral majority, while avoiding the widespread and 
highly visible violence that the Returning Board was intended to prevent. “The scheme,” 
wrote US Commissioner and former district judge Aaron Levissee, “was to expel from the 
country the Republican leaders and thus to frighten th  negroes into acquiescence.”27  
 Economic pressure played a crucial part in this strategy. Conservatives in Shreveport 
publicly pursued such a strategy by publishing their boycott pledge in the Times. After the 
election, landowners made good on their threats. Leviss e reported employers “driving the 
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freedmen from their homes, naked and penniless, to urvive the severities of winter as best 
they may.” He personally encountered a  
colored man, of honest and intelligent expression, [whose] employer, a white man 
(well known to me) by force (displaying a pistol and threatening to use it) put him and 
his wife and three helpless children out of their house to spend their night as best they 
might in the [public] highway – which they did under the open canopy of heaven and 
what may be put down as a special aggravation of the offence is that two of the 
children were ill and taking medicine and one of them so ill that it was not expected to 
survive. These people (turned out) were partners in the crop which they had raised on 
the lands of the man who turned them out and the crop has not yet been divided and is 
all in possession of the land owner who turned them out.28 
 Elsewhere, conservative whites shielded such economic intimidation from public 
scrutiny. In Rapides, which saw an extensive congressional investigation into the 1874 
elections, the planter John W. Prescott told the inv stigators that “some of my friends, a little 
hot-headed [...] wanted to get an expression of opini n from the members of the party as to 
co-operating with each other about the non-employment of negroes who voted the radical 
ticket.” Prescott quickly nixed the suggestion, not because he opposed it on principle, but 
because “it would be very impolitic to do anything of the kind, and that if we attempted 
anything of the kind, it would be used as a pretext for counting out our candidates after they 
were elected.” Another planter, James Jeffries, denie  any knowledge of blacks being 
threatened with dismissal. Such blunt and explicit threats were hardly necessary, however, as 
whites increasingly found more indirect, but equally effective, ways to leverage their 
economic power over black laborers. As Jeffries put it, whites would make to their employees 
some such remark as this: that our lives and property are involved in this struggle; it is 
a life and death struggle for us; we are hopeless if we are not successful this time. If 
you go with us we consider you our friends. If you do not go with us, but vote for 
those who are robbing both of us, we will consider that you are instrumental in taking 
from us our rights and our property, and that we will have to treat you accordingly. If 
your family is sick, you must go to your Radical friends for medicines, and for 
assistance and protection. Our relations instead of being friendly and kind will be 
hereafter at arm’s length. You will have to look to y ur other fiends for that charity 
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which we have been extending to you. We will employ y u and pay you your wages, 
and that is all.29 
 Immediately following the election, the Caucasian profusely thanked those black 
voters “who broke loose from their old political masters [...] and joined with us on Monday 
last.” The editor went on to urge “every planter, merchant and employer [to] give the 
preference in employing laborers of any kind to those colored people that supported our ticket 
[...] Some distinction is due, and it should be made, on every occasion.” As elections 
generally took place in November, when annual contracts came to an end, planters could use 
their economic leverage without actually dismissing any laborers, but simply refusing to 
rehire them. “While they are perfectly free to exercise the ballot as they see fit, we have the 
same right to give preference to those who have exhibited a desire to relieve us of our burdens 
and do away with the unnatural state of affairs that has existed for the last six years.”30 Such 
an approach, which veiled economic blackmail behind the discourse of free labor, was far less 
likely to attract federal interference than physically nd violently running laborers of the 
plantation, even though the effect was practically indistinguishable. 
 In the atmosphere of intimidation created by the White League over the summer of 
1874, such relatively subtle pressure may well have sufficed for many of the freedpeople to 
vote the Democratic ticket or simply to stay home on election day. Even Republican witnesses, 
such as Stephen B. Packard and State Senator George Y. Kelso, admitted that far more blacks 
had voted the Democratic ticket in Rapides and elsewhere than at previous elections, 
explaining this as a direct consequence of White Leagu  violence and economic 
intimidation.31  Numerous conservative whites - as well as Christopher Hunt, a black 
Methodist minister who had come into conflict with the Republican organization during the 
campaign - told a different story. They argued that Republican mismanagement at the local 
level had created fissures within the black electorate, which conservative whites exploited in 
order to create a biracial electoral majority. Conservatives routinely made such claims, but 
these witnesses presented far more precise complaints than the usual White League 
propaganda, including the loss of $10,000 from the school fund deposited in a bank that failed, 
and the subsequent refusal by Republican school board members to take responsibility; high 
taxes that both affected black directly and also created downwards pressure on laborers’ 
                                                 
29 CSS, 43-2, HOR. Rep. 101, part 2, 44, 52. 
30 AC, 74-11-07. 
31 CSS, 43-2, HOR. Rep. 101, part 2, 24, 28-29, 45. 
7. Towards ‘Redemption’ 
 250  
 
wages; and, finally, dissatisfaction among rank-andfile Republicans with the parish 
leadership.32  
 Other white witnesses emphasized the collapse of law and order, and particularly the 
inability of the Republican sheriff John DeLacy to execute the laws. As Jeffries put it:  
For the last two or three years we have had a judiciary which has failed to inspire 
respect in the community, and has failed to enforce its decrees. We have had a sheriff 
who has failed to execute writs placed in his hands; in fact, we have been compelled 
to fall back upon natural law for protection, and the colored people in that country 
argued about it in this way: They say that these white people whom we have been 
supporting have failed to give us protection. For instance, a very little while ago a 
colored man was killed by a drunken white man on the borders of the town. No arrests 
were made at the time or since. Now we told these pople that we would give them as 
good government, and that they should have full protection; that heretofore we have 
had no part or parcel in the administration of justice; that the men whom they had 
placed in power had failed to administer the law, but if they placed in our hands the 
offices of the parish we would give them protection, a d see that they were secure in 
their rights, and that they would have such security as would protect them.33 
 By November 1874, militant whites had demonstrated that they held de facto political 
control along the Red River Valley by driving off Republican officials and preventing those 
who remained in office from carrying out their duties. Conservatives, for instance, 
continuously drew attention to the unpopularity of Republican sheriff DeLacy, because he 
failed to effectively apprehend offenders. Republicans insisted that he dared not for fear of 
reprisals by a white community that already detested him for marrying a black woman. Such 
distinctions, however, would have mattered little to some of the blacks by 1874, who simply 
saw that Republicans lacked the wherewithal to make good on their election promises. Blacks 
similarly may have resented the poll tax, regardless of the fact that its imposition was likely a 
political ploy by the independent tax collector, Michael Legras, and his Democratic deputy, 
John M. Barret, to discredit the Republican regime.34 By election time, moreover, whites had 
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taken control of most of the parish offices, demonstrating the powerlessness of Republicans in 
the face of persistent white opposition.  
 With whites in effective political control of the parish, and the Republican Party both 
powerless and divided, a significant number of black voters may have decided to stay at home 
on election day or to vote the Democratic ticket. Even if they did not anticipate immediate 
dismissal or violent reprisal for voting the Republican ticket, they may have calculated that 
supporting the conservatives who held political contr l regardless offered greater benefits 
than supporting a Republican Party that lacked the resources to implement the greater racial 
equality it advocated. No doubt, Republican ineffectiveness was itself largely the result of 
persistent, and often violent, white resistance that had decapitated and driven of the party’s 
most competent leadership and undermined its ability to effectively govern by refusing to 
recognize its courts, obey its officials, or pay its taxes. Nevertheless, on election day itself, 
whites could credibly claim that blacks had voluntarily voted for their candidates. Indeed, 
Lieutenant E. A. Belger, in command of troops in Rapides, reported a fair and quiet elections, 
either unaware of or uninterested in the atmosphere of violence and intimidation that had 
characterized the preceding months.35 
 Joe Gray Taylor has correctly concluded that “there is no way […] to determine who 
won the election of 1874 in Louisiana.” Although scholars of Louisiana Reconstruction agree 
that significant numbers of blacks voted the conservative ticket or stayed away from the polls, 
the role that intimidation played remains impossible to determine.36  In the absence of 
independent black testimony the above conclusions regarding black voting and its motivations 
must remain tentative. In any case, conservative whites, who had claimed that Republican 
officials had held office as usurpers ever since the 1872 elections, had no intention of simply 
acquiescing in the Returning Board results that denied them not only a majority in the state 
legislature but also prevented them from legally reclaiming political control of the parishes 
along the Red River. They vociferously attacked the Returning Board, employing the kind of 
incendiary rhetoric that they had tempered prior to the election.  
 The Times set the tone with an editorial published in mid-November insisting that “the 
Returning Board cannot change the count of a single precinct, without perpetrating fraud and 
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violating the constitution and the most sacred rights of the people.” Leonard warned that 
“unless they return the elections as they were return d at the polls, they and those they seek to 
‘count in,’ will pay the forfeit with their lives.” The White Leaguers who had fought at 
Liberty Place would take care of the Board members in New Orleans, and in the individual 
parishes “the people should use hemp or fall on the def ated candidates counted in.” For the 
candidates along the Red River, the threats were personal:  
If Geo. L. Smith is counted in over W. M. Levy, or if Twitchell is counted in over 
Elam, let Smith and Twitchell be killed; if Johnson a d Tyler, in DeSoto, are counted 
in over Scales and Schuler [...] or if Keeting, Levissee and Johnson in Caddo are 
counted in over Vaughan, Horan and Land, then let Johnson, Tyler, Keeting, Levissee 
and Johnson be killed.37 
Wilbur F. Blackman, from Alexandria, expressed similar sentiments in a personal letter. “We 
are in a hell of a fix,” he wrote, “and I see no way of righting matters but by taking the bull by 
the horns and killing off all the rascals that intrude into office.” He saw no alternative to 
“anarchy for two years, no courts, no law, and dam it, - but little money – or I would leave the 
country.”38  
 Conservative papers throughout the region echoed such entiments, albeit in less 
explicit terms. Biossat’s Democrat labeled the Returning Board “a gross cheat and fraud” on 
which “Republicanism, again defeated in Louisiana as in 1872” depended for its victory. The 
Republican candidates in the parish themselves admitted defeat, the paper claimed, and “if 
any one of them shall change his mind and try his hand on our people, his punishment will 
come so swift and sure that a lightning flash won’t be a circumstance to it.” The Vindicator 
argued that the Returning Board’s actions legitimized the White League’s resistance to the 
Kellogg government after the fact. The editor expressed conservative whites’ determination 
“from this hour to never pay to that government one dollar of Taxes, and we will resist its 
officers to the death who attempt to enforce it.” The Caucasian, meanwhile, drummed up L. J. 
Kennedy, a black commissioner of elections, to write an open letter asserting that large 
numbers of blacks voted the Democratic ticket voluntarily, and calling on the blacks of 
Rapides to “meet in a mass meeting, and denounce publicly the fraud of the Returning Board 
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and let the whole world know that the colored race in this parish, are not responsible for its 
wrongs.”39  
 Such vicious editorials, as well as personal observation, led Colonel Henry A. Morrow 
to conclude that  
local disturbances of a very serious character may take place in the event of the 
returning-board [...] ruling the votes of parishes for mere technical reasons. Already 
all influential and respectable citizens concur fully and entirely in the view that 
violence to any extent will be justifiable, and should be resorted to secure to the 
people a change of local administrators to which they claim they are entitles, as the 
result of the late election.40 
Merrill concurred, warning superiors that such a “determination appears well settled and so 
generally expressed and approved by a large majority of whites that I doubt not it is more than 
idle threat.” In Caddo, he predicted, most local officials elected on the Republican ticket, 
except maybe the parish judge, a “man of courage and coolness,” would refuse to take up 
their office out of fear of retribution, while those Republicans who left for New Orleans to 
take their seats in the legislature would be murdere  if they returned.41 
 As it turned out, the conflict over the results of the 1874 elections came to a head in 
New Orleans, before local conflicts in northwestern Louisiana could escalate to the point of 
violence. When the new legislature met in early January, both Conservatives and Republicans 
claimed a majority that would entitle them to contrl of the House of Representatives. The 
initial strong response by federal authorities in support of the Republican regime soon 
backfired, precipitating the de facto withdrawal of federal interference from state affairs, a full 
two years before President Hayes formally ended the military presence in Louisiana. 
 
The Banditti Backlash  
The four parishes along the Red River that the Returning Board threw out entirely (Bienville, 
DeSoto, Grant, and Winn) complicated Louisiana politics immensely when the new state 
legislature met for the first time on January 4, 1875. As no legal results existed for these 
parishes, five seats in the house for representatives remained unoccupied. It fell to the other 
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members to determine the outcome of these elections, which would determine the chamber’s 
majority. Conservatives quickly seized control of the chaotic proceedings, claiming to elect 
Louis Wiltz as speaker, despite procedural objections. Wiltz then seated the conservative 
candidates present from the disputed districts, as well as conservative representatives from 
Caddo and Rapides, which seats the Returning Board h d declared for the Republicans. A 
number of Republican representatives then walked out in an attempt to prevent a quorum, but 
conservatives nevertheless proceed to organize the House under their own leadership. 
 Federal troops, under the command of Colonel P. Regis de Trobriand, initially assisted 
Wiltz and his Conservative allies by clearing the corridors of the state building of a crowd that 
protested against the irregular proceedings. Soon, h wever, Kellogg requested Trobriand to 
clear the legislature of members not officially approved by the Returning Board. Trobriand, 
aware of the gravity of this request, insisted on receiving written orders from his superior 
before acting. He subsequently removed eight represntatives, three from Caddo, three from 
Rapides and one each from Grant and Winn. All but one insisted that an armed soldier escort 
him out and entered a lengthy verbal protest before retiring.42 
 The following day, Trobriand’s superior, General Phillip H. Sheridan, whom Grant 
had sent to Louisiana in response to reports of unrest, backed up the colonel’s firm actions 
with even stronger words. He telegraphed Secretary of War William W. Belknap that he could 
preserve the peace with the military forces available, requesting that “Congress [...] declare 
the White League and other similar organizations banditti.” This would allow the military 
authorities to arrest and prosecute the leadership of these organizations under martial law, and, 
as a result, Sheridan predicted, “the terrorism now existing in Louisiana, Mississippi and 
Arkansas could be entirely removed.”43  
 Later that week, Sheridan sent a more extensive report in defense of such a policy. He 
claimed that in the course of Reconstruction, in Louisiana alone, whites had murdered or 
severely assaulted nearly 3500, mostly black, victims, half of them in the explosion of 
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violence leading up to the November 1868 election. Political motives lay at the root of over 
1200 of these attacks, and in the vast majority of cases the civil authorities had been unable or 
willing to take action. As a result  
in but a few of the country parishes can it truly be said that the law is properly 
enforced and in some of the parishes, the judges have not been able to hold court for 
the past two years. Human life in this state is held so cheaply that when men are killed 
on account of political opinions the murderers are regarded rather as heroes than as 
criminals.  
The bad government that conservatives complained of, Sheridan continued,  
is the result of the armed organizations which have now crystallized into what is 
called the White League. Instead of bad government d veloping them, they have by 
their terrorism prevented to a considerable extent the collection of taxes, the holding 
of courts, [and] the punishment of criminals.44 
 Republicans from the South applauded Sheridan’s firm actions and firmer words. 
“How entirely ridiculous are the howls and indignation of Rebs and Democrats over being 
called a name,” John Hammond, a Southerner living in Chicago, wrote the general.  
You call one name against their mountain of slang ad Billingsgate. Why, General, 
cannot the Northern public comprehend that when Rebels and Democrats speak of the 
people of the South and their rights, they mean the Rebel people? […] Anyone who 
imagines that Kuklux, carpetbag denunciations and murders of negroes and white 
Republicans, and white league are more individual and local outbreaks, is not alive to 
the situation. On the contrary, there is a well-defined plan and powerful combination 
to put the government in the hands of the late rebels.45 
 In a thorough analysis of the national debate sparked by Sheridan’s banditti telegram, 
Carole T. Emberton argues that the general was a “deft verbal swordsman,” who consciously 
used such terms to “strip[...] the White League of their moral authority” and “place[...] their 
campaign outside the boundaries of legitimate protest.” By labelling the white terrorists, not 
Republican officeholders, as the true criminals in Louisiana, Sheridan hoped the national state 
would bring its full force to bear in suppressing them. “A stronger backbone is what Sheridan 
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offered his party,” as Republicans from President Grant on down sought to “reconcile the use 
of physical force with the process of democratization.”46 
 Grant and Belknap initially supported Sheridan, informing the Senate on January 13 
that  
if error has been committed by the Army in these matters, it has always been on the 
side of the preservation of good order, the maintenance of law, and the protection of 
life. Their bearing reflects credit upon the soldiers, and if wrong has resulted, the 
blame is with the turbulent element surrounding them.  
Sheridan, meanwhile, backed up his claims of political terror a few months later with an 
extensive “list of persons killed and wounded in the State of Louisiana since the close of the 
late war from causes arising out of the political condition of affairs in that State.” Soon, 
however, “Grant found himself in an untenable situat on as the negative reaction exploded.”47 
 In the end, Sheridan’s insistence on a “vigorous counterinsurgency strategy” found 
support neither among leading Republican policymakers, nor among the military 
establishment. After engineering the removal of General Emory, whom he considered 
unreliable in his support of Reconstruction and the Louisiana Republicans, Sheridan had 
General Christopher Columbus Augur appointed in his stead. As it turned out, however, 
Augur belonged to “a growing number of senior officers who no longer supported the bygone 
Radical views on Reconstruction that had once dominated the thinking of the commanders of 
the five Military Districts.” Sheridan’s forceful actions not only isolated him from the 
mainstream current of thinking among the national political and military leadership, but also 
shocked Northern public opinion, undermining electoral support even for a more modest 
military role in the former Confederacy. In the aftermath of Trobriand’s intervention, US 
District Attorney James R. Beckwith predicted that any federal support for Kellogg’s state 
government would inevitably “result in unpleasant complications and must become the stock 
and trade of liars and slanderers working for political and party purposes.48 
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 Conservative immediately grasped the significance of the moment. The Democrat 
cynically applauded Sheridan’s and Trobriand’s actions, predicting that  
the audacious and utterly illegal conduct of Sheridan will do for stricken Louisiana 
what nothing else could do so effectually. It will compel the American people to make 
our case their own. From one end of this country to the other a spirit will be aroused 
[...] that will bring military despotism to its senses. [...] The trooper of the Shenandoah 
will prove to be the executioner of his master.49  
 Such optimism proved justified. Over the next two years, the federal government 
increasingly refrained from interfering in civil aff irs, protecting Republican officials, or 
enforcing racial equality in Louisiana, beyond ensuring that Kellogg maintained nominal 
control of the state government in New Orleans. Thearmy, the Department of Justice and 
congressional investigators all retained a presence in Louisiana, but their passivity stands in 
marked contrast to the relatively vigorous enforcement policies pursued by Merrill, Sheridan, 
Packard, Beckwith, and other federal officials in the months leading up to and the weeks 
following the 1874 elections. 
  In fact, many local military commanders had begun to retreat from enforcement even 
earlier, reflecting the army’s changing priorities a  Radical Republicanism faded from 
political prominence in the mid-1870s. Major E. A. Belger, and Captain S. D. Parker, 
commanding in Rapides and Caddo respectively, personified these changes. Both men 
proudly disavowed any inference that their men had interfered in the 1874 elections or 
otherwise influence the political situation. Parker assured his superiors that his troops had 
merely been near the polls and not “at them,” which “ ould not be constructed by 
unprejudiced persons as a partisan measure in any se se whatever.” Belger sent small 
detachments to a number of election precincts, but in the absence of open violence during the 
elections they returned “without any trouble.” Belger, who prided himself on being ignorant 
of politics, assured his superiors that “the people in this section of country are peaceable and 
law abiding. I have heard no complaint of breaches of the law or of crimes having been 
committed and gone unpunished.” Conservatives gratefully quoted Belger’s reports during the 
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subsequent congressional investigation to bolster th i argument that the elections had been 
fair and peaceful.50 
 Such a passive attitude towards Reconstruction soo pread throughout the military 
leadership. The military records clearly illustrate the reduced priority given to enforcing 
Reconstruction in the aftermath of the 1874 election. Although a substantial amount of 
military correspondence has been preserved for the years 1875 and 1876, both from 
departmental headquarters in New Orleans and from various posts and detachments along the 
Red River, none of these concern military involvement in civil affairs, the enforcement of 
Reconstruction, or the protection of Republicans and freedpeople from violence and 
intimidation. Both a volume of letters sent and one f telegrams received at the departmental 
headquarters during 1875 and 1876 - including correspondence with posts at Shreveport, 
Colfax, Natchitoches, and Alexandria - relate exclusively to routine matters of finance, 
military discipline, troop movement, and supplies. The same applies to collections of letters 
sent from posts at Shreveport, Alexandria, and Natchito hes between the spring of 1875 and 
the elections in November 1876.51  
 When Lieutenant, and at that point acting, Governor C. C. Antoine asked for federal 
troops to act as a posse comitatus in response to a violent outburst in West Feliciana parish in 
the spring of 1876, Augur bluntly denied his request. He reminded Antoine “of the limitation 
of the right of US Troops to interfere in the internal affairs of a state.” Only a formal appeal 
through the president, as mandated by the constitution would allow the military to interfere, 
no matter “how desirable or useful [such interference] might be.”52 Troops briefly left their 
camps in November 1876 to keep the peace during the presidential elections, but their order 
explicitly prohibited them from “offensively or unduly meddling with local or political 
affairs.” Except under exceptional circumstances, troops were to remain in barracks on 
election day. Local commanders generally sent down reports of peace and quiet throughout 
the region, which subsequently served to legitimize conservatives’ claims that they no longer 
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needed to engage in violence and intimidation in order to win elections, in much the same 
way that Belger’s reports had done in 1874.53  
 Within days of that final election of the Reconstruc ion era, the departmental 
command in New Orleans ordered most of the military fo ces in northwestern Louisiana to 
break up their posts and return to the city, leaving just a token force of a single company at 
Pineville.54 By December, the military commander in Monroe, just east of the Red River 
Valley, where troops also remained, warned that  
the ‘moral influence’ resulting from the presence of the United States troops, of which 
so much has been said and written, if it ever existd, is being rapidly dissipated, and 
[…] these men, feeling assured through agencies of partisan newspapers, of being 
sustained by a large proportion of the political party, north and south, with which they 
affiliate, will only be restrained from execution of their unlawful designs by actual 
and sufficient physical force.55 
 In early March, outgoing President Grant’s private secretary informed Packard, the 
Republican claimant to the Louisiana governorship, that the military would no longer 
“support the maintenance of state government in Louisiana.” Two months later, on May 14, 
1877, the last troops, including those at Pineville, received orders to “break up your post and 
proceed with all public stores and property to Jackson barracks.”56 Although the conservative 
press trumpeted this final and official removal of troops from Louisiana as a major victory, 
conservative whites had, in reality, experienced little hindrance from the military presence for 
two years previous. The Democrat acknowledged as much when it sent the last company off 
with an editorial expressing “the common and outspoken sentiment of our community, when 
we assert, that take the command, from its highest officer down to the lowest private, they 
have all the time here behaved like true soldiers, and that we all regret, on a personal grounds, 
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their leaving here.” The editor singled out Belger, and his successor Penrose, for especial 
praise, styling them “gentlemen of the old army regime.”57 
 The army was not the only federal institution to tread water during the final years of 
Reconstruction. In June of 1874, following an earlir mistrial, United States District Attorney 
Beckwith had succeeded in winning a hard-fought conviction of Bill Cruickshank, James 
Hadnot, and Bill Irving for their involvement in the massacre of dozens of blacks at the 
Colfax courthouse more than a year earlier. During the preliminary hearings, Supreme Court 
Justice Bradley, while ‘riding circuit,’ had taken the bench alongside local federal judge 
William B. Woods and shown himself amenable to the defense’s constitutional objections in 
the case. These objections centered on the contention that the court had no jurisdiction under 
the Enforcement Acts, because the indictment did not explicitly specify race as a motivation 
for the alleged crimes. Following the convictions, Bradley returned to New Orleans and 
promptly allowed the defense’s motion for arrest of judgment on these grounds. Woods 
dissented, making an appeal to the full bench of the Supreme Court all but inevitable. In the 
meantime, the judge had no choice but to release the convicted men, who returned to 
northwestern Louisiana as heroes.58 
 On March 27, 1876, the Supreme Court issued a ruling upholding Bradley’s earlier 
decision. That same day, the court also declared Sections 3 and 4 of the Enforcement Act 
unconstitutional in its decision of Unites States v. Reese, a voting rights case originating in 
Kentucky. Although the Department of Justice would continue to pursue cases in support of 
black voting rights following these judicial defeats, he Supreme Court’s action in these cases 
significantly undermined the judicial enforcement of Reconstruction in the crucial years 
between 1874 and 1876, at the same time that the army quietly began beating a retreat in the 
South, and public support for Reconstruction evaported in the North.59  
 Well before the court’s final decision in the Cruickshank case, moreover, Bradley’s 
decision to grant the arrest of judgment had paralyzed the efforts by Beckwith and US 
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Marshall Packard to pursue any further prosecution of those suspected of violating the 
Enforcement Acts. Conservatives, on the other hand, welcomed the judgment from a federal 
judiciary, which, until then, they had experienced mostly as an “engine of oppression of every 
man who refuses to bend the knee to the Radical Baal.” In August, Governor Kellogg warned 
President Grant that Bradley’s decision, in combination with the president’s refusal to support 
Republicans in neighboring Arkansas and Texas, would lead to an increase in political 
violence, beyond the state authorities’ ability to suppress. Beckwith, meanwhile, complained 
that Bradley’s action had “placed US officers in a most unpleasant situation from the 
vagueness of the opinion as published. Inferences against the jurisdiction of the federal courts 
and the power of the federal government of the broadest character are drawn by those who 
engage in or countenance violence.” The White Leagu, Beckwith believed, “sprang into life 
or received their only vitality from the action of Justice Bradley.” The entire organization 
“would never have existed but for his action and the immunity supposed to be found in his 
opinion of the law in that case.”60  
 In response, Beckwith urgently appealed to the attorney general in Washington to 
pursue an early trial in the Cruickshank case, as further prosecutions under the Enforcement 
Act would be useless until the matter was settled. “I am very much embarrassed by Justice 
Bradley’s action,” Beckwith complained. He feared that jurors would use it as an excuse to 
acquit those suspected of political violence, especially when they “apprehend personal danger 
or inconvenience in event of a guilty verdict.” This was no abstract conjecture. On the same 
day he made his request, Beckwith reported on his investigation of the Coushatta massacre, of 
which “the details are more horrible and inhuman than the newspaper accounts.” Prosecutions, 
however, would be unless and until the Supreme Court reversed Bradley’s ruling, which 
combined with the terrorism resulting from repeated acts of barbarity perpetrated for 
purposes of intimidation, will render it impossible to get a jury of sufficient courage in 
this district to punish even the Coushatta outrage. Jurors will seize upon the slightest 
pretext or excuse for avoiding responsibility. Any trial under current conditions will 
be but an expensive mockery. In the case Grant or Coushatta murderers are arrested, 
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they should not be put on trial until after the supreme court decision, even if this 
means admitting them to bail.61  
 In February 1875, ten men indicted in connection with the Colfax case petitioned 
Attorney General Williams in Washington to instruct Beckwith to enter a plea of nolle 
prosequi. They claimed to “have been maliciously and illegaly endangered in their rights of 
liberty and pursuits of usual avocations” by the indictments and warrants against them. They 
enclosed dozens of pages of affidavits to prove they had been nowhere near Colfax on Easter 
Sunday. They also challenged the jurisdiction of the federal court in New Orleans, which 
“subjects them to very great expense, deprives them of consulting counsel,” and infringes on 
“their right to trial in a local court, situated at  reasonable distance from the place where the 
crimes were allegedly committed.”62 These men couched their petition in general legal 
arguments and made no reference recent judicial and political events. The petition’s timing 
nevertheless suggests that their actions were influe ced by Bradley’s decision and the 
political fallout from the Trobriand and banditti imbroglio. Why else would they have waited 
a year-and-a-half before making their complaint, if not for the political winds to change in 
their favor?  
 Judicial enforcement of Reconstruction was further complicated when US District 
Judge Edward H. Durrell resigned in December of 1874. A year later, no replacement had yet 
been appointed, prompting Beckwith to complain thata “large amount of important business 
[remains] unattended, some of which US is interested party in.63 Clearly, the enforcement of 
Reconstruction was no longer a priority of the Republican administration in Washington, and 
most of Beckwith’s correspondence for the years 1875 and 1876 refers to various civil cases 
with only sporadic mention of either criminal proceedings or related political matters, most 
importantly a suit brought by conservatives against Sheridan, Trobriand and Emory. While 
Louisiana would see significant judicial action based on the Enforcement Acts in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, Bradley’s intervention effectively nullified the only such 
convictions obtained in the state during Reconstruction and prevented the prosecution of any 
more such cases in the crucial years between 1874 and 1876. 
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 Like the executive and judicial branches, Congress al o withdrew much of its support 
for Reconstruction in the years following the 1874 election. In part, this was the inevitable 
result of Republicans’ massive losses in these election, which gave control of the House to the 
Democrats for the first time since the Civil War and reduced the Republican majority in the 
Senate from 35 to 19 seats. Regardless of their numerical decimation, however, the actions of 
Republican congressmen who visited Louisiana as members of congressional investigations 
during this period clearly indicate that their highest priority was not the protection of their 
fellow party-members and the black electorate in the South. 
 The first indication of this shift came with the sub-committee of George F. Hoar’s 
Select Committee on the Condition of the South, which the lame duck Republican majority 
sent to New Orleans in December of 1874 to investigate the recent elections there. Although 
the sub-committee numbered two Republicans, Charles Foster and William Walter Phelps, 
and just one Democrat, Clarkson N. Potter, they unanimously reported that “no general 
intimidation of republican voters was established.” They argued that  
frequent arrests by the United States marshals for intimidation or threats of non-
employment, and the apprehension that was felt that the returning-board would count 
out their men if excuse for such a course were offered, all combined [...] to put the 
conservatives on their good behavior, and the result was that in November, 1874, the 
people of the State of Louisiana did fairly have a free, peaceable, and full 
reregistration and election in which a clear conservative majority was elected to the 
lower house of the legislature, of which majority the conservatives were deprived by 
the unjust, illegal, and arbitrary action of the Returning Board.64 
 The methods employed by the investigators to reach these conclusions were dubious at 
best. Regarding northwestern Louisiana they took testimony only on the relatively peaceful 
parish of Rapides, collecting no evidence from the much more violent parishes farther north. 
The Republican House leadership subsequently sent the entire select-committee to New 
Orleans, in hope of its reaching a more politically favorable conclusion before Democrats 
took over control of the House. Such hopes, however, proved ill founded. The committee’s 
second Democratic member, Samuel S. Marshall, joined th  three members of the sub-
committee in a majority report that once again denied any widespread violence or intimidation 
of colored voters and declared the 1874 elections t have been free and fair, thus confirming 
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the narrative presented by Louisiana’s conservative whites who claimed to have one the 
election fair and square.65 
 Chairman Hoar, along with fellow Republicans William A. Wheeler and William P. 
Frye disagreed, but their minority report did not endorse the state Republicans nearly as 
ringingly as the majority report did the Democrats. They acknowledged the deleterious effect 
of the widespread use of violence and intimidation - both in the immediate run-up to the 
election but also in earlier years - on blacks’ ability to safely vote as they pleased. As a result, 
they concluded that “the election of 1874 was neither full, free, nor fair [...] and that many 
more voters than were needed to give the republican party a complete victory were prevented 
from voting at all or coerced into voting the white man’s ticket.” What the minority report 
gave to Louisiana Republicans with one hand, however, it immediately retracted with the 
other. The report went on to conclude that the Returning Board had gravely overstepped its 
legal authority in effectively nullifying the election results and handing the legislature to 
Republicans and, en passant, declared the order by Judge Durrell that had placed Kellogg in 
the governor’s mansion in 1873 to have been illegal.66 
 The Republican minority report, in essence, declard the political situation in 
Louisiana to be an insoluble mess. It admitted that  
it is not strange that the Republicans of Louisiana should delude themselves by any 
plausible views of laws which will enable them to occupy the places which they 
believe the will of a majority of the legal voters of the State, if free from violence and 
intimidation, would award to them. It is not strange that the democrats of Louisiana 
should believe the whole State government a usurpation, should give it no credit for 
its best acts, should seek to embarrass, and thwart and resist it to the extent of their 
power, and should be unwilling to wait for the slow but sure operation of lawful 
remedies to cure whatever evil really belongs to it.67 
 Such a Solomon’s judgment, however judicious, hardly helped the beleaguered state 
Republican Party. With a majority that included two Republicans giving unequivocal support 
to the Democrats and a minority essentially declaring both sides in the wrong, Kellogg had 
little choice but to accept the political adjustment brokered by Wheeler on the basis of these 
reports. The deal allowed him to stay on as governor for the remainder of his term, but 
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Republicans lost control of the state legislature and - although this was not part of the formal 
agreement - of much of the local government in the outlying parishes  
 Wheeler and the other committee members almost certainly understood that this 
agreement could never be more than a way-stop on the way to complete Democratic control 
of the state. Many conservative whites, indeed, felt that their position was so strong that they 
need not accept the compromise at all, and might take control of the state government 
immediately. Thomas C. Manning, a prominent local Democrat from Alexandria, wrote to ex-
governor Moore that “the feeling [in New Orleans] against the surrender, miscalled 
‘compromise’, [...] is very general and pervades all classes.” He nevertheless counseled 
Moore to keep his spirits up, as “our ultimate releas  is now sure, though we shall have to 
endure our present misery until the new Congress meets.”68 While the adjustment may indeed 
have been a success for the Republican Party at the national level, as James T. Otten has 
argued, it also clearly signaled that the same natio l party was willing to sacrifice 
Reconstruction in Louisiana on behalf of its greater interests.69 
 The next major congressional investigation in Louisiana took place in the summer of 
1876. Its primary object concerned the management of the New Orleans Custom House, an 
important source of federal patronage for the state Republicans, and particularly the collector 
of the port and the President’s brother-in-law James A. Casey. In what was clearly a 
politically motivated inquiry, the Democratic majority, including Louisiana representative and 
committee chairman Randall L. Gibson, found evidence of “irregularities and frauds” as well 
as “an effort on the part of James F. Casey [...] to obstruct the investigation,” while the 
Republican minority insisted that “the collector ofcustoms had uniformly managed the 
business of his department with promptness and courtesy, with fidelity to the Government, 
and sure regard to the convenience of the public.”70 
 Of greater interest to us is the result of an inquiry by two of the committee members, 
Democrat John L. Vance and Republican William Woodburn, into the mysterious shooting in 
Coushatta of local Republican leader Marshall Harvey Twitchell . Despite the murder of most 
of his relatives and fellow white Republicans, Twitchell had continued to pursue his political 
career, both as a state senator and locally as a member of the police jury, the school board, 
and as United States commissioner. Late in April 1876, Twitchell returned to Red River 
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Parish, after a prolonged absence, to attend to his business and political interests there. Early 
in the morning of May 2, Twitchell, with his brother-in-law and fellow police juror David 
King, boarded a skiff to cross the river an attend a police jury meeting, despite black ferryman 
Dennis Dam’s warning of danger. When they were halfway across, a mysterious stranger, 
disguised with a fake beard and green eyed goggles, opened fire on the boat from the opposite 
bank. Although Twitchell was his primary target, the assassin hit all three men in the boat, 
killing King, wounding the ferryman in the hand, and striking Twitchell in his left thigh and, 
after he jumped ship, in both arms as he tried to hold on to the skiff. Miraculously, Twitchell 
survived, although both arms had to be amputated.71 
 When the news of the shooting reached Washington, the House authorized the select 
committee already in New Orleans to investigate the affair. Vance and Woodburn left for 
Coushatta and on June 7 and 8 spent two days questioning witnesses there. Numerous black 
and white Republican witnesses testified that the att mpted assassination of Twitchell was 
politically motivated. These included Twitchell himself, former Union army general W. R. 
Mudgett, Clerk of Court Z. T. Wester, black minister Benjamin Perrow, and black carpenter 
and Republican activist Andrew Bosley. Conservative whites, on the other hand, told a 
different story, blaming the shooting on personal enmity with members of his own party, 
including former sheriff John T. Yates.72 
 Even the testimony from these conservative witnesses, however, implicitly supported 
the allegations of a politically motivated assassination attempt, as they nearly all admitted that 
an extreme prejudice existed in the white community against Twitchell. They took care, 
however, to erect an artificial distinction between Twitchell’s partisan affiliation and his 
supposed mismanagement of parish affairs, blaming his unpopularity exclusively, in E. W. 
Rawle’s words, on “the monstrosities of his administration,” rather than “his political 
opinions.” White League leader B. W. Marston admitted hat “our people rejoiced at it as 
much as they would at the hanging or killing of any tyrant in the world,” and labeled 
Twitchell “as much a usurper as Mr. Kellogg.” But with the same breath Marston denied that 
the murder “had any political significance.”73 
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 Such partisan, contradictory, and often ambiguous testimony need hardly surprise us. 
More significant is the fact is that the two Representatives unanimously endorsed the 
conservatives’ reading of events. Nevada Republican Woodburn concluded that the 
“testimony of all disinterested witnesses [...] in regard to the conduct of parochial affairs was 
to the effect that they had been loosely and extravag ntly managed,” even though many 
Republican witnesses testified to the contrary, an investigation by a local tax-payers 
association found no irregularities in the parish’s finances, and an indictment against 
Twitchell for fraud would have been quashed, according to his Democratic co-defendant Jules 
Lisso, if Twitchell had been present at the session of the district court.74 Woodburn similarly 
concurred in the conclusion that “the shooting of King and Twitchell was not caused by 
reason of their political opinions, and that the affair ‘was not of a political character.’” The 
greatest suspicion rested on his personal enemies within the Republican Party, although the 
evidence was not of a character to create a reasonable ground of suspicion against any 
particular person.75 
 The only dissenting voice on the full select committee belonged to Chester B. Darrall, 
a Northern-born Republican and Union veteran who represented Louisiana’s third 
congressional district. Although he had not gone to Coushatta to hear testimony, he submitted 
a dissenting report based on the testimony collected to show that “the murder of David King 
and attempted murder of Senator Twitchell was of a political character and for political 
reasons; and [...] that it is very unsafe for a memb r of the republican party to actively 
advocate his principles in that part of the State.” He insisted not on “any further legislation, 
but, first, a more prompt and rigorous enforcement of he laws and punishment of those 
violating them by the local and state authorities, aided, if need be, by the power of the General 
Government.” The third Republican member of the selct committee, Michigan representative 
Omar D. Conger, did not join in Darrall’s dissent.76 The report thus strikingly illustrates the 
changed political realities in Washington: southern Republicans desperately needed federal 
enforcement to withstand the onslaught of the White League and similar organizations, but 
with Democrats’ political fortunes ascendant and the nation caught in a severe economic crisis, 
Northern and Western Republicans considered their Southern brethren as expendable..  
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The Final Push 
In the wake of the 1874 election and the Wheeler compr mise, what Republican organization 
and government that remained along the Red River rapidly disintegrated. The means and the 
pace with which whites reclaimed power varied from parish to parish and those places where 
Republican held on to power the longest experienced th  most violent transition to de facto 
Democratic rule between 1874 and 1876. At the same ti e, the transition to conservative rule 
was not always seamless. Even as Reconstruction collapsed throughout the region and the 
state, nominally Republican officials at times briefly reclaimed power at the local level. The 
formal party affiliation of these officials, however, made little practical difference to the 
freedpeople, who saw the protection and of their political and civil rights continually erode 
during these years.77  
 In Rapides and Caddo, the conservative candidates elected in 1874, according to the 
original returns, had taken possession of the parochial and municipal offices by March 1875. 
Although Kellogg sent up commissions for the officials certified by the Returning Board, 
these men never attempted to carry out their duties. Following the compromise of 1877, the 
parish saw a brief return to nominal Republican rule. The original results, which gave a 
statewide majority to Nicholls for governor, returned Republican majorities in Rapides and a 
number of other parishes along the Red River. In its campaign to reclaim control of the state, 
the New Orleans Democrat, he official journal of the Nicholls government, accepted these 
parochial results.78 
 While their local defeat undoubtedly disappointed he Democrats in Rapides, their 
party’s statewide victory offered ample compensation. The officers elected, moreover, proved 
more than acceptable to the white population. George Kelso and John DeLacy, the most 
despised Republican leaders of the parish, had run for state senator and representative; 
conservatives were glad to see them leave for New Orleans, where they joined a legislature in 
which their party was now a minority. The local officials were cut from a different cloth. The 
sheriff, H. M. Robinson, and parish judge, John Clements were both former Democrats - 
Robinson had even run on the anti-Fusionist, or straight-out Democratic, ticket of Robert P. 
Hunter in 1872 - whom whites might resent for their political opportunism, but whose racial 
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views conformed to the dominant norms. The clerk of c urt, James Ransdell, had held the 
office since the summer of 1875 on an appointment by Kellogg. Conservatives considered 
him a “capable and worthy young Creole of the Parish.” Ransdell had announced himself as 
an independent candidate, although he subsequently appeared on the Republican ticket.79  
 While nominal Republican rule did not necessarily imply an active pursuit of the racial 
equality envisioned by Reconstruction architects, neither did Democratic control imply its 
complete dismantling prior to 1876. In DeSoto, where both the parish and the judicial district 
it belonged to had reverted to conservative control by 1875, blacks continued to serve on 
grand and petty juries, albeit in much smaller numbers than they had when Levissee was 
judge. In the fall term of 1876 and the spring term of 1877 black participation suddenly 
increased, in an effort by white conservatives to demonstrate their bona fides to federal 
election officials. Once the troops had been permanently removed, however, conservative 
judge David Pierson established a ‘jury commission’ consisting of five white residents of the 
parish. Although the precise responsibilities of this commission remain unclear, its results are 
indisputable. At the next term of court in October, not a single black man sat on the grand jury 
for the first time in six years, while of four petty juries empanelled that term, two included a 
single black member and the other two were entirely white. Black participation in the DeSoto 
district court - and presumably in other parishes throughout the state - had effectively ended.80 
 Rapides was not the only parish on the Red River that saw a return to - or in the case 
of Bossier a continuation of - nominal Republican rule following the 1876 election. Caddo 
and Bossier saw a similar development. In Bossier, as in Rapides, the officials elected on the 
Republican ticket did not represent the hated Radical wing of the party. The two most 
prominent candidates were the incumbent sheriff, J. B. O’Neal, and parish judge, B. F. Fort, 
who had joined the Democratic district attorney in a petition to Kellogg in 1875, denying 
reports of large scale violence against blacks in the parish and disavowing the need for 
assistance from state or federal troops to restore ord r. By the summer of 1877, moreover, 
Governor Nicholls’s regime had undermined Republican ontrol of the police juries in these 
parishes. In April, the legislature passed a law allowing the Governor to appoint up to five 
new police jurors in any country parish he saw fit.Such appointments assured that 
conservatives in Caddo, Rapides, and Bossier regaind control over the police jury and thus 
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over parish taxes and, importantly, the organization of the elections in 1878. In combination 
with renewed violence against blacks, who now had no possibility of redress, this measure 
ensured that all three parishes reverted to Democratic control following these elections.81 
 Matters did not resolve themselves as easily in Natchitoches, where conservatives had 
claimed the narrowest of victories after the 1874 election. For the office of parish judge, in 
fact, they claimed that the Democratic candidate C. F. Dranguet, had beaten J. Ernest Breda 
by just a single vote and for most other offices the conservative majority was 40 or 50 votes at 
most out of about 3000 cast. The Republican candidates were close political allies to the 
Republican officials whom the White League had forced out of the parish the previous 
summer, and conservatives proved hell-bent on preventing them from regaining control of the 
parish. They felt, if anything, an even greater hatred against E. L. Pierson, who had been a 
prominent Democratic politico, but defected to the R publicans on July 4, 1874, who 
promptly nominated him for the state legislature. Following the election, an attempt was made 
to assassinate him, and a few weeks later he fled Natchitoches along with Breda, arriving in 
New Orleans as “the heroes of north western Louisiana nd our daring trip [...[ the comment 
and theme of conversation for several days after our arrival among the leading men of our 
party.”82 
 Though their fellow Republicans may have received them as heroes, and despite 
Breda’s confidence that before long “Grant’s order to the troops to recognize, assist and 
protect the officers holding Kellogg commissions and none other, will be in full force and 
operation,” Conservatives continued to hold de facto power in Natchitoches so long as the 
Republican leadership remained in New Orleans. Around the time Pierson and Breda arrived 
in New Orleans, the police jurors elected on the conservative ticket met to organize 
themselves under the leadership of William Payne and elected a parish treasurer, constable 
and clerk. The parish still lacked a tax collector, parish and district judge, and clerk of court, 
but the Vindicator insisted that  
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anarchy is much more preferable, if this be it, to such Republican form of government 
as is ‘guaranteed’ us by Grant’s army and navy, or rather the army and navy paid for 
with our money and run by Grant for his own amusement. After six months trial of 
this ‘anarchy,’ [since the bulldozing of Republicans i  July] we have concluded that 
we will continue it indefinitely. 
While the officials certified by the Returning Board remained in New Orleans, the 
conservative police jury continued to operate, and the Democrats organized informal 
‘committees of public safety’ and ‘courts of arbitration’ to enforce order and resolve civil 
disputes. Following the Wheeler compromise, conservatives reluctantly acquiesced in a 
number of Republican appointments for the parish, alt ough they repeatedly urged Kellogg to 
choose officials whom, although nominally Republican, the white community considered 
acceptable.83  
 The appointment of such a compromise candidate resolv d the ongoing dispute over 
the 17th Judicial district. Kellogg appointed the Liberal Republican candidate of 1872, C. C. 
Chaplin, even though he had not even been a candidate in 1874. Conservatives would have 
preferred their own candidate, William H Jack, but they realized that the latter was “classed 
by some of our ‘step-ins’ as violent in politics to which class the Governor assisted by the 
‘moderates’ will give no preferment.” They instead ccepted Chaplin as “a gentleman in 
every way qualified and acceptable to our people,” especially as M. J. Cunningham, the 
Democratic candidate in 1874 for district attorney, received his commission from Kellogg at 
the same time. As a result, court resumed throughout t e district over the summer and fall of 
1875, following an interruption of over a year.84 
 Conservatives in Natchitoches proved less pliant when Kellogg attempted to replace 
the Payne police jury, which had been effectively acting for almost half a year, by a 
Republican body under the despised Republican Joseph Ezernack. Editorials in the Vindicator 
had repeatedly reminded its readers that any Republican officials served, in effect, at the 
sufferance to the white community, and that if they overstepped their bounds they would 
suffer the same fate as the Republican officials run o t in the summer of 1874. The editors 
now warned that “when it is attempted to foist upon us an ignorant Police Jury [...] it bears 
upon its face the intention to plunder, and we intend to prevent evils this time, not to cure 
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them [as] we did before.” If Kellogg persisted, “Natchitoches will do as she did in 1874, take 
care of her own interests, and protect her own people at whatever cost.” Wanting to avoid the 
embarrassment of having Republican officials again chased out of the parish, Kellogg backed 
down. Rather than try and enforce the commissions he had issued, Kellogg had the 
Republican police jurors attempt to claim their offices through the courts. The delay that such 
a course implied, in the Vindicator’s view, “sets at rest the question of the defacto legality of 
the People’s Police Jury.”85 Conservatives thus retained effective control of the parish. 
Having run the most prominent Republican leaders out of town in 1874, and with the state 
authorities unable and the federal authorities increasingly unwilling to enforce Republican 
rule, conservatives could pick and choose which Republican appointees they tolerated, 
without having to resort to outright violence.  
 Even so, a Republican organization remained active in Natchitoches during the 1876 
campaign. J. Ernest Breda was now the undisputed hea of the party in the parish and ran 
himself for district judge. Soon after the election he, along with Raford Blunt and Henry 
Myers, went to New Orleans, again leaving control of the parish in the hands of the 
conservatives. In their absence, “the ‘Bulldozers’ alias Texans, took possession of 
Natchitoches [...] and committed all kinds of excesses.” A. P. Breda wrote his brother that 
these men rode into town on November 28, causing “much excitement on the streets by 
cussing the ‘d--d Radicals,’ shooting, etc.” The next day they “raised perfect hell in the streets, 
whipping one negro and telling him ‘you d--d son of a B--- go home or I will kill you,’ 
shooting their guns all along Front Street, finally coming to wait upon Phillip [Breda] and 
myself.” The Breda brothers managed to defuse the confrontation, although the men claimed 
they had been paid three hundred dollars to kill the Bredas. The town was crowded with 
armed Democrats, who “openly declare on the streets tha  no Republican shall take his office 
if elected, that they are determined this time to kill the last one of them.”86 
 As late as February, Breda held out hope that Packard would be recognized as 
governor, but when the final compromise handed Louisiana to the Democrats, the Republican 
organization in Natchitoches quickly collapsed. By the 1878 elections, an anonymous black 
correspondent warned Breda that “Mr. Bright Eyed Democrat buys a great deal of [the black] 
votes. Buys some votes for a peck or bushel of meal, some for an old coat. Buys some for 
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want of homes. Tells them, if you don’t vote for us leave our plantation.” Nor did white 
conservatives lightly forgive those who had attempted to cross the racial barrier and enforce 
blacks’ political and civil rights. In September 1878, in order to ensure a complete victory at 
the next election, Democrats chased the most prominent Republicans, white and black, out of 
the parish. Eventually, conservatives allowed the Republicans to return to the parish, but in 
January 1879, nearly five years after whites had reclaimed de facto control of the parish, the 
bitterness still ran too deep for that. J. Emile Brda, Ernest and Philippe’s youngest brother, 
wrote to them in New Orleans that if either they or “Blunt, Lewis, Raby, Barron, or any others 
who testified against them ever return to Natchitoches,” they would “killed on sight.”87 
 In Red River and Grant, Republicans initially held on to local power following the rise 
of the White League and the 1874 election. In Red River it took the near fatal assault on 
Twitchell to break the Republican hold on the parish, which reverted to Democratic control 
following the 1876 election.88 In Grant, meanwhile, Democrats gradually undermined a local 
Republican Party already suffering from internal divisions. A high-profile court case against 
William B. Phillips, one of the most prominent white Republican leaders of the parish, 
created frictions within the Republican Party that led to the murder of the Republican tax 
collector by the Republican sheriff. In the ensuing confusion and disorder, Democrats 
succeeded in reclaiming control of the parish government. 
 Divisions among the Republicans emerged when Phillips and William Ward came up 
to Colfax during the 1874 election campaign. Both men had run for office in the parish, even 
though they lived mostly in New Orleans. The following week, simmering tensions within the 
Republican ranks boiled over. Ward got into a firefight with a Captain Moss, a Republican 
from St. Landry who had come to the parish with Ward nd Phillips as a school teacher. That 
same night, a number of blacks set fire to the house of the local tax collector G. H. Radetzki, 
with whom Ward had had an altercation a few days earlier. The next month, Phillips, who had 
returned to New Orleans, was arrested there on the charge of being an accessory before the 
fact in the murder of Needham Walters in Grant. Walters had accused Phillips of having had 
him arrested some time before for the sole purpose of xtorting him. Phillips allegedly 
arranged for his release in return for the payment of $300.00. Fearing that Waters would 
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expose him, Phillips arranged for his murder and the body was found a few days later floating 
in the river. Common wisdom in Grant Parish, at least among the whites, held that Phillips 
was not only an accessory, but that he and Ward were “guilty not alone of the murder of 
Needham Walters and the burning of the Tax Collectors, G. H. Radetzki’s house, but [were] 
in truth the instigators and incendiaries that from the beginning have caused so much 
bloodshed and slaughter in this parish.”89 
 In June, Phillips was brought from New Orleans to Colfax as a prisoner, initially on 
the sole charge of illegal voting based on his being a resident of New Orleans. Within a 
fortnight, however, the grand jury of the district court in Colfax – according to the Democrat 
“the best,” presumably meaning the whitest, “since th creation of the parish” – indicted 
Phillips and deputy sheriff and coroner Alfred Shelby for the murder of Needham Walters. 
The Democratic district attorney, E. G. Hunter, requ sted a continuance to prepare the case 
and asked that Phillips and Shelby be remanded to jail.. Republican judge John Osborne 
granted the continuance, but left it to Sheriff John B. McCoy’s discretion whether to lock the 
men up. McCoy, an ally of Phillips, saw no need to put Phillips and Shelby in jail, even after 
Hunter had pressured Osborne into ordering him to do so. Expecting little help from Osborne, 
Hunter began proceedings against McCoy for refusing to execute a warrant issued by the 
parish court. In early July, Parish Judge F. J. Stokes suspended McCoy and appointed J. W. 
Callam in his stead, who then selected as his deputy Christopher C. Nash, Delos White’s 
murderer, whose claims as sheriff had prompted the s andoff that resulted in the massacre at 
the Colfax courthouse just two years earlier. These new officers immediately began hunting 
Phillips and Shelby, who had fled as soon as it became clear that they risked going to jail.90 
 Radetzki, although a Republican and a Kellogg appointee, was not part of Phillips’s 
clique. He had, in fact, been instrumental in bringing Phillips up to Colfax to face trial and, it 
was rumored, had had a hand in getting McCoy suspended. In response, an enraged McCoy 
shot Radetzki dead in cold blood a few days later on the streets of Colfax. He was promptly 
arrested by newly-minted deputy sheriff Nash. The symbolism was not lost on local 
conservatives, who gloated that “our day is coming at last, and all alike, white and black, must 
participate in the coming blessing.” At its Septembr session, the district court in Grant Parish 
released McCoy on a $5000 bond. After conservatives regained control of the state he was 
                                                 
89 NV, 74-11-14, 75-01-02; LD, 74-11-18, 74-12-09; AC 75-01-02; CSS, 43-2, HOR. Rep. 261, 518-519. 
90 LD, 75-06-09, 75-06-23, 75-06-30, LD, 75-07-07; NV, 75-07-17. This is the same Shelby who had replaced 
Delos W. White as sheriff and had played a part in the burning of Phillips and White’s house in 1871.  
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convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. Phillips and Shelby, 
meanwhile, fled to New Orleans, where the Louisiana Supreme Court granted Phillips’ 
petition to have his case removed to the district court in Pointe Coupee Parish. Phillips had 
argued that he was so disliked in Grant Parish that he could secure neither legal representation 
nor an impartial jury there.91   
 With the Republican leadership either in jail or on the run, Republicanism in Grant 
Parish quickly collapsed. Ward, Eli Flowers, and Phillips, who had formed the Radical 
backbone of the party and struggled to keep the parish Republican not only gave up on these 
efforts, but also defected to the opposite side, actively campaigning for the Democrats in the 
1876 election campaign. As a result, Grant parish, carved out to be a Republican stronghold 
and a bastion of Reconstruction, elected a Democratic p rish government and state legislator 
that year, formally ‘redeeming’ itself even before many of its larger neighbors.92 
 
Conclusion 
Between 1873 and 1879, conservative whites honed a combination of legal and extra-legal 
strategies to reclaim political power throughout Louisiana. In most of the Red River region, 
they had seized effective, if not always nominal, control by early 1875 through a combination 
of economic blackmail, targeted violence, and verbal intimidation. This strategy succeeded in 
simultaneously undermining local Republican organiztions, mobilizing white support, 
limiting black voting, and, crucially, ensuring a modicum of support, or at least benign 
neglect, among Northerners. Republicans’ response to the banditti controversy clearly 
illustrates that enforcing Reconstruction no longer ranked high among their priorities. After 
Democrats swept the 1874 midterm elections, the natio l party set out to salvage its electoral 
viability, albeit at the expense of its still nascent Southern wing. 
 The rise of the White League, the federal retreat from federal enforcement, and the 
subsequent collapse of local Republicanism, entailed more than the transfer of political power 
from one party or clique to another. For the hundreds of thousands of blacks living in the state, 
as well as the far smaller number of loyal white Republicans, these developments impacted 
not only their political, social, and economic position and opportunities, but threatened their 
                                                 
91 ‘July 20, 1875, Colfax, Register to Kellogg,’ Kellogg Papers, folder 5.32; LD, 75-07-21, 75-09-08, 77-05-23; 
‘State of Louisiana ex rel. William B. Phillips vs. John Osborn, Judge of the Ninth Judicial District Court,’ 
Louisiana Supreme Court, Docket 5898, November 1875:  
http://libweb.uno.edu/jspui/handle/123456789/21544. 
92 LD, 76-10-11, 77-12-05. 
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physical security. As Merrill reported, following the elections of 1874, “the usual worrying 
and harassing of the negroes goes on with little int rmission.” With the murderous violence 
that characterized the first postwar years in declin , “such acts are now confined to plundering 
them with or without some show of legal form and driving them from their homes to seek 
places to live elsewhere.” The political instability, moreover, threatened to greatly aggravate 
the condition of things which is already serious enough,”93  
 In February 1875, in the wake of the banditti contr versy, a committee of former 
Union soldiers and sailors addressed a petition to President Grant, praising Sheridan’s 
forceful action and apprising him of their increasingly precarious position in the state. “There 
is no safety in the state,” they complained,  
for Republicans or ex-soldiers and sailors of the Union. Even god’s sanctuary has not 
been spared, for they have sent their missiles into the churches, while the worshipers 
were in the midst of divine service. Nor have the schools escaped, for bands of White 
Leaguers paraded the streets of New Orleans from school to school and drove from 
them children of African descent, who in some instaces, it is but true to state, were 
their own half-sisters.94 
 In northern Louisiana, blacks, and the very few white Republicans who remained there, 
faced even greater dangers. In the spring of 1875, hundreds of colored citizens from Caddo 
and surrounding parishes petitioned President Grant, informing him of the physical and 
economic persecution faced by those who had voted th  Republican ticket in November: 
“These white people, who once held us slaves, they have taken all of our last year’s crop away 
from us, and have taken a part of our bed clothing, a d have taken our old mules and horses 
and taken even our furniture for voting a Republican ticket.”95 The president and his party, 
however, turned a deaf ear to such entreaties, leaving blacks’ civil, economic, and political 
rights utterly dependent on their hostile white neighbors. It would be many generations, 
before the nation once again attempted, with more success, to make good on the promises of 
Reconstruction.  
 
                                                 
93 ‘December 30, 1874, Shreveport, Merrill to AG,’ enclosed in ‘January 6, 1875, New Orleans, Sheridan to 
Belknap,’ NARA, RG 94, M666, file 1874-3579, reel 173, frame 110. 
94 ‘February 17, 1875, New Orleans, Borgui to Grant,’ DOJ reel 2, frame 523. 
95 ‘May 1, 1875, n.p., Bull to Grant,’ DOJ, reel 2, frame 597. 
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The experience of Reconstruction in the Red River Valley, where political terrorism reached 
levels unsurpassed throughout the South, powerfully illustrates the interaction between 
Southern whites hell-bent on reestablishing white supremacy in the wake of the Civil War, 
and the freedpeople, federal officials, and Southern white Republicans who sought to 
implement some measure of civil and political equality. Numerous factors influenced the 
dynamics of these interactions, and we cannot, and ought not, assume that the Red River 
Valley’s experience is identical to that of other ru al regions of the South. Indeed, even within 
this region, we have seen tremendous variations. The early collapse of authority and 
subsequent pervasive violence that characterized DeSoto Parish, for instance, differed from 
the relative peace and order that prevailed for years in Natchitoches, until the white 
population there decided they had had enough and ‘bulldozed’ the Republican leadership in 
1874. Despite such variations, however, we can identify a number of broad patterns that 
characterized and determined the dynamics of politica  terrorism and state authority during 
this period. 
 Underlying geographic and demographic characteristics of the region contributed to 
the high levels of violence it experienced. Although a majority-black region, whites were not 
so outnumbered as to make electoral success impossible. If whites could keep enough blacks 
away from the polls, or ensure they voted the Democratic ticket, they could regain local 
political power. Violence thus offered a potentially high ‘return on investment.’ Accidents of 
geography, meanwhile, limited the risks involved. With inaccessible swamps and forests just 
beyond the river banks, and the Texas and Arkansas lines nearby, whites had easy avenues of 
escape available, particularly if the authorities rlied on infantry forces, as they mostly did, to 
enforce law and order. 
 The vast majority of whites’ mindset, meanwhile, ensured that only a firm and 
determined enforcement of Reconstruction had any hope f success. While whites most 
certainly felt despondent at the Confederacy’s loss f the Civil War, defiance and 
recalcitrance prevailed from the outset. Their unwavering belief in white supremacy and 
concomitant racial prejudices ensured that they would not lightly acquiesce in civil and 
political equality for the black population. Deep-seated fears of a black insurrection, moreover, 
prevailed among the white population, reinforced by the widespread presence of black troops 
and veterans. However unrealistic, these fears werereal and they predisposed many whites to 
respond with apparently disproportionate violence to ven minor provocations. 
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 With the vast majority of whites opposed to Reconstruction, blacks and the small 
number of white Republicans who sincerely supported th m depended on federal authority for 
protection of their civil and political rights, not to mention their physical security. The federal 
government and its northern constituency, however, n ver wholeheartedly supported the 
program of racial equality pursued by the Radical faction of the Republican Party. Not only 
Andrew Johnson, but also President Grant, failed to implement even the limited civil and 
racial equality envisioned by Congress. Instead, the agencies tasked with policing 
Reconstruction - including the army, the Freedman’s Bureau, and the Department of Justice - 
lacked both the mandate and the resources to perform the task entrusted to them.  
Economically, the black population soon found itself once again dependent on white 
landowners. Many Freedmen’s Bureau agents, including Louisiana’s first assistant 
commissioner, Thomas Conway, had hoped to redistribute a significant amount of the 
agricultural land that had been confiscated, captured, or abandoned during the war, to the 
freedpeople in 40-acre plots. Very briefly, the Bureau did in fact pursue such a policy, which 
reflected the Republican free labor ideology that advocated broadly-shared economic 
independence. President Johnson, however, rejected this policy, restoring the vast majority of 
plantations in the South to their original owners intact. As a result, Bureau agents began to 
pursue a modified free labor ideal, based on the idea of voluntary contracts, rather than land 
redistribution. In the Red River region, contracts based on a share of the crop soon 
predominated, making the freedpeople dependent on their employers for credit, and often 
leaving them with little if any cash after the crop was harvested. Although local Bureau agents 
did what they could to protect the freedpeople from the worst excesses and abuses of the 
system, this dependence made blacks vulnerable to economic blackmail and intimidation in 
later years. 
 During the crucial early years of Reconstruction, President Johnson, acting from 
personal conviction, resisted the implementation of Reconstruction by deliberately obstructing 
any attempt to reform the South beyond the abolition of slavery and the renunciation of 
secession. Only after Congress, and later President Grant, took over the reins of 
Reconstruction through the Military Bill, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and the 
Enforcement Acts, did the federal government succeed in providing local Republicans in 
Louisiana with the security and stability needed to establish political control over state and 
local governments. Even then, however, Republican rule in the South, particularly in rural 
areas far from the state capital, remained tenuous and embattled at best. 
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 Southern whites, meanwhile, used the political space created by Johnson’s 
conservative policies to entrench their political, economic, and racial dominance at the local 
level. By the elections of May 1866, just a year after the war had ended, hard-line 
conservatives had replaced the more moderate officials appointed by Governor James 
Madison Wells as sheriffs, district and parish judges, and police jurors throughout the state. 
Militia outfits, staffed mostly by Confederate veterans, scoured the countryside and disarmed 
blacks, while reactionary legislators enacted Black Codes that reduced the freedpeople to a 
condition little better than slavery. Some federal officials, either from naiveté or from 
conviction, supported these local white elites, while those who sincerely sought to ensure a 
measure of civil and political equality for the black population, lacked the mandate and the 
resources to do so. 
 Once entrenched, these conservatives did not readily give up their political power. 
They used every means at their disposal, legal and extra-legal, to obstruct the intent of the 
Reconstruction Acts and prevent blacks from securing the civil and political rights they were 
now theoretically entitled to. In northwestern Louisiana, in particular, conservative whites 
used any means, fair or foul, to prevent blacks from participating in the political process. 
Even during the elections of September 1867 and April 1868, which most historians have 
characterized as fair and peaceful, whites along the Red River had begun experimenting with 
strategies of terror that would sweep the state in the summer and fall of 1868 during the 
campaign for the presidential election. The terminatio  of most Freedmen’s Bureau activities 
that same year, and the refusal of the army to vigorously interfere following Louisiana’s 
formal return to civil government, contributed to an tmosphere of lawlessness and impunity 
that impressed on both whites and blacks the important lesson that, when push came to shove, 
state authorities were powerless in the face of concerted white violence. 
 The reign of terror that spread across the state from the Red River Valley in the 
summer and fall of 1868 not only ensured that Democrats won the presidential and 
congressional elections in November – although the latt r results were later reversed – but 
also complicated the transition to Republican rule at the local level. Conservative whites in a 
number of parishes used violence and intimidation to prevent Republicans elected in April 
from taking up their offices, either by forcing them to renounce their claims or by chasing 
them out of the parish. Conservative whites thus continued to occupy crucial positions as 
police jurors, mayors, sheriffs, justices of the peace, and parish judges, permitting them to 
control, or at least influence, the management of parish finances and the enforcement of law 
and order. 
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 The decentralized, community-based legal culture that characterized the nineteenth-
century rural South ensured that whites, even when t y did not hold the reins of power, could 
protect the perpetrators of political terrorism from legal repercussions. With no active 
constabulary force in place, sheriffs depended on p sses comitati to apprehend suspects. If 
whites, who owned most horses and arms, refused to cooperate, the capture of criminals 
became difficult. Even if apprehended, sheriffs, or their deputies, often allowed prisoners to 
escape. If Republicans controlled the sheriff’s office, conservative police jurors refused to 
authorize funding to renovate often ramshackle jails. Suspects might also turn themselves in 
to a sympathetic justice of the peace, who would acquit them or sentence them to a symbolic 
fine, making further prosecution more complicated. White grand jurors often refused to indict, 
white district attorneys refused to prosecute, and white petty jurors declined to convict men 
suspected of politically-motivated violence against blacks or white Republicans. Conservative 
judges released prisoners on insignificant bonds, allowing them to flee, or, in the rare instance 
of a conviction, handed down reduced sentences. The broader community, meanwhile, often 
shielded suspects from apprehension, and white militants pressured Republican officials to 
drop prosecutions. Many of these obstacles plagued District Judge Aaron B. Levissee during 
the trial of Hinley and Pittman, who murdered the only Republican voter in Caddo in 
November 1868. Although he succeeded in getting them convicted, both men escaped and 
only one of them was ever recaptured to serve his sentence. Levissee, meanwhile, had 
sacrificed what support he had in the white community, making it much harder for him to 
operate effectively as district judge, and ensuring the failure of his reelection bid four years 
later. 
 The young Republican governor Henry Clay Warmoth responded to the challenge of 
white terrorism by combining a ‘policy of force’ with a ‘policy of peace.’ The former 
involved the institution of a metropolitan police force to enforce Republican rule and the 
establishment of a Returning Board and other measurs aimed at preventing future electoral 
manipulations through fraud or violence. The ‘policy of peace’ sought to increase white 
support for the Republican Party by coopting moderate conservatives through the lure of 
patronage. In the short run, these policies proved mo erately successful. In conjunction with 
the relatively vigorous federal prosecutions of white terrorists elsewhere in the South 
following the passage of the Enforcement Acts, Warmoth’s ascendancy ushered in a brief 
period of relative calm and nominal Republican contr l of both the state and most of the 
parishes. Such nominal control, however, did not always translate into substantial civil and 
political rights for the black population, as Warmoth increasingly appointed conservative 
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whites who shared their class’s racial prejudices, rather than local black leaders or the few 
white Republicans who sincerely supported them.  
 Even this limited Republican ascendancy did not last long, as Warmoth’s dual policy 
embroiled the Republican Party in contradictions that undermined its legitimacy. Warmoth’s 
election measures undermined the legitimacy of Republican elected officials not only in the 
eyes of Southern whites, but also, more importantly, in the eyes of northern Republican 
politicians and the electorate they depended upon. The Metropolitans, meanwhile, had no 
jurisdiction beyond New Orleans and its immediate environs, leaving Republicans in rural 
areas with few means of enforcing their authority when conservative whites resumed their 
campaign of violence. Warmoth’s attempt to lure moderate whites into the Republican fold 
eventually alienated his core constituents, who felt left out of the spoils of office. By the 1872 
elections, Warmoth had joined the Democrats to field a Fusionist ticket, while the 
Republicans, now cleansed of their more conservative elements, nominated William Pitt 
Kellogg. Although Kellogg held the governorship of the state for the next four years, 
conservative whites continuously disputed the legality of his election, leaving him dependent 
on federal support to prop up his regime. 
 Following the disputed elections of 1872, whites rnewed their attempts to reclaim 
control of the state and local governments by force. Unlike the public, even theatrical, 
violence of the Klan during Reconstruction’s early years, they now made a conscious, and 
often successful, effort to mask their violence behind a smokescreen of political and legal 
justifications. These spoke primarily to a northern audience increasingly fed up with the 
financial burdens and constitutional entanglements i volved in Reconstruction. Occasional 
outbreaks of massive violence, including the massacre  at Colfax and Coushatta, reminded 
blacks and white Republicans of the risks they ran if they opposed Democratic attempts to 
reclaim political, economic, and racial control. Asmuch as possible, however, whites limited 
themselves to economic intimidation, targeted assaults on local Republican leaders of both 
races, or attacks that could be publicly justified as personal feuds, justifiable homicides, or 
unfortunate but “non-political” criminal acts. Using such strategies, White Leagues reclaimed 
political control in numerous parishes and municipalities in 1874, through the ‘bulldozing’ of 
Republican officials. 
 Most importantly, in combination with the economic malaise that gripped the nation 
after 1873 and the subsequent Democratic resurgence, this strategy undermined the 
effectiveness of federal enforcement. Even when local army commanders, Lewis Merrill the 
most prominent among them, made a sincere attempt to curb the political terrorism of 
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southern whites, their superior officers curtailed their efforts. Supreme Court Justice Joseph P. 
Bradley, meanwhile, undermined the judicial enforcement of Reconstruction by overturning 
the hard-won conviction of three of the whites involved in the Colfax massacre, a decision 
later confirmed by the full court. Inspired by the apparent impunity with which they could 
operate, whites made a successful attempt to overthrow the Republican state government on 
September 14, 1874, in what became known as the Battle of Liberty Place. Although federal 
authorities quickly restored Kellogg to nominal contr l of the state government, these events 
made clear that he depended entirely on federal forces for his authority, further undermining 
his regime’s legitimacy. 
 Following the, once again disputed, 1874 elections, the Returning Board threw out 
election result on the basis of what were clearly partisan, rather than evidential, considerations. 
Infuriated, conservatives attempted to capture control of the state legislature by a show of 
force. Federal troops under the command of Colonel Regis de Trobriand prevented this. His 
superior, General Phillip H. Sheridan, supported this intervention and urgently requested 
authority to treat the White Leaguers as ‘banditti,’ which, in effect, would place Louisiana 
under martial law. Under pressure of a public opinion increasingly weary of Southern 
entanglements, Grant and the senior military commanders refused Sheridan’s request. Instead, 
Congressman William H. Wheeler brokered a compromise under which Kellogg retained 
nominal control of the state government for the remainder of his term, while conservatives 
obtained a majority of the seats in the state House of Representatives as well as control over 
many parish and municipal offices throughout the state.  
Although federal troops maintained a token presence i  Louisiana for two more years, 
they rarely interfered in civil affairs or attempted to enforce Reconstruction in rural areas. 
Even in the parishes where Republicans succeeded in reclaiming nominal control in the 1876 
elections, the moderate whites they nominated did little to upset the now entrenched racial 
hierarchy. In effect, Reconstruction had ended in northwestern Louisiana by the spring of 
1875, with the black population relegated to a position of second-class citizenship, their 
political, economic, social opportunities entirely dependent on hostile white neighbors.  
 By then, the fire of optimism that had blazed among the freedpeople in the wake of 
emancipation and enfranchisement had nearly died out. The black population increasingly 
sought refuge in schemes of colonization, hoping to find a refuge from persecution outside the 
bounds of the American nation. “We have done everything that man could do to live with 
them and we cannot live with them,” the petitioners concluded,  
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we can’t make a crop of cotton and receive the benefit of it. We can’t enter a piece of 
government land and live quietly upon it. We cannot get upon [?] a steamboat and 
make a round trip but what some of us are whipped, or beat, or killed, or driven ashore. 
[...] these white men of these southern states say that we must die, and we do die, and 
we have resolved to not stand it any longer. 
Nevertheless, even at these depths of desperation, the embers of hope still glowed, inspired by 
the promise of political freedom and civil equality that Reconstruction, for a brief but 
tantalizing moment, had seemed to offer them: 
If it kills us we will die, if it saves us we will ive, and if it brings war let it come. Sink 
or swim, live or die, our feet and our hearts are upon the rock. This is the voice of the 
whole African race of the southern states. The injustice of England drove the 
Americans to arms and we believe the American whites in the south will drive us to 
the same. We intend, by god’s help, to carry out the republican form of government. 
We approve of it and we shall always do it, whilst people of the north issue justice to 
us. Independence is what every American white man occupies, also the rights of life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and we are entitled to the same. In the Civil War 
our fathers and our brothers and our sons, at the opportunity, bore an equal share of 
desolation in it for the defense of the Union and the Union was saved and we must say 
that we have a right to it. We insist that those who fought to save the Union must run 
the government.1 
Such hopes, however, would prove in vain. Not the men who had fought for the Union’s 
preservation, but the so-called Bourbons, the politica  heirs to the secessionists and the 
militant conservatives of Reconstruction, would contr l the South for decades to come. They 
dismantled Reconstruction’s achievements, erecting in its place a one-party South in which 
debt-peonage stifled blacks’ economic independence a d Jim-Crow laws stifled silenced their 
political voice. This outcome, which has influenced very imaginable aspect of American 
history since, was no inevitability. The extent of political and civil equality envisioned by 
congress in the late 1860s may have been limited by modern standards, but it was 
undoubtedly greater than the reality experienced by blacks throughout the South over the next 
century. Widespread, and increasingly effective terrorism played a crucial role in undermining 
Northern commitment to the more radical program of Reconstruction and helped condemn the 
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majority of recently freed slaves and their descendants to decades of economic dependency 
and political exclusion.  
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Dutch Summary  
 
Samenvatting van het proefschrift 
 
De politiek van terreur 
De handhaving van Reconstruction in de Red River Vallei van Louisiana 
door 
Mark Leon de Vries 
 
Waarom was de federale overheid van de VS niet in staat om een effectief antwoord te bieden 
op de gewelddadige terreur waarmee conservatieve blanken in het Zuiden zich verzetten tegen 
pogingen om direct na de burgeroorlog de politieke n civiele rechten van de zwarte 
bevolking te garanderen? Diezelfde federale overheid had immers kort daarvoor de 
opstandige legers van het Zuiden overtuigend en onherroepelijk verslagen. Dit proefschrift 
zoekt een antwoord op deze vraag middels een casestudy naar de Red River Vallei in 
Louisiana, één van, zo niet demeest gewelddadige regio van het Zuiden van de VS gedurende 
deze periode. Om die reden is deze regio uiterst gechikt om onderzoek te doen naar de 
dynamiek van politieke terreur die zo een stempel drukte op deze periode. Niet zozeer omdat 
deze regio representatief is voor het gehele Zuiden (er was hier immers veel meer geweld dan 
elders), maar wel omdat deze illustratief is voor het type geweld dat de regio kenmerkte. Juist 
door die grote schaal en de daarmee samenhangende zichtbaarheid van het geweld, leent deze 
regio zich goed tot het nader onderzoeken hiervan. 
 Dit werk borduurt voort op drie recente historiografische ontwikkelingen met 
betrekking tot Reconstruction, de wederopbouw periode onmiddellijk na de Amerikaanse 
Burgeroorlog, toen gedurende een decennium getracht werd om de politieke en civiele rechten 
voor de voormalige slaven in het Zuiden te institutionaliseren. Allereerst analyseert deze 
studie de dynamiek en beleving van het vrijwel dagelijks  geweld, welke een zo 
nadrukkelijke stempel drukte op de lokale politiek n rurale delen van het Zuiden gedurende 
Reconstruction. Ten tweede, benadrukt dit onderzoek het zwaar bevochten en vaak 
anarchistische karakter van deze lokale politiek, waarbij de facto controle over concrete 
machtsmiddelen van groter belang was dan de uitkomst van geïnstitutionaliseerde politieke 
processen. Ten derde, deconstrueert dit onderzoek de moralistische kaders waarin zowel de 
conservatieve Dunning school als revisionistische historici het verhaal van Reconstruction 
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veelal hebben geplaatst. Het blanke Zuiden was zeker niet het onschuldige en onderdrukte 
slachtoffer van een klein aantal manipulatieve Noorderlingen die onwetende ex-slaven voor 
hun karretje spanden; maar evenmin waren de zwarte en blanke leiders van de Republikeinse 
partij altruïstische en idealistische profeten van de twintigste-eeuwse burgerrechten beweging. 
Het verhaal van Reconstruction kent bitter weinig helden, en biedt geen soelaas an diegenen 
die de Amerikaanse geschiedenis graag beschouwen als de belichaming van een 
ononderbroken mars van de vooruitgang. 
  Sinds de jaren zeventig hebben historici, veelal gebaseerd op onderzoek naar de 
nationale politiek, betoogd dat het falen van de R construction een min of meer 
onvermijdelijk gevolg was van de compromissen die de Republikeinse partij moest sluiten en 
het daaruit voortvloeiende, betrekkelijk conservatieve hervormingsbeleid dat zij uitdroegen. 
Dit onderzoek suggereert, daarentegen, dat het falen van de Reconstruction allerminst 
onvermijdelijk was. Het was het gevolg van de weigering van de federale overheid om de wel 
doorgevoerde hervormingen, al waren die beperkt, in de praktijk te handhaven. Deze 
hervormingen hadden veel meer kunnen bereiken, indien e federale overheid een adequaat 
antwoord had gevonden op het gewelddadige verzet van de blanke bevolking. De uitkomst 
van Reconstruction was dan ook niet zozeer een ‘compromis van principes,’ maar een 
algehele capitulatie aan terreur. 
  
Het noordwesten van Louisiana behoorde tot de laatste gebieden van de Confederatie die zich 
overgaven in de Burgeroorlog. De blanke bevolking van de regio kon zich maar moeilijk 
verzoenen met het verlies van politieke autonomie en de afschaffing van de slavernij. Dankzij 
steun van president Andrew Johnson en gouverneur James Madison Wells kregen de 
traditionele conservatieve elites echter al snel een groot deel van hun lokale politieke macht 
terug. Een combinatie van wetgeving - de zogeheten Black Codes - en de inzet van blanke 
milities, zorgden er voor dat de economische en politieke autonomie van de zwarte bevolking 
in de praktijk vaak niet veel groter was dan tijdens de slavernij. Dezelfde milities, alsook 
minder formele verbanden van Zuidelijke veteranen, voerden ondertussen een 
terreurcampagne tegen de leiders van de zwarte gemeenschap en de weinige blanken die hen 
steunden - juist diegenen die potentieel het kader hadden kunnen vormen van een lokale 
Republikeinse partijorganisatie. De nationale krijgsmacht, die als enige de capaciteiten had 
om op te treden tegen dit geweld, was onderwijl druk bezig met de enorme logistieke operatie 
die gemoeid ging met het demobiliseren van de vrijwilligerslegers. Het merendeel van de 
relatief weinig soldaten die een jaar na de oorlog n in de regio aanwezig waren, bestond uit 
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zwarte rekruten, wier aanwezigheid vaak zorgde voor n g meer sociale en politieke 
spanningen. 
 De enige federale institutie die in de eerste jaren na de Burgeroorlog opkwam voor de 
belangen van de zwarte bevolking was het Freedmen’s Bureau. President Johnson 
dwarsboomde echter al snel de door het Congres beoogd  landhervormingen en benoemde zo 
veel mogelijk conservatieve officieren op sleutelposities in de organisatie. Bovendien kampte 
het Freedmen’s Bureau consequent met een tekort aan mankracht en andere middelen, 
waardoor deze in de praktijk maar een klein deel van de zwarte bevolking kon bereiken. 
Johnson blokkeerde ook de juridische macht van de organisatie, waardoor de zwarte 
bevolking was aangewezen op de lokale, door de blanke elite gedomineerde rechtbanken. 
Ondanks al deze beperkingen, speelde bemiddeling door veldofficieren van het Freedmen’s 
Bureau een cruciale rol bij het beschermen van met neme de economische rechten van de 
zwarte bevolking in deze periode. Lokale agenten waren vaak de enige instantie waar zwarten 
beroep konden aantekenen tegen economische uitbuiting en gerechtelijke onderdrukking en 
hun bemiddeling bewerkstelligde vaak meer dan hun beperkte machtsmiddelen zouden doen 
vermoeden. 
 Vanaf het voorjaar van 1867 namen de Republikeinen i  het Congres het beleid 
omtrent Reconstruction grotendeels uit handen van president Johnson, uit onvrede met diens 
conservatieve beleid. Zij benoemden rechtstreeks militaire gouverneurs in het Zuiden, die 
vervolgens lokale verkiezingen uitschreven waaraan de zwarte bevolking deel zou mogen 
nemen. De blanke bevolking in het gehele Zuiden verzette zich hevig tegen deze federale 
inmenging en de daarmee gepaard gaande toename van d  politieke participatie van de zwarte 
bevolking. Dit verzet kwam tot uitbarsting tijdens de landelijke verkiezingscampagne in het 
najaar van 1868. Blanke Zuiderlingen, al dan niet geor aniseerd in geheime genootschappen 
zoals de Ku Klux Klan of de Knights of the White Camelia, vermoordden in enkele maanden 
tijd honderden zwarten en blanke Republikeinen en maakten nog eens talloze duizenden het 
stemmen onmogelijk. Deze uitbarsting was nergens heviger dan in het noordwesten van 
Louisiana. Bovendien begon het politieke geweld in eze regio al veel eerder dan elders. Juist 
langs de Red River ontwikkelden militante conservatie en al tijdens eerdere verkiezingen, in 
het najaar van 1867 en het voorjaar van 1868, de geweldsstrategieën die in het najaar van 
1868 zo effectief zouden blijken.  
 In eerste instantie reageerden de Noordelijke publieke opinie en politiek geschokt op 
de geweldsuitbarsting. De uitkomst van de verkiezingen in de Zuidelijke staten werd nietig 
verklaard, het Congres lastte een grootschalig onderzoek in, en de militaire aanwezigheid in 
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het Zuiden werd verhoogd. Juist in deze jaren, echter, kende Louisiana een periode van 
relatieve rust en stabiliteit, waardoor de aandacht van de federale overheid zich verplaatste 
naar andere delen van het Zuiden. Onder de gematigde Republikeinse gouverneur Henry Clay 
Warmoth staakten blanke conservatieven tijdelijk hun gewelddadige verzet en konden lokale 
Republikeinse bestuurders relatief veilig hun ambt bekleden. Zelfs in DeSoto Parish, één van 
de meest conservatieve en onverzettelijke deelstaten van Louisiana, kon een Republikeinse 
rechter enkele jaren lang zitting houden waarbij zwarten en blanken gezamenlijk hun 
juryplicht voldeden. Deze stabiliteit rustte echter of een fundament van drijfzand. 
Geschrokken van de politieke terreur in 1868, zag Warmoth zich gedwongen om maatregelen 
te nemen die het succes van Republikeins bestuur op langere termijn onmogelijk zouden 
maken. Enerzijds deed hij concessies aan de meer gemati de elementen van de traditionele 
blanke elite, door op lokaal niveau bestuurders te benoemen die in naam weliswaar 
Republikein waren, maar die in de praktijk weinig ondernamen om de positie van de zwarte 
bevolking te verbeteren. Hierdoor vervreemde Warmoth zich steeds verder van het 
grotendeels zwarte electoraat waar hij zijn verkiezing aan had te danken. Anderzijds voerde 
hij een draconische verkiezingswet in, die de legitimiteit van toekomstige verkiezingen zou 
ondermijnen door de uitkomst daarvan afhankelijk te maken van het oordeel van een door de 
gouverneur te benoemen commissie. 
 In de aanloop naar de verkiezingen van 1872 viel de coalitie van zwarte Republikeinen 
en gematigde blanken uiteen en verdeelde het electoraat zich wederom langs raciale lijnen. 
Mede vanwege Warmoth’s bemoeienis verliepen de verkiezingen chaotisch en het overgrote 
deel van de blanke bevolking erkende nooit de legitimiteit van de nieuwe Republikeinse 
gouverneur William Pitt Kellogg, die zich de daaropv lgende vier jaar slechts met steun van 
het federale leger wist te handhaven. Langs de Red River verloren de Republikeinen in deze 
periode allengs de controle. Na de massamoord op tientallen zwarten in Colfax en de executie 
van zes blanke Republikeinse leiders uit Coushatta, wisten blanke militanten, georganiseerd in 
paramilitaire White Leagues, vrijwel overal in het gebied de politieke macht te grijpen. In de 
aanloop naar de verkiezingen van 1874 slaagde een georganiseerde legermacht van 
conservatieve blanken er zelfs kortstondig in om de gouverneur uit New Orleans te verdrijven. 
Kellogg werd al vrij snel door het leger in zijn ambt hersteld, maar verder weg van de 
hoofdstad maakten conservatieve blanken van de gelegenh id gebruik om de weinige 
resterende Republikeinse bestuurders te verdrijven. Door een strategie die kortdurende 
geweldsuitbarstingen, veelal gericht tegen politieke leiders, combineerde met een gehaaide 
media campagne die de legitimiteit van de lokale Republikeinen in twijfel trok, wisten blanke 
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militanten om grootschalige federale interventie te voorkomen. De federale overheid zelf 
bleek bovendien weinig ambitie meer te hebben om Reconstruction te handhaven. Lokale 
officieren die op eigen initiatief – en vaak met succes – het geweld wisten in te dammen, 
kregen niet de middelen die zij nodig hadden om hun beleid uit te bouwen en werden zelfs 
teruggefloten door hun meerderen. 
 Voortgestuwd door het succes van de White Leagues grepen militantere en blank-
nationalistische elementen de macht binnen de Democratis he partij van Louisiana. Toen de 
landelijke Democraten in 1874 voor het eerst sinds de Burgeroorlog een meerderheid 
behaalden in het Huis van Afgevaardigden, was het lot van Reconstruction bezegeld. In 
Louisiana kenmerkten deze verkiezingen zich door massale fraude aan beide kanten en was de 
uitkomst wederom omstreden. Generaal Philip H. Sheridan stuurde soldaten om de 
Republikeinse meerderheid in de staatsassemblee te b schermen en vroeg vervolgens aan 
President Grant om tijdelijk de noodtoestand uit te ro pen, om blanke militanten door een 
krijgsraad te kunnen berechten. Grant durfde dit ech er niet aan en de lokale Republikeinse 
partij verloor haar laatste restje legitimiteit door de ogenschijnlijke afhankelijkheid van het 
leger.  
 Hoewel het nog twee jaar zou duren voordat de Democraten ook formeel het 
staatsbestuur zouden terugveroveren, reikte de macht v n Kellogg vanaf 1975 niet veel verder 
dan de buitenwijken van New Orleans. In vrijwel de g hele Red River Vallei hadden de 
traditionele blanke elites het weer voor het zeggen. Zolang er nog een klein aantal soldaten in 
de staat gestationeerd waren en de nationale Republikeinse Partij zich officieel nog 
committeerde aan het Reconstruction project, stonden deze lokale elites een beperkte mate 
van politieke en juridische participatie toe aan de zwarte bevolking om verdere federale 
inmenging te vermijden. Toen, in de nasleep van de verkiezingen van 1876 de Republikeinen 
het leger definitief terugtrokken en de blanke Zuiderlingen lokaal zelfbestuur toestonden in 
ruil voor het presidentschap, kwam er snel een einde aan deze symbolische handreiking. De 
blanke bevolking in het Zuiden begon al snel met de institutionalisering van de raciale 
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